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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
Famine, Aid, and Markets in North Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beginning sometime in the early 1990s and extending into 1998, North Korea 
experienced famine. We estimate that the great North Korean famine killed 
between six hundred thousand and one million people, between 3 and 5 percent 
of the entire population of the country. Such events are national traumas that 
live in the collective memory for generations. Famines produce countless per- 
sonal tragedies: watching loved ones waste away from hunger and disease; mak- 
ing fateful choices about the distribution of scarce food; migrating to escape 
the famine’s reach; and, all too often, facing the stark reality that these coping 
strategies are futile. A full understanding of such disasters can only be com- 
municated through their human face: the individual experience of the suﬀering 
and humiliation that extreme deprivation brings to its victims. Through refugee 
accounts, this human face of the North Korean famine is slowly becoming 
available to us and speaks far more eloquently than we can here. 
But famines also have causes as well as profound demographic, economic, 
and political consequences for the societies that experience them. Despite its 
rigidly authoritarian and closed nature, North Korea is no exception to this rule. 
The purpose of this book is to explore the political economy of this great famine 
through a number of diﬀerent but ultimately complementary lenses. What does 
the North Korean case say about the causes of famines more generally? What 
lessons does it hold for the humanitarian community? What does it say about 
the transition from socialism? And how have recurrent food shortages played 
into the security equation and political dynamics on the Korean peninsula? 
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Sadly, our concerns are not simply historical ones, and we were ﬁrst brought 
to these issues by contemporary concerns (Haggard and Noland 2005). As in far 
too many cases, famines are not necessarily followed by a return to abundance. 
Rather, the acute shortages of the mid-1990s turned into a chronic food emer- 
gency that persisted well into the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. Despite the 
eﬀorts of the international humanitarian community, and despite—and even 
because of—a set of wide-ranging but ultimately ﬂawed economic reforms, 
large portions of North Korea’s highly urbanized society suﬀer from unreliable 
access to food. North Korean families continue to experience the ravages of 
malnutrition, most painfully evident in the admittedly partial and imperfect 
information we have on the nutritional status of children over time. 
Famines bear a curious resemblance to genocides. As Samantha Powers 
(2002) has pointed out, outsiders’ ﬁrst response to genocides is denial. Given 
the horror of events, the natural reaction is that it can’t be happening; it is 
not possible. During genocides, however, delay is fatal; where there is a will, 
masses of people can be killed quickly. Similarly, while we can procrastinate 
about many things, we cannot go for long without adequate sustenance (for a 
compelling account of hunger and starvation, see Russell 2005). By the time 
the evidence of famine is clear, it is often too late to reverse its eﬀects, and the 
worst damage has been done. 
Yet the humanitarian eﬀort in North Korea faced additional barriers. Until 
a series of great ﬂoods in the summer of 1995, the North Korean government 
was slow to respond to the warning signs that a famine was under way. The 
closed nature of the country made it even more diﬃcult for outsiders to read 
the signals. 
Once aid was fully mobilized in 1996, the North Korean government proved 
deeply suspicious of foreign intent and has to this day thrown roadblocks in the 
way of the relief eﬀort. The delivery and monitoring of humanitarian assistance 
to North Korea is an ongoing negotiation and struggle, and for a good reason: 
there is ample evidence of things to hide. Large amounts of aid—we estimate 
as much as 30 percent or more—is diverted to the military and political elite, 
to other undeserving groups, and to the market. 
Floods, subsequent natural disasters, and the hostile policy of outsiders 
constitute the oﬃcial explanation for North Korea’s food problems. Yet the 
chronic nature of North Korea’s problems suggests that forces more systemic 
were at work. These included failed economic and agricultural policies but also 
a particular system of entitlements associated with the socialist economy and a 
political system that provided no channels for redress when these entitlements 
failed. Following the pioneering work of Amartya Sen (1981; 2000: chap. 6; 
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Dreze and Sen 1989), we suggest throughout this book that the ultimate and 
deepest roots of North Korea’s food problems must be found in the very nature 
of the North Korean economic and political system. It follows almost as a 
matter of logic that those problems will not be deﬁnitively resolved until that 
regime is replaced by one that, if not fully democratic, is at least more respon- 
sive to the needs of its citizenry. 
As we have suggested, however, the famine was not without its own con- 
sequences, and one of them was an increasing marketization of the economy 
and, beginning in 2002, the initiation of economic reforms. Marketization and 
reform remain the key unfolding story in the country, a work-in-progress that 
contains the small glimmers of hope we can hold out for an economically if 
not politically reformed North Korea. Yet through 2005 these signs of change 
remained largely hopes. The initiation of reform overlapped with renewed 
international political conﬂict over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—a crisis 
largely of North Korea’s own making—which in turn had predictably mixed 
eﬀects on the reform eﬀort. 
Moreover, the reforms themselves failed to return the country to sustainable 
growth and unleashed a stubborn inﬂation that contributed to the ongoing 
food problems in the country. By this time, North Korea was a society increas- 
ingly divided between those with access to foreign exchange and stable supplies 
of food and those vulnerable to an erratic public food distribution system and 
markets providing food and other goods at prices beyond the reach of the 
ordinary citizen. 
We divide our account into three broad questions. In part 1 (chapters 2 and 
3), we consider the contours of the famine of the mid-1990s: its underlying 
and proximate causes and its trajectory and more immediate consequences, 
including mortality. In these chapters, we are speaking both to a broader lit- 
erature on famine and to important accounts of the North Korean case, on 
which we build.1 The second section (chapters 4 and 5) is devoted to a discus- 
sion of the political economy of humanitarian assistance. These politics involve 
the humanitarian community and its norms, the political as well as economic 
interests of the North Korean government, and the sometimes congruent, 
sometimes conﬂicting interests of the donor governments. In the third section 
(chapter 6), we look at the famine through yet a third lens: what it says about 
North Korea as a socialist economy undergoing some sort of transition. The 
famine ultimately triggered a process of economic reform in the North. But as 
we now know from nearly twenty years of “transitology,” the route to the mar- 
ket is not linear but strewn with partial reforms and a variety of intermediate 
models of which North Korea is certainly one. 
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In the remainder of this introduction, we outline these themes in some- 
what more detail, returning in the conclusion to some of the broader policy 
issues posed by North Korea’s famine and food shortages (the subject of chap- 
ters 7 and 8 in part 3). Before turning to those themes, however, we sketch a 
few features of the country’s postwar political history. Although this survey is 
admittedly cursory, we reference a number of works where these issues can be 
pursued in greater depth and focus primarily on those background conditions 
that are germane to our story. 
 
The Setting 
 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Japanese colony of Korea was 
partitioned into zones of U.S. and Soviet military occupation.2 Unable to agree 
on a formula for a uniﬁed Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) 
declared independence under U.S. patronage in 1948, while the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) was established under 
Soviet tutelage. In June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The initial 
success of the invading forces was reversed with the support of a U.S.-domi- 
nated United Nations force, which in turn drove China to enter the war in 
October to prevent a North Korean defeat. Combat ended with an armistice 
in 1953. After tremendous physical destruction and loss of life, the war did little 
more than reestablish the original borders. No formal peace treaty was ever 
signed, and the combatants technically remain at war. 
Kim Il-so˘ng fully consolidated his power over rival factions in the DPRK 
after 1956 and began to articulate a distinctive national ideology called chuch’e 
(for accounts of the early consolidation of political power in the North, see 
Armstrong 2002 and Lankov 2002). Typically translated as “self-reliance,” North 
Korean ideology in fact combines a number of elements—extreme nationalism, 
Stalinism, even Confucian dynasticism—into a complex mix (Cumings 2003; 
Oh and Hassig 2000). The political order has exhibited a high degree of per- 
sonalism. Kim Il-so˘ng was deiﬁed as the “Great Leader.” Similar eﬀorts have 
been made to canonize his son, Kim Jo˘ng-il, who assumed the reins of political 
power when his father died in 1994. 
Personalism was combined with an extreme, even castelike social regimenta- 
tion. The government classiﬁed the population—and kept dossiers on them— 
according to perceived political loyalty and even the social standing of parents 
and grandparents. The share of the population deemed politically reliable is 
relatively small, on the order of one-quarter of the population, with a core 
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political and military elite of perhaps two hundred thousand, or roughly 1 per- 
cent of the population.3 As we will show, this political-cum-social structure also 
has important implications for the distribution of food and other goods. 
A further feature of the political and economic system is extreme militari- 
zation (Kang 2003). By standard statistical measures such as the share of the 
population under arms or the share of national income devoted to the military, 
North Korea is the world’s most militarized society. The bulk of its million- 
strong army is forward-deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separat- 
ing it from South Korea, a highly destabilizing military conﬁguration. Viewed 
with the beneﬁt of hindsight, the division of the peninsula has proven surpris- 
ingly stable; a recurrence of full-scale war has been avoided. Yet underneath this 
apparent stability is a history of sustained military competition and recurrent 
crises. Moreover, militarization has important domestic eﬀects. During external 
crises, the government reverts to s˘ on’gun, or “military-ﬁrst” politics. As we will 
argue, the expenditure priorities of the regime are also an important aspect of 
the hunger story, and the question of diversion of humanitarian supplies to the 
military is an ongoing political issue among donors. 
In the early 1990s, North Korea experienced a rapid deterioration in its 
external security environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongo- 
ing reform eﬀorts in China put North Korea at odds with its two most impor- 
tant patrons. The continued dynamism of the South Korean economy made it 
more and more diﬃcult—and costly—to maintain the illusion of military par- 
ity. The acquisition of nuclear weapons no doubt seemed an inexpensive way to 
address these insecurities but resulted in a major crisis with the United States in 
1992–94 (Sigal 1998; Wit, Poneman, and Galucci 2004). The nuclear crisis and 
the question of food aid became inextricably linked, but in unexpected ways, 
as the provision of assistance was used to induce North Korean participation in 
diplomatic negotiations. Similar issues arose after the 2002 nuclear standoﬀ as 
the main aid donors—the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and the 
European Union—diverged on how to deal with North Korea’s nuclear ambi- 
tions; we return to these issues below. 
Despite claims of self-reliance and the extremely closed nature of the econ- 
omy, international assistance has long been crucial to North Korea’s very survival. 
Before the 1990s, North Korea depended both militarily and economically on 
Soviet largesse. China subsequently has come to play a more important role. 
From a balance-of-payments standpoint, it appears that North Korea now derives 
roughly one-third of its revenues from aid, roughly one-third from conventional 
exports, and roughly one-third from unconventional sources (in estimated order 
of signiﬁcance, missile sales, drug traﬃcking, remittances, counterfeiting, and 
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smuggling; see appendix 1). The remittances come mostly from a community of 
pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans in Japan and increasingly from refugees in China, 
who may number one hundred thousand or more (KINU 2004). 
North Korea is characterized by a complete absence of standard political free- 
doms and civil liberties. The political system is completely dominated by a dei- 
ﬁed leader, with the military complex, the Korean Workers’ Party, and the state 
apparatus playing supporting roles that have shifted in importance over time. 
Independent political or social organizations are not weak in North Korea; they 
are virtually nonexistent. Any sign of political deviance, from listening to foreign 
radio broadcasts to singing South Korean songs to inadvertently sitting on a 
newspaper containing the photograph of Kim Il-so˘ng, can be subject to pun- 
ishment. Until the famine forced their breakdown, the government maintained 
complex controls on internal migration and foreign travel and even criminalized 
the very coping behaviors through which families sought to secure food. 
The regime maintains a network of political prison camps that hold two 
hundred thousand or more political prisoners (Hawk 2003; KINU 2004; Kang 
2002, a memoir by one camp survivor). Death rates in these camps are high, 
torture is practiced, and there are numerous eyewitness accounts of public 
executions, including cases of schoolchildren being forced to witness these kill- 
ings (see United States Department of State 2005, Amnesty International 2004, 
and KINU 2004). A second network of smaller extrajudicial detention centers 
developed as an ad hoc response to coping behavior at the height of the famine, 
which included unauthorized internal movement and crossing into China. 
In sum, the North Korean case exhibits a number of features that make it a 
particularly diﬃcult target for humanitarian eﬀorts. In contrast to civil war set- 
tings, the government exercises complete control over its territory. It has a well- 
developed ideology that has until recently been highly impervious to reform 
or outside advice. The political leadership exhibits an extreme wariness toward 
outside inﬂuences of any sort, a posture justiﬁed by an increasingly adverse 
security setting. These characteristics not only make North Korea a hard target 
for humanitarian assistance, but they help explain some of the underlying and 
proximate causes of the famine as well. 
 
The Great Korean Famine: Causes, Trajectory, Consequences 
 
Famines and food shortages have been a perennial feature of the human con- 
dition and, as the North Korean case suggests, have by no means been elimi- 
nated. Table 1.1, adapted from Devereux (2000) with our estimates for the 
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  TABLE 1.1. Estimated Mortality in Major Twentieth-century Famines  
 
Years Location (epicenter) Excess mortality Causal triggers 
1903–6 Nigeria (Hausaland) 5,000 Drought 
1906–7 Tanzania (south) 37,500 Conﬂict 
1913–14 West Africa (Sahel) 125,000 Drought 
1917–19 Tanzania (central) 30,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1920–21 China (Gansu, Shaanxi) 500,000 Drought 
1921–22 Soviet Union 9,000,000 Drought and conﬂict 
1927 China (northwest) 3,000,000–6,000,000 Natural disasters 
1929 China (Hunan) 2,000,000 Drought and conﬂict 
1932–34 Soviet Union (Ukraine) 7,000,000–8,000,000 Government policy 
1943 India (Bengal) 2,100,000—3,000,000 Conﬂict 
1943–44 Rwanda 300,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1944 Netherlands 10,000 Conﬂict 
1946–47 Soviet Union 2,000,000 Drought and govern- 
ment policy 
1957–58 Ethiopia (Tigray) 100,000–397,000 Drought and locusts 
1958–62 China 30,000,000–33,000,000 Government policy 
1966 Ethiopia (Wollo) 45,000–60,000 Drought 
1968–70 Nigeria (Biafra) 1,000,000 Conﬂict 
1969–74 West Africa (Sahel) 101,000 Drought 
1972–73 India (Maharashtra) 130,000 Drought 
1972–75 Ethiopia (Wollo and 
Tigray) 
200,000—500,000 Drought 
1974–75 Somalia 20,000 Drought and govern- 
ment policy 
1974 Bangladesh 15,000,000 Flood and market failure 
1979 Cambodia 1,500,000—2,000,000 Conﬂict 
1980–81 Uganda (Karamoja) 30,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1982–85 Mozambique 100,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1983–85 Ethiopia 590,000–1,000,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1984–85 Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan) 250,000 Drought 
1991–93 Somalia 300,000—500,000 Conﬂict and drought 
1995–99 North Korea 600,000—1,000,000 Flood and government 
policy 
1998 Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal) 70,000 Conﬂict and drought 
Source: Adapted from Devereux 2000, table 1 
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North Korean case, suggests that roughly seventy million people died of famine 
in the twentieth century.4 Yet a simple Malthusian picture of famine as a natu- 
ral inevitability has become harder to sustain, because of changes both in the 
nature of famine and in our understanding of it. The postwar period has seen 
a gradual elimination of famine from virtually all parts of the world with the 
exception of Africa (North Korea, along with China and Cambodia, constitute 
important exceptions to this rule). One reason for this hopeful development 
is that famines caused by crop failure associated with natural disasters such as 
ﬂoods and droughts can be mitigated by the increasing ability of both the inter- 
national community and national governments to respond to food shortages. 
Increasingly, famines and food shortages must be seen not as natural events but 
as complex man-made disasters. Civil conﬂict ﬁgures prominently in a large 
number of the famines listed in table 1.1, and, tellingly, the socialist famines— 
in the Soviet Union, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, and North Korea—rank 
among the most deadly. 
In his early work on famine, Amartya Sen (1981) made the important obser- 
vation that famine could occur even where aggregate supplies of food were 
adequate if there were failures in the distribution system, including through 
the market. Rather than focusing on the sheer quantity of food available, Sen’s 
analysis delved into issues of distribution and entitlement and in doing so set 
in train many of the most important debates on the phenomenon of famine 
that continue to this day. To what extent can famines in general, and any given 
famine in particular, be attributed to food availability decline as opposed to 
questions of distribution and entitlement? If we do ﬁnd evidence of a decline in 
food availability, is this in fact a result of natural disasters, or must we also look 
at other causes, such as incentives for production or failure to access external 
sources of supply? And if we do witness entitlement failures—the inability of 
individuals to command the resources to gain access to food that is in principle 
available—to what political economy factors do we owe this failure? 
Chapter 2 takes up these questions. We show that for military, political, 
and ideological reasons that can be traced to the division of the peninsula, the 
North Korean regime has consistently pursued the goal of achieving agricul- 
tural self-suﬃciency. Whatever its political rationale, the economic logic for 
doing so is dubious; arable land is scarce in North Korea, and the weather is 
far from hospitable for agriculture. Given these obstacles and the unwilling- 
ness to pursue a more market-oriented agricultural policy, the North Korean 
government pursued a “forced march” approach to agricultural production 
that included heavy reliance on industrial inputs. This agricultural strategy has 
proven problematic throughout the country’s history, generating a recurrent 
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pattern of shortages—in 1945–46, 1954–55, and 1970–73—of which the great 
famine and ongoing crisis is only the most recent example. 
Moreover, for political as well as economic reasons, the North Korean gov- 
ernment suppressed private production and trade in grain and monopolized 
distribution through the so-called Public Distribution System (PDS). This sys- 
tem was at the core of the socialist system of entitlements to food and consti- 
tuted a powerful tool of social control, particularly for urban populations that 
were completely dependent on it. No understanding of the famine is possible 
without understanding the PDS and its virtual collapse. 
In turning to the more proximate causes of the famine of the mid-1990s 
and the chronic food problems the country has faced since, we ﬁrst address the 
oﬃcial explanation oﬀered by the North Korean government. That explanation 
attributes the famine to natural disasters—ﬂoods and drought—and indirectly 
to the decline in preferential trade relations with Russia and China. As can be 
seen, this interpretation bears a close family resemblance to theories of fam- 
ine that stress declines in food availability and exogenous shocks, in this case 
including not only weather but the disruption of imported inputs. 
We show that this interpretation is misleading in important respects. The 
change in North Korea’s external economic relations was clearly permanent, 
not merely a transitory shock, and the decline in food production was visible 
well before the ﬂoods of 1995. Yet the government was slow to recognize the 
extent of the problem and take the steps necessary to guarantee adequate food 
supplies, whether through increases in domestic production or greater access to 
external sources of supply. To attribute the famine primarily to external causes is 
to neglect the fundamental failure of the government to respond to its changed 
circumstances in a timely and appropriate way, particularly through eﬀorts to 
increase or conserve foreign exchange earnings that would have allowed com- 
mercial imports. 
To elaborate this point, we construct food balance sheets for the country 
from 1990 to the present. We approach this task with the caution—and warn- 
ings—that it deserves, but the underlying purpose is to assess the overall avail- 
ability of food from all sources and the shortfall between diﬀerent estimates of 
supply and demand. To what extent have North Korea’s food problems been 
the result of a decline in overall food availability, and what is the ultimate 
source of that decline? To what extent can North Korea’s problems be traced to 
the distribution of food? 
The evidence with respect to food availability is mixed; the country cer- 
tainly experienced a decline in production, and under some assumptions about 
demand North Korea’s famine could be treated as a classic food availability 
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problem. But we also show that with some important adjustments—such as 
maintaining the ability to import food on commercial terms or aggressively 
seeking humanitarian assistance—the government could have avoided the 
worst of the great famine and the shortages that continue to this day. Indeed, 
we argue that in an increasingly integrated global market for basic foodstuﬀs, 
food availability must be seen in an open-economy context. If internal food 
availability declines but external sources of supply are available, then we have 
really identiﬁed a new sort of entitlement problem. Why do donors fail to 
respond to manifest need? Even more perplexing, why do governments not 
avail themselves of external sources of supply available through trade or aid? 
A disturbing ﬁnding from this balance sheet exercise is that as humanitarian 
assistance responded to the crisis, commercial imports of food fell. Rather than 
using humanitarian assistance as an addition to supply, the government used 
it largely as balance-of-payments support, oﬀsetting aid by cutting commercial 
food imports and allocating the savings to other priorities. Again, these ﬁnd- 
ings cast particular doubt on arguments that food shortages after 1995 could be 
attributed to a decline in domestic food availability alone. 
In chapter 3, we turn our attention to the system of socialist entitlements in 
more detail: the complex problem of who had—and who lost—access to food 
during the great famine. North Korea is a surprisingly urbanized country, a 
result of the regime’s emphasis on heavy industrialization. Between 60 and 70 
percent of the North Korean population depended on the PDS, and we show 
the importance of regional, urban-rural, and occupational diﬀerences in access 
to food. The regions directly aﬀected by the ﬂoods of 1995 certainly suﬀered 
shortages, but so did remote mountain areas of the north and the industrial 
cities of the east coast. In contrast to famines elsewhere in the world, North 
Korea’s was an urban as well as rural phenomenon. Pyongyang—the seat of 
government and of the ruling elite—was at least relatively protected. 
These regional diﬀerences—and information suggesting that certain parts 
of the country were cut oﬀ from both aid and domestic distribution—suggest 
strongly that political decisions about distribution played an important role 
in the famine. We review a number of possible reasons why the government 
responded to the pattern of shortfalls as it did. While we ﬁnd no evidence that 
particular segments of the population were deliberately starved—as was the 
case in the Ukraine under Stalin (Conquest 1986) and Cambodia under Pol 
Pot (Short 2004)—there is evidence that informational failures and the lack of 
accountability characteristic of authoritarian regimes played a crucial role. 
As is always the case, food shortages took a particular heavy toll on vulner- 
able groups such as children and the elderly, and deaths were the result not only 
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of starvation but of increased susceptibility to disease and the more general col- 
lapse of the public health-care system. We review the various eﬀorts to estimate 
the death toll, which range from a low of 225,000 excess deaths (by the North 
Korean government) to as many as 3.5 million at the upper end. We argue that 
the most plausible estimates fall in the range of 600,000 to 1 million deaths as 
a result of the famine, or roughly 3 to 5 percent of the population. 
 
The Humanitarian Response: The Political Economy of Aid 
 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrined the right to ade- 
quate food. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul- 
tural Rights elaborated this commitment as “the fundamental right of everyone 
to be free from hunger.” At the 1996 World Food Summit, oﬃcial delegations 
from 185 countries, including representatives from the governments of the 
United States and the DPRK, reaﬃrmed “the right of everyone to have access 
to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free of hunger” (FAO 1996). 
When these rights were ﬁrst advanced, the international community did 
not have the means to honor them; they were little more than pious wishes. 
In today’s world, however, many of the economic, administrative, and logistic 
barriers to realizing these objectives have fallen away. Global food supplies are 
adequate: there is plenty of food to go around. Global markets for basic grains 
are well developed and highly integrated. Satellite technology and improved 
forecasting mean that information on weather patterns and crop conditions is 
now readily available, providing an eﬀective early warning system of potential 
shortfalls and crises. An eﬀective set of international institutions is now capable 
of soliciting food contributions and delivering emergency assistance to popula- 
tions facing distress from natural disasters and economic dislocation. Logistics 
capabilities have improved dramatically. This system is by no means perfect; 
chronic food shortages still plague a number of countries (FAO 2003). But at 
least one reason for the decline in the incidence of outright famine is the devel- 
opment of highly eﬀective humanitarian aid institutions. 
Just as the sources of food shortage and famine and the eﬀectiveness of 
relief eﬀorts must be traced to human rather than natural causes, so must the 
eﬀectiveness of relief eﬀorts. In a number of countries in Africa—the Great 
Lakes region, Sudan, Somalia—both the source of shortages and the inability 
of outsiders to provide timely relief can be traced to civil war or weak states 
that do not control their territory. Humanitarian eﬀorts face diﬃculties in these 
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cases largely because of the absence of centralized authority, a clear interlocutor 
for outside agencies. 
A second, more rare set of cases includes those in which authoritarian gov- 
ernments exercise full control over their populations but fail to respond in  
a timely fashion to signs of food distress and limit external access for other 
political reasons. The “socialist” famines in the Ukraine, China, Cambodia, and 
North Korea all fall into this category. Such settings raise fundamental ethical 
questions for donors. It is impossible in such circumstances to guarantee that 
all aid is being used appropriately. Should the international community provide 
assistance even if it means prolonging the life of a despotic regime? Does aid 
prolong the very policies that led to the famine in the ﬁrst place, creating a 
problem of moral hazard? Should donors provide assistance even if some por- 
tion of that assistance is diverted to undeserving groups, including the military 
and party cadre? If the decision is made to provide assistance, how can donors 
guarantee that food aid reaches vulnerable groups and achieves other objectives, 
such as inducing economic reforms or empowering new social groups? 
These questions are partly ethical in nature, and in the conclusion of the 
book we consider some ways of thinking about them. But these questions also 
require attention to empirical issues of political economy, bargaining, and strat- 
egy. We can make a more informed judgment of the core ethical questions— 
how and even whether to aid North Korea—by shedding light on how the aid 
relationship actually works in practice. 
The aid eﬀort that began in 1995 consisted of three distinct components: 
aid channeled through multilateral institutions, the World Food Programme 
(WFP) in particular; bilateral aid outside the WFP; and assistance from the 
NGO sector. The NGO sector has made important contributions to easing 
the crisis; several excellent studies have reviewed this experience in some detail 
(Smith 2002; Flake and Snyder 2003; Reed 2004), and we provide an overview 
in chapter 4. But the bulk of food assistance has passed through multilateral 
and bilateral channels, and we focus most of our attention on them. 
We consider this humanitarian response through two distinct lenses, the ﬁrst 
having to do with the relationship between the donors and the North Korean 
government (chapters 4 and 5); the second looking in more detail at the donors 
themselves (chapter 6). A growing literature on the political economy of aid 
has underscored the mixed-motive nature of any aid relationship.5 Donors give 
aid for a variety of political, economic, and humanitarian reasons and naturally 
want to assure that their objectives are being achieved. They do so through the 
imposition of conditions of various sorts (ex ante controls) and monitoring and 
review procedures (ex post controls). In the case of humanitarian assistance, 
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these conditions involve eﬀorts to target vulnerable populations and guarantee 
that they are being reached. 
Aid recipients have their own reasons for taking aid, and while some condi- 
tions attached to aid may be perfectly acceptable—and incentives of donors 
and recipients therefore aligned—other conditions attached to aid entail costs 
of various sorts. These range from adopting politically diﬃcult policies, as is 
the case with International Monetary Fund programs, to accepting external 
monitoring of aid, as is the case with humanitarian assistance. 
An increasingly skeptical literature has argued that the incentives embodied 
in the aid relationship are almost by necessity perverse. Burnside and Dol- 
lar (1997) were among the ﬁrst to challenge the notion that aid could induce 
policy change, arguing that aid should therefore only be extended where policy 
conditions were ripe. Yet the eﬃcacy of aid even in countries with good poli- 
cies is now in doubt as well (Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2003). Aid may 
also have perverse political eﬀects. It is a pure rent to the incumbent govern- 
ment, which (in the absence of adequate monitoring at least) can dole it out 
with the sole object of maintaining its incumbency. This issue of supporting 
the regime has been a recurrent one in discussions of North Korea, where 
most aid passes through the Public Distribution System, and at least some 
humanitarian groups regarded the PDS, embodying a high degree of nominal 
centralization and direct state control, as a useful instrument for delivering aid. 
Recent research also suggests the aid may actually undermine the quality of 
governance by encouraging rent seeking and diversion (Knack 2000; Svensson 
2000). Moreover, aid is only likely to be eﬀective under a limited set of politi- 
cal conditions. For example, Svensson (1999) ﬁnds that the growth-promoting 
eﬀects of aid are conditional on political rights, which needless to say are alto- 
gether absent in North Korea. 
A central theme of our study is the incredible diﬃculty the humanitarian 
community has had in dealing with the North Korean government. In part 
for reasons of political accountability the donors, in part because of concerns 
over eﬀectiveness, the humanitarian eﬀort has sought to target its assistance 
to North Korea to vulnerable groups, mainly children, pregnant and nursing 
women, and the elderly, and to monitor those priorities closely (chapter 4). 
At virtually every point, the government placed roadblocks in the way of the 
donor community’s achieving this objective, which it met to the extent that 
it did only through extraordinary perspicacity and ﬂexibility. We detail the 
restrictions placed on external monitoring and show that, as diligent as outside 
monitors are, it is virtually impossible for them to track food donations within 
the country from the port to the ﬁnal consumer. This is not a secret; it is a 
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well-known fact, and no one knows it better than the dedicated cadre of aid 
workers and NGOs themselves. 
The question of monitoring is closely related to the third rail of humani- 
tarian assistance: the perennial problem of diversion of aid to unintended 
purposes and undeserving recipients (chapter 5). We argue that the term 
“diversion” is used casually and in fact encompasses several quite diﬀerent 
phenomena. The most common image is of the military seizing grain to feed 
the army and party cadre. But the political and military elite has a variety  
of channels for accessing food, including ﬁrst draw on the domestic harvest, 
access to unmonitored imports from China and South Korea, and access to 
grain via the market. This type of large-scale centralized diversion no doubt 
occurs but is almost certainly exaggerated. 
Much less attention has been given to the eﬀect of the huge diﬀerences 
between controlled and market prices on the incentive to divert food for eco- 
nomic reasons: to sell it in the market. These incentives operate with respect to 
farmers, who can earn more by selling grain to the market than by surrendering 
it to the state. They operate with respect to those with access to imports, and 
they almost certainly operate with respect to aid as well. This aspect of diversion 
is almost certainly underestimated in standard accounts, and its eﬀects are not 
straightforward. There is no question that such diversion reduces the amount of 
food going to intended beneﬁciaries. But ironically it also has the unintended, 
and presumably positive, long-term consequence of promoting the marketiza- 
tion of the economy and even lowering prices; in our discussion of reform, we 
consider who the winners and losers were from this process of diversion and 
marketization. 
Before turning to those issues, however, we step back and consider the aid 
process from a macropolitical perspective. Although the World Food Pro- 
gramme is the immediate supplier of food, the WFP does not have its own 
stocks and ultimately depends on appeals issued to governments. Moreover, 
a number of governments deliver aid bilaterally, outside of the WFP channel. 
In addition to their humanitarian motives, what, if anything, were the donor 
governments trying to do by supplying aid to North Korea? This question is 
the subject of chapter 6. 
Despite the continuing refrain that humanitarian objectives should be held 
separate from politics, particularly in the United States, this separation has 
proven impossible to maintain in practice; aid is closely tied up with shifting 
political objectives on the part of donor governments and the publics to which 
they are ultimately accountable. We begin with brief sketches of the aid behav- 
ior of the major donors: the United States, Japan, South Korea, the European 
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Union, and China. In a handful of instances, political factors have pushed 
governments to withhold aid; Japan provides some of the starkest examples of 
this political linkage. For the most part, however, political calculations have 
had the opposite eﬀect, leading governments to maintain or increase food aid 
to entice North Korea into negotiations. This has even been the case since the 
onset of the current nuclear standoﬀ in October 2002. 
A consideration of donor interests cannot consider individual country pro- 
grams in isolation, however; foreign assistance involves important issues of 
coordination. When donor objectives are not aligned, it becomes more dif- 
ﬁcult to maintain a united front vis-à-vis a recalcitrant recipient, and problems 
of moral hazard can quickly arise. In the early 2000s, patience with North 
Korea began to wane in the United States and Japan. Overall stresses on the 
emergency relief system made it harder to meet targets, and multilateral aid 
declined. Yet North Korea has been able to compensate partly if not fully for 
these losses by increasing EU involvement, continuing reliance on quasi-com- 
mercial imports of food and other inputs from China, and, above all, by the 
growing generosity of South Korea. Although we focus primarily on food, 
we show how South Korea’s humanitarian assistance is but one aspect of the 
much broader shift in that country’s foreign policy that began under President 
Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and has accelerated under President No Mu-hyo˘ n 
(2003–present): namely, to seek an improvement of political and military rela- 
tions on the peninsula through a process—and a highly costly and unrecipro- 
cated one—of economic engagement. 
 
Marketization and Reform: From Socialist Famine to 
the New Shortages 
 
In chapter 7, we return to the domestic front by looking at the DPRK’s response 
to the immediate aftermath of the famine. On the one hand, the government 
sought to reassert control over a country that had come apart during the great 
famine. On the other hand, the coping strategies that households pursued dur- 
ing the famine produced fundamental changes in the political economy of 
North Korea, including extensive marketization. 
The emergence of markets is often associated with leadership decisions and 
top-down reforms, such as those launched in China in the late 1970s that ﬁnally 
came to North Korea twenty-ﬁve years later, in 2002. But the marketization 
fueled by the famine, we argue, can be traced in part to the coping strategies of 
local party, government, and military units together with individual enterprises 
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and households. As the Public Distribution System collapsed and the market 
came to supply a greater and greater share of total consumption, a new divide 
appeared in North Korean society, between those who could augment their 
wages with foreign exchange and other sources of income and those who could 
not. A new poor emerged as a result, with the cities once again being among 
the most severely aﬀected. 
Marketization struck fear into the hearts of political authorities, who saw 
it as the opening wedge for the emergence of an economy and private sphere 
beyond the clutches of the state. We interpret the reforms of 2002 not simply as 
a progressive eﬀort to move the North Korean economy in a new direction but 
also as a defensive move designed to reassert control. Whatever the intent of 
the reforms, however, they resulted in very high levels of inﬂation. Food prices 
rose far faster than nominal wages, resulting in a sharp decline in the welfare of 
those forced to purchase food in the market. Farmers probably beneﬁted from 
this change in relative prices, but the result was to exacerbate the stark division 
we have noted between haves and have-nots. 
What eﬀect did marketization and the reforms have on welfare in North 
Korea? The same patterns of secrecy and obstruction that have hampered the 
implementation of relief activities militate against the evaluation of their eﬀec- 
tiveness as well. We can, however, evaluate the four UN-sponsored nutrition 
surveys that have been done to date, as well as a variety of other sorts of evidence 
that has not been fully exploited in this context, including refugee interviews 
and data on prices. We conclude chapter 7 by using this information—sketchy 
as it is—as a guide to where North Korea stood ten years after the famine of 
the mid-1990s and roughly ﬁve years into the reforms. We ﬁnd that, as of 2005, 
there had been some marginal improvement in nutritional status since the peak 
of the famine. There is also considerable cross-regional variation in nutritional 
status, however, as well as ample evidence that this major humanitarian disaster 
was by no means over. 
 
Looking Forward 
 
As we sent this manuscript to press in mid-2006, the Six-Party Talks remained 
stalled. Most analysts, however, could see the contours of the “grand bargain” 
that would resolve the standoﬀ. In return for abandoning its nuclear weap- 
ons programs, returning to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, and accepting international safeguards inspections, the other parties 
to the talks—most importantly, the United States—would oﬀer North Korea 
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a security guarantee, a promise of recognition, and eventual entry into the 
international ﬁnancial institutions. The deal would also include a package of 
additional humanitarian assistance as well as energy from South Korea in the 
form of electricity. 
We would like to believe that the relaxation of North Korea’s security con- 
cerns will provide an opportunity for a serious reform eﬀort that will move 
North Korea, however gradually, toward a more market-oriented economy and 
a more liberal if not fully democratic polity. Unfortunately, we are skeptical 
on both counts. The reform process through mid-2006 appeared inauspicious, 
and there are no signs of political relaxation; to the contrary. Moreover, we 
anticipate that North Korea will rely heavily on international largesse for some 
time. In the conclusion, we take up the ethical issues of dealing with a country 
like North Korea. 
The core of the ethical dilemma surrounding engagement with North Korea 
is the political leadership of the country’s apparent lack of concern for the 
welfare of the people. As we document, the regime has acted with systematic 
recklessness and callousness. In this context, we take seriously the argument 
that the country should not be assisted at all and note, for example, that some 
of the most courageous survivors of North Korea’s prison system have advo- 
cated a strategy of cutting North Korea oﬀ and seeking to hasten its decline 
(see, e.g., C. Kang 2005). 
Few would rue the disappearance of the Kim Jo˘ng-il regime, but wishful 
thinking is not a substitute for policy. Given that North Korea has already sur- 
vived a famine that ranks among the most destructive of the twentieth century, 
there is precious little evidence that denying it access to food—even if such an 
eﬀort could be orchestrated—would produce regime change. In the interim, 
the innocent—who have no eﬀective control over the policies and behavior of 
their government—would continue to suﬀer. We see no substitute for a policy 
of seeking to aid the North Korean people while engaging the government and 
encouraging its political as well as economic evolution. 
Yet if the world is going to continue to provide aid, we should be clear- 
eyed about the terms on which it is provided. Two issues continue to loom 
for the humanitarian eﬀort: coordination among the donors and the design of 
the relief eﬀort itself. We make a practical as well as principled case for mul- 
tilateralism. The supply of eﬀectively unconditional aid by South Korea and 
China has undercut the eﬀectiveness of the multilateral humanitarian eﬀort 
through the World Food Programme. Bilateral development assistance runs the 
same risks of supporting ineﬀectual policies. Second, the WFP and the donors 
have the obligation to continue to bring to the world’s attention not only the 
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humanitarian conditions in North Korea—the ongoing shortages of food— 
but the conditions under which outside donors operate. It is an obligation of 
those who seek to engage with North Korea—as we believe we must—also to 
speak the truth about the conditions in which North Koreans live. This book 
is designed in some small way to further that objective. 
  
PART I 
 
Perspectives on the Famine 
  
  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Origins of the Great Famine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tolstoy leads oﬀ Anna Karenina with the well-known observation that while 
happy families are all alike, unhappy families are all unhappy in their own ways. 
So it is with famines. The more closely we study these complex and rare social 
events, the more we have come to appreciate not only their intricacies but their 
idiosyncrasies; not all famines arise from similar causes. A central debate in the 
famine literature, however, concerns the relative inﬂuence of food availability 
decline versus problems in entitlement and distribution: the bundle of legal 
and moral rights that determine the access of particular groups or individuals 
to food. Amartya Sen’s (1981) study of four major twentieth-century famines 
noted that the prefamine period was not necessarily characterized by inad- 
equate aggregate food supply or a signiﬁcant decline in the availability of food. 
Rather, he argued, the famine resulted from entitlement failures, particularly 
the failure of “exchange entitlements”: the ability of certain groups to purchase 
food on the market (for a critical review, see Devereux 2001). Although Sen’s 
initial formulation included reference to entitlements in the form of transfers 
from the state, only in subsequent work (Dreze and Sen 1989) did he and oth- 
ers begin to elaborate how work, production, and exchange entitlements were 
embedded in systems of political rights, what Appadurai (1984) called “enfran- 
chisement,” and de Waal (1997) captured in the idea of an “anti-famine political 
contract” (see also Ravallion 1987; Devereux 1993:76–82). 
In adopting this entitlement framework to the study of the North Korean 
case, we make two amendments and extensions. First, it is critically impor- 
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tant to begin the analysis of any famine with an understanding of the exist- 
ing set of entitlements. The failure of socialist systems of entitlements is core 
to many of the greatest famines of the twentieth century, including those in 
the Soviet Union (1921–22, 1946–47, and in the Ukraine in 1932–34), China 
(1958–62), Cambodia (1979), and Ethiopia (1984–85), as well as in North Korea. 
Although we believe that these entitlement failures can be attributed in part to 
the authoritarian nature of political rule, socialist systems do have distinctive 
features that warrant elaboration. 
The entitlement approach was initially formulated with respect to settings 
in which markets failed because the poor did not command adequate resources 
to purchase food. As we will show in chapters 3, 6, and 7, these circumstances 
came to pertain in North Korea as well as markets emerged in the wake of the 
famine and a succession of economic reforms. Yet in the prefamine and fam- 
ine period, entitlement failures did not have to do with the market but with 
the socialist production and distribution system, or what might be called the 
socialist social contract. In socialist systems, the discrete types of entitlements 
that have been distinguished in other settings—for example, entitlements to 
work, to produce, to exchange, and to transfers from the government—are all 
determined very directly by the state (Kornai 1992). Assignment to a particular 
job and even work location is a function of manpower planning and, as we 
will see, political calculations. Cultivators do not have independent rights to 
their property or products, either; rather, any food that is available to them is 
a function of procurement and allocation decisions taken by the state. Markets 
are completely or tightly controlled suppressed, and so at least in theory there 
are no independent sources of supply; exchange entitlements in the sense Sen 
initially intended do not exist or emerge only as the economy marketizes. 
As a result, to the extent that we can speak of entitlement failures, they 
are entirely and more immediately state failures: the failure to pursue sustain- 
able agricultural policies (Walker 1989; Devereux 1993:133–137); the failure to 
procure adequate grain supplies from the agricultural sector; the failure to dis- 
tribute food equitably, particularly in the context of shortages. In the next 
chapter, we argue that while the government did make eﬀorts to equalize the 
distribution of food during the famine,1 it ultimately failed to do so because of 
both a surprisingly decentralized system of distribution and deep-seated politi- 
cal biases in the distribution of food. We thus circle back to observations about 
the close relationship among political regime type, rights, and famine. 
A second observation that we explore in more detail in this chapter is that 
the line between food availability and entitlements is particularly blurred in 
such a system. It is increasingly recognized that food availability cannot be 
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treated as exogenous, for example, a result of weather-related shocks such as 
drought or ﬂoods. Rather, aggregate food availability is also strongly aﬀected by 
a variety of government policy choices. We must thus consider decisions that 
aﬀect patterns of production and risk in the domestic economy. Many of the 
problems that North Korea faced in the 1990s were the result of policy choices 
the regime made with respect to agriculture that substantially increased the risk 
of production shortfalls and even weather-related shocks. 
In a closed-economy context, socialist governments facing a decline in 
food availability have little choice in the short run but to restrict consump- 
tion directly. However, this Hobson’s choice sidesteps external sources of sup- 
ply. When the early famine literature spoke of food availability, it did so with 
respect to some delimited geographic space, typically the nation-state or the 
relevant subnational unit within it, such as the region or province. In consider- 
ing the history of famines, this made sense because political leaders have not 
traditionally been able to command resources outside their jurisdictions. 
But as global markets not only for food but for other commodities and capital 
have become more integrated, countries are in principle able to command for- 
eign food. They do this either by trading other products in exchange for it or by 
maintaining the capacity to borrow so that food can be purchased from abroad. 
Moreover, as international humanitarian institutions have evolved, countries 
increasingly have recourse to what might be called international humanitarian 
entitlements, however imperfectly deﬁned these remain. De Waal (1997) has 
focused renewed attention on both the short- and longer-term failures of the 
humanitarian community in stopping famine, but we must also consider the 
responses of governments themselves. In the case of shortages, or even of the 
risk of shortages, governments have the obligation to exploit external sources 
of supply fully. Indeed, under the United Nation’s International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which North Korea has been a party 
since 1981, states have an aﬃrmative obligation to seek and facilitate interna- 
tional assistance to ensure the availability of food during times of shortage 
(Haggard and Noland 2005:app. B). 
However, socialist governments that pursue policies of self-suﬃciency limit 
their capacity to purchase food and frequently fail to avail themselves of inter- 
national assistance as well. As a result, they eﬀectively deny their citizens entitle- 
ments just as clearly as more localized entitlement or political contract failures 
do. When North Korea was faced with external shocks—and they were severe 
ones—the government failed to respond in ways that would increase its ability 
to purchase food, whether through earned foreign exchange or by borrowing. 
Moreover, the government was slow to appeal for outside support and even 
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placed roadblocks on the delivery of foreign assistance (chapter 4). To under- 
stand the North Korean famine—and many others, we would suggest—we 
must consider why governments fail over both the long and short run to avail 
themselves fully of external sources of supply. 
We tackle the issues of the causes of the great famine in two steps. In this 
chapter, we take up the question of food availability and possible government 
responses to a decline in production. In chapter 3, we consider the question of 
socialist entitlements by dissecting the public distribution system (PDS) and 
its collapse in the 1990s. Throughout, we focus on issues of human agency 
and political economy. Natural causes—even ones such as the weather—often 
gain their force because of prior political and policy choices. North Korea did 
experience severe ﬂoods in 1995 and a succession of natural disasters thereafter 
as well. But the country’s vulnerability to those conditions was compounded at 
every point by decisions the government made that compounded risk. 
 
Socialist Agriculture, North Korean Style 
 
Following the Korean War, debates emerged within the Korean Workers’ Party 
over the appropriate course of reconstruction. These debates closely mirrored 
those taking place in Moscow at the time. Revisionists argued for a more bal- 
anced strategy that would pay more attention to light industry, consumer 
goods, and food production (Okonogi 1994). With Kim Il-so˘ng’s rejection of 
de-Stalinization and his consolidation of complete political control vis-à-vis his 
factional rivals (Lankov 2005a), the government adopted the classic Stalinist 
strategy of promoting heavy industry. Socialist industrialization typically rests 
on the mobilization of rural labor into the industrial workforce; in addition to 
the squeeze on agriculture, this labor mobilization constitutes one important 
source of primitive accumulation in socialist systems. Yet this industrialization 
strategy conﬂicted with the equally important goal of achieving food self-suf- 
ﬁciency, an objective that was closely tied both to security concerns and the 
ideological commitment to chuch’e that ﬁrst surfaced in the mid-1950s. 
As a result of North Korea’s industrial ambitions, the country exhibits a 
somewhat anomalous economic structure. Despite a relatively low per capita 
income, the country was fairly urbanized at the outset of the famine, with 
fully 61 percent of the population living in urban areas. Only 31 percent of the 
workforce was in agriculture, with fully 41 percent in industry and the remain- 
der in services and other activities (UNDP 1998).2 This economic structure 
had important implications. In contrast to many other famines, vulnerability 
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to food shortage was by no means limited to the countryside but struck urban 
workers particularly hard as well. 
In pursuing a policy of food self-suﬃciency, the most basic problem con- 
fronting the North Korean leadership was the inauspicious nature of the coun- 
try’s natural resource endowment. At the time of partition, Korean industry, 
and almost all heavy industry, was concentrated in the North, developed by the 
Japanese as a component of their larger strategy of controlling Manchuria. The 
southern part of the country was the rice bowl. Only some 20 percent of North 
Korean land can be cultivated; the rest comprises mountainous areas that oﬀer 
extremely limited scope for agricultural expansion.3 Given its northern lati- 
tude, weather conditions are also far from favorable. It is cold, and growing 
seasons are short. 
Particularly after the peninsular war, the government set about establish- 
ing a thoroughly orthodox centrally planned economy, remarkable only in the 
degree to which markets were suppressed. Land belonging to Korean landlords 
and Japanese colonialists had been seized and redistributed to the peasantry 
during 1945–46. Land reform was accompanied by a particularly dramatic fall 
in agricultural output and the ﬁrst of a succession of recurrent food shortages. 
Because of the increasingly rigid partition, the government was unable to draw 
on supplies from the South as the northern part of the country had historically 
done. The new administration responded by temporarily banning private trade 
in food and launching compulsory grain seizures in the rural areas during the 
winter of 1945–46. This policy of forcible rural grain seizures in response to 
urban shortages was to be repeated during subsequent food emergencies in 1954 
(in conjunction with collectivization) and again in 1970–73. Eﬀorts by the state 
to expand its take from the harvest undoubtedly constituted an important his- 
torical memory shaping the behavior of cultivators into the 1990s. Such seizures 
inevitably create perverse incentives, encouraging farmers to preharvest, hide 
and consume grain, and divert food toward the black market, barter, and other 
nonstate channels such as transfers within extended family networks; as we will 
show in the next chapter, all these factors came into play during the famine. 
Following the Korean War, the government rapidly collectivized agriculture 
as a means of supporting the industrial push, introduced quantitative planning 
in production, established state marketing and distribution of grain, and in 
1957 ﬁnally prohibited private production and trade of grain once and for all. 
Henceforth, co-ops would sell only to the state; merchants had to join coop- 
eratives or ﬁnd other employment to maintain eligibility for rations (Lankov 
2005a:179). Beginning in 1959 and motivated by military as well as economic 
concerns, food security was pursued through self-suﬃciency not only at the 
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national level but also at the provincial and even county levels as well (Lee 
2000; S. Lee 2003). This strategy resulted in a distribution system that was in 
fact decentralized in certain respects since local oﬃcials were responsible for 
coordinating demand and supply within their jurisdictions. Nonfarm house- 
holds obtained grain and some other food items through a rationing system, 
the public distribution system or PDS, which we take up in more detail in the 
next chapter. It is only necessary to note here that for urban consumers, the 
PDS constituted their only access to food. 
In pursuing the goal of self-suﬃciency, the government sought to compen- 
sate for natural resource constraints and the relatively limited share of the work- 
force devoted to agriculture through three core strategies: expanding cropland; 
shifting output from traditional food crops such as tubers, millet, and potatoes 
in favor of higher-yield grains, namely, rice and corn; and, above all, adopting 
an industrial approach to agricultural production that paralleled the “big push” 
approach to industry. This last component of North Korean agriculture is key 
to understanding the country’s subsequent vulnerability. 
Particularly from the 1960s, the government aggressively pursued the “four 
modernizations” of “mechanization, electriﬁcation, irrigation, and chemicaliza- 
tion.” The result was one of the world’s most input-intensive agricultural systems, 
with unusually high use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Yields increased 
but were highly vulnerable to availability of these crucial inputs, either from 
imports or from the industrial sector, which also relied on imported inputs. 
Fertilizer provides the central example. North Korea developed its own capacity 
in fertilizer production with Soviet assistance, but these facilities in turn were 
dependent on petrochemical feedstock that came directly from imports or was 
dependent on imported oil. 
In response to food shortages in 1970–73, the degree of centralization of 
agricultural planning intensiﬁed. Local authorities were increasingly marginal- 
ized with respect to supply management. Food production was subject to the 
same process of input-output standardization as any other economic activity. 
Instructions to state farms and cooperatives were speciﬁed down to the level of 
fertilizer usage by individual farm households. In 1973 a Cultural Revolution– 
type movement—the Three Revolutions Team Movement—dispatched young 
Communists to initiate ideological, cultural, and technical education of farm 
households. The movement established new rural educational institutions and 
reassigned existing rural extension oﬃcials, requiring them to enroll in chuch’e 
curriculum programs. This social engineering eroded knowledge of, respect for, 
and inﬂuence of traditional farming techniques and further stiﬂed individual 
initiative (S. Lee 2003) 
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The External Environment Sours 
 
The crisis of the 1990s had its origins in a complex set of external and inter- 
nal developments that began to unfold in the late 1980s. Notwithstanding its 
claims to self-reliance, North Korea had in fact long been dependent on out- 
side assistance, with ﬁrst the Soviet Union and later China playing the role of 
patron. Not only did the Soviet Union ﬁnance North Korea’s recurrent current 
account deﬁcits, but Soviet pricing of coal and oil exports reﬂected additional 
subsidies (Eberstadt, Rubin, and Tretyakova 1995). 
Facing economic constraints of its own and perhaps frustrated by North 
Korean unwillingness to repay accumulated debts, the Soviet Union began 
to  cut  aid  and  reduce  its  support  beginning  in  1987.4  In  1990  the  Soviet 
Union initiated a diplomatic breakthrough with South Korea and simul- 
taneously demanded that North Korea pay world market prices—and in 
foreign exchange—for Soviet goods. The Soviets also began to terminate 
technology transfer in the military sphere; this proved important because 
the export of arms based on Soviet designs constituted an important source 
of foreign exchange. 
This fundamental change in North Korea’s external relations not only rep- 
resented a profound political shock (see Oberdorfer 1997:chaps. 9 and 10); the 
end of barter and debt ﬁnancing, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
economy, constituted a profound economic shock as well. The decline in 
imports from Russia in 1991 was equivalent to 40 percent of all of North Korea’s 
imports. By 1993 imports from Russia were only 10 percent of their 1987–90 
average and subsequently declined to irrelevance (ﬁgure 2.1; Eberstadt, Rubin, 
and Tretyakova 1995). In the face of this massive trade shock, the North Korean 
industrial economy began to implode. 
Under these conditions, the regime faced two basic options, and although 
we tell the story with respect to food, it applied to consumption more gener- 
ally.5 The country could either reduce domestic consumption to bring it into 
line with shrinking domestic supplies, or it could relieve the domestic supply 
constraint by importing food from abroad. The latter strategy in turn could be 
achieved through three non–mutually exclusive means: increasing exports to 
pay for needed imports, sustaining the ability to borrow on commercial terms, 
or seeking foreign aid. 
The regime began to repress demand, initiating a “let’s eat two meals a day” 
campaign in 1991.6 In 1987 the government also substantially increased food 
imports and became a net food importer (S. Lee 2005:6). But the government 
proved unable to sustain the needed level of imports into the 1990s. Perhaps 
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FIGURE 2.1. Trade with USSR/Russia, 1985–2004 
Source: Eberstadt 2003 for 1985–2001; IMF 2006 for 2002–2004. Note: Eberstadt data reported as 
exports from the Soviet Union/Russia. 10% c.i.f./f.o.b. adjustment made. 
 
 
because of the country’s unrelenting emphasis on autarky and self-reliance, the 
political leadership seemed strangely unable to grasp the epochal nature of the 
changes around it and took only limited and woefully inadequate steps to boost 
exports or reestablish access to commercial borrowing. 
Eﬀorts with respect to expanding exports were not auspicious. During 
the cold war, North Korea’s fraternal allies complained bitterly about the low 
quality of the North Korean manufactures they were forced to accept as part 
of politically determined barter trade. Arms sales, particularly to both Iran 
and Iraq during their decade-long war in the 1980s, had been an important 
source of revenue, a kind of franchise granted to North Korea by the Soviets. 
But  entering  the  1990s,  North  Korean  arms  exports  fell  victim  to  declin- 
ing global demand, intensiﬁed competition from Eastern Europe, and the 
increasing obsolescence of Soviet-era designs as the new Russian government 
became less and less willing to support Pyongyang with the transfer of cur- 
rent technologies. 
In 1991 the government took its ﬁrst, tentative step toward mimicking the 
export processing zones that had sprung up throughout the Asia Paciﬁc since 
the 1960s. Yet nearly every aspect of this eﬀort—from the geographical location 
of the ﬁrst zone in the isolated Rajin-So˘nbong corridor to the lack of a clear 
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and credible legal foundation for the zone7—reﬂected lack of North Korean 
understanding of the needs of foreign investors. Not until the mid-1990s, when 
the famine was in full swing, would the leadership attempt to revive the virtu- 
ally dormant Rajin-So˘nbong zone, and not until the late 1990s would it begin 
to explore other locations that made more economic sense, such as along the 
Chinese border (Sinu˘ iju) or more proximate to South Korea (Kaeso˘ng). Given 
the options investors had to choose from, it is not surprising that missions sent 
abroad to attract foreign investment into the zone in 1995–96—at the height 
of the famine—proved largely fruitless. North Korea attracted little investor 
interest beyond some speculative Hong Kong money, and the bulk of that was 
devoted not to manufacturing but to a resort and casino designed to attract 
Chinese tourists. 
It could be argued that the export sector was vulnerable to the same con- 
straints as those facing the economy as a whole, including the decline of reli- 
able power supplies and the collapse of the transport infrastructure. There is 
certainly truth in this argument, yet these constraints were precisely what early 
export processing zones—whether in Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s or China 
in the 1980s—were trying to circumvent. Estimates vary, but between 1990 
and 1995 North Korea’s merchandise exports fell by 50 to 60 percent (Noland 
2000). Over the same period, Vietnam, which suﬀered a similar trade shock 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, nearly tripled its exports by reforming 
with alacrity and making itself attractive to foreign investors.8 External shocks 
alone cannot explain these diﬀerences. 
In the short run, the alternative to earning foreign exchange through 
exports would have been to borrow money on international capital markets. 
Financial markets are even less forgiving than other foreign investors, how- 
ever, and North Korea had thoroughly burned its bridges in this regard. In 
the  1970s,  the  North  Korean  government  contracted  loans  extended  from 
foreign, mostly Japanese and French, banks as well as a ﬂood of suppliers’ 
credits extended by Western companies eager to do business. Erik Cornell 
(2002:5–6), Sweden’s ﬁrst ambassador to North Korea, describes how expen- 
sive machinery was left to rust in warehouses because of failure to coordi- 
nate its purchase with factory construction or power. Expensive prototypes 
were built largely to demonstrate technological capability, and great sums 
were squandered on luxurious cars for the nomenklatura and fancy electrical 
equipment for theaters and museums. Payments quickly lapsed, and North 
Korea eﬀectively defaulted on its obligations Rarely, Cornell concludes, “have 
trading relations been established, and contracts and agreements of this scale 
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and magnitude entered into, between parties wallowing in such monumental 
delusions with regard to each other’s principles, intentions, priorities, produc- 
tion capacity and social mores” (2002:6). 
The government had also accumulated a substantial foreign debt during 
the 1970s and 1980s to the Soviet Union and China. Virtually all that debt 
had fallen into arrears as well.9 Reestablishment of access to Western ﬁnancial 
markets was no doubt further constrained by growing tension over the regime’s 
nuclear ambitions, which began to surface in the second half of 1992. As a result 
of its past behavior and mounting political tensions, the capacity of the govern- 
ment to borrow was limited to little more than trade credits, and even such 
short-term credits required substantial courage on the part of the lender. For 
many transactions, North Korea was reduced to paying cash out of dwindling 
foreign exchange reserves. 
The aid option was also constrained, although again North Korea’s own 
political and policy choices were an important component of that failure as 
well. As we have seen, the Soviet Union had already tired of providing end- 
less, unrequited support. Once the transition to a new foreign policy occurred 
under Gorbachev and particularly with the coming of democratic rule through- 
out the Eastern bloc, support for North Korea quickly became an anachro- 
nism, championed in Russia, for example, by a dwindling faction of disaﬀected 
nationalists. Even China, as we will discuss in more detail in chapter 4, tired 
of providing assistance. North Korea lacked diplomatic relations with the West 
outside of the Scandinavian countries, foreclosing bilateral aid; not until the 
second half of the 1990s did it pursue an active diplomacy to build these ties 
and secure assistance through them. Nor was North Korea a member of the 
international ﬁnancial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that could have served 
as sources of assistance on concessional terms. Again, it was not until the after- 
math of the famine in the mid-1990s that the country would begin exploratory 
contacts with these organizations. 
Responsibility for North Korea’s failure to gain entry into the international 
ﬁnancial institutions lies in part with the advanced industrial states. Even in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, North Korean eﬀorts in this regard were blocked 
by the United States and Japan.10 Even if these political constraints had not 
existed, however, the regime showed little willingness to subject itself to the 
conditionality, transparency, and monitoring associated with membership in 
the international ﬁnancial institutions; to attribute North Korea’s isolation to 
foreign actors alone is at least somewhat disingenuous. IMF staﬀ report that 
during a 1996 informational mission—still the high-famine period—the North 
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Korean delegation lost interest when it became apparent that IMF funds would 
not be immediately forthcoming. At a roundtable on agricultural recovery con- 
vened by UNDP in 1998, discussed in more detail in chapter 3, North Korean 
representatives made it clear that they were unwilling to entertain any funda- 
mental institutional changes in the system of cooperative farming. The purpose 
of the meeting in their view was simply to secure support for their rehabilita- 
tion eﬀorts. Indeed, during one 1998 UN meeting on agricultural recovery, 
the North Korean delegation walked out when one of the foreign participants 
mentioned the word “reform.” 
A particularly revealing example of the challenges associated with North 
Korean participation in the IFIs concerns the availability and quality of data. 
In May 1997, when North Korea’s membership fees to the United Nations 
were being assessed, North Korea dramatically lowered data on per capita GNP 
provided to the UN Budget and Finance Committee in order to decrease mem- 
bership dues. A year later, to acquire UNDP and IMF support, the government 
reported very diﬀerent statistics. In both cases, the data came from the same 
source: the Choso˘n Central Bureau of Statistics (KIEP 2004:25–26). 
Instead of expanding legitimate commercial transactions or international 
borrowing, the 1990s witnessed an intensiﬁcation of illicit activities, includ- 
ing smuggling and counterfeiting. These sorts of illicit activities, together with 
legal, though diplomatically contentious, missile sales, accounted for perhaps 
one-third of North Korean foreign exchange earnings and would later become 
the focus of U.S.-led interdiction activities and sanctions under the administra- 
tion of George W. Bush (we provide a more detailed outline of these activities 
in appendix 1). 
The diﬃculties North Korea faced in earning foreign exchange and its 
inability to borrow from commercial or international public sources had 
important  implications  for  its  capacity  to  import.  Table  2.1  tracks  North 
Korean grain imports by source in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and shows the 
dangerous instability of the country’s commercial grain transactions. Cana- 
dian and Thai imports were volatile, and imports from other sources declined 
sharply in 1992. 
Of particular interest is the course of North Korea’s grain trade with China, 
a crucial episode that we take up in more detail in chapters 4 and 6. China qui- 
etly followed the Soviet Union by establishing diplomatic relations with South 
Korea in 1992. In the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, however, China had stepped into the economic breach and became 
North Korea’s primary supplier of both oil and food, most of it almost certainly 
on “friendship” or concessional terms.11 By 1993 China supplied North Korea 
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  TABLE 2.1. Grain Imports, 1991–97 (thousands of metric tons)  
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
China 300 620 740 305 153 547 867 
Syria – – – – – 140 34 
Thailand 90 20 78 52 162 30 38 
Canada 350 80 160 – – – – 
Japan – – – – 370 132 – 
EU – – – – – – 115 
Other 550 110 115 133 277 201 576 
Total 1,290 830 1,093 490 962 1,050 1,630 
Note: Other includes imports from other countries and food aid from international organizations. 
Source: Cho and Zang 1999. 
 
 
 
with 77 percent of fuel imports and 68 percent of food imports (Cho and Zang 
1999:26, table 1). But in that same year, China began to demand that it be paid in 
cash as well, a demand that was increasingly diﬃcult given the tightening of 
sanctions during the nuclear crisis. China also pulled back on crucial exports 
of corn to North Korea. In 1994 there was a second, sharp reduction in North 
Korean imports from China. Preferential relations were reestablished in the 
wake of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of that year, and North Korea 
got some assistance in the form of heavy oil shipments from the United States 
under the agreement. Nonetheless, North Korea’s food situation was already 
extraordinarily precarious at this point. If there was a single proximate external 
trigger to the North Korean famine, Chinese trade behavior during these cru- 
cial years is a plausible candidate. 
One way to grasp the extent and eﬀect of these external shocks is to con- 
sider the decline in the availability of fertilizer. The Ministry of Agriculture has 
estimated that the annual requirement of fertilizer nutrients (nitrogen, phos- 
phorus, and potassium, or NPK) needed to maintain adequate levels of pro- 
ductivity is around 700,000 tons. As can be seen in ﬁgure 2.2, the availability 
of fertilizer showed a steady decline over the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, reﬂecting 
a decline in imports of both fertilizer and the petroleum feedstock needed by 
North Korean plants. By 2000, when total availability had recovered some- 
what, to 210,000 tons, only 28,300 tons was supplied by domestic production; 
the remaining 181,700 tons came from commercial imports and particularly 
bilateral and multilateral fertilizer assistance. 
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FIGURE 2.2. Fertilizer (NPK) Consumption, 1989–2004 
Source: FAO/WFP 2004. 
 
 
Domestic Response and the Debate over Proximate Causes 
 
Faced with these shocks, the government did take a number of policy initiatives 
to increase domestic supplies. In December 1993, the government admitted 
that the Third Seven-Year Plan 1987–93 had not fulﬁlled its objectives. This 
admission was a surprising one for a government of this sort, although the 
failure was attributed to external shocks rather than any inherent problems in 
the socialist strategy. Some government actions marked departures from past 
policy and the ﬁrst stirrings of the “reform from below” that occurred during 
the famine. The government increased the permissible scale of private gardens 
from 80 to 120 square meters, though the gardens remained merely privately 
tended, not privately owned, and were situated on marginal, nonirrigated land. 
Similarly, after an attempt to crack down on black markets before 1993, the 
government also extended the frequency and scope of farmers’ markets. These 
markets were at least temporarily allowed to trade in grains, a major departure, 
as we will show in more detail below. 
The dominant approach of the government, however, was to focus on tech- 
nical ﬁxes that reﬂected a continuation of past policy rather than policy reforms 
emphasizing producer incentives. Among the government’s reforms were eﬀorts 
to expand grain-sown areas, shift crop composition in favor of high-yield rice 
and corn, maximize industrial inputs (subject to availability), and intensify 
double-cropping and dense planting—in short, what it had done in the past. 
Continuous cropping led to soil depletion, and the overuse of chemical fer- 
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tilizers contributed to acidiﬁcation of the soil and eventually a reduction in 
yields.12 As yields declined, hillsides were denuded to bring more and more 
marginal land into production. These measures contributed to soil erosion and 
river silting and thus bear some responsibility for the catastrophic eﬀects of the 
ﬂooding that occurred in 1995. 
The increasing vulnerability associated with the government’s strategy to 
increase grain output provides the context for considering the eﬀects of the 
succession of natural disasters that struck the country from the middle of the 
decade (for a catalog of these, see Woo-Cumings 2002:27–29). Catastrophic 
ﬂoods hit the country in July and August 1995. In mid-August, the North 
Korean government announced that the ﬂoods had resulted in nearly two mil- 
lion tons of lost grain, the destruction of over 300,000 hectares of cropland, 
and the displacement of 5.4 million people.13 The ﬂooding played an important 
role in the politics of the crisis, since it provided the opening for the govern- 
ment to portray the problem as a natural disaster, to admit to catastrophic 
crop failures, and to seek international relief more openly. For example, the 
government unit charged with obtaining international assistance was renamed 
the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC), a guise that a number 
of foreign relief agencies found advantageous as well. The ﬂoods of 1995 were 
followed by less severe ﬂoods in July 1996 and by drought in 1997 and again in 
2000–2001 when the most serious postfamine shortages emerged. 
In considering the eﬀects of these various shocks, it is useful to start with 
what we know about agricultural output. We know of serious food shortages 
in 1945–46, in 1954–55, and again in 1970–73 (see S. Lee 2003 for a discussion of 
each of these episodes). Thereafter, the industrial approach to agriculture 
bore some fruit before the country started to reach its limits in the late 1980s. 
We present the data available in two ways. Figure 2.3 provides four oﬃcial esti- 
mates of production that are commonly used in discussions of North Korean 
food output: North Korean oﬃcial pronouncements and estimates from the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (which most closely mirror oﬃcial pro- 
nouncements), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
South Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation. Table 2.2 includes the same four sets of 
estimates shown in ﬁgure 2.3 but also all others by independent researchers of 
which we are aware. 
As can be seen, these estimates diﬀer on several crucial points. All four of the 
series tracked in ﬁgure 2.3 show increases in production through most of the 
1980s. They also all show a decline in output during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. 
But diﬀerences in the timing and depth of this decline are highly consequential 
for any interpretation of the famine. Those that appear to reﬂect more closely 
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FIGURE 2.3. Estimates of North Korean Grain Production, 1982–2005 
Sources: FAOSTAT; USDAFAS; Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation: Woo 2004. 
 
 
 
information provided by the government show a pattern of high initial output 
followed by a sharp collapse in 1995–96; Lee, Nakano, and Nabukuni (1995) 
also show an output collapse but from lower levels of production. 
A number of factors, however, lead us to doubt the veracity of this “high 
initial output, rapid collapse” scenario or even the “steady output, sudden col- 
lapse” variant. First, there is evidence of several sorts (which we review in more 
detail in chapter 3) that the government was concerned about food availabil- 
ity well before the mid-1990s. This evidence includes stepped-up diplomatic 
eﬀorts to secure external sources of supply, acknowledgment of diﬃculties and 
the tentative reforms noted above, hortatory campaigns to reduce consump- 
tion, and the ﬁrst reports from defectors of food shortages in 1993. If domestic 
production really were as high as the oﬃcial pronouncements or the FAO 
series show, there would have been no reason for food shortages in the absence 
of some fundamental change in entitlements. But there is no evidence of such 
a change. 
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TABLE 2.2. Domestic Production Estimates, 1990–96. (millions of metric tons 
in milled grain equivalent) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
High initial output, rapid collapse        
Oﬃcial announcements (UNDP 
1998) 
9.00 8.90 8.80 9.00 7.10 3.50 2.50 
Roundtable 7.58 7.26 7.27 7.06 7.50 5.73 2.77 
FAO 8.10 8.80 8.60 9.10 7.20 3.70 2.50 
Steady output, sudden collapse 
       
Lee, Nakano, and Nabukuni 1995 5.79 5.72 5.84 5.82 5.85 5.90 2.84 
Secular decline 
       
NUB 5.48 4.81 4.43 4.27 3.88 4.13 3.45 
USDA/FAS 5.08 4.30 3.86 3.72 3.42 3.83 3.38 
Kim 2003 4.43 3.90 2.92 3.77 2.60   
WFP 4.08 2.84      
Sources: Noland 2000, table 5.1; FAOSTAT n.d. 
 
 
 
Second, there are strategic reasons for the government to present the esti- 
mates that they did. Caught up in a major foreign policy crisis in the ﬁrst 
part of the decade, the political leadership did not want to reveal any signs of 
weakness or vulnerability to external pressure or sanctions. Once the govern- 
ment had admitted its diﬃculties, however, its incentives were almost exactly 
the opposite: the greater the production shortfall, the greater the humanitarian 
relief that would be warranted. 
Third, there are some technical issues with the data that reﬂect the diﬃculty 
of dealing with a closed society. To this day, there is still some confusion about 
whether the North Korean numbers are reporting hulled grain. The high esti- 
mates for the earlier period might well be reporting harvests on an unhulled 
basis, thus overstating food availability. Conversely, for the political reasons 
noted above, the government may have switched to reporting hulled grain at 
some point to highlight the shortfall. 
In our view, the “secular decline” story is much more plausible than those 
focusing simply on the short-run collapse of output. Agriculture, like the rest 
of the economy, saw a steady contraction over the ﬁrst half of the decade, a 
result of declining inputs such as fertilizer (ﬁgure 2.2) and the limits of the 
 The Origins of the Great Famine 37 
 
government’s industrial approach to food production. The estimates produced 
by the USDA and the South Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation indicate that grain 
production fell by more than 15 percent between 1990 and 1994, well before the 
ﬂoods. In our construction of a food balance sheet for the country, however, 
we entertain the possibility that these estimates might nonetheless still be high 
for 1996–97; as can be seen, it is in those two postﬂood years when there is the 
greatest divergence in the series since the mid-1990s. We therefore take that 
possibility into account. 
Nonetheless, the review up to this point establishes two important points. 
First, as the situation deteriorated in the early 1990s, the government was fatally 
slow in adjusting to its changed economic circumstances. The deterioration 
in the country’s external credit and balance of payments—not to mention its 
nuclear brinksmanship—made it diﬃcult to pursue commercial sources of 
imports. But the government was also slow and secretive in exploring con- 
cessional sources of food as well. After a failed overture to the World Food 
Programme and South Korea in the early 1990s, it was not until the fall of 
1994 that North Korea again opened an aid oﬀensive by approaching the Japa- 
nese for assistance. In the absence of any sense of urgency emanating from the 
North Koreans themselves, it was unlikely that potential donors would respond 
aggressively. It was not until 1995 that the government openly appealed for 
outside support and even then the full magnitude of the crisis took some time 
to sink in. Not until 1996 did humanitarian assistance begin to ﬂow into the 
country in any volume. 
Second, this chronology, as well as information that we have on the timing 
of the onset of the famine (chapter 3), undermines the claim that the ﬂoods 
were the principal or even proximate determinant of food shortages (e.g., Woo- 
Cumings 2002, Smith 2005b). The ﬂooding contributed to the food crisis both 
directly through the loss of stocks and the removal of farmland from production 
and indirectly through its impact on infrastructure and particularly the energy 
sector (Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes 2000). All the estimates reported in 
table 2.2 show a falloﬀ of production in 1996, the year following the ﬂoods. 
The agricultural sector, however, like the rest of the economy, had been in 
secular decline since the beginning of the decade, and the eﬀects of the ﬂoods 
must be placed in the context of the other external shocks we have noted. On 
the basis of their econometric analysis of North Korean agricultural produc- 
tion, Heather Smith and Yiping Huang conclude that “the dominant triggering 
factor in the crisis was the sharp loss of supplies of agricultural inputs following 
the disruption of the trade with the socialist bloc from the late 1980s.   The 
contribution of climatic factors to the agricultural crisis, as stressed by North 
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Korea’s policy-makers, was at most a secondary cause” (2003:756). This conclu- 
sion is supported by the computable general equilibrium model-based simula- 
tion of Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang (2001), who ﬁnd 
that restoration of ﬂood-aﬀected land and capital would have had but a minor 
impact on the availability of food. 
 
Why the Delayed Adjustment? 
 
Given our emphasis on the government’s delay in making the necessary eco- 
nomic adjustments required to address the food shortages or seeking external 
assistance, we must ask the next logical question: why did the regime prove 
unable to adapt to its very changed circumstances? General arguments about 
the role of chuch’e, nationalism, and the ideological signiﬁcance of self-reliance 
certainly constitute a general backdrop to understanding the regime’s behav- 
ior.14 But these ideas were quite plastic. Notwithstanding claims of self-reliance, 
the government had been highly dependent on socialist sources of aid for some 
time, and ultimately it did make a strong international appeal. Our answers to 
this crucial question are necessarily speculative, but it is worth reviewing some 
contending, although not mutually exclusive, hypotheses. 
The ﬁrst throws the responsibility back onto the international community. 
Under this interpretation, the government did in fact signal its distress and sent 
signals of its willingness to trade concessions of various sorts for economic assis- 
tance. But these appeals did not meet a favorable response and as a result may 
have discredited those within the North Korean government who were associ- 
ated with them. The nuclear standoﬀ of 1992–94 has been interpreted as an 
extended eﬀort to secure not only security guarantees but economic assistance 
as well.15 The failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency, South Korea, 
and the United States to resolve the crisis in a timely manner and the tightening 
of sanctions against the country constituted an important background condi- 
tion for the famine. 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found in the 1991 opening of the 
Rajin-Sonbo˘ng export-processing zone, which drew little investor interest, and 
a failed appeal to the World Food Programme in the same year (on the latter, 
see Natsios 1999:166). Most important for our purposes, however, are signs of 
more aggressive commercial diplomacy and “aid seeking” beginning in 1994. 
These proposals were initially either rebuﬀed or their signiﬁcance ignored.16 
Particularly striking in this regard was a request made by the North Koreans 
at the end of the ﬁrst round of postcrisis talks in Geneva for 2.5 million tons 
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of food aid. This suggested a shortfall of staggering proportions, yet American 
negotiators do not appear to have appreciated fully the full implications of the 
admission (Wit, Poneman, and Galucci 2004:281). Selig Harrison (2002:142) 
reports that North Korea made a “food for peace” proposal as late as 1997 that 
was similarly ignored by the United States. Moreover, as we will show in our 
discussion of the aid regime below, the initial humanitarian response got caught 
up in eﬀorts to use aid strategically as well as honest disagreements within the 
humanitarian community about the extent of the famine. 
Before the second half of 1994, North Korean appeals were still not straight- 
forward about the extent of the country’s food distress. Even then, the North 
Korean authorities were trying to hide the extent of the problem, particularly 
as it aﬀected the northeast of the country. The WFP mission of 1991 is reveal- 
ing in this regard. After being called in, the assessment team was given no 
evidence that the country had any special food needs (Natsios 1999:166). From 
1993 on, the growing evidence of famine leaking out of China was continually 
oﬀset by mixed messages from the North Koreans. An additional problem arose 
from the fact that Pyongyang, to which foreigners had the most direct access, 
was protected from the worst of the food shortages by its highly privileged 
status. Subsequent accounts by resident foreigners note the emergence of short- 
ages even in the foreign community (Harrold 2004:108–10), but even a highly 
trained observer could conclude in 1996 that malnutrition was not widespread 
(Nathanail 1996). In retrospect, of course, it is easy to see that the signs of fam- 
ine were there, but the important point is that they were being read in spite 
of—not with the assistance of—the North Korean authorities. 
Given the weakness of these signals, a second possible explanation for the 
delay focuses on divisions within the North Korean government itself over the 
priority that should be given to the military (hard-liners) and to economic reform 
(soft-liners); Selig Harrison (2002:chap. 4) oﬀers this explanation most explicitly 
(see also Martin 2004:472–81). Harrison argues that Kim Jo˘ng-il was either a 
closet reformer at the time (which we strongly doubt) or forced to tolerate a 
certain degree of marketization as a result of the crisis (for which we provide 
more detailed evidence below). But according to Harrison, the government was 
riven between competing factions. Hard-liners ridiculed the idea that Pyongyang 
would get any help from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, which they believed 
were intent on bringing about the collapse of North Korea. Military and political 
concessions were therefore pointless and would not be reciprocated. The gov- 
ernment’s primary obligation was survival, which called for a strengthening of 
military capabilities, including through nuclear weapons if necessary. These cal- 
culations constituted the historical origin of the so-called military ﬁrst politics—a 
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new ideological emphasis under Kim Jo˘ng-il on the political role of the military 
in North Korean society—that we take up in more detail in chapter 8. 
The reformers, by contrast, recognized that the nuclear issue was a stumbling 
block to normalization of relations with the United States and the liberaliza- 
tion of foreign economic policy. They were initially able to win concessions on 
opening the country to nuclear inspections, but the result was an uneasy inter- 
nal compromise. As the international community came to doubt the veracity 
of North Korean claims and the United States began to exert pressure on the 
country, the reformers were discredited and forced onto the defensive. 
As military tensions deepened, an additional security motive may have played 
a role in the decision to conceal the extent of the food problem. In December 
1996, Kim Jo˘ng-il made a speech at Kim Il-so˘ng University commemorating its 
ﬁftieth anniversary that was subsequently smuggled out of the country. While 
the veracity of such documents can always be challenged, the speech contains 
a wide-ranging review of the country’s problems at the time that has the ring 
of authenticity to it. In it, Kim Jo˘ng-il explicitly states, “If the U.S. imperialists 
know that we do not have rice for the military they would immediately invade 
us” (1996). In the context of a severe crisis, such an admission of weakness 
might have been seen as risky. The very substantial appeal made to the United 
States at the end of the Geneva talks in 1994 could be interpreted in this light; 
with the crisis over, the government was in a position to reveal its true food 
needs (Wit, Poneman, and Galucci 2004:281). 
The question of the responsibility for the nuclear standoﬀ of 1992 and its 
subsequent escalation into full-blown crisis takes us far beyond our purposes 
here, but it is ultimately germane to any interpretation of the famine.17 Were the 
North Koreans responding to the severe deterioration in their security environ- 
ment, signs of aggressive intent from the United States, and botched negotia- 
tions? Or was the crisis ultimately of their own manufacture, an eﬀort to extract 
concessions for fulﬁlling their obligations under the NPT and bilateral agree- 
ments with South Korea as well? If the latter is the case, as we are more inclined 
to believe, then the responsibility of the government only deepens. In either 
case, however, we can certainly imagine that the period of high international 
tension—followed almost immediately by the death of Kim Il-so˘ng and a highly 
uncertain political transition—could result in a shift in favor of security consid- 
erations over preoccupation with economic issues and even food security. 
But evidence from this period provided by defectors suggests yet another 
explanation for the slow adjustment and delay in seeking assistance, evidence 
that comports with the arguments and ﬁndings of Jean Dreze and Amartya 
Sen on the relationship between regime type and famine (Dreze and Sen 1989, 
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1991).18  In a succession of steps stretching over two decades, Kim Jo˘ng-il took 
over political and administrative responsibilities from his father as well as being 
promoted within the military. Several journalistic accounts of the period based 
on defector interviews note that, during 1991 and 1992, Kim Il-so˘ng—and per- 
haps  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  as  well—were  being  shielded  from  damaging  information 
about the extent of economic deterioration. 
Particularly interesting is Jasper Becker’s reporting (2005:101–3) on the views of 
Lee Min-bok, a North Korean agricultural expert who defected in 1995. 
According to Lee, inspectors from Pyongyang were continually deceived by 
sycophantic local oﬃcials fearful of admitting grain shortfalls. These oﬃcials 
falsiﬁed reports on targets and even borrowed grain from one another to dem- 
onstrate their successes. These fears stemmed from the fact that the top politi- 
cal leadership had directly identiﬁed itself with particular farming techniques, 
down to the details of the inputs to be used and the spacing of plantings. To 
admit failure or to question these techniques was to question the top leadership 
itself—an action of potentially fatal consequence. In his speech at Kim Il-so˘ng 
University in 1996, Kim Jo˘ng-il himself admitted that this sort of deception was 
a problem, a practice he labeled “pointism.” 
This  deception  was  not  revealed  until  one  of  Kim  Il-so˘ng’s  guerilla  col- 
leagues, Kang So˘ng-san—who not coincidentally had been governor of North 
Hamgyo˘ng  Province,  one  of  the  hardest-hit  regions—went  directly  to  Kim 
Il-so˘ng with information on the problems he had seen ﬁrsthand (Oberdorfer 
1997:298;  Natsios  1999:166–67).  According  to  Kang  Myo˘ng-do,  Kang  So˘ng- 
san’s son-in-law and a defector, this information triggered a review of economic 
policy that ultimately led to the admission of failure and partial change in 
policy course in December 1993. But this change of course came as the nuclear 
confrontation was escalating and was in any case too late to stem the damage 
that had been done not only by external events but also by complacency at the 
top. The crucial importance of adjusting policy at this point in time is damning 
testimony to the incredible cost of the leadership’s nuclear gamble as well as the 
deeper entitlement problems that can arise in totalitarian political systems. 
 
Constructing Food Balances 
 
The traditional approach to analyzing famines has been to construct an aggre- 
gate balance sheet of food supply and demand. This approach is inadequate 
standing on its own because it ignores the critical question of distribution. 
Nonetheless, it is a necessary exercise when assessing food availability and 
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remains a staple of organizations such as the World Food Programme, which 
use it as a guide to overall need. 
Total supply is equal to domestic production plus imports, either in the 
form of commercial purchases or aid receipts, minus exports. We have no evi- 
dence that North Korea exported grain during the famine—an anomaly that 
has arisen in a number of cases, most notably the Irish famine of 1846–50—so 
this last component can safely be ignored.19 Before we can construct food bal- 
ances, however, we need to address three issues: discrepancies among alterna- 
tive reporting sources with respect to the production data; the apparent nega- 
tive correlation between humanitarian assistance and commercial imports and 
domestic production; and the appropriate measure of domestic demand. 
With respect to the ﬁrst issue, we have reviewed in some detail the alterna- 
tive estimates that exist and construct our presentation around estimates pro- 
duced by the USDA. These are generally lower than the ﬁgures reported by 
the FAO, especially in the early 1990s. But we consider the implications of the 
FAO numbers to be right for two crucial years—1996 and 1997—when their 
estimates of production are substantially lower. 
A second set of complications has to do with imports. The data suggest 
that there is a very close relationship between North Korea’s receipt of conces- 
sional aid and its commercial imports. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, commercial 
imports were highly erratic, varying by as much as 500,000 metric tons from 
one year to the next. As the famine broke, the government scrambled to secure 
grain, and commercial imports rose somewhat. But as the international aid 
campaign took oﬀ, rising aid inﬂows crowded out or replaced food imports on 
commercial terms (ﬁgure 2.4).20 
Some have made the exculpatory argument that this decline in imports 
occurred in the context of an economic contraction and a decline in total 
imports (Lim 2006a). This is narrowly true but misleading: as shown in ﬁgure 
2.5, both total imports and commercial food imports declined in the mid-1990s, 
but the decline in food imports was far greater—that is, there was a dispro- 
portionate fall in commercial food imports. Figure 2.5 also illustrates another 
striking point: that while total imports subsequently grew in the context of an 
overall economic recovery, commercial food imports remained essentially ﬂat. 
Put diﬀerently, the component of the total food supply coming from imports 
cannot be treated as a given; rather, imports appear to have been aﬀected by 
policy and expenditure choices by the North Korean government. Rather than 
continuing to import on commercial terms and using humanitarian aid as a 
supplement to those imports, the government used humanitarian sources as a 
substitute for them. Aid was used as form of balance-of-payments support. 
  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4. North Korean Food Imports and Aid, 1990–2004 
Source: Imports: FAO/WFP (various publications); Aid: WFPINTERFAIS 2004, 2005b. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.5. North Korean Commercial Food Imports and Total Imports, 1993–2003 
Sources: Total imports: Lee, Young-Hoon 2005, table 2.2; Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation; Inter- 
Korean Cooperation, www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp. 
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This phenomenon is not unknown in other famines: food merchants, for 
example, may experience a signiﬁcant increase in real income during short- 
ages, some of which may go into the consumption of luxury imports. What 
is diﬀerent about socialist famines in general, and the North Korean case  
in particular, is that those resource allocation decisions were not made by 
decentralized economic actors via the market. Rather, they were political 
decisions made by the state, presumably reﬂecting some degree of conscious 
choice. As we discussed in chapter 1, one consequence of the suppression of 
markets and the assertion of control over production and distribution by the 
socialist state is the counterpart assumption of responsibility for managing 
entitlements to food. 
Under certain circumstances, such a policy of treating humanitarian assis- 
tance as balance-of-payments support might have made sense. If humanitarian 
assistance and domestic production fully met domestic demand, then foreign 
exchange could be diverted from commercial imports of food to other pur- 
poses, such as capital goods and intermediate goods, or other inputs that would 
boost overall economic recovery. But domestic demand was not adequately 
met. Moreover, the conserved foreign exchange was used partly for military 
imports, which discouraged more aggressive eﬀorts to earn foreign exchange 
through increased economic openness and exports.21 
To complicate matters, it is misleading to assume that aid and commercial 
imports are unrelated. Had North Korea continued to import grain on com- 
mercial terms, it probably would not have received as much aid as it did. Rightly 
or wrongly, the humanitarian eﬀort might have been adjusted downward. 
In recognition of these diﬃculties, we have constructed two counterfactual 
food supplies in ﬁgure 2.6. The baseline is the supply that obtained in real- 
ity: local production plus imports and aid. The ﬁrst counterfactual supply line 
is based on an assumption that commercial grain imports remained at their 
1993 level instead of declining and that the country received no aid. This “go 
it alone” scenario provides a sense of how North Korea would have fared if it 
had relied solely on commercial imports without any humanitarian assistance. 
The second counterfactual assumes that commercial imports were maintained 
at their 1993 level and that the food aid North Korea actually received was fully 
additional, rather than crowding out imports.22 By deﬁnition this supply line 
will exceed all others, since it embodies the (arguably unrealistic) assumption 
that North Korea continued to import substantial supplies of food on com- 
mercial terms and received the same level of assistance from the international 
community that it actually did. 
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FIGURE 2.6. Scenarios of Food Supply and Minimum Human Need, 1990–2004 
Note: Demand Figures based on population data taken from the Bank of Korea and annual per capita 
consumption of 167kg in cereal equivalent. Counterfactual supply keeps 1994–2003 imports held at 
1993 level. Normal human derived from FAO/WFP 1995. Sources: Production: USDAFAS: PSD data- base; 
Imports: Noland 2003; WFPINTERFAIS 2004, 2005b. 
 
As there is uncertainty about the supply of food in North Korea and how 
to think about imports, so there are also divergent estimates as to demand. In 
constructing food balances, the FAO and WFP use ﬁxed estimates or targets 
that are adjusted for estimated spoilage. To derive a national minimum needs 
target, the FAO/WFP posits a per capita grain consumption ﬁgure and simply 
multiplies by the population; the calculation makes no reference to prices but 
is rooted in a postulated individual human need. To perform this exercise, one 
therefore needs data on both food consumption—or target consumption—and 
population. As with all North Korean data, population ﬁgures are of question- 
able accuracy, in part because of disagreements over the death toll during the 
famine, which we take up in more detail at the end of the next chapter (on 
the diﬃculty of assessing North Korea’s population statistics, see Eberstadt and 
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Banister 1992 and Eberstadt 2000). For the sake of this exercise, we set aside 
these concerns and use the same ﬁgures as the FAO/WFP. 
The second component of this calculation—the level of human need—is sim- 
ilarly problematic. The FAO/WFP estimates that minimum per capita human 
needs in North Korea are 167 kilograms of cereals such as rice and corn annually 
(FAO/WFP 1996). In a devastating critique written during the famine, however, 
Australian economist Heather Smith points out that this estimate—increased 
in the midst of the famine—was deﬁcient in at least two ways (Smith 1998). 
First, the WFP analysts had underestimated the role of other food products 
in the North Korean diet, particularly noncereal grains such as pulses (beans) 
and starchy roots (potatoes and sweet potatoes). As a result, they overestimated 
North Korean cereal needs. Second, the 167 kilograms per annum ﬁgure was 
inconsistent with data reported both by the North Korean authorities and the 
FAO showing that North Koreans had historically consumed well under that 
target, as had other comparable populations. Smith argued that attaining this 
target would have implied the highest level of cereals consumption in North 
Korea since 1968! In combination, Smith concluded that the WFP had over- 
estimated the minimum cereals target by approximately 20 percent. Figure 2.6 
thus reports two levels of “minimum human needs,” one taken directly from the 
WFP and one adjusted downward by 20 percent following Smith’s observation 
about the North Korean diet and historical patterns of consumption. 
As is immediately obvious, aggregate supply exceeds both of these targets for 
the entire decade of the 1990s regardless of the production numbers used. If the 
demand and supply ﬁgures are accurate, and food is distributed equally across 
the population, no one starves. If there is starvation, it must be due to inequali- 
ties in distribution, not inadequate aggregate supply. 
Minimum human needs may be too modest a benchmark, however. The 
WFP has also published an estimate of normal human demand—that is, what 
was being consumed in North Korea before the famine (ﬁgure 2.7). Here the 
interpretation is more ambiguous. Starting in 1993, actual supply—produc- 
tion, imports, and aid—generally lies below the “normal human demand” line. 
However, this aggregate shortage disappears if one accepts Smith’s criticism 
that demand has been overestimated or if the North Korean government had 
continued to import grains on commercial terms and had continued to receive 
aid at the volumes that were actually given. On the “normal human demand” 
criterion, the severity of the North Korean situation depends on what weight 
puts on Smith’s demand-side critique, the North Korean government’s irre- 
sponsibility in not maintaining commercial food imports, and the extent to 
which the international community would have reduced aid if they had. 
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FIGURE 2.7. Scenarios of Food Supply and Normal Human Demand, 1990–2004 
Note: Demand Figures based on population data taken from the Bank of Korea and annual per capita 
consumption of 167kg in cereal equivalent. Counterfactual supply keeps 1994–2003 imports held at 
1993 level. Normal demand derived from FAO/WFP 1995. Sources: Production: USDAFAS: PSD 
database; Imports: Noland 2003; WFPINTERFAIS 2004, 2005b. 
 
One point is worth emphasizing strongly, however. Looking at the counter- 
factual supply ﬁgures, it appears that the additional imports required to close 
the supply gap were modest to the point of triviality. As we noted in the pre- 
vious section, there is considerable disagreement on a critical variable—local 
production—and for the mid-1990s some sources generate substantially lower 
estimates of local output. But substituting the quasi-oﬃcial FAO numbers for 
the USDA ﬁgures does not alter this analysis in any signiﬁcant way. A modest 
eﬀort to increase imports would have had a large ameliorative eﬀect. 
Finally, ﬁgure 2.8 reports an estimate of “normal total demand” constructed 
by taking the “normal human demand” ﬁgure and adding to it a generous pro- 
vision of 2.3 million metric tons (MT) for nonfood purposes such as livestock 
feed, the production of liquor, and postharvest losses.23 This ﬁgure is the maxi- 
mum nonhuman use number ever cited by the FAO/WFP, and some analysts 
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question whether it adequately takes into account reduced needs for livestock 
feed as a result of the herd culling that occurs in all famines; the inclusion of 
feed requirements probably biases the demand estimate upward (see Smith 1998 
and Lintner 2005). Using these ﬁgures, demand always exceeds supply. But it is 
important to underline that this shortfall does not imply an inability to meet 
basic needs but rather would reﬂect a failure to meet basic needs because alter- 
native uses were prioritized. On the basis of her extensive ﬁrsthand observation 
of the situation in the DPRK in 1995 and 1996, Susan Lautze reached exactly 
this conclusion and also conﬁrmed our emphasis on the signiﬁcance of for- 
eign exchange earnings for meeting overall domestic demand: “The DPRK has 
the opportunity and capacity to meet survival consumption food requirements 
through commercial avenues, including the prioritization of its scarce foreign 
exchange reserves for the commercial import of food” (1996:6). 
 
 
FIGURE 2.8. Scenarios of Food Supply and Normal Total Demand, 1990–2004 
Note: Demand Figures based on population data taken from the Bank of Korea and annual per capita 
consumption of 167kg in cereal equivalent. Counterfactual supply keeps 1994-2003 imports held at 
1993 level. Normal demand derived from FAO/WFP 1995. Sources: Production: USDAFAS: PSD 
database; Imports: Noland 2003; WFPINTERFAIS 2004, 2005b. 
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The analysis thus far has treated food as a nonstorable commodity that must 
be supplied annually. In fact, food is storable. The one institution in North Korea 
alleged to maintain substantial inventories is the military, with published esti- 
mates of military grain stockpiles ranging from around 400,000 metric tons to 
as high as 1.5 million metric tons, or something on the order of 5 percent to 20 
percent of normal annual demand (Lautze 1996, Noland 2000).24 If the military 
had large stockpiles entering the period of shortage, the government could have 
drawn these stocks down as an additional source of domestic supply. We cannot 
say for certain what the size of military inventories were, but if they existed and 
were not drawn down, it would only reinforce the argument that shortages were 
a function of distribution rather than a lack of aggregate supply. If military inven- 
tories were drawn down, then the domestic supply numbers are probably under- 
stated to some extent. But if the military was forced to disburse its accumulated 
stocks during the famine (as some contemporaneous reports claimed), it might 
also subsequently have sought to rebuild those inventories once conditions had 
eased. As a result, the supply ﬁgures following the worst of the famine may over- 
state eﬀective supply in more recent periods as the military began to restock. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Famines are complex political and social as well as economic events. In this 
chapter, we have begun our analysis by focusing on some of the longer-run 
factors that aﬀected overall food availability. The ﬁrst lesson is painfully simple: 
North Korea does not have a comparative advantage in the production of grain, 
and any eﬀort to go against that trend is likely to involve substantial ineﬃcien- 
cies. But the story of North Korean agriculture is not simply one of the sorts of 
ineﬃciencies that plague protected agriculture in a number of advanced indus- 
trial states or elsewhere in Asia, for example, in Japan and South Korea. Rather, 
North Korean strategy toward agriculture as well as toward the economy as a 
whole was based on a particularly rigid pursuit of self-suﬃciency that had the 
unintended and sadly ironic eﬀect of making the economy more rather than 
less vulnerable to external shocks. 
North Korea did experience a number of political and economic shocks in 
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, and they were severe. These included the changing 
trade behavior of the Soviet Union and China as well as weather-related disas- 
ters. These shocks contributed to a secular decline in domestic output. But a 
central point of this chapter is that total supply is not a function of domestic 
output alone. It also depends on the ability and willingness of the country to 
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maintain imports: by earning adequate foreign exchange through exports, by 
borrowing, or through timely appeals for international public assistance. 
The supply data and food balances we have outlined suggest that the capac- 
ity of the government to secure adequate external supplies in the ﬁrst half of 
the 1990s was erratic and tenuous. But even then, and with all the caution that 
should be used in approaching our balance sheet exercise, it is not clear that 
demand outstripped aggregate supply or that the country experienced a food 
availability famine. If the North Korean government had maintained access to 
commercial imports during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, the famine could have 
been avoided. Similarly, if it had treated the aid that it received as an additional 
increment to aggregate supply instead of oﬀsetting aid receipts by cutting com- 
mercial imports, and if the international community had accommodated this 
decision, it could have quite easily serviced normal human demands. Similarly, 
if the country’s priorities across alternative uses had been diﬀerent, it is quite 
possible that it could have serviced normal human demand. 
Regrettably, rather than using humanitarian assistance as an addition to domes- 
tic production and commercial sources of supply, the government used aid largely 
as balance-of-payments support, allowing it to allocate the savings in commercial 
imports to other priorities, including military ones and luxury imports for the 
elite. For example, in 1999, at the same time that it was cutting commercial grain 
imports to less than 200,000 metric tons, the government allocated scarce foreign 
exchange to the purchase of forty MiG-21 ﬁghters and eight military helicopters 
from Kazakhstan. Moreover, this was a period during which North Korea’s security 
situation had actually improved. The Agreed Framework ending the ﬁrst nuclear 
standoﬀ had been in place for nearly ﬁve years, and the country was making prog- 
ress, albeit slowly, on negotiating a number of remaining issues with the United 
States—particularly with respect to missiles—that could have led to improved dip- 
lomatic and economic relations. It is this combination of failure to adjust, falling 
commercial imports in the face of rising aid, and continued military expenditures 
and luxury imports in the face of famine deaths that constitutes the ﬁrst important 
piece of evidence in evaluating the government’s response to the famine. 
We again want to emphasize the caution with which our statistical analysis 
should be approached. Life in North Korea during the 1990s would have been 
diﬃcult under any set of policy choices. But the evidence does not support 
the pessimistic conclusion that a famine that killed hundreds of thousands of 
people was an inevitable result of external shocks and adverse weather condi- 
tions. To understand why demands a more careful consideration of domestic 
distributional issues and the management of foreign aid; we take these issues 
up in the next three chapters. 
  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Distribution of Misery 
Famine and the Breakdown of the Public Distribution System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The balance sheet approach laid out in the previous chapter provides the overall 
context for understanding the allocation of food in North Korea. Yet it does 
not get at the crucial distributional questions that are often at the heart of food 
emergencies and famines. We structure our discussion of these issues around a 
detailed analysis of the Public Distribution System and its eﬀective breakdown 
during the high famine period of 1994–98. The PDS was the major source of 
food for most North Koreans until the famine and thus implicitly a central 
pillar of political control. It remains an important if declining source of food 
to this day and also serves as the main conduit for the delivery of food aid. 
Understanding the PDS is therefore also crucial for our discussion of humani- 
tarian assistance in chapter 4. 
The main question we seek to address is how—and how equitably—food was 
distributed in the country. These issues are complex; access to food in North 
Korea has been a function of jobs and age, the season of the year, and, increas- 
ingly over time, cash income as well. We, however, place particular emphasis on 
the regional dimension of the crisis. Where people lived—in Pyongyang and the 
rice bowl of the country as opposed to the east coast and more remote mountain 
provinces of the north—made a big diﬀerence on how they fared. We show that 
the famine hit particularly hard at the urban working class of the cities and towns 
of the eastern provinces of the country (see also Smith 2005a, 2005b:83–87). 
Perceived political reliability inﬂuenced virtually all the factors that in turn 
aﬀected entitlements to food, including access to education, the nature of 
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employment, and place of residence. A full consideration of entitlements thus 
requires a closer look at features of the political system, most notably its com- 
plex system of political stratiﬁcation. 
Diﬀerences in entitlements naturally inﬂuenced mortality. We close the 
chapter with the debate over the famine’s overall death toll but also a con- 
sideration of how that mortality was distributed across diﬀerent groups. Our 
analysis of the PDS serves one additional purpose. The collapse of the PDS 
marked a fundamental change in the socialist system of entitlements. Local 
political oﬃcials and households responded by developing a variety of coping 
strategies, from the diversion of food by cooperative farmers, to the stripping of 
enterprise assets, to internal migration and foraging, to various forms of trade. 
When the famine had run its course, the government sought to reassert control. 
But as a consequence of both policy and these coping strategies, markets began 
to play an increasingly important role in the allocation food. The reforms of 
2002 that we take up in more detail in chapter 7 must be seen in this historical 
context. Reform should not necessarily be interpreted as an eﬀort to liberalize 
the economy. Rather, it can be interpreted as an eﬀort to control a process of 
decentralization and marketization that emerged out of the ashes of the PDS 
and was seen as a threat to the state’s political as well as economic control. 
 
The Public Distribution System and the System of Entitlements 
 
Under the PDS, each of the twelve provinces and special province-level munici- 
palities (Pyongyang, Namp’o, and Kaeso˘ng) has a Food Administration Depart- 
ment (FAO/WFP 1998b). Each of the more than two hundred counties and 
urban districts (seventeen cities and thirty-six urban districts) of the country 
also has a Food Administration Section and a warehouse. The county ware- 
house is the primary source of food supplies to the lower-level public distribu- 
tion centers (PDCs) throughout the county as well as the distribution channel 
for food commodities speciﬁcally allocated to institutions such as nurseries, 
kindergartens, and hospitals. Outside of food going to these institutions, the 
PDCs are the ﬁnal “retail” outlet for all cereal food distribution to the general 
public other than cooperative farmers. Each PDC covers a speciﬁc geographical 
area with population ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 families. 
Although the North Korean political and administrative system appears cen- 
tralized and hierarchical, it is in fact decentralized in several important respects 
and became more so as the food crisis deepened. One implication of the central 
government’s push for self-suﬃciency at the county and provincial levels was 
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that local authorities had to coordinate not only the supply of food but its 
demand as well. As a result, local oﬃcials exercised considerable inﬂuence over 
the distribution of food in their jurisdiction. 
The county level of government is an intermediary link between the pro- 
vincial level authorities and those at the village level. As we have discussed, the 
agricultural strategy of the government encouraged self-suﬃciency at fairly low 
levels of administrative organization. County-level warehouses are controlled 
by the county-level People’s Committees, which are made up of party function- 
aries and senior administrative cadre. These committees played an important 
role both in the collection of food—by transmitting targets and supervising 
grain collection from the cooperatives in their jurisdictions—and in allocating 
food to the ultimate “retail” sites. County-level party and administrative oﬃ- 
cials were also at the front line in coping with the shortfalls that spread across 
the country as the famine deepened. 
At the onset of the famine, the PDS distributed food to between 60 and 70 
percent of the population at highly subsidized prices (FAO/WFP 1996).1 The 
allocation of rations followed a complex system of occupational and age-related 
stratiﬁcation; table 3.1 shows these allocations at the beginning of the 1990s as 
well as estimates of the population falling in each group. This hierarchy of 
entitlements broke down in the 1990s and therefore should not be treated as a 
guide to how diﬀerent occupational groups fared; according to the ﬁrst direc- 
tor of the WFP operations in Pyongyang, the famine reduced the number of 
distinct PDS categories to three (Becker 1996). Nonetheless, several general 
points about this system are worth noting. 
First, for those in urban areas, the availability of food outside the PDS was 
extremely limited before the marketization of the 1990s and, more important, 
prohibitively costly. In 1992 a kilo of rice through the PDS cost .08 won; on 
the market, it sold for 25 won a kilo, over three hundred times the PDS price 
and approximately 35 percent of the average monthly wage (S. Lee 2003:table 
8–11). Control over access to food thus constituted one of the central elements of 
overall political and social control. 
Second, the distribution of food reﬂected quite openly the basic principles of 
stratiﬁcation in the socialist system. At the top of the hierarchy of entitlements 
were the military and special security forces and high-ranking government oﬃ- 
cials, as well as those engaged in heavy labor. Yet table 3.1 does not fully capture 
the system of privilege because the top ranks of the political class were also cen- 
trally rather than generally supplied, receiving their rations through the party 
or special suppliers within the government (S. Lee 2003:255); this fact is impor- 
tant when we take up the issue of diversion of food to the military and political 
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  TABLE 3.1. PDS Allocations and Population Estimates by Occupation  
Population distributionRatio of Rice to Corn 
 
Occupation and 
Age Group 
Per Capita 
Daily Ration 
(grams) 
 
 
(thousands) 
 
 
(%) 
 
Pyongyang 
Area 
 
 
Other Areas 
High-ranking gov- 
ernment 
oﬃcials 
700 4.8 0.02 10:0 10:0 
Regular laborers 600 [4905.45] 37.14 6:4 3:7 
Heavy-labor work- 
ers 
800 [4905.45] 18.95 6:4 3:7 
Oﬃce workers 600 1976.3 7.48 6:4 3:7 
Special security 800 [603.3] 2.28 7:3 7:3 
Military 700 [603.3] 2.28 6:4 3:7 
College students 600 591.7 2.24 6:4 3:7 
Secondary school 
students 
500 2182.5 8.26 6:4 3:7 
Primary school 
students 
400 2397.5 9.08 6:4 3:7 
Preschool students 300 1270.6 4.81 6:4 3:7 
Children under 3 
years 
100–200 1866 7.06 6:4 3:7 
Aged and disabled 300 104.9 0.40 6:4 3:7 
Source: Adapted from Kim, Lee and Sumner 1998. Note: Figures in brackets appear as such in original 
source to indicate that they were calculated under assumptions of the population distribution. Popula- 
tion ﬁgures for preschool students correspond to “Children under 6 years” in original source. 
 
 
elite in chapter 4.2 The military—which includes not only combat units but 
also an array of productive enterprises—maintained its own internal distribu- 
tion system. The Provisions Bureau, under the General Rear Services Bureau 
of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, had responsibility both for sup- 
plying rations to military units and for managing the military’s emergency war 
stockpiles of food and fuel. At the bottom of the hierarchy were children—who 
have lower caloric needs—but also the elderly and disabled. These vulnerable 
groups naturally became a central focus of the relief eﬀorts. 
Not noted in the table are the inmates of the country’s vast political prison 
system, which probably held roughly two hundred thousand prisoners, or just 
under 1 percent of the population. By numerous refugee accounts, the rations 
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allocated to prisoners were well below subsistence levels, suggesting a policy of 
deliberate starvation, and mortality levels were extremely high (see, e.g., Kang 
2002; Hawk 2003:25). 
These apparent principles of distribution do not fully capture the underlying 
system of entitlements, however, because assignment to these occupational cat- 
egories in turn rested to some extent on political status.3 Since the purges of the 
late 1950s, the Korean Workers’ Party has undertaken a succession of eﬀorts to 
investigate the class background of the population and to classify individuals in 
terms of their political reliability.4 These eﬀorts drew a basic distinction among 
“core,” wavering,” and “hostile” classes based on family background. The most 
recent eﬀort at categorization rested on a highly diﬀerentiated set of ﬁfty-one social 
groups. For example, families of workers, soldiers, or party members were consid- 
ered core; families of middle peasants, traders, and owners of small businesses were 
considered wavering. The government classiﬁed twenty-nine distinct groups as 
hostile, from families of rich peasants, to individuals with clear religious identities, 
to the intelligentsia and even returning Chinese and Japanese Koreans. 
Membership in these categories did not directly determine access to food, 
but it had powerful indirect eﬀects. Class position inﬂuenced membership and 
promotion in the party, access to education and housing, and work assignments 
and subsequent mobility. Class position also had important implications for resi- 
dence. Beginning in the late 1950s, members of the hostile class were relocated 
to remote parts of the country that experienced severe deprivation during the 
famine. Interestingly, many of the counties suspected of housing such internal 
exiles as well as the large-scale penal colonies for political prisoners have remained 
oﬀ-limits to external monitoring.5 By contrast, members of the core class were 
much more likely to gain residence in Pyongyang. By all accounts, residency in 
Pyongyang—which constitutes roughly 15 percent of the population—is a privi- 
lege. Its residents fare much better than those living elsewhere in the country and 
were protected to at least some extent from the worst of the famine. 
Finally, it is important to consider the question of the size and composi- 
tion of the elite in North Korea: those whom the government would seek to 
protect. A recent South Korean estimate from the mid-1990s suggested that the 
core class constituted 28 percent of the population,6 and the Korean Workers’ 
Party is relatively large by Communist standards; Armstrong (2001) estimates 
membership as high as 15 percent of the population. 
These relatively broad deﬁnitions of favored groups are much too inclusive, 
however. The core class includes families with working-class and peasant back- 
grounds who were by no means elite. The party includes low-level cadre at the 
village and work-unit level who were almost certainly not protected during the 
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famine. The military, security, and high-ranking government and party oﬃcials 
constitute only 6 percent of all those receiving rations in this form. Nonethe- 
less, there is ample evidence, including from a speech attributed to Kim Jo˘ng- 
il himself, that the military was not fully protected from food shortages and 
hunger (1996). The very ﬁrst reports to leak out of the country in 1993 came 
from military defectors who noted problems of malnutrition within the army 
(Associated Press 1993; Becker 1996). Nor was residency in Pyongyang a guar- 
antee. Accounts by expatriates living in Pyongyang report signs of food short- 
ages during the famine (e.g., Harrold 2004)—although not of starvation—and 
from at least 1998 if not before, the North Korean government has made eﬀorts 
to reduce the size of Pyongyang and other provincial cities by relocating people 
to rural areas (KINU 2004:31–32). 
It is impossible to say what the size of the protected population was; for the 
purpose of estimating the death toll, we estimate that four million people were 
probably protected from extreme deprivation through one means or another (resi- 
dence in Pyongyang, party connections, being in the military). But it is too facile 
to say that the North Korean government simply protected the elite while allowing 
others to starve, unless by “elite” we mean a narrow circle of the very top party, 
government, and military leadership.7 Many if not most of this group of four mil- 
lion almost certainly experienced food shortages and even hunger at some time 
during the famine. The food crisis of the 1990s thus cut at the very base of the 
regime’s support and posed serious problems of political legitimacy and control. 
 
The Distribution of Food in the Countryside 
 
Two groups fell partly or entirely outside of the PDS. Workers on state farms 
that specialized in nongrain production received six months rations shortly after 
the harvest; for the other six months of the year, they relied on the PDS. The 
overwhelming share of farm households—roughly 90 percent—worked on the 
cooperative farms created through collectivization. Cooperatives are given pro- 
duction targets each year in the spring, although targets are adjusted—in eﬀect, 
renegotiated—depending on the harvest. Cooperative farms paid the govern- 
ment for inputs, but individuals were allowed to supplement their rations by 
maintaining family plots.8 Cooperative farms also retained the grain for annual 
farm household rations, which were distributed after the main harvest in Octo- 
ber.9 These rations, determined by the government, were subtracted from pro- 
duction before it was sold to the state at prescribed prices.10 In addition, coop- 
eratives retained prescribed quantities of cereals for seed and livestock. 
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This system is somewhat diﬀerent from that in other socialist countries since 
farm households do not surrender all grain and thus have a direct claim on the 
harvest (S. Lee 2003). Of course, the government sets production targets, farm- 
ers’ rations, and the prices cooperative and state farms have to pay for inputs; 
all these decisions are interdependent and aﬀect the ﬁnal availability of food to 
farmers. But the government faced several daunting strategic problems when- 
ever they sought to increase procurement from cooperatives and farm house- 
holds. These problems were particularly critical at the height of the famine but 
remain relevant to this day.11 
First, and at the broadest level, the socialist grain procurement system rests 
on a fundamental exchange between the government and cultivators. The farm- 
ers surrender grain at prices well below what they could command on the 
market, but they receive in return an allotment of food and a bundle of inputs 
and consumer goods. Yet, as we have shown, the ability of the government to 
uphold its end of the bargain was severely impaired as external sources of inputs 
dried up and the industrial economy went into decline. The government was 
increasingly unable to provide the most basic inputs on which agricultural pro- 
duction depended: fertilizer and the energy required to maintain the country’s 
irrigation system. Nor did the industrialization strategy historically favor the 
production of consumer goods. As a result, the terms of trade between agricul- 
ture and industry were increasingly unfavorable to the farmers as the economy 
contracted. The surrender of grain to the government no doubt looked more 
and more like a one-sided deal or conﬁscatory tax. 
Second, the government historically allocated relatively generous rations for 
farmers, equivalent to those for heavy manual laborers. If the allocation to 
farmers were cut sharply—or if farmers had the expectation that it might be 
cut, for example, in response to reduced yields or adverse weather—households 
had strong incentives to protect themselves. They could do this by: 
 
• preharvesting grain so that it would not be subject to the harvesttime 
procurement; 
• hiding and hoarding food once harvested; 
• diverting eﬀort into the private plots allowed to state and cooperative 
farmers and into altogether illegal plots that were maintained secretly on 
marginal lands; 
• diverting food into various forms of exchange, either for cash or through 
barter, where they could earn very high returns as shortages became more 
severe; 
• remitting food to family members in the city. 
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We only have hints at the magnitude of these behaviors, but they were almost 
certainly signiﬁcant and constitute the main reason why the production num- 
bers reviewed in chapter 2 are not reﬂective of the actual availability of grain. 
Production data do not speak to the crucial issue of the share of the harvest 
that actually ﬁnds its way into the distribution system. We analyze this issue 
quantitatively in chapter 4. 
A ﬁnal problem the government faced has to do with the way food is distrib- 
uted to farmers as opposed to those dependent on the PDS. Once the alloca- 
tion is made to farmers at the time of the harvest, they have the relative security 
of those stocks. Those dependent on the PDS, by contrast, receive their rations 
every two weeks and are at the mercy of government largesse. As a result, it is 
easier for the government to impose the costs of any disruption in supply on 
the PDS rather than on farmers, which it could only do by recollecting grain 
already allocated. Again, this is precisely what appeared to happen; the PDS 
became increasingly erratic in its delivery of food, with long stretches of very 
low rations or none at all. 
 
The Breakdown of the PDS 
 
Although we talk about the breakdown of the PDS system during the famine, 
there is evidence that it had not been functioning for some time before that. 
Choi and Koo (2005) document problems with the PDS extending well back 
into the 1980s. As Soviet aid was terminated after 1987, daily grain rations 
distributed through the PDS—which oﬃcially had been 600 to 700 grams for 
most urban dwellers and 700 to 800 grams for high oﬃcials, military person- 
nel, and heavy laborers—were cut by 10 percent. In 1991, as economic diﬃcul- ties 
worsened, the government launched a “let’s eat two meals a day” campaign, 
though according to former East German ambassador Hans Maretzki, cam- 
paigns to suppress food consumption were already under way in the late 1980s. 
In 1992 rations were cut yet another 10 percent.12 
The erratic performance of the PDS before the famine is conﬁrmed by refu- 
gee interviews. The Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement conducted the earliest 
systematic refugee interviews in late 1997 through the ﬁrst half of 1998 (KBSM 
1998). This sample is biased in two important respects. First, just over half the 
respondents are from North and South Hamgyo˘ng provinces, which were hit 
particularly hard by the shortages. Second, their very refugee status suggests 
that they were among the most vulnerable—although perhaps the most entre- 
preneurial—in their particular locations. 
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Despite these possible sources of bias, it is revealing that almost 30 percent of 
the interviewees reported that regular food distribution had stopped by 1993 and 
that 93 percent said that such distribution had stopped by 1996 (table 3.2). 
Similar evidence of the decline of the PDS is found in a pair of well-designed 
studies conducted by the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, the ﬁrst based 
on interviews of 440 adult refugees done in September 1998 (Robinson et al. 
1999), the second based on a larger sample of 2,692 refugees conducted from 
July 1999 to June 2000 (Robinson et al. 2001). The ﬁrst Hopkins study reported 
average  daily  rations  for  1994  of  only  150  grams  per  day.  By  1997,  however, 
reported rations had fallen to only 30 grams per person per day. The 1999–2000 
interviews yielded similar ﬁndings. For 1995 respondents reported receiving only 
120 grams per person per day; by 1998 this had fallen to 60 grams. 
Outside of these refugee interviews, we do not have consistent data on PDS 
deliveries from the government itself until the fall of 1995 when the inter- 
national relief eﬀort began. The data reported in ﬁgure 3.1 were provided by 
North Korean authorities to the World Food Programme/UN Food and Agri- 
cultural Organization assessment teams that began to visit the country regularly 
beginning in the fall of 1995. Unfortunately, they, too, are potentially subject to 
bias. The North Korean authorities arguably had incentives to understate food 
deliveries in order to maximize external support. Moreover, as with the food 
balance information we reviewed in chapter 2, these averages mask important 
distributional diﬀerences across regions and groups; we take these diﬀerences 
up in more detail below. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.2. Answers to Question “When Did Regular Food Distribution Stop?” 
  (September 1997–May 1998)  
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
People 
 
 
Percent 
Percent 
Providing 
Date 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Providing Date 
1992 or before 137 13.4 14.5 14.5 
1993 136 13.3 14.4 28.9 
1994 329 32.3 34.9 63.8 
1995 287 28.2 30.4 94.2 
1996 or after 55 5.4 5.8 100 
Unknown 75 7.4 – – 
Total “1,019” 100 – – 
Source: Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (1998) 
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FIGURE 3.1. Estimates of Daily per Capita PDS Rations 
Note: In most cases, averages are taken directly from the source. Otherwise, they are calculated as the 
simple average of the estimates for diﬀerent cohorts throughout the marketing year. Source: NAO/ 
WFP (various publications); Natsios 2001. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the overall picture of the evolution of the PDS suggested by 
this data is broadly consistent with that generated by the refugee interviews. 
Four points are worth noting. First, average distribution under the PDS for the 
period never reaches the absolute minimum need of approximately 457 grams 
per day necessary to provide 1,600 calories. Even if we make the 20 percent 
adjustment used in chapter 2 to account for the fact that the North Korean diet 
typically has other sources of calories—generating a minimum consumption 
ﬁgure of 365 grams per day—the average ration still consistently falls below it. 
Second, while we would expect average rations to fall steadily from 1995–96 
through 1998, the peak famine period, PDS rations do not recover after that 
point despite the increase in humanitarian assistance and the partial revival of 
production beginning in 1998. This can be seen in more detail in the monthly 
estimates we have extracted from WFP reports from 2000 through May 2004, 
when such reports were terminated (ﬁgure 3.2). In some months, rations get up 
to 350 grams, but in no month do they equal the 450-gram minimum. 
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FIGURE 3.2. PDS Rations, January 2000–May 2004. 
Source: Humanitarian Development Resource Center for DPR Korea. 
 
 
A third point concerns farmers; the one important exception to the rela- 
tively constant PDS rations in the postfamine period pertains to this group. 
As ﬁgure 3.1 shows clearly, farmers’ rations turn upward with the fall harvest in 
1999. This change was almost certainly a conscious policy decision, as the very 
low rations allocated to farmers at the harvests of 1995 and 1996 were undoubt- 
edly responsible for the diﬃculties the government had in procuring grain. If 
we consider that farmers also have easier access to other foodstuﬀs—not to 
mention any grain they can divert and cash income they can generate from 
trade—it is clear that at least some portion of the rural population ended up 
faring somewhat better in the wake of the famine, and perhaps even during 
it, than the urban populations. The obvious exception would have been those 
areas directly aﬀected by the ﬂoods. 
Finally, it is important to underscore that these numbers mask important 
seasonal ﬂuctuations that constitute one of the most serious problems with 
the breakdown of the PDS. Historically, the months of April through June are 
the lean or hungry months in Korea: stocks from the previous fall harvest are 
running low, and early crops have not yet come in yet. In North Korea during 
the famine, this lean season would begin as early as December, and rations 
would fall to nominal amounts or nothing at all; this pattern was repeated in 
the spring of 1998 and again in 1999, when rations basically ceased. The period 
2002–03 showed more even estimates of grain across seasons resulting from 
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increased shipments from South Korea, although levels remained low. But the 
data in ﬁgure 3.2 for 2000 and 2001—well after the peak of the famine had 
past—still show sharp seasonality in PDS deliveries. 
 
The Famine Unfolds 
 
A decline in food availability is not typically distributed across the population 
evenly. Food shortages among some sectors of the population, and even famine 
and starvation, can occur within the context of adequate aggregate food avail- 
ability.13 The distribution of shortages across groups thus tells us something 
about both de jure and de facto entitlements. 
In tracing the unfolding of the famine, it is useful to focus in the ﬁrst 
instance on its geographic incidence and spread.14 As regionalized crises 
appeared, beginning in the northeast of the country, the government had  
to make strategic decisions about how to respond. In the absence of timely 
external supplies, the government would have had to reallocate grain aggres- 
sively across provinces.15 The government, however, faced not only declin- 
ing domestic production but also increasing diﬃculties in procuring grain 
and the simultaneous breakdown of the country’s transport system. As a 
result, the capability of the government to move food across provinces was 
severely impaired. 
Despite the earlier shortages noted above, 1994 probably marked the onset 
of famine conditions. As we indicated in chapter 2, that year was characterized 
not only by a continuing deterioration in North Korea’s economy and external 
position but a sharp reduction in maize imports from China. Moreover, table 
3.3 suggests a second, equally important problem: a weak harvest in the north- 
east of the country. The data on regional production come from North Korea’s 
report to the ﬁrst roundtable discussions at the United Nations in 1998 (UNDP 
1998), a meeting with donors designed to outline a broad rehabilitation pro- 
gram. The North Koreans might have exaggerated the extent of the overall drop 
in production. Nonetheless, we see no clear reason why they would misrepre- 
sent the relative performance of diﬀerent provinces. The northeast provinces 
(South and North Hamgyo˘ng and Yanggang) are colder, have shorter growing 
seasons, and produce less rice. Yields for maize, the dominant food crop, have 
historically been lower than in other regions. If per capita production in the 
northeastern provinces dropped to 153 kilograms per person as oﬃcial data sug- 
gests, it would fall below the ability of these provinces even to meet the reduced 
ration of the time (S. Lee 2003:238). 
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  TABLE 3.3. Provincial Grain Production, 1989–97 (Index, 1989–92 = 100)  
 
 1989–92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Pyongyang, Namp’o 
and Kaeso˘ng 
100 116 69 48 36 37 
South and North 100 113 91 33 24 29 
Phyongan       
South and North 
Hamgyo˘ng 
100 61 73 44 28 18 
South and North 100 111 70 42 25 38 
Hwanghae       
Kangwo˘n 100 86 89 50 22 19 
Total 100 104 80 40 27 31 
Source: S. Lee 2003.       
 
 
But the problem was even more severe than these numbers suggest because 
of the economic geography of this part of the country. Two issues stand out, one 
having to do with the urban populations of the northeast, the other with rural 
ones. Table 3.4 shows the government’s estimate of the distribution of popula- 
tion by province and the share of the population in each province dependent 
on the PDS, which correlates closely to the level of urbanization. The entire 
country  is  relatively  urbanized,  but  North  and  South  Hamgyo˘ng  and Yang- 
gang provinces are at or above the mean. The coastal cities in the Hamgyo˘ng 
provinces were the backbone of the country’s heavy industrial base in sectors 
such as steel, chemicals, and fertilizer: Hamhu˘ng-Hu˘ngnam (1993 population, 
701,000);  Cho˘ngjin  (520,000);  Tanch’o˘n  (284,000);  Kimch’aek  (179,000); 
Sinp’o (158,000) (City Population 2003). These cities were devastated by the 
collapse of foreign inputs and of the energy system but at the same time almost 
completely dependent on the PDS. 
On the other hand, Yanggang and the western parts of North Hamgyo˘ng 
Province contain some of the most mountainous terrain in the country. 
Although much more sparsely populated, these areas are also highly dependent 
on the PDS. Moreover, they are not easily accessible for relief eﬀorts even in 
the best of times, let alone when the transport infrastructure has been severely 
compromised. 
At this critical juncture, the government took some fateful decisions. Grain 
rations to farmers had already been reduced, but the government took the 
further step of trying to recollect part of the grain that already been distrib- 
uted among farm households (Ahn 1996:251). This decision no doubt triggered 
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TABLE 3.4. Government Estimates of Population by Province and Food 
  Category (thousands)  
Population Percentage 
Province Total (% of Total) Agricultural PDS* 
 
Pyongyang 3,044 -13 8 92 
S. Phyongan 3,100 -14 27 73 
N. Phyongan 2,625 -12 40 60 
Chagang 1,232 -5 28 72 
S. Hwanghae 2,290 -10 49 51 
N. Hwanghae 1,734 -8 40 60 
Kangwo˘n 1,467 -7 31 69 
S. Hamgyo˘ng 2,932 -13 31 69 
N. Hamgyo˘ng 2,227 -10 22 78 
Ryanggang 703 -3 21 79 
Kaeso˘ng 386 -2 35 65 
Namp’o 814 -4 18 82 
Total 22,554 -100 29 71 
* Includes 767,000 service personnel 
Source: FAO/WFP 1999b, table 6) 
 
 
some of the behaviors that have been described above: hoarding, preharvesting, 
diverting eﬀort into private plots, and diverting yield to the market. Even more 
important was the apparent decision to cut domestic grain shipments to the 
northeast, a decision Natsios refers to as “triage” (2001:106). 
The claim about triage has echoed through the literature on the North 
Korean famine and, if true, would appear to constitute a damning indictment 
of the regime. Nonetheless, the metaphor is unclear, and much of the evidence 
cited for the claim is circumstantial.16 Does triage imply that the government 
was protecting stocks—perhaps on security grounds—that could have relieved 
the distress? Was the government explicitly refusing to ship grain from prov- 
inces producing a surplus in order to protect politically favored jurisdictions? 
Or had stocks been drawn down, and was the government struggling to pro- 
cure adequate supplies and distribute them in the face of a general breakdown 
in the transport system?17 The ethical implications of these diﬀerent possibili- 
ties are obviously not the same. 
We do not know for sure which of these conditions pertained, but there is 
one more direct source of evidence that the government was eﬀectively limiting 
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food distribution to the east coast. That evidence stems from the government’s 
posture toward the foreign aid that started to ﬂow in late 1995. From the begin- 
ning of the relief eﬀort, the government focused relief and monitoring eﬀorts 
on the west coast and insisted that food be delivered through the main west 
coast port of Namp’o despite the fact that the transportation system linking the 
west and east coasts had broken down. Not until May 1997 was an agreement 
reached with the North Korean government that permitted direct shipments 
to  the  east  coast  through  Ch’o˘ngjin.  Not  until  July  was  the  ﬁrst  delivery  to 
Ch’o˘ngjin actually made, and even then the east coast received only one-third 
of a 25,000-ton shipment (WFP 1997). Natsios’s analysis of shipping manifests 
comes to the conclusion that during all of 1997–98 only 18 percent of all WFP 
aid was shipped to eastern ports despite the fact that these provinces consti- 
tuted approximately a third of the prefamine population and had a high overall 
dependence on the PDS (1999:108). 
Nor is there any evidence that Chinese food shipments—the main source of 
food outside of the WFP—were targeted to the east coast. Although relatively 
small amounts of food no doubt leaked across the Tumen River, the major 
rail and shipping links between China and North Korea are along the west 
coast. Moreover, we know that the North Korean authorities denied that the 
east coast was facing particular problems, despite clear refugee evidence to the 
contrary. Either the government did not have information on the extent of the 
distress or it was willfully ignoring it. 
The ﬂoods of July and August 1995 marked a new stage both in the famine 
and in the relationship with donors. In approaching the international com- 
munity, the government quickly presented extraordinarily high estimates of 
the damage from the ﬂoods: 5.4 million people displaced—roughly a quarter 
of the population—330,000 hectares of agricultural land destroyed, 1.9 million 
tons of grain lost, and total damage of $15 billion. As can be seen from table 
3.3, the North Koreans reported a dramatic decline in food production across 
all regions of the country in that year. Again, even if these numbers are exagger- 
ated, the variation across provinces is notable. Early UN assessments found that 
the bulk of the crop damage (61 percent) and displaced persons (67 percent) 
came  from  the  three  northwestern  provinces  of  North  and  South  P’yo˘ng’an 
and Chagang (S. Lee 2003:238). This assessment was subsequently conﬁrmed 
by detailed analysis using satellite imagery that suggested that as much as 42 
percent of the total paddy area in the entire country was aﬀected by the ﬂood- 
ing, but with a high concentration of damage in the northwest (Okamoto, 
Yamakawa, and Kawashima 1997). 
In responding to food emergencies, timing is crucial. Although the govern- 
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ment had been making some belated eﬀorts to secure commercial supplies and 
bilateral aid, the ﬂoods led the government to make an appeal for multilateral 
assistance through the UN on August 23. This got the wheels of the interna- 
tional humanitarian machinery moving, but initial commitments were modest: 
20, 250 tons of rice and 675 tons of vegetable oil, or enough to meet the con- 
sumption needs of 500,000 ﬂood-aﬀected people for three months. The second 
appeal—and the ﬁrst of real substance—was not even issued until July 1, 1996, 
and the ﬁrst shipment resulting from that appeal did not arrive until August, 
well past the shortages of the lean months that the ﬂood damage would have 
severely exacerbated (WFP 1996). 
The harvest of 1995 therefore once again presented the central government 
with a crucial dilemma. The government could seek to increase procurement 
from the farms in the face of an increasingly generalized shortfall but at the risk 
of generating the behaviors we have noted: preharvesting, hoarding, diversion 
of eﬀort, and informal exchange. According to an assessment conducted by the 
WFP in the spring of 1996, the government chose to reduce farmers’ rations at 
the time of the harvest quite dramatically: from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms 
(Nathanail 1996:25). As ﬁgure 3.1 indicates, this is well below minimum human 
need. If farmers had not started their course of active and passive resistance to 
the government before this time, then the eﬀorts to increase procurement in   
the wake of the ﬂoods would certainly have triggered it. 
The most striking evidence we have for farmers’ behavior comes from two 
sources. The ﬁrst is the FAO/WFP crop assessment made in December 1996. 
This assessment estimates the losses from the ﬂoods at roughly 300,000 met- 
ric tons but notes—almost in passing—that fully half of the maize crop of 
2.3 million metric tons was lost. The WFP’s interpretation is that this grain 
was consumed in August and September because of hunger. Natsios is worth 
quoting at length on this point: “The weakness of [the FAO/WFP explanation 
for the disappearance of the maize crop] becomes more apparent when one 
calculates the population’s consumption requirements. At a minimal  ration, 
15,000 MT of grain will feed one million people per month, which means    that 
345,000 MT of grain would feed the entire country for a month, and 1.3 million 
MT [somewhat more than the estimated losses] would feed the entire country 
for nearly four months” (1999:115). The magnitude of the loss of the corn 
harvest once again puts claims about the eﬀects of the ﬂoods into per- spective. 
The government claimed ﬂood-related losses of 1.9 million MT. That amount is 
certainly higher than the sum of the WFP estimate of 300,000 MT   of ﬂood-
related damage and 1.15 million MT of lost maize crop, or a total of 
1.45 million MT of lost grain. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
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that the government was including lost stocks that were in fact estimated in the 
600,000 metric ton range. 
But the implicit explanation for the shortfall is very diﬀerent in the two 
cases: one emphasizes natural causes, while the other places more emphasis on 
the problems the government faced with farmers. Farmers were well informed 
about the extent of the ﬂood—they were aﬀected by the same weather sys- 
tems—and motivated not only by hunger but also by the desire to hoard food 
in anticipation of still further cuts in their rations. 
The second piece of evidence on farmers’ behavior comes directly from the 
leadership itself. In Kim Jo˘ng-il’s speech at Kim Il-so˘ng University referred to 
above, he acknowledged that the food shortage was the most urgent problem 
facing the government. Curiously, he makes only passing reference to natural 
disasters. “Currently the farmers and miners are hiding food at every opportu- 
nity,” he points out and acknowledges black market activities. The eﬀect: “we 
cannot supply our military with rice.” Kim Jo˘ng-il goes on to admonish the 
party both to undertake practical projects that will help solve the food prob- 
lem—such as growing vegetables—and to raise the consciousness of farmers to 
the crisis and thus elicit higher contributions from them. “If we say you should 
eat only 450g a day and the remains should be sent to the army then they will 
agree” (1996).18 
The ﬁnal phases of the famine, from the 1996 harvest through the 1998 
harvest, saw a more generalized spread of distress. Again, weather played a 
role, with ﬂoods in 1996 now aﬀecting North and South Hwanghae prov- 
inces, Kangwo˘n Province and Kaeso˘ng Municipality, which together produce 
some 60 percent of the country’s food grain, principally rice. The FAO/WFP 
assessment team estimated losses as a result of these ﬂoods at 300,000 tons of 
grain. The 1997 growing season began auspiciously with good rains in May, but 
the country then experienced severe drought, a typhoon in August, and thus 
another severe challenge to the harvest in 1998 with a particular decline—per- 
haps as much as 50 percent—in the maize harvest. 
Yet it is important to underscore that 1997 and 1998 also saw an increase in 
external supply as the aid eﬀort ramped up. Thus, even if we accept the govern- 
ment’s ﬁgures of a sharper decline in production in 1996 and 1997 than is suggested 
by other external estimates, aggregate supply did not change much in 1997–1998. 
What did change is that more grain was being consumed or distributed outside 
of oﬃcial channels and the government abandoned even the pretense of consis- 
tent public supply. In June 1997, the WFP/FAO reported that the government 
admitted that rations since the ﬁrst of the year had been as low as 100–200 grams 
and even went so far as to announce the precise dates, by province, on which 
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supplies would be exhausted and PDS deliveries would cease altogether. These 
announcements were no doubt designed to inﬂuence the donors to accelerate 
shipments, but the truth remains that the PDS had eﬀectively collapsed, leaving 
work units and households to depend entirely on their own eﬀorts. 
 
Tracking the Distribution of Misery 
 
With the relatively strong harvest of 1998 and the upturn in foreign assistance, 
the worst of the famine was probably over by the end of the year. How was the 
misery of the famine distributed? Who had been most seriously aﬀected? 
One interpretation is that the famine was a classic food availability fam- 
ine and that the government did all in its power to distribute food as equally 
as it could (S. Lee 2003, 2005; Woo-Cumings 2002). In such a setting, the 
command-and-control features of the socialist system might even have been 
an advantage because of the power of the state to command and reallocate 
resources. Under this interpretation, while a very small core elite might have 
been shielded altogether from the famine’s eﬀects, the rest of the population 
shared relatively equally in the declining food that was available. 
Three types of data allow us to test this claim, at least for 1997–98: variation 
in provincial production of grain, variation in farmers’ rations by province, 
and variation in provincial distribution through the PDS. These data show that 
while production varied enormously across provinces, the government main- 
tained a relatively common target for farmers’ rations in 1997. If we consider 
the problems that the government faced procuring grain following the 1994–96 
harvests, then the eﬀort to raise farmers’ rations and to keep them constant 
across provinces was almost certainly a conscious eﬀort to limit diversion. 
A consideration of the PDS data in table 3.5, however, suggests anything but 
equality across provinces. Using data supplied by the government on the supply 
of food to the PDS population by provinces and the share of the population 
dependent on the PDS, we can calculate the per person allocation of grain across 
provinces during the last part of the famine, from September 1997 through April 
1999.19  The diﬀerences are striking. Pyongyang consistently comes out on top, 
sometimes receiving per person rations that are nearly twice those in less protected 
provinces. Chagang and the rice bowl of South Hwanghae also see higher alloca- 
tions, while two cities—Namp’o and Kaeso˘ng—and the northwest and northeast 
provinces fare much less well. The government appears to do a quite remarkable 
job of allocating grain after the harvest of 1998; indeed, the uniformity of distribu- 
tion is even suspicious. But by that point, the worst of the famine had passed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  TABLE 3.5. Monthly PDS Allocations, November 1997–April 1999 (kg per person)  
 Nov. 97 Dec. 97 Jan. 98 Feb. 98 Mar Apr– 
Aug 98 
Sep-98 Oct. 98 Nov. 98 Dec. 98 Jan. 99 Feb. 99 Mar. 99 Apr. 99 
Pyongyang 9.9 9.9 7.4 4.9 1.0 0.0 3.7 3.7 8.5 8.5 5.6 5.6 4.2 0.9 
S. Phyongan 6.6 6.6 4.9 3.3 0.7 0.0 2.5 2.5 8.6 8.6 0.6 0.6 4.3 0.9 
N. Phyongan 6.4 6.4 4.8 3.2 0.6 0.0 1.6 1.6 9.1 9.1 6.0 6.0 4.4 1.0 
Chagang 10.5 10.5 7.9 5.2 1.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 8.7 8.7 5.7 5.7 4.3 0.9 
S. Hwanghae 8.8 8.8 6.6 4.4 0.9 0.0 3.3 3.3 8.2 8.2 5.5 5.5 4.1 0.9 
N. Hwanghae 8.8 8.8 5.3 3.6 0.7 0.0 2.3 2.3 8.0 8.0 5.3 5.3 3.9 0.8 
Kangwo˘n 5.6 5.6 4.1 2.8 0.5 0.0 1.4 1.4 7.9 7.9 5.3 5.3 4.0 0.9 
S. Hamgyn 6.7 6.7 5.0 3.4 0.6 0.0 1.3 1.3 8.5 8.5 5.7 5.7 4.3 0.9 
N. Hamgyo˘n 7.5 7.5 5.8 3.9 0.7 0.0 1.5 1.5 8.5 8.5 5.6 5.6 4.2 0.9 
Ryanggang 9.5 9.5 7.0 4.7 0.9 0.0 1.9 1.9 8.3 8.3 5.6 5.6 4.1 0.9 
Kaeso˘ng 8.2 8.2 6.0 4.0 0.8 0.0 1.8 1.8 7.2 7.2 4.8 4.8 3.6 0.8 
Namp’o 6.8 6.8 5.1 3.4 0.6 0.0 1.7 1.7 8.2 8.2 5.5 5.5 4.0 0.9 
Total 7.9 7.9 5.8 3.9 0.7 0.0 2.3 2.3 8.4 8.4 4.9 4.9 4.2 0.9 
Note: Calculated as monthly PDS allocation to province as a share of the province’s PDS-dependent population. 
Sources: November 1997–October1998: FAO/WFP (1998b, table 6); November 1998—April 1999: FAO/WFP (1999a, table 3); Population by province: FAO/WFP 
(1999b, table 6) 
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Further insight into regional diﬀerences emerges from refugee interviews. 
Starting in September 1997 and continuing over a period of more than a year, 
the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (later Good Friends) researchers 
interviewed nearly two thousand North Korean refugees in the Chinese border 
area. These interviews combined more open-ended testimonials with structured 
questions designed to document the rise in mortality, the decline in birth rates, 
and the coping behavior of households (see, e.g., KBSM 1998; Good Friends 
1998, 2004). As the Good Friends researchers freely admitted, the interview- 
ees were not randomly selected and overrepresented both geographical regions 
close to the Chinese border, particularly the northeast, and households that 
were the most vulnerable relative to the nation as a whole. Nonetheless, with 
the appropriate cautions and adjustments, the Good Friends work tells us a 
tremendous amount about the famine. 
An update of earlier research by Good Friends (1998) based on a sample 
of 1,694 refugees asks which areas they believe were the hardest hit. Sixty-two 
percent said South Hamgyo˘ng, 23 percent said North Hamgyo˘ng, and 22 per- 
cent said other provinces; only 9 percent said that provinces were experiencing 
equal levels of distress. These responses gain some credence because they do not 
simply mirror the residences of the refugees. Nearly 60 percent of respondents 
came  from  North  Hamgyo˘ng  and  only  20  percent  from  South  Hamgyo˘ng; 
nonetheless, a substantial majority saw the latter province as the more seri- 
ously aﬀected. Information on mortality provides further conﬁrmation of these 
regional diﬀerences. The average mortality of all respondents’ families in the 
sample is 28.7 percent, but this ranges from a low of 16.7 percent for Pyongyang 
to 32.1 percent for South Hamgyo˘ng and 32.9 percent for Chagang. 
A plausible reason for this diﬀerence between the two provinces is that it was 
somewhat easier for the residents of North Hamgyo˘ng to move across the bor- 
der or to beneﬁt from black-market exchanges and trade. These responses also 
provide more circumstantial support for Natsios’s claim with respect to triage, 
particularly when we consider that food aid did not start to ﬂow directly into 
the northeast until the second half of 1997. As we discuss in chapter 7, UN- 
sponsored nutritional surveys provide striking evidence of regional disparities 
in nutritional status and modest support for the notion that South Hamgyo˘ng 
was disadvantaged relative to North Hamgyo˘ng. 
Both the nature of the PDS and the interview evidence suggest that the 
most severely aﬀected were urban households in the disadvantaged provinces.20 
Without any direct claim on the harvest, with no access to private sources 
of supply, and with inadequate money wages to command food through the 
relatively limited market channels, urban workers and their families were com- 
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pletely at the mercy of a faltering PDS. This ﬁnding also gets support from ref- 
ugee interviews. In the 1998 Good Friends study just cited, the overwhelming 
majority—88.7 percent of those answering—said that urban areas were more 
severely aﬀected than rural ones. Only 9.5 percent said that urban and rural 
areas fared the same, and only a handful of respondents—1.8 percent—said 
that rural residents did worse. 
The occupational data on mortality from the 1998 survey also provides a 
number of interesting clues about the breakdown of the urban industrial econ- 
omy (table 3.6).21 As we would expect, oﬃce workers, professionals, and sol- 
diers—in descending order of vulnerability—were more protected than other 
occupational groups. Although manual laborers constitute the largest group of 
family members, they also show somewhat lower than average mortality rates. 
What is striking is the large number of family members who are identiﬁed 
as jobless. While this could be capturing the elderly, refugee testimonials sug- 
gest that factories in the major industrial cities were eﬀectively left idle by the 
absence of inputs and energy. New investment, and thus construction, had 
also ground to a complete halt. Despite the guarantee of employment that 
the socialist economy presumably provides, the industrial sector was almost 
certainly going through a process of informalization quite similar to that seen 
in other developing countries during economic crises. Some strata of more 
marginal workers—perhaps in sectors such as construction, in less favored cit- 
ies and industries—were undoubtedly the very hardest hit. 
 
 
  TABLE 3.6. Mortality Rate by Occupation  
 
Occupation Family Members Mortality Mortality Rate 
Manual labor 2,398 441 18.4 
Oﬃce worker 633 75 11.8 
Professional 43 3 7.0 
Farmer 296 71 24.0 
Student 1,951 336 17.2 
Soldier 217 13 6.0 
Housekeeper 284 95 33.5 
Other 122 27 22.1 
Jobless 1,769 807 45.6 
Unknown 1,536 785 51.1 
Total 9,249 2,653 28.7 
Source: WFProgramme 1998.   
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What about the rural sector? It is revealing that only a small share of the 
refugees interviewed—3.2 percent—were farmers, but whether this reﬂected 
tighter control at the village level and greater diﬃculty of movement or better 
material circumstances is diﬃcult to say. Although the share of farmers in the 
Good Friends sample is small, the reported mortality rate among farm families 
is only slightly lower than the mean (24 percent vs. 28 percent). Even if in prin- 
ciple the allocation granted to farmers was relatively even across the country, 
the weather resulted in regional and more localized production shortfalls that 
pushed cooperative farm supplies near or below subsistence thresholds. 
Thus, while farmers as a whole undoubtedly did better than urban dwellers, 
residence mattered: farmers living in areas strongly aﬀected by the ﬂoods and 
drought depended largely on international largesse and the capacity of the cen- 
tral government to reallocate grain across provinces, counties, and villages. As 
we have seen, this capability was almost certainly impaired. Moreover, it must 
also be remembered that approximately 10 percent of farm households lived on 
state farms, and while these farmers had access to land and the ability to grow 
other crops, they, too, were dependent on the PDS for some part of the year 
and thus almost certainly experienced shortfalls as well. 
In short, as the famine crested, the evidence emphasizing the crucial role of 
entitlements and distribution becomes more evident. The FAO/WFP assess- 
ment from November 1997 is worth citing at some length: “There is also 
mounting evidence that much greater polarity in food consumption exists in 
the population than perceived hitherto. Reasons why this is occurring include 
transport diﬃculties, geographical diﬀerences, where some provinces are bet- 
ter equipped to deal with shortages than others, greater access amongst rural 
communities than urban and diﬀerential access to assets and foreign remit- 
tances and the corresponding ability to purchase food from emerging, though 
relatively insigniﬁcant, ‘private’ markets.” As we will argue in chapter 7, these 
comments are remarkably prescient. As early as 1997, the ﬁrst signs were visible 
that the famine and food shortages were driven not only by the collapse of the 
PDS but also by the emergence of diﬀerential capacities to command resources 
to purchase needed grain on the market. 
 
Mortality I: Who Died? 
 
We have looked at the famine through the lens of how and to whom food was 
distributed in North Korea. Another cut on these questions is to consider who 
died and how. The growing work on famine has provided some general insights 
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into this question that can be summarized quite succinctly (Devereux 2000). 
First, deaths occur not simply from starvation but from disease, as a result 
of either increased individual vulnerability or the simultaneous breakdown of 
public health systems and the unavailability of medicine. Second, the most 
vulnerable within the household are infants, children, and the elderly.22 
These observations are borne out by the refugee interviews we have (par- 
ticularly Robinson et al. 1999, 2001).23 UN estimates for 1990–95 put infant 
mortality at 24.4 per 1,000 live births. The ﬁrst Hopkins study ﬁnds under- 
four mortality to be nearly four times as high for the 1995–97 period (88.9 
per 1,000). The second Hopkins study ﬁnds infant mortality of 57.4 per 1,000 
and under-ﬁve mortality of 30.3. Both studies also ﬁnd predictably high and 
elevated levels of mortality among the elderly as well. The 1998 Good Friends 
study, which asks about causes of death, underlines the signiﬁcance not only 
of starvation but also of disease. Only 33 percent of respondents cited “starva- 
tion” as the cause of death; fully 51 percent ascribed death solely to disease and 
another 10 percent to starvation and disease. 
In sum, the evidence we have on the distribution of mortality by age group 
conﬁrms both prior research and the concerns of the donor community to 
focus on the children and elderly. This concern was compounded by an impor- 
tant institutional issue that became a point of conﬂict with the donors. Many 
of the most vulnerable populations were in institutions—orphanages and hos- 
pitals—that were less well positioned to defend their entitlements than were 
PDS centers or work units. Indeed, we have convincing evidence from the 
NGO community in particular that the government even sought to conceal 
the existence of these institutions. 
 
Mortality II: How Many Excess Deaths? 
 
Given the secrecy of the North Korean regime, it is unsurprising that contem- 
poraneous estimates of the death toll from the famine vary enormously. State- 
ments by North Korean oﬃcials in May 1999 and again in July 2001 oﬀered an 
estimate of 220,000 famine-related deaths between 1995 and 1998, or roughly 
1 percent of the population. Yet interviews with party defectors, including the 
highest-ranking oﬃcial to leave the country, Hwang Jang Yo˘p, suggest internal 
estimates ranging from 1 to 2.5 million deaths. Outside observers, by contrast, 
have oﬀered estimates as high as 3.5 million famine-related deaths, a staggering 
16 percent of the population. 
What can we say about these eﬀorts to quantify the famine’s toll? The usual 
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metric is “excess deaths”: the elevation in the mortality rate as a result of pre- 
mature death, inclusive of “births forgone,” or the drop in fertility that accom- 
panies a famine. Births forgone during famine are often at least partly oﬀset by 
unusually high fertility once the famine has ended and normal conditions are 
reestablished; early or premature death is an obviously irreversible condition. 
The ﬁrst systematic attempt to quantify the demographic impact of the fam- 
ine came from the Good Friends researchers; their work formed the basis of 
many subsequent statements about the famine’s consequences. Extrapolating 
to the whole country, Good Friends and other commentators working from 
their survey produced estimates of famine-related deaths on the order 2.8 to 3.5 
million (13 to 16 percent of the population). 
Similar, though more methodologically rigorous work was subsequently 
conducted by a team from Johns Hopkins (Robinson et al. 1999). On the 
basis of 771 refugee interviews conducted in 1998 and 1999, this group recon- 
structed mortality rates for a single heavily aﬀected province and concluded 
that between 1995 and 1997 nearly 12 percent of that province’s population 
had died. Projected across the whole country, this would yield excess deaths of 
2.64 million. That ﬁgure is consistent with a number of often-cited estimates. 
In 2003, for example, USAID administrator Andrew S. Natsios testiﬁed that 
“2.5 million people, or 10 percent of the population” had died in the famine 
(Natsios 2003), a number roughly consonant with South Korean estimates as of 
1999 (KINU 2004). On the basis of defector accounts, Médicins sans Frontières 
oﬀered a still higher estimate, of 3.5 million deaths (Terry 2001).24 
The high end of these estimates is almost certainly exaggerated. The precrisis 
population of North Korea was approximately 22 million, but some share of 
that population in fact faced little or no risk of starvation, even if individuals 
may have experienced food shortages and even hunger. We do not know the 
size of this elite, and we have refugee evidence of malnutrition in the army as 
we have noted. But if we assume a privileged or protected share of the popula- 
tion of 4 million—roughly equal to but not coterminus with the populations 
of the armed forces (about 1 million) and Pyongyang (around 3 million)—this 
would leave a total nonprivileged or “exposed” population of around 18 mil- 
lion people. 
The work of Robinson and his collaborators implies an excess mortality 
rate of roughly 12 percent for refugees coming from the most severely aﬀect 
northeastern provinces, an estimate that the team then used to calculate excess 
for mortality for North Hamgyo˘ng Province as a whole. Even applying this 
mortality rate to an entire province is questionable if we assume that refu- 
gees reﬂect a particularly aﬀected part of the population. If we nonetheless 
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apply the 12 percent ﬁgure to the total “exposed” population of 18 million, it 
yields a ﬁgure of just over two million excess deaths. In our view, this number 
has to be considered the absolute upper estimate. The reason is as follows: If 
one accepts the Robinson et al. estimate of 245,000 excess deaths for North 
Hamgyo˘ng Province out of a precrisis population of approximately 2 million, 
the Natsios statement implies that there must have been roughly 2.25 mil- 
lion deaths among the remaining 16 million “exposed” population, implying 
an excess mortality rate of 14 percent. Such a mortality rate would be higher 
for the country as a whole—fully 15 percent higher—than what Robinson et 
al. calculated for what was, by consensus, the worst aﬀected province. This 
extrapolation is not plausible. 
Two accounts that have attempted to take a somewhat more systematic 
approach to calculating excess deaths also come to somewhat lower estimates 
of total excess deaths. Taking 1994 as the base, Daniel Goodkind and Lorraine 
West (2001) use an age-speciﬁc death-rate model and oﬃcial DPRK statis- 
tics on crude death rates to arrive at an estimate of excess deaths of 236,900 
between 1995 and 2000. Using the same model with the much higher mortal- 
ity rates implied by the Robinson et al. interviews generated an estimate of 
2.6 million excess deaths over the same period—a ﬁgure more than ten times 
the estimate derived from the oﬃcial statistics. Of all the alternative estimates 
reviewed by Goodkind and West, they prefer those based on data from the 1998 
WFP nutritional survey and calibrated with crude death rates for the period of 
China’s Great Leap Forward. This approach yields excess deaths for the period 
1994–2000 of about 1 million based on the Chinese death rates, and 605,000 
adjusted for nutritional status from the 1998 WFP survey. 
A problem with the Goodkind and West study is that they date the start 
of the famine to 1995, using 1994 as a baseline for their calculations. Suk Lee’s 
careful analysis of oﬃcial statistics ﬁnds (2003), however, that mortality was 
already elevated in 1994. Also using a gender- and age-speciﬁc model of death 
rates, Lee estimates that between January 1, 1994, and August 31, 1999, North 
Korea experienced 668,000 excess deaths. Lee ignores population loss stem- 
ming from refugee ﬂows into China, and, as a consequence, his analysis may 
wrongly include these as famine-related deaths. But from what we know of 
the collapse of the economy, declining agricultural production, and anecdotal 
evidence from refugee interviews, Lee is almost certainly right that the fam- 
ine started in 1994. If so, then the estimates by Goodkind and West probably 
underestimate its impact. 
Both Goodkind and West, as well as Lee, assume that fertility rates remained 
unchanged and hence do not consider births forgone as part of the famine’s 
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demographic toll. This assumption is probably more defensible than it might 
appear at ﬁrst glance. The Good Friends interviews document a decline in fer- 
tility, but the analysis of other famines has suggested that this drop in fertility 
is typically oﬀset by a subsequent rise in fertility when the crisis passes. 
There is still much we don’t know about the demographic eﬀects of the 
North Korean famine. Moreover, the excess deaths are just one summary mea- 
sure of the famine’s costs. Such statistics do not capture the long-run devel- 
opmental eﬀects of early childhood stunting, not to mention the wide-rang- 
ing social consequences of the food shortage, from the breakup of families to 
human traﬃcking, prostitution, and crime born of desperation. Nonetheless, 
in our view, the most sophisticated attempts to measure excess deaths put them 
in a range of roughly 600,000 to 1 million, or approximately 3 to 5 percent of 
the precrisis population. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In chapter 2, we took a broad approach to the famine by looking at overall 
food availability. In this chapter, we complemented that approach by consider- 
ing in more detail the question of distribution and entitlements, including the 
question of who perished and how. We paid particular attention to the regional 
dimensions of the famine and its impact on the urban working classes in the 
industrial cities of the east coast. Yet perhaps the most important point to 
emerge from this overview is not the diﬀerences across groups—as important 
and fateful as those proved to be—but the systemic nature of the crisis. In the 
mid-1990s, the most fundamental component of the socialist social compact— 
the ability of the government to guarantee adequate food—broke down. This 
compact had been strained by food shortages and possibly by localized famine 
before. But the famine of the mid-1990s and the subsequent persistence of 
shortages were something altogether new: a chronic and generalized breakdown 
of the food distribution system. In chapter 7, we return to the long-run impact 
of this change. But before doing so we turn to a more detailed consideration 
of the aid eﬀort, which after 1996 became a central pillar—arguably even the 
mainstay—of the ability of the government to provide food at all. 
  
 
PART II 
 
The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Assistance 
  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Aid Regime 
The Problem of Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Through the end of 1995, the availability of food in North Korea was over- 
whelmingly a function of domestic production, dwindling—and increasingly 
erratic—commercial imports, and stocks of unknown magnitude that the gov- 
ernment was almost certainly drawing down. 
After 1995, aid mattered. North Korea quietly negotiated some bilateral aid 
from South Korea and Japan in early 1995 that assisted the country in the spring 
of 1996 (see chapter 6). But it was not until the ﬂoods of July and August 
1995 that the government made an unprecedented appeal for wider multilateral 
assistance. With a critical delay of almost a full year—caused in part by the 
North Korean government’s misleading emphasis on the ﬂoods, in part by con- 
ﬂicting assessments of the food situation within the donor community—aid 
ﬁnally began to ﬂow into the country in large quantities. 
We look at this decadelong aid experience through three related lenses. In 
this chapter, we consider the contentious relationship between North Korea and 
the humanitarian community over the issue of monitoring; in the next chapter, 
we address the related issue of diversion. In telling this story, we pay particular 
attention to the World Food Programme (WFP), which has managed the bulk 
of humanitarian assistance to the country. However, the WFP is an agent of 
governments; the organization secures all its food through an appeals process 
and is ultimately dependent on the largesse of the ﬁnal donors. In chapter 6, we 
explore the conﬂicting humanitarian and political motives the donors have for 
extending aid, motives that have made coordination among them diﬃcult. 
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From the very beginning of the aid eﬀort, North Korean authorities made 
it clear that they did not ascribe to the most basic norms of the humanitarian 
community, which include access, transparency of the aid operation, non- 
discrimination in distribution, and a focus on the most vulnerable groups. 
As is true in any aid game, the North Korean government sought to maxi- 
mize ﬂows of aid while limiting the conditions attached to it. Among these 
restrictions were strict limits on the number of aid workers—multilateral, 
bilateral, and from the NGO community—and severe limits on movement 
and access. 
In these circumstances—again, as in all aid relationships—the donor com- 
munity faced a recurrent choice about whether to continue their eﬀorts or 
to walk away. At various times, both individual governments and particu- 
lar NGOs made the principled decision to halt their programs and in some 
cases to leave the country permanently. Yet for both humanitarian reasons 
and political ones that we detail in chapter 6, most donors acquiesced to 
North Korean exceptionalism and stayed. This continued commitment might 
have been morally appropriate. But it is also clear that once this commitment 
was made, the ability to exercise leverage over the terms of engagement was 
severely compromised. 
This strategically compromised position did not imply a lack of eﬀort to 
secure improved access; to the contrary. Because of both international and 
national norms of accountability, the donor community in general, and the 
WFP in particular, was under constant pressure to ensure that aid was going to 
its intended beneﬁciaries. As a result, the aid process can be viewed as a pro- 
tracted negotiation centering on the two closely related issues we address here: 
monitoring and diversion. 
We examine in some detail the eﬀorts by the WFP to deﬁne appropriate 
target groups and the history of its eﬀorts to monitor aid delivery to them; we 
also make these problems concrete by walking through the complex logistical 
diﬃculties of monitoring even a single food shipment. We conclude that moni- 
toring became more sophisticated over time. Some NGOs probably slipped 
under the government’s radar by building local-level programs that were not 
only eﬀective in humanitarian terms but had other positive eﬀects as well, such 
as building capacity and trust. We ﬁnd a surprising degree of continuity, how- 
ever, in the basic constraints on large-scale international assistance. Moreover, 
the gains made over time were reversible. We close this chapter by outlining 
the eﬀorts by the North Korean regime to curtail signiﬁcantly the activities of 
the WFP in late 2005 and early 2006, an episode that reveals very clearly the 
bargaining issues in the relationship. 
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Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea: An Overview 
 
Food aid has constituted the dominant share of total assistance to North Korea 
from the onset of the relief eﬀort and continues to dominate assistance to this 
day (see appendix 2, tables 1–3). Aid has passed through a variety of diﬀer- 
ent channels, including multilateral institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and a 
diverse, active, and highly innovative NGO community.1 The multiplicity of 
channels makes it diﬃcult to track external assistance with complete conﬁ- 
dence; in appendix 2, we provide a more detailed breakdown of total assistance 
by sector and agency. But this accounting exercise shows clearly the prominent 
role played by food aid. 
From the opening of the country in 1995 through 2005, the world commu- 
nity poured over $2.3 billion of assistance into North Korea. Of that sum, 67 
percent has taken the form of food aid, and another 9 percent has addressed 
food security or agricultural rehabilitation and development (appendix 2, tables 
1 and 3).2 Figure 4.1 looks at this wide-ranging international eﬀort in the context 
of domestic production and two of the demand estimates that we constructed 
in chapter 2; Chinese food trade is included in these estimates, which are mea- 
sured in millions of metric tons of basic grain equivalents. Several points are 
striking, the ﬁrst of which is the continuing precariousness of North Korea’s 
overall food supply. A second striking fact is the extent of aid dependence. The 
sluggish recovery of production since the collapse of the great famine and the 
government’s continuing unwillingness to use foreign exchange for commercial 
imports have implied a steadily increasing reliance on humanitarian assistance. 
The third point, however, is the declining willingness of the international com- 
munity to continue to support North Korea. Even before the onset of the most 
recent nuclear crisis in the fall of 2002, total aid had begun to decline, reﬂecting 
a combination of severe pressures on the humanitarian system from other crises 
as well as donor fatigue with North Korea’s uncooperative stance. WFP situation 
reports have always reﬂected concern about the timely ﬂow of aid, even in years 
when international commitments appeared strong. In February 2002, however, 
the WFP experienced the ﬁrst major break in the aid pipeline. WFP warnings 
became increasingly desperate in tone, and the organization was repeatedly forced 
to adjust food deliveries to targeted populations. In 2005 the position of the WFP 
became more precarious still as North Korea argued that it no longer needed 
international assistance and took steps to reduce its presence dramatically; we 
return to this episode in more detail in the conclusion to this chapter. 
In any aid eﬀort, coordination poses serious challenges to both donors and 
recipients. In 1991, following a problematic response to the plight of Iraqi Kurd- 
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FIGURE 4.1. Sources of Food Supply, 1990–2004 
Note: Figures are for November of year indicated to October of following year. Source: USDAFAS; 
PSD database, WFPINTERAIS 2004, 2005b, Noland 2000. 
 
 
ish refugees, the United Nations General Assembly created the Consolidated 
Appeals Process (CAP), led by the United Nations Oﬃce for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Aﬀairs (OCHA). The consolidated appeal rests on a planning 
cycle that includes consultations with the aid-receiving governments; independent 
assessments of needs; the formulation of an appeal; the tracking of international, 
bilateral, and NGO contributions; and the monitoring and assessment of subse- 
quent aid delivery. The CAP was also designed to solve the coordination problems 
that can arise among the multilateral institutions and donor governments. As we 
will show, North Korea posed severe and ongoing challenges to this mandate. 
The World Food Programme is the multilateral organization with primary 
responsibility for humanitarian food assistance.3 Quite early, it was clear that 
the WFP would play a major role in the international community’s response to 
North Korea’s distress (appendix 2, table 2). Since 1995, $1.5 billion of aid has 
ﬂowed through the consolidated appeals process; of that, the WFP is respon- 
sible for $1.3 billion, corresponding to roughly four million tons of food. 
The dominance of food aid partly reﬂected the demands of the situation. 
The emphasis on food aid, however, has also reﬂected a reticence on the part 
of donors to lend to North Korea or extend any assistance that could be inter- 
preted as balance-of-payments support. Table 4.1 tracks the appeal cycles from 
 
 
  
 
 
  TABLE 4.1. Results of UN Consolidated Appeals Process ($US millions)  
 
 WFP % of  WFP % of  
Appeal Target total target Actual total income % fulﬁlled 
1995 n.a. - n.a. - n.a. 
WFP 8.9 n.a. 6.7 n.a. 75.3 
1996 43.6 - 34.4 - 78.8 
WFP 26.8 61.5 26.2 76.2 97.8 
1997 184.4 - 158.4 - 85.9 
WFP 144.1 78.1 134.3 84.8 93.2 
1998 383.2 - 215.9 - 56.3 
WFP 345.8 90.2 202.7 93.9 58.6 
1999 292.1 - 189.9 - 65.0 
WFP 141.6 48.5 177.9 93.7 125.6 
2000 313.8 - 153.1 - 48.8 
WFP 222.5 70.9 145.6 95.1 65.4 
2001 384.0 - 248.0 - 64.6 
WFP 315.9 82.3 240.1 96.8 76.0 
2002 246.8 - 220.0 - 89.1 
WFP 216.7 87.8 206.1 93.7 95.1* 
2003 229.4 - 133.1 - 58.0 
WFP 202.7 88.4 117.8 88.5 58.1 
2004 208.8 - 151.6 - 72.6 
WFP 
2005 
172.3 
n.a. 
82.5 
- 
118.9 
n.a. 
78.4 
n.a 
69.0 
WFP 202.3 - 29.7 - 14.7 
TOTAL, 1996– 2,286.1 
2004 
- 1,504.4 - - 
WFP (1996– 1,990.7 78.2 1,399.3 91.0 - 
2005)** 
* Reported achievement rate reﬂects amount received during the appeal relative to the target and 
excludes $99.3 million carried over. 
** Percentage only takes into consideration WFP contributions from 1995–2004 
Notes: n.a. = not available. No consolidated appeal in 2005. Thus, for 2005, WFP data is not via 
consolidated appeals but its own appeal. 
Sources: UN-OCHA n.d.a.; FAO/WFP 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 
2004; WFP 2006b. 
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1995 through 2005, showing the role of the WFP in the consolidated appeal. 
The WFP share dominates in every cycle, accounting for between 48.5 percent 
of the appeal (1999) to just over 90 percent (1998). If we look at actual contri- 
butions, however, we see that the WFP always had greater success in securing 
support than did the other agencies included in the consolidated appeal. From 
1998 through 2002, WFP requests constituted 76 percent of the appeal but 
nearly 95 percent of actual contributions. This changed beginning in 2003, but 
in the context of declining overall assistance and the faltering ability of both 
the consolidated appeal and the WFP to meet targets. 
The reluctance of the donors to provide other forms of assistance can be seen 
most clearly in the fate of the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Pro- 
tection Plan (AREP) in North Korea (Kim 2001). At the behest of the North 
Korean government, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
convened a thematic roundtable in 1998, the ﬁrst international conference 
designed—at least from the perspective of the donors—to get at the root causes 
of North Korea’s food and agricultural problems. The UNDP had been a party 
to the consolidated appeal from the outset, although by its own admission had 
met only limited success in securing support before the roundtable. 
At the roundtable meeting—three years after the ﬂoods of 1995—the North 
Korean government continued to interpret the country’s problems in terms of 
natural disasters and declining external trade rather than institutional and pol- 
icy constraints. North Korean oﬃcials clearly viewed the roundtable process as 
a way to secure external support for rehabilitation projects, including not only 
rural infrastructure but also the modernization of plants producing fertilizer 
and farm equipment. The government initially sought $340 million through 
the roundtable process. Through April 2000, $128.4 million had been extended 
in support of the program. About $40 million of this came in the form of grants 
and loans from OPEC and the International Fund for Agricultural Develop- 
ment, approximately another third from the EU, and the remainder from bilat- 
eral donors—the Republic of Korea, China, Switzerland—and NGOs. 
But contributions came overwhelmingly in the form of material supports, 
mainly fertilizer and commodity support for food-for-work programs. For 
example, large fertilizer contributions by the South Korean government were 
counted in AREP totals. No support was granted for the modernization and 
operation of fertilizer and agricultural machinery plants or for the foreign 
exchange costs of rural infrastructure rehabilitation (though private crop insur- 
ance payouts were available for this purpose). From 1996 through 2004, the 
UNDP and FAO together accounted for only $20 million of total consolidated 
appeal commitments, or just over 1 percent of total aid. 
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Although the bulk of total humanitarian assistance was provided through a 
multilateral process, a substantial amount of aid still ﬂowed outside of the con- 
solidated appeal (table 4.2). Of $2.4 billion of total assistance (again excluding 
Chinese support), approximately 62 percent went through multilateral institu- 
tions, and another 26 percent through bilateral channels; European countries 
accounted for some of the bilateral aid, but South Korea and China accounted 
for the majority of it. The NGO community has accounted for the remaining 
12 percent of total aid, although that share rose somewhat as government com- 
mitment began to ﬂag in the early 2000s. 
This share almost certainly undervalues the social contribution of private 
assistance. Dedication among the NGO community is extraordinarily high. 
Small projects are closely monitored, based on the development of trust at the 
local level and no doubt relatively eﬃcient as a result. Wages paid to NGO 
workers are also low compared to those of international civil servants. Nonethe- 
less, it is clear that public aid dominates the total, and even these ﬁgures may 
overestimate the private share as measured in purely ﬁnancial terms. 
 
Humanitarian Norms 
 
The forgoing sketch has established the centrality of multilateral food aid to 
the overall humanitarian eﬀort but has said little about the operational nitty- 
gritty. In particular, we want to focus on two core questions: Whom was the 
aid designed to help? And how did the donors try to ensure that aid was getting 
to intended beneﬁciaries? Before turning to those questions, it is important to 
outline the principles on which the humanitarian community operates. During 
the postwar period, the public humanitarian relief system centered on the UN 
agencies, particularly the World Food Programme, has developed a well-articu- 
lated set of norms governing the implementation of relief operations. These 
principles received at least rhetorical support from most of the major national 
donors—with the exception of China—as well as the overwhelming majority 
of the NGO community. 
The desire to articulate clear norms among the humanitarian community is 
not simply an exercise in idealism; it is also designed to solve a particular set 
of incentive problems that can emerge in any humanitarian operation. In the 
absence of normative constraints, diﬀerences among donors and competition 
among them can lead to a race to the bottom: a willingness to turn a blind eye 
to diversion, a tendency to exaggerate aid eﬀectiveness, and even the empow- 
erment of groups who bear responsibility for causing the humanitarian crisis 
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TABLE 4.2. Total humanitarian assistance, by donor organization 
  (millions of US$)  
Within 
Appeal Outside Appeal 
Multilateral 
(through 
UN) Bilateral UN Agencies 
NGOs 
(including 
Red Cross) Other TOTAL 
 
1996/7 34.39 11.28 0.00 4.67 0.00 50.35 
1997/8 158.38 105.79 1.80 26.49 0.00 292.46 
1998 215.87 92.06 0.00 27.16 0.00 335.09 
1999 189.89 41.64 0.00 4.32 0.00 235.85 
2000 153.10 58.58 0.06 12.48 0.00 224.22 
2001 247.97 61.16 1.51 66.80 0.15 377.59 
2002 220.01* 79.24 2.98 58.60 0.00 360.83 
2003 133.10 9.64 1.62 42.34 0.00 186.70 
2004 151.51 121.39 2.20 24.76 0.63 300.49 
2005** 0.00 61.09 0.68 1.80 0.00 63.56 
TOTAL 1,504.23 641.87 10.85 269.43 0.78 2,427.16 
* Includes $99.32 million carried over by the WFP 
**2005: Bilateral data includes WFP data not listed in UN-OCHA. 
 
 
 
 
in the ﬁrst place.4 These incentive problems can be exacerbated when private 
transnational groups act as subcontractors for the oﬃcial donors, as has been 
the case in North Korea (see Cooley and Ron 2002). 
The basic principles governing delivery of humanitarian aid are straightfor- 
ward (Reed 2004:9). Aid should go to those in greatest need based on objective 
and systematic assessment. Access to aid should not be determined on the basis 
of age, gender, social status, ethnicity, and political beliefs (Ziegler 2002). Aid 
delivery should be transparent, enabling agencies to conﬁrm that it is distrib- 
uted to the target group. Donor agencies should also be allowed to assess the 
impact of aid, which requires direct and ongoing contact with the aﬀected 
populations. 
These basic norms, as well as principles of accountability within donor coun- 
tries, drive the related insistence on thorough monitoring of aid. The WFP has 
a standard operating procedure embodying reciprocal obligations on the part 
of donors and recipients. The WFP’s responsibility to the donor governments is 
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to ensure that donations are used properly. Recipient governments are respon- 
sible for facilitating WFP oversight. Under the standard WFP agreement, the 
recipient government guarantees that commodities reach speciﬁed target ben- 
eﬁciaries and that improper diversion does not occur. Within a given time 
frame, the government agrees to account for all contributions by providing the 
WFP with an audited report containing speciﬁed information on the volume 
of food (and subsidies) received, the number of beneﬁciaries, location of distri- 
bution centers, losses incurred, their causes, and measures undertaken to limit 
those losses. Agreements also call for assessments that allow donors to gauge 
the impact of the aid eﬀort on beneﬁciaries’ nutritional status. Agreements 
specify in some detail the required monitoring, including repeat visits to all 
distributional units and the freedom to make spot checks, and further specify 
that recipient governments will facilitate the internal movement of WFP staﬀ 
necessary to executing these duties (GAO 1999). 
The NGO community is much more diverse than the public humanitarian 
aid machinery, and we do not pretend to treat its contribution thoroughly; 
other excellent accounts of their operations exist (most notably Flake and 
Snyder 2003). Although the NGO contribution is relatively small in ﬁnancial 
terms, the private humanitarian community has had a substantial inﬂuence on 
the broader politics of aid to North Korea. On occasion, consortia of NGOs 
have been involved in the monitoring and even delivery of food. Moreover, the 
on-the-ground experience of the NGOs makes them an invaluable source of 
information on the country, and their conﬂicts with the North Korean govern- 
ment mirror closely the constraints facing the WFP. 
Diﬃcult ethical dilemmas in Bosnia and Central Africa in the 1990s pushed 
the NGO community to codify voluntary norms that overlapped at a number 
of points with those governing the multilateral aid eﬀort.5 Among these norms 
are prior understanding of basic conditions; evaluation of eﬀectiveness; partici- 
pation by recipients in the design management and monitoring of programs; 
distribution of aid through a transparent system that can be monitored and 
adequately audited; and impartiality, or the distribution of aid in a fair and 
equitable manner. 
North Korea severely challenged the NGO commitment to these humanitar- 
ian norms, and the community has been deeply, even bitterly, divided on the 
propriety of staying; these debates are worth tracing in some detail. Beginning 
in mid-1998, the ﬁrst of a series of highly publicized withdrawals by European 
and American NGOs took place, beginning with Médicins du Monde in July 
1998, Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) in September 1998, and Accion Contra 
la Faim in the spring of 2000 (Schloms 2003). These NGOs had several things 
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in common, including a focus on medical issues, which of necessity required 
ongoing contact with patients, and a belief in the importance of training, which 
meant ongoing contact with doctors and nurses. These European NGOs also 
shared an approach to humanitarian assistance in which relief and concern for 
basic human rights and the empowerment of civil society were seen as closely 
linked. All issued strong justiﬁcations for their actions, and MSF quite explicitly 
criticized those who chose to stay and thus created tensions between the North 
Korean government and the entire NGO community (IFRC 2000:84). This ﬁrst 
wave of departures was followed by still other withdrawals, including CARE and 
Oxfam (McCarthy 2000; Smith 2002; Schloms 2003; Flake 2003; Reed 2004). 
In the wake of MSF’s highly visible departure, the humanitarian agen- 
cies outlined a statement of humanitarian principles in November 1998; this 
was subsequently updated in April 1999 and March 2001.6 A working group 
comprising all the resident humanitarian agencies established benchmarks for 
gauging progress on these norms, which is regularly recorded in reports by 
the OCHA. The humanitarian community also issued consensus statements, 
although these statements seem to have had the objective of reassuring the 
North Korean authorities following highly publicized departures as much as 
showing joint resolve. Before turning to the question of the extent to which 
WFP and NGO norms were met, it is ﬁrst important to consider the question 
of whom food aid was intended to reach. 
 
Principles in Practice I: Origins and Objectives of the Aid Program 
 
From the outset, the multilateral agencies and NGOs in North Korea operated 
at a disadvantage because they did not have a presence in the country when the 
crisis broke and thus lacked accumulated, on-the-ground expertise. The United 
Nations Development Program had established an oﬃce in 1980 and helped 
to organize early humanitarian assistance (Smith 2002). But it took time for 
other organizations to establish even a rudimentary presence, and the North 
Korean government was far from cooperative. The WFP established an oﬃce 
in Pyongyang in November 1995, but early monitoring was limited to the west 
coast.7 The NGOs faced the particular problem that the North Korean authori- 
ties were resistant even to granting residential status at all, forcing coordination 
both among the NGOs that did enjoy residential status and between those that 
were in-country and those who were not.8 
The multilateral response was also aﬀected by very diﬀerent assessments of 
the nature and extent of the food problem among some of the principal actors, 
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assessments that remain controversial and even divisive to this day. Informa- 
tion ﬁltering out along the Chinese border provided evidence of severe food 
shortages and even famine conditions quite early, and a number of journalists, 
NGOs, and analysts jumped on these reports and reached conclusions that, 
with the beneﬁt of hindsight, were largely justiﬁed (Becker 1996, 1998b; Snyder 
1996; Lautze 1997; KBSM 1998). Certain analysts in the U.S., Japanese, and 
South Korean intelligence and foreign policy communities almost certainly had 
similar information, although they were in some cases constrained from speak- 
ing out (Natsios 1999:170–71). 
But for some of those sitting in Pyongyang—or suspicious of North Korean 
motives, or reluctant to provide assistance—the evidence of famine was much 
less straightforward or altogether lacking.9 Highly orchestrated visits to insti- 
tutions housing the malnourished could be read as evidence of a much wider 
problem but could also be interpreted as a cynical play for sympathy—and 
more aid. With initial access limited entirely to the west coast and to tightly 
controlled visits, outsiders also lacked access to the types of information—the 
markers—that would allow them to gauge the extent and severity of the prob- 
lem: information on food prices, which tend to rise sharply during famines; 
evidence of large-scale population movements and foraging; evidence on diet, 
such as the consumption of inferior foods; surveys on actual nutrition and 
health status or mortality. Not until the WFP pressed successfully for the open- 
ing of the northeastern provinces in May 1997 did the extent of the damage 
already incurred become fully apparent and was it possible to ramp up supplies 
to these highly distressed areas. 
Whatever the diﬀerences among the early assessments, the ﬁrst WFP/FAO 
teams were quite blunt in underscoring that the food crisis was not simply a 
result of the ﬂoods. Rather, structural and policy problems in the agricultural 
sector and in the economy more generally were to blame.10 
From the outset, however, the North Korean government deﬁned the issue 
as a humanitarian concern that centered on providing food aid to ﬂood victims. 
The main interlocutor for both the WFP and NGOs was the FDRC, a commit- 
tee of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. The main objective of this committee was 
to maximize the ﬂow of food aid to the country while stringently controlling the 
access of the multilateral agencies and NGOs. As one close observer put it, “The 
interaction between the FDRC and the international humanitarian aid commu- 
nity was adversarial from its inception, since the primary task of the FDRC was 
to watch the international food monitors and only secondarily to help ensure that 
assistance was delivered to end users” (Snyder 2003a:6). Indicative of this stance 
is the fact that through 2005 UN special rapporteur on the right to food Jean 
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Ziegler was denied entry to the DPRK ﬁve times, despite the fact that UN pro- 
grams had been feeding nearly one-third of the population on an ongoing basis. 
Despite the North Korean government’s unwillingness to abandon its expla- 
nation that the ﬂoods were the driving cause of the food shortage, it quickly 
became apparent that the scope of the humanitarian disaster was much, much 
wider. In principle, the appropriate response to a geographically limited disaster 
would be to provide the victims with emergency ﬁnancial support, enabling 
them to prioritize their needs and allocate resources accordingly. This approach 
was not possible in the North Korean case and frequently is not politically fea- 
sible from the perspective of donors. The donors surely did not trust the North 
Korean authorities to administer ﬁnancial transfers. In any event, North Korea 
was not a market economy, and this ﬁrst-best approach could not work. Instead, 
aid was provided in-kind and sourced outside the country. This approach was 
consistent with the politics of the main donor, the United States, where the 
farm lobby supports US-sourced food as the primary modality of relief. But 
it also accorded with the political interests of the North Korean government, 
which insisted that the PDS serve as the conduit of this externally sourced aid. 
Given donor concerns about North Korean reticence with respect to access, 
the WFP had to deﬁne the target groups it sought to reach and construct an 
elaborate mechanism to ensure that externally sourced aid was actually reach- 
ing the intended beneﬁciaries. Each WFP appeal was thus accompanied by a 
relatively detailed outline of target groups (appendix 2, table 4). 
This targeting went through several phases. In the ﬁrst appeal cycle in 1995, 
food was targeted at ﬂood victims. In subsequent appeals, the pretense that 
humanitarian relief was going to immediate victims of the ﬂoods or other natu- 
ral disasters was dropped. As the numbers fed through the WFP rose dramati- 
cally, from 500,000 in 1995 to nearly 7.5 million in 1998, the WFP identiﬁed 
two basic target groups (ﬁgure 4.2; appendix 2, table 4). The ﬁrst was a set 
of groups that were vulnerable because of their particular food needs, age, or 
position within the household, such as children, pregnant and nursing women, 
and the elderly. These groups dominated the highly elaborated—and spuriously 
precise—language of the appeals (“297,955 pregnant/nursing women” [FAO/ 
WFP 2003]). After 1998 these groups were also the target of WFP-sponsored 
factories that began to produce fortiﬁed biscuits and noodles. A second target 
group comprised the beneﬁciaries of a food-for-work program. This program 
combined distribution of food to rural reconstruction projects that fed as many 
as 1 million people (including direct participants and dependents) each year. 
The total targeted populations peaked at more than 8 million in 1999 and 2000, 
amounting to well over one-third of the population, and remained in excess 
of 6 million through 2005. This policy of casting relief in terms of narrowly 
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FIGURE 4.2. WFP Targets by Appeal 
Sources: FAO/WFP 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004; UN-OCHA n.d.b. 
 
 
targeted groups was almost certainly suboptimal in principle but arose out of 
the speciﬁc political constraints embodied in the North Korean case. 
In the period since the 2002 reforms, the WFP began to collect survey and 
focus group information suggesting the particular vulnerability of PDS-depen- 
dent urban households and to develop a quite nuanced understanding of the 
identity of the most seriously aﬀected groups (FAO/WFP 2003, 2004). The 
target groups did not change in composition, but WFP statements suggest an 
eﬀort to shift resources toward urban households in the northeast in particular 
and to extend the food-for-work eﬀort into the cities. 
A crucial feature of the North Korean setting was that the multilateral agen- 
cies had no independent channels for delivering food to these targeted groups 
and were not allowed to develop them. A number of vulnerable groups, how- 
ever, were either institutionalized or had daily contact with institutions, namely, 
hospitals, orphanages, kindergartens, and schools.11 By targeting these groups, 
the WFP could sidestep the charge that it was supporting a public distribution 
system used to control the population and channel food to privileged groups. 
Whatever the political merits of focusing on such vulnerable groups, the sub- 
stantive merits are somewhat less clear. First, it is not obvious that this particular 
deﬁnition of the vulnerable was appropriate given the setting. These groups were 
certainly among the hardest hit in any community that faced serious shortages, and 
feeding children frees up food that can be consumed by other household members. 
But distress had a strong regional dimension, and some members of the groups 
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targeted were in fact protected. Attempting to feed all the children in the country 
almost certainly channeled food to less deserving households. This targeting strat- 
egy would also have done little for an urban family with no school-age children. 
Although these criticisms have some merit, it is probably misguided to over- 
target in a setting in which distress is broad. The larger problem was institu- 
tional. The North Korean food system does not have a distinct channel for 
distribution to schools, hospitals, and orphanages or to pregnant and nursing 
mothers. Even if it did, the WFP would not have controlled it. Food going to 
these institutions and individuals passed through the county-level warehouses 
and thus the county-level People’s Committees, as did processed food coming 
from the factories that the WFP set up after 1998.12 
These crucial decision makers do not have an interest in seeing the people in 
their jurisdictions starve. They are closer to their constituents than the govern- 
ment in Pyongyang. Many aid workers have remarked on the fact that local 
oﬃcials were generally more engaging and responsive than their political supe- 
riors. County-level oﬃcials may also be inﬂuenced at the margin by checks on 
their behavior through monitoring, an issue we take up in more detail below. 
But these party and administrative leaders had to deal with a number of 
competing demands on any food they received: from local military and impor- 
tant work units, to the “retail” distribution centers (PDCs), to the lures of 
corruption and diversion to the market. Whatever the target groups designated 
by the WFP were, multilateral food assistance passed through the same basic 
distribution channels that supported the PDS and was ultimately commingled 
with other sources of supply. Food-for-work beneﬁciaries were essentially sup- 
plied through the same distribution channels. On this point, the critics are 
undoubtedly right: food aid passed through and supported the PDS. 
An important question, therefore, is whether dependence on state distri- 
bution channels, and eﬀectively the PDS, aﬀected the extent to which food 
reached intended beneﬁciaries. We argue that this debate is to some extent 
misguided. The problem was not the reliance on state distribution channels per 
se but the cooperativeness of the government in using them. Such cooperation 
was limited, to say the least. 
 
Principles in Practice II: The Monitoring Regime 
 
For nearly a decade, the North Korean government has consistently violated 
its fundamental obligation to facilitate WFP operations within the country.13 
When shortages have been acute, North Korean oﬃcials have made tactical 
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concessions. The converse is also true. When supply constraints have relaxed, 
as they did in 2005 as a result of increased aid and an improved harvest, the 
government has tightened access and threatened to evict the WFP and NGOs 
altogether. As a result, the evolution of the aid regime has had a grudging, “two- 
steps-forward, one-step-back” quality. 
One of the most contentious constraints has been a very basic geographi- 
cal one: the WFP and other groups have been denied access to parts of the 
country—and parts of the country believed to be particularly vulnerable. North 
Korean behavior with respect to the geographic scope of monitoring can be seen 
in ﬁgures 4.3 through 4.5. At the outset, whole provinces were simply ruled oﬀ 
limits, and monitoring visits were tightly circumscribed even within those prov- 
inces that were accessible.14 By the end of 2000, the WFP had gained access to 
approximately 167 of 201 counties. But this changed very little between 2000 and 
2005: large parts of the country remained oﬀ limits, and marginal increases in 
access were oﬀset by the exclusion of some new counties. For example, in January 
2003, part of Kaeso˘ng Municipality was placed oﬀ limits because an industrial 
complex was being developed in conjunction with a South Korean company! 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3. Accessible and Restricted Counties, 1995–96 
Source: WFP Asia Regional Bureau, pers. comm.. 2005. 
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FIGURE 4.4. Accessible and Restricted Counties, February 2000 
Source: WFP Asia Regional Bureau, pers. comm.. 2005. 
 
 
 
A number of direct conﬂicts over these issues provide insights about North 
Korean behavior in the face of external pressure; these cases also buttress our 
conclusions about triage in chapter 2.15 The ﬁrst had to do with the open- 
ing of the east coast. According to Natsios (1999:174), each of the ﬁrst three 
WFP directors (serving between August 1995 and May 1997) had been directly 
rebuﬀed when they sought to make arrangements to visit the northeast and 
Chagang Province. Initial monitoring visits were limited to the west coast. In 
March 1997 WFP executive director Catherine Bertini visited North Korea and 
appeared to extract a promise to allow a WFP tour of conditions in the north- 
east. Bertini sent Tun Myat, a Burmese international civil servant, to North 
Korea to undertake this mission in May. Again according to Natsios, Myat 
threatened that the WFP would undertake no more appeals unless he were 
permitted to visit, and the North Korean government relented, opening up the 
east coast. This pressure was applied in the lean months at the very peak of the 
famine, and by the end of 1997 the WFP in principle had access to 159 counties, 
although it had only visited 110 (Bennett 1999:15). 
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FIGURE 4.5. Accessible and Restricted Counties, October 2005 
Source: WFP Asia Regional Bureau, pers. comm.. 2005. 
 
 
 
The ongoing conﬂict over access next came to a head in April 1998, when 
Bertini visited North Korea and warned the government that the WFP would 
suspend operations in 50 of the country’s 210 counties if the agency could 
not monitor food distribution. The timing presents a close parallel to events 
of the previous year: this, too, was during the lean months. The government 
subsequently opened 11 more counties, but 39 were left inaccessible, and many 
of those remain inaccessible to this day. The WFP followed through on its 
threat by scaling back its proposed operations by 55,000 metric tons, or about 
the amount of food that would have been allocated to these counties. In this 
case, the outcome is ambiguous. Pressure did open some new counties, but the 
government also held ﬁrm on those about which it felt strongly, most probably 
counties with either military facilities, prison camps, particularly bad condi- 
tions, or all three. 
In addition to the question of geographic access, the WFP has faced constant 
North Korean opposition to its desired number of outside monitors. The num- 
ber of international WFP staﬀ peaked at approximately ﬁfty in 2001, despite a 
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program delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in food annually to a coun- 
try the size of the state of New York or Louisiana. The North Korean authori- 
ties have also consistently stuck to the principle that agency staﬃng levels are 
contingent on the dollar value of aid. Operational protocols speciﬁcally reﬂect 
this, and if donations drop, staﬀ are asked to leave. By the time of the standoﬀ 
of 2005, when North Korea ﬁrst threatened to evict the WFP altogether, the 
number of international staﬀ had fallen to approximately forty. 
An additional barrier to humanitarian operations is that oﬃcial relief agen- 
cies are not permitted to use Korean speakers or ethnic Korean staﬀ. Not until 
2004 did the North Korean government allow resident WFP staﬀ even to take 
Korean language lessons. The North Korean practice of seconding to relief 
operations only people with training as English-language translators also has 
a number of implications, the most obvious of which concerns the loyalty of 
staﬀ. Without outside Korean speakers, the WFP and other organizations are 
reliant on government-supplied interpreters who owe their primary allegiance 
to the FDRC, not the relief agency that pays their salary. As one observer put it, 
“Their reporting loyalties are almost always toward the government” (Bennett 
1999:16). A current aid worker put it less diplomatically: “In other countries, 
local nationals are on our side. In the DPRK even your driver tries to cheat 
you.” In private interviews, more than one aid worker described a situation 
that would be amusing if not for the stakes. Unable to speak Korean or read 
Korean-language signs, aid workers had no idea if they were being shown the 
institutions that they had requested to visit and in multiple instances strongly 
suspected that they had been taken to the same institution twice. 
The restrictions on staﬀ not only severely limit the overall supply and their 
loyalty but aﬀect quality as well. With aid workers trained primarily in English 
rather than a substantive ﬁeld, local staﬀ are unlikely to have the speciﬁc techni- 
cal abilities to manage an aid eﬀort, such as background in logistics, nutrition, 
and health. Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez observed in 2005 that of UNICEF’s 
ten North Korean counterparts, none had speciﬁc technical or sectoral skills. 
The exception to the use of Korean speakers is the growing involvement of 
South Korean agencies in humanitarian eﬀorts. Interviews with South Korean 
government oﬃcials indicate that as of mid-2005 the country had sixty people 
at twelve distribution centers in six major cities involved in their monitoring 
eﬀorts. But the South Korean Red Cross is constrained to work with its North 
Korean counterpart and has avoided confrontation over monitoring (Becker 
1998b). South Korean NGOs are also highly restricted in interactions with their 
North Korean counterparts. 
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The constraints associated with these personnel practices are reinforced by 
North Korean laws prohibiting unauthorized contact with foreigners; these 
laws constitute a substantial disincentive for North Koreans to interact with 
foreign aid workers at all, let alone to provide information that might appear 
unﬂattering to the regime. When making monitoring visits, WFP staﬀ are 
accompanied not only by local oﬃcials—who may be quite sympathetic to 
WFP concerns—but by FDRC staﬀ as well. Given the rigidly authoritarian 
nature of the political system, the presence of representatives of the central 
government stiﬂes the creation of alliances and networks with local oﬃcials or 
the revelation of any information that may be unﬂattering to the government. 
Reputedly, local oﬃcials who get too close to donors have been removed. 
Leaving little to chance, the government also seeks to restrict the possibility 
of unauthorized contacts through pervasive controls and surveillance of foreign 
personnel as well. Not until April 2000 were WFP suboﬃce employees outside 
Pyongyang permitted to walk outside their hotels without being accompanied. 
We now have a handful of personal accounts of life in North Korea written 
from the perspective of diplomats and other foreigners working in the country 
(Cornell 2002; Harrold 2004). All contain descriptions of incidents—some- 
times humorous, sometimes maddening—where personal belongings were 
riﬂed and searched without consent, phones tapped, and personal movements 
and contacts subjected to surveillance. 
Beyond geographic restrictions, personnel practices, and the barriers dis- 
couraging unauthorized contacts, the North Korean government imposes a 
variety of restrictions on aid operations that make satisfactory monitoring dif- 
ﬁcult. The key instrument the WFP uses to ensure the integrity of its aid eﬀort 
is the site visit. In principle, such visits should include the institutions that are 
ﬁnal recipients of aid, such as schools, hospitals, public distribution centers, 
and food-for-work sites. These visits should include a random and even surprise 
component, allowing monitors to observe everyday rather than staged practices. 
Given the growing importance of the market in overall food consumption, it 
is also important for aid workers to be aware of market trends by being able to 
monitor food prices in farmers’ and other markets. Finally, monitors should be 
able to collect systematic statistical information—for example, on nutritional 
status—in order to guarantee and improve the eﬀectiveness of aid. 
There is some evidence of progress on these fronts after 2000. Figure 4.6 
provides some sense of the sheer number of monitoring visits conducted by the 
WFP staﬀ over time by tracking the monthly number of visits from mid-1999 
through early 2005. The number of contacts is large and shows a steady upward 
trend.16 Outside of special travel restrictions imposed around the time of the 
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FIGURE 4.6. Number of Monthly Monitoring Visits, June 1999–March 2005 
Note: Figure for March 2005 is preliminary. Source: WFP Monthly Updates (various issues), www. 
wfp.org/DPRK; USAID 2005. 
 
 
2000 summit, variation across months during the time periods was largely a 
function of weather and staﬀ availability rather than ﬂuctuations in access. 
These visits included a variety of institutional locations. PDS centers and tar- 
geted institutions typically dominated the number of visits, and ports were also 
covered. Prenotiﬁcation is required, and visits to speciﬁc sites may in principle 
be denied. The standard procedure is for the WFP to make weekly requests to 
visit facilities in particular regions, which DPRK authorities then review. In 
2002 about 8 percent of requests were denied. By 2003 this had fallen to 1 per- 
cent, and by the end of 2004 virtually all requests were met (Takahara 2004). 
Table 4.3 moves beyond itemizing the sheer number of contacts by providing 
an overview of qualitative developments in the monitoring regime. Although 
a number of NGOs chose to leave, as we have mentioned, others reported 
marginal improvements in the operational climate (Smith 2002). Not only did 
the number of WFP visits increase, but the program also made a number of 
substantive gains beginning in 2002. One important new source of informa- 
tion came from focus groups that allowed WFP oﬃcials to discuss sources of 
income and food with target groups. These expanded over subsequent years, 
allowing the WFP to shift its focus from overall, national-level food security to 
household-level food security and a more nuanced understanding of who was 
vulnerable. The government also agreed to new nutritional surveys, one in 2002 
and a second in 2004, that provided new information (see chapter 7). 
 
 
  
 
 
  TABLE 4.3. Developments in the monitoring regime  
Appeal Policy Developments International WFP Staﬀ (end of year) 
Sept. 1995-June 1996 All early monitoring visits limited to west coast: North and South Hwanghae, North and 
South P’yo˘ng’an, Pyongyang and Nampo 
June 1996-Mar. 1997 June: USAID monitoring report argues against use of PDS, reports evidence of preferen- 
tial distribution of food 
April 1997-Dec. 1997 The WFP negotiates the opening of the northeast provinces to direct shipments and some 
monitoring, but parts of the provinces of Chagang and all of Ryanggang were basically 
inaccessible. At beginning of appeal, WFP has access to 159 of 211 counties. 
WFP suboﬃces opened in Ch’o˘ngjin, Hamhung, and Sinu˘iju 
1998 WFP threatens to suspend planned operations in 50 of 210 counties if not allowed to 
monitor. DPRK responds by opening 11 counties where 2 percent of population live, 
bringing total in May 1998 to 171 counties. WFP scales back assistance accordingly, 
reducing proposed operations by 55,000 tons ($33 million) 
May: WFP suboﬃce opened in Wonsan 
September—October: EU, UNICEF, and WFP, in collaboration with the DPRK govern- 
ment, conduct nutritional survey 
October: WFP suboﬃce opened in Hyesan 
November: Humanitarian principles outlined by NGOs participating in the 1999 appeal 
and ﬁrst Consensus Statement of all UN agencies, NGOs, and donors operating in the 
DPRK, expressing commitment both to relief and to the humanitarian principles, includ- 
ing eﬀective monitoring 
WFP has four international staﬀ 
WFP has ﬁve international staﬀ 
WFP has 24 international staﬀ 
 
 
WFP has 35 international staﬀ 
1999 April. Update of humanitarian principles to reﬂect new donors WFP has 41 international staﬀ 
2000 Regional Programming Monitoring Teams established to decentralize monitoring. WFP has 37 international staﬀ 
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  TABLE 4.3. Developments in the monitoring regime, continued  
Appeal Policy Developments International WFP Staﬀ (end of year) 
2001 Four new counties opened to monitoring (three in South Hwanghae and one in Phyon- 
gan) 
WFP has 51 international staﬀ 
 March: Update of humanitarian principles to reﬂect new donors and third consensus state- 
ment 
 
 August: Government commits to providing WFP with full list of beneﬁciary institutions  
2002 Authorities allow double teaming: simultaneous monitoring by two WFP teams in the 
same province on the same day. 
WFP has 39 international staﬀ 
 The WFP is allowed to use focus groups to gather information on sources of food and 
income 
 
 Satellite agreement reached allowing satellite communications facilities in Pyongyang and 
ﬁve ﬁeld stations 
 
 Government honors its commitment to conduct a nutritional survey  
 Substantial personnel allowed to walk unaccompanied outside their hotels  
 August: DPRK and WFP sign protocol on conduct of a nutrition survey  
2003 January: A county in Kaeso˘ng is closed to monitoring because of the establishment of an 
industrial complex in conjunction with a South Korean ﬁrm. 
WFP has 45 international staﬀ 
 May: Internal travel restrictions associated with SARS impede monitoring in North 
Hamgyo˘ng province and Sinu˘iju 
 
 October: A new county in South Phyongan is made accessible  
2004 Discussions with government over apparent sale and purchase of grain by county level oﬃ- 
cials at market prices. 
WFP has 42 international staﬀ 
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  TABLE 4.3. Developments in the monitoring regime, continued   
Appeal Policy Developments International WFP Staﬀ (end of year) 
2004, cont’d From fall, increasing conﬂict over monitoring as government authorities review humanitar- 
ian operations and limit access to seven counties in Chagang province, seek to reduce the 
overall number of site visits, and limit the nature of questions posed through focus groups 
and surveys. 
December: WFP suspends operations in Chagang on no access, no food principle 
2005 March: WFP regional director for Asia Tony Banbury outlines elements of a new moni- 
toring regime under negotiation with North Korean authorities, including more visits to 
PDCs, more extensive baseline surveys, expanded survey groups and electronic tracking of 
shipments. 
This regime is never implemented. At the end of the year regional oﬃces, food factories, 
and food-for-work programs are closed. 
2006 March: WFP and North Korea negotiate over a greatly circumscribed program, involving 
a dramatic reduction in staﬀ and restricted (quarterly) opportunities to monitor projects 
outside Pyongyang. 
Sources: FAO/WFP 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004; UN-OCHA n.d.a. 
WFP has 43 international staﬀ (as of 
the end of January) 
 
 
 
 
WFP has prospectively 10 or fewer 
staﬀ 
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It is important to underline, however, that these marginal changes have 
taken place in the context of quite substantial limitations on the freedom of 
movement of monitors, as well as clear evidence of the reversibility of any gains 
that the WFP has been able to make. In large humanitarian operations, it is 
impossible to monitor every transaction. Random, unannounced inspections 
are thus critical to maintaining the integrity of the relief eﬀort, but in North 
Korea they are not allowed. WFP oﬃcials claim they can increase the eﬀective 
randomness in the context of a system that requires prenotiﬁcation, for exam- 
ple, by proposing to visit an orphanage in a particular county (of which there 
are, say, seven) and on visitation day demanding to be taken to a particular 
orphanage of the seven possible. Yet even these techniques are imperfect since 
interviewees at any given site cannot be chosen at random. Moreover, as of 
late 2005, the North Korean government had still not provided the WFP with 
a comprehensive list of institutions that beneﬁt from foreign support despite 
repeated requests over a period of years. 
 
A Typical WFP Shipment 
 
To see how these various constraints work in practice, it is useful to consider 
a typical WFP delivery.17 Following the appeal and commitments from donor 
governments, the WFP works with donors to orchestrate shipments, which 
land at North Korean ports. The WFP and FDRC agree on a delivery plan for 
each shipment, specifying the ﬁnal distribution of aid by local jurisdiction and 
targeted group. 
The WFP and FDRC meet the food at the port. The logistics of distribu- 
tion within North Korea, however, are handled not by the FDRC but by the 
Ministry of Food Administration, and the food ultimately passes through the 
public distribution system (Bennett 1999). As early as 1997, it became clear 
that limited trucking capacity and fuel shortages were a major constraint on 
eﬀective delivery of food. The WFP oﬀered the North Korean government fuel 
subsidies, but to keep track of food trucked to the county-level warehouses and 
to justify the subsidies, the WFP and the North Korean authorities developed 
a “consignment note system” to monitor shipments. The system used waybills 
in English and Korean that identiﬁed the contents of the shipment and its 
destination (Bennett 1999:12; GAO 1999:11–12). The North Korean authorities 
compile the waybills for a particular shipment. When delivery is complete, the 
waybills are returned to the WFP for the fuel reimbursement. The WFP in turn 
maintains a database of shipments. 
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The opportunities for leakage in such a system are multiple. Major diver- 
sion at the port is unlikely, but much food does not go from port to truck but 
rather to trains and barges before it is transferred to trucks; these shipments are 
not tracked. The staﬀ in the WFP suboﬃces receive copies of the distribution 
plans. In principle, warehouse managers are supposed to receive copies of these 
as well. WFP staﬀ have reported on a number of occasions their suspicions 
that much of the paperwork required by the WFP was fabricated ex post (Kirk 
and Hochstein 1997; Bennett 1999; Kirk, Brookes, and Pica 1998), although 
whether this was to hide diversion or simply reﬂected lack of administrative 
capacity is impossible to say. The WFP ﬁeld oﬃces attempt to check as many 
county warehouses as they have access to, and although access has been lim- 
ited, Bennett claims that through the peak of the famine there were “only very 
few occasions when consignments were not received as stated in the counties 
visited” (1999:12). 
Nonetheless, there is at least anecdotal evidence of problems at this stage 
in the distribution chain. Kirk, Brookes, and Pica (1998), for example, report 
observing food donated by the European Union (EU) loaded onto a military 
truck with military personnel and headed toward a province not covered by 
the EU assistance program. Another example is recounted by Chin Yong-gyu, 
a former sergeant in the Korean People’s Army and driver (1998–2002), who 
described in detail how the military diverted foreign relief supplies and fooled 
UN monitors (International Federation for Human Rights 2003). Yet more 
recent incidents of this sort are provided by Good Friends (2005). 
Once food reaches the county warehouse, the only check on delivery to the 
ﬁnal institutional destinations—whether public distribution centers (PDCs) or 
targeted institutions—and on the use made of the food by those ﬁnal destina- 
tions is through spot checks by WFP suboﬃces. Although large-scale diversion 
at higher stages in the distribution chain is possible, it is at this lower level of the 
chain that monitoring is the weakest and diversion thus most likely to occur. 
The task of tracking supplies across tens of thousands end-user institutions 
under diﬃcult working conditions is vast. Ironically, some NGOs operating on 
a smaller scale may have a more accurate grasp of where their contributions are 
ending up, despite what appears to be less rigorous monitoring. 
With approximately 43,000 ultimate destinations and the multiple restric- 
tions on monitoring, it is extremely diﬃcult for the WFP and NGO leadership 
to say with certainty where food is going. We take up the issue of diversion in 
more detail in the following chapter, but a fascinating example is documented 
by Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez (2005). UNICEF maintains an EU-funded 
program to distribute therapeutic milk, which can be fatal if administered 
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incorrectly. According to the 2003/2004 agreement, this milk was to be pro- 
vided to three provincial hospitals with properly trained staﬀ. During a moni- 
toring visit in November 2003, however, the EU’s technical assistant discovered 
that the supplies were being distributed to baby homes in the cities of Hyesan 
and Ch’o˘ngjin. The DPRK then proposed for the 2004/2005 aid cycle that the 
product be distributed to 157 rehabilitation centers of various sorts, an altera- 
tion in terms of reference that Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez describe as without 
justiﬁcation, cost-ineﬀective, and potentially dangerous. 
Centrally directed conspiracies to divert aid may well exist,18 but our recon- 
struction of an aid shipment suggests that local politics are likely to play a more 
important role in the ﬁnal distribution of food than are central government 
authorities. County-level administrators have substantial inﬂuence over the dis- 
position of aid supplies and face a host of motivations ranging from genuine 
and sincere diﬀerences with donors over priorities, to the universal local politics 
phenomenon of back-scratching, to personal pecuniary gain. The latter may be 
particularly important if we consider that these midlevel government and party 
oﬃcials are living on rapidly eroding won-denominated salaries, as we discuss 
in more detail in chapter 7. 
According to interviews with WFP oﬃcials, staﬀ members occasionally go to 
the PDCs and observe distribution to ﬁnal aid recipients. Yet as one UN oﬃcial 
put it, “We are not naïve. We have 300 monitoring visits a month. They don’t 
mean anything, because there are no random visits” (quoted in Flake 2003:37). 
Both U.S. and EU oﬃcial monitors indicated “staging” and signiﬁcant discrep- 
ancies between reported numbers of beneﬁciaries at particular institutions and 
those actually observed during the 1997–98 period. More important, refugee 
interviews suggest that there is diversion from the warehouse level to the army 
and privileged party personnel. 
 
Conclusion: The Stand-Oﬀ of 2005–6 
 
In this chapter, we have outlined the principles governing the monitoring of 
food aid and the evolution of those principles in practice. We argued that these 
principles were in eﬀect the subject of an ongoing negotiation between the 
donor community and the government, with some signs of progress—albeit 
from a low base—after 2000. But these gains were by no means irreversible, 
and 2004 witnessed a backlash against foreign monitoring that ended with the 
WFP narrowly managing to maintain its operations in the country.19 
This backlash began in the summer, when the North Korean authorities 
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indicated that they would not participate in the UN’s annual consolidated 
appeal, were requesting the dissolution of the UN’s Oﬃce for the Coordi- 
nation of Humanitarian Aﬀairs in Pyongyang after August 2005, and were 
threatening to expel NGOs that did not bring in suﬃcient volumes of aid. 
In September 2004, the government began to take a number of restrictive 
measures: limiting the overall number of visits (from over ﬁve hundred a 
month to around three hundred a month; see ﬁgure 4.6), closing a number 
of counties and the whole province of Chagang (although some counties were 
subsequently reopened); and limiting household survey questions not directly 
related to food. 
Observers ascribed a variety of motivations to these developments. One line 
of reasoning was that with the worst of the food emergency easing and with 
South Korean aid beginning to ﬂow in large quantities, the DPRK did not 
need other, more intrusive assistance as badly and was less willing to make 
political concessions to secure it. The DPRK was receiving enough food aid, if 
all sources were considered, and would prefer development assistance because 
it was more fungible. Moreover, North Korean authorities were tired of WFP 
requests to visit PDCs, follow trucks carrying supplies, and do more interviews 
with recipients and focus groups. In short, in the words of one WFP oﬃ- 
cial, the North Koreans were getting fed up with having forty WFP monitors 
“traipsing around their country.” 
Yet another possible explanation is that the government’s fears were in fact 
warranted. The period after 2000 had seen an increasing penetration of infor- 
mation originating from outside the country through increased access to mobile 
phones, videotapes, and other sources of information such as travel to China 
(Lankov 2006a). The North’s harder line might therefore have been a reﬂection 
of a government increasingly concerned about losing internal political control 
and the impact of a visible foreign presence on this process. And, of course, 
there is yet another, and perhaps simpler, explanation: monitoring did in fact 
constitute a partial check on behavior, and, as we will discuss below, members 
of the North Korean government who were involved in diversion might have 
simply preferred a less rigorous monitoring regime. 
These conﬂicts gave rise to intense negotiations between the North Korean 
authorities and the WFP over monitoring questions. In a press conference in 
March 2005 that received wide distribution, WFP regional director Anthony 
Banbury suggested that the government and the WFP had reached an agree- 
ment “in principle” to a shift in the monitoring regime.20 In return for a reduc- 
tion in the overall number of visits, the WFP proposed four changes to the 
monitoring system: 
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• Household food information. Every four months the WFP would under- 
take baseline household surveys, interview local oﬃcials and others (e.g., 
farmers, factory oﬃcials), hold focus group discussions, and take observa- 
tional walks. The ﬁrst household survey was conducted in June 2005. 
• Distribution monitoring. The WFP would shift at the margin to moni- 
toring distribution centers and food-for-work projects, interview those 
receiving food aid there, and increase monitoring visits to nonhousehold 
sites (e.g., county warehouses, factories producing food products with 
WFP commodities, institutions receiving food aid). 
• Ration cards. All WFP beneﬁciaries would be given a WFP-designed and 
-printed ration card that would be checked by the WFP at distributions. 
As of August 2005, the distribution of these cards was nearly complete. 
• Commodity tracking. WFP staﬀ would be allowed to follow food aid 
physically from the port of entry, to county warehouses, to three to six 
public distribution centers per county, as well as implementing a more 
uniform and consistent system to track commodities by waybill number, 
with the ultimate goal of eventually introducing an electronic system that 
would allow tracking of individual bags from port to ﬁnal point of deliv- 
ery. The ﬁrst visits to PDCs began in June 2005. 
 
These developments were promising; fully implemented and sustained, the 
changes would have marked an important advance in monitoring. Subsequent 
events, however, revealed that the North Koreans had no intention of sub- 
jecting themselves to greater scrutiny; to the contrary, increased aid and an 
improved harvest provided them with the leverage to squeeze the WFP. 
In the fall of 2005, North Korea experienced its best harvest in a decade, 
and South Korea increased its aid. The North Koreans responded to these eased 
supply conditions by demanding that the WFP switch from food aid to devel- 
opment assistance and that all foreign personnel from private aid groups leave 
the country by year’s end. They also banned private trade in grain, announced 
a revival of the PDS, and conﬁscated grain from North Korean farmers, pol- 
icy developments we take up in greater detail in the conclusion to chapter 7. 
According to the WFP’s resident representative in Pyongyang, Richard Ragan, 
the monitoring regime constituted a major motive for these actions. Accord- 
ing to Ragan, the North Koreans “repeatedly stressed that our monitoring is 
too excessive” (Agence France Press 2005). (This claim was paradoxical insofar 
as development assistance would require even greater contact with foreigners 
and transparency in ﬁnancial operations.)21 A North Korean diplomat similarly 
cited the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States, 
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which linked continuing support for humanitarian activities to improvements 
in transparency (Brooke 2005). 
The United Nations’ immediate response was to underline the continued 
precariousness of the situation in North Korea and the indispensability of its 
presence. Whatever the humanitarian merits of this position, it eﬀectively sig- 
naled that the WFP was unwilling to walk away and consequently reduced 
negotiating leverage with the North Koreans over the terms of engagement.22 
What followed was a diplomatic dance that ultimately resulted in the suspen- 
sion of WFP operations in North Korea at the end of 2005, followed by the 
approval in February 2006 by the WFP executive board of a proposal for a 
greatly scaled-down program. The proposed program would feed roughly 1.9 
million beneﬁciaries, less than one-third of the previously targeted population, 
requiring 150,000 metric tons of commodities at a cost of approximately $102 
million (WFP 2006a). Conﬁrming our emphasis on the government’s concerns 
about monitoring, the North Koreans demanded a reduction in staﬀ to ten or 
fewer, closure of the regional oﬃces outside Pyongyang, and conﬁnement of 
this staﬀ to Pyongyang with only quarterly opportunities to visit project sites in 
the ﬁeld, a stunning concession that the WFP incorporated into its proposal. 
As of this writing, critical aspects of the terms of engagement remained to be 
negotiated with the North Korean government, and the United States remained 
noncommittal pending the outcome of these negotiations. But the negotiations 
underscore the basic points we have made here about the strategic nature of 
negotiations over transparency and monitoring issues with North Korea. When 
times are good, the government moves to limit access; when times are tough, 
they make the concessions necessary to secure at least adequate assistance. 
The importance of transparency and monitoring for donors is not simply 
a humanitarian issue; it relates to the politically sensitive question of whether 
assistance is being diverted into unauthorized uses. It is to this contentious 
issue of diversion that we now turn. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Diversion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allegations of diversion and the corruption of the aid eﬀort have dogged relief 
eﬀorts in North Korea from their start in 1995. There are three reasons to be 
concerned with the diversion of food aid. The ﬁrst is the obvious, humanitarian 
one: aid is intended to relieve the suﬀering of the most vulnerable, and having 
it reach its intended beneﬁciaries is a better outcome than having it consumed 
by those who are less vulnerable or altogether undeserving. A second reason for 
concern has to do not with the deserving but with the undeserving. Most forms 
of diversion involve corruption: not only do targeted beneﬁciaries go without 
allotted food while the less deserving are fed, but corrupt oﬃcials and others 
enrich themselves in the process. 
But beyond these direct welfare considerations lies a third concern: that 
diversion could destroy political support for relief programs in donor coun- 
tries. In February 2001, the UN special rapporteur for food rights, Jean Ziegler, 
wrote, Most of the international food aid was being diverted by the army, the 
secret services, and the Government” (United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights 2001:11). In asking that this assessment be retracted, the executive direc- tor 
of the WFP, Catherine Bertini, admitted that her “gravest concern is that 
this erroneous information will undermine the political will of our donors” 
(NAPSnet Daily Report 2001). 
The question of diversion is both contentious and poorly understood, and 
we therefore begin with the microeconomics of the process. Diversion is a 
distributional issue. Diverted aid does not vanish into the ether; someone con- 
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sumes it. The incidence of the gains and losses across diﬀerent social groups 
therefore requires careful analysis. In the case of North Korea, where markets 
had historically been suppressed, we argue that aid diversion contributed to 
the their development. This change in the institutional environment in turn 
altered the distribution of gains and losses from diversion and the nature of 
food vulnerability more generally as an increasing share of total demand was 
met through the market. 
In such a system, the incentives to divert aid from its intended recipients are 
clear and strong. Moreover, the weakness of the monitoring regime undoubt- 
edly provided ample opportunity to do so. Assessing the actual magnitude of 
any illicit activity is diﬃcult, however. In making our evaluation, we appeal to 
a variety of sources of evidence: eyewitness and participant accounts, interviews 
with humanitarian aid workers, refugee surveys, and documentary evidence 
such as photographs and video footage. Finally, we present a balance sheet exer- 
cise that demonstrates that the estimates derived from these various sources are 
consistent—in a quantitative, accounting sense—with information about other 
aspects of the North Korean food economy in which we have at least somewhat 
greater conﬁdence. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the magnitude 
of diversion is probably large, perhaps 30 percent or more of total aid. 
Before considering evidence on the magnitude of diversion, it is important 
to distinguish between the common image of large-scale centralized diversion 
by state oﬃcials and the military, as implied by Ziegler, and what we call decen- 
tralized diversion by lower level oﬃcials. It is also important to note that, in 
the context of the state-controlled Public Distribution System, food can be 
diverted not only from aid sources but also from domestic production and the 
PDS. Moreover, aid can be diverted directly to consumption by the undeserv- 
ing but also into the market. The end recipients of diverted food purchased 
in the market might include the military and political elite and nontargeted 
groups. But purchasers of diverted aid also include targeted groups, who pay 
for the food instead of receiving it gratis. 
We begin with the standard image of diversion as a centralized, large-scale 
process directed by the party and military for its own beneﬁt. Certainly, the 
North Korean military has the ability to divert aid in this fashion if it wishes 
to, in part because of its political power, in part because of its logistic capabili- 
ties, in part because of the general weakness of the monitoring system and the 
speciﬁc exclusion of militarily sensitive areas. Anecdotal evidence has certainly 
conﬁrmed that at least some donated food ﬁnds its way to the military and 
party cadre; often-repeated stories of this sort include the discovery of cans of 
food from a private NGO on a North Korean submarine that ran aground in 
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1997 and eyewitness accounts by a U.S. House of Representatives staﬀ delega- 
tion that visited the country in 1998 (U.S. House of Representatives 1999:23). 
There are several reasons, however, to doubt centrally directed, large-scale 
diversion of humanitarian assistance to the military for its own consumption. 
As the WFP’s John Powell testiﬁed with admirable frankness before the U.S. 
Congress, “The army takes what it wants from the national harvest upfront, 
in full. And it takes it in the form that Koreans prefer: Korean rice” (Powell 
2002:52). The form that most WFP aid takes—wheat, corn, protein biscuits— 
is less appealing to an elite that has access to more desirable foods. In addition, 
there are other international sources of aid besides those channeled through 
the WFP that are not subject to monitoring at all. One WFP oﬃcial, speaking 
from ﬁrsthand experience but on the condition of anonymity, described a bar- 
gain under which the DPRK military has access to aid donated by China, thus 
preserving the WFP’s claim that its food does not go directly to the military. 
There is, however, a second and more plausible process that we call “decen- 
tralized diversion”: a variety of actions taken by lower-level party, administra- 
tive, and military personnel that divert food from intended beneﬁciaries to 
other consumers. The military no doubt undertook some of these actions dur- 
ing the famine and acute shortages, but not at the direction of central com- 
mand. Indeed, almost exactly the opposite was the case: incentives for diversion 
at the unit level arose because of the inability of the central military command 
structure to orchestrate supplies. Defectors have reported at various times that 
lower-ranking military personnel and those stationed in certain regions were 
not protected from food shortages. As early as 1993, a military defector report- 
ing malnutrition—and discontent—in the army stated that “soldiers are some- 
times selected to raid government food supplies meant for the people” (Asso- 
ciated Press 1993; Becker 1996). Refugee interviews conducted in 1997 just as the 
famine was cresting go further, suggesting a partial breakdown in military 
authority, with units in some areas of the country even having been broken up 
and soldiers told return to their villages (Becker 1997c). 
These reports are by no means inconsistent with refugee interviews claim- 
ing that the military and party were shown preference in the distribution of 
food (Becker 1997b; 1998a).1 These interviews, reﬂecting on the high famine 
period, suggest that diversion from the PDS was occurring even before human- 
itarian aid arrived. Other reports suggest that soldiers in the northern part of 
the country were not simply diverting food from oﬃcial channels but extort- 
ing food and money from households with Chinese relatives. One defector’s 
account is worth citing in full: “Soldiers received daily rations, but those were 
not enough to live on. So the chief of my son’s unit ordered them to forage 
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in the countryside. Small companies were sent out to steal village stocks and 
if they found nothing in the granaries, they robbed people’s homes. One day 
my son protested and said he was not in the army to steal from people. He 
was immediately shot” (Becker 1997a). As succinct as this testimony is, it con- 
tains a wealth of information as well as drama: the breakdown of the military’s 
capacity to feed its troops; the organized pursuit of coping strategies through 
foraging; the ultimate and no doubt desperate turn to violence; the fate of those 
who protested. 
A related source of decentralized diversion to military consumption arose 
from what Natsios calls the “militarization of agriculture” (1999:117). Partly to 
increase able-bodied labor, partly to prevent hoarding, the military established 
a greater presence on the state farms and collectives from 1996 on. So-called 
corn guards were deployed to stop preharvesting and diversion by farmers and 
had orders to kill “thieves.” The corn guards were themselves ill fed, however, 
and farmers were able to bribe them with food. 
The political and ethical implications of decentralized diversion to consump- 
tion by the military or other less-deserving groups are more ambiguous than is 
commonly recognized. Certainly, the extortion of food at the barrel of a gun is 
hard to condone. But the North Korean army is made up of forced conscripts 
who serve for long periods in Spartan conditions. Decentralized diversion 
occurred not only to the military elite, and not because of the overwhelming 
power of the state, but to low-level conscripts and because of the inability of 
the military machine to feed itself. Indeed, as we have seen from Kim Jo˘ng-il’s 
speech, cited in chapter 3, a plausible explanation for the government’s reluc- 
tance to reveal the extent of its food problems was to conceal the deterioration 
of the military’s most basic capabilities. 
To this point, we have focused largely on the politically contentious issue of 
diversion to the military. Yet this overlooks other channels through which food 
might be diverted and other sets of beneﬁciaries, including diversion to other 
undeserving groups and to the market. As we have seen, outside donors pri- 
oritized vulnerable segments of the population: children, pregnant and nursing 
mothers, the destitute, the inﬁrm, and the elderly. The repeated experience of the 
aid community is that the North Korean regime did not fully share these priori- 
ties and was also seeking to protect key constituencies: not simply the military 
and senior party oﬃcials but also the capital city of Pyongyang and productive 
workers in key sectors. This struggle for political survival was being replayed at 
the local level, where county-level committees similarly had to choose between 
allocating food to vulnerable groups with little political inﬂuence and productive 
workers and farmers. A report from a South Korean NGO that we outline in 
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more detail below claims to ﬁnd evidence of exactly such priorities: government 
instructions that aid be channeled not just to the military but to workers in 
state-owned enterprises and administrative functions. Conversely, a recent report 
from an NGO worker with substantial experience in-country found an increase 
in overall access by 2005 and a willingness to let her drive across the countryside 
but continued resistance to meeting with the disabled who constituted one of the 
organization’s target groups (Caritas—Hong Kong 2005b). 
 
Aid and Marketization 
 
A more complex problem has to do with diversion not for consumption or 
stockpiling but for sale in the market;2 again it is important to underline that 
such diversion can come out of domestic supply as well as aid. We are skeptical 
that the military diverts aid in order to gorge itself on low-quality foods such 
as protein biscuits. However, organization, logistical capabilities, and ability to 
compel compliance make it certain that party, state, and military oﬃcials are 
involved in diverting aid to the market for the purposes of self-enrichment. We 
devote somewhat more attention to this issue because it is highly consequential 
for the more general question of reform and transition to a more market-ori- 
ented system in North Korea that we take up in chapter 6. 
The incentive for this type of diversion depends on three key variables: 
the price of food, the existence of markets, and the ability of public-spirited 
authorities or donors to limit it. The economic incentives have undoubtedly 
varied over time with the degree of scarcity and the extent of marketization, 
and we return to them in more detail below.3 Under conditions of food scarcity, 
however, the returns on this type of activity can be astronomical; there can be 
little doubt that the incentives for diversion are extraordinarily strong. 
As the institutional environment changes, so does the likely impact of diver- 
sion away from its intended recipients. These eﬀects are not well understood 
and as a result have given rise to misleading assumptions about the eﬀects of 
diversion; it is worth spelling them out in some detail. 
Take the simplest case, in which food cannot be stored—perhaps because 
of the insecurity of attempting to do so—but there are functioning markets. If 
aid goes only to individuals who have no command over resources—orphaned 
children, the destitute, or those wholly dependent on institutions—it will not 
have any eﬀect on the market price of food. These individuals do not have the 
resources to purchase food in any case. Aid is purely additional. In this limiting 
case, the recipients capture the beneﬁts of aid wholly, and any diversion of aid 
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away from them is a zero-sum game. Diversion represents a direct reduction 
in the welfare of the targeted group. The beneﬁts of such diversion are shared 
between the sellers and buyers. 
In the North Korean case, however, aid went not only to these vulnerable 
groups but to households and individuals who were also purchasing some of their 
food on the market in any case; as we have seen above, dependence on the PDS 
was declining over time, and more and more individuals relied on the market 
(and other means) to secure food. In this case, the consequences of food aid are 
more complex. First, aid directly satisﬁes some portion of the recipients’ demand, 
its traditional purpose. But it also has a second, indirect eﬀect of reducing overall 
demand in the market and thus leading to a fall in the price of food (ﬁgure 5.1). 
Put diﬀerently, the beneﬁts of aid include not only the direct transfer but 
also the more general beneﬁt to consumers from a reduction in the prices paid 
for the portion of consumption that comes from purchases on the market. 
Cultivators, on the other hand, will suﬀer because the price of their product 
has fallen. The eﬀect on cultivators cannot be dismissed. As a matter of equity, 
farmers typically have lower incomes than urban residents. The provision of aid 
can thus have a regressive distributional impact. Equally if not more important 
is the fact that maintaining low producer prices results in adverse incentives, 
discouraging production and thus the eventual resolution of the chronic food 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1. Eﬀect of Food Aid on the Market Price of Food 
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emergency. It is noteworthy that domestic production in North Korea has 
never recovered to its precrisis level, and the absence of strong incentives to 
farmers is certainly one cause. 
What is the eﬀect of diversion in these more realistic circumstances where 
some share of demand is being supplied by the market? As under our ﬁrst set 
of assumptions, diversion directly reduces the welfare of those who would have 
received the food for free and increases the welfare of the diverters. But the 
eﬀect on the rest of the population is mixed. If the aid is diverted to groups 
that would have purchased food, diversion contributes to a fall in the price of 
food, conveying beneﬁts to consumers and losses to producers.4 
Additional diﬃculties in assessing the eﬀects of diversion arise when we add 
in two additional institutional complications: the existence of PDS entitle- 
ments and the fragmentation of markets. North Korean oﬃcials have contin- 
ued to insist that the PDS provides a subsidy to urban consumers, although, 
as we will discuss in chapter 7, the size of that subsidy has diminished over 
time as the PDS has moved toward more market-based pricing. The system of 
entitlements in such a system might be thought of as a kind of cascade. The 
privileged get the ﬁrst draw on PDS rations and enjoy the subsidy associated 
with access to the rationing system. After their need is satisﬁed, PDS supplies 
go to less-favored groups, including the vulnerable. Diversion from the PDS 
therefore does not aﬀect all equally but is more likely to reduce the consump- 
tion of those at the bottom of the hierarchy of food entitlements. 
Finally, the analysis of diversion must take into account the fact that mar- 
kets in North Korean are not fully integrated. We provide some evidence of 
wholesale networks operating over long distances, but diﬃculties in transport 
and the absence of middlemen who can openly proﬁt from arbitrage suggest 
that market fragmentation is a plausible assumption. The eﬀects of the cascade 
we have described are therefore highly localized and thus subject to substan- 
tial variation across the country. Any additional supply to one region is likely 
to pool there, beneﬁting consumers (and hurting producers) in those locales 
but not necessarily having wider eﬀects. Evidence we provide in chapter 7 on 
price diﬀerentials across the country provides strong support for the segmented 
nature of markets in North Korea. 
 
The Magnitude of Diversion 
 
Firm evidence of diversion is, of course, diﬃcult to come by because it reﬂects 
illicit behavior, at least in the eyes of the international donor community. As 
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a consequence, prior expectations are likely to play a strong role in any evalu- 
ation of the imprecise and fragmentary evidence that exists. Before turning to 
that evidence, however, it is important to restate the context. North Koreans 
have a multiplicity of motivations for diversion. In discussing diversion to con- 
sumption, we have already noted how the government has diﬀerent priorities 
with respect to distribution than donors do. But we should not rule out simple 
greed. We will provide a more detailed discussion on the evolution of prices in 
chapter 7, but we begin here by considering brieﬂy information on the wedge 
between oﬃcial and market prices. 
Table 5.1 reports such diﬀerentials for rice and corn both before and after 
the introduction of price reforms in July 2002. The table makes a very simple 
point: before the reforms, the diﬀerences between the oﬃcial and market 
prices for staple foods such as rice and corn were gigantic and widened as 
the country entered the famine and the real price of food increased. During 
the peak famine years, a farm household could make roughly one hundred 
times as much money by selling rice in the market as it could receive by 
selling it to the state. This constituted a powerful incentive to funnel output 
through unoﬃcial rather than state-sanctioned channels. These diﬀerentials 
narrowed dramatically after the July 2002 reforms, although they widened 
somewhat thereafter as the oﬃcial price remained ﬁxed and inﬂation surged. 
But even after the reforms, market prices remained multiples of oﬃcial pro- 
curement prices. 
While the economic incentives for farmers to redirect supply were enor- 
mous, the incentives for public oﬃcials to divert food, including food aid, 
were even greater still. As table 5.1 makes clear, the wedge between PDS and 
market prices was even larger than the wedge between procurement and market 
prices. Given the high real price of food in North Korea, the opportunity to 
steer donated grain into the market was virtually a guarantee of riches, and in 
an environment in which the economy was collapsing and the ability to secure 
the necessities of life was increasingly tenuous. 
Of course, temptations of this magnitude carried corresponding risks. As 
theories of corruption routinely note, the incentives for corrupt behavior are 
aﬀected not only by the size of the rents that can be earned but by the certainty 
and severity of punishment for getting caught. The severity and swiftness of 
punishment surely constituted a deterrent for some groups, although in a con- 
text in which the state was losing its ability to provide food and playing by the 
rules itself could risk a slow death. For the politically connected, however, it is 
not clear that punishment was either certain or severe. Higher-level authorities 
faced problems of monitoring their subordinates similar to those outlined in 
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  TABLE 5.1. Price Wedges  
Market Price 
 Oﬃcial 
Procurement 
Price 
 
 
PDS Price 
 
 
Market Price 
as Multiple of 
Procurement 
Price 
Market Price 
as Multiple of 
PDS Price 
Rice      
1990 0.8 0.08 20 25 250 
1992 0.8 0.08 25 31.3 312.5 
May 1996 0.8 0.08 100 125.0 1250.0 
1997 0.8 0.08 102.5 128.1 1281.3 
1998 0.8 0.08 77.0 96.3 962.5 
1999 0.8 0.08 64.0 80.0 800.0 
2000 0.8 0.08 46.6 58.3 582.5 
2001 0.8 0.08 49.5 61.9 618.8 
2002 17.1 18.40 52.5 3.1 2.9 
2003 40.0 44.00 156.6 3.9 3.6 
Corn      
1998 0.5 0.06 39.6 80.8 660.0 
1999 0.5 0.06 32.6 66.5 543.3 
2000 0.5 0.06 27.2 55.5 453.3 
2001 0.5 0.06 31.8 64.9 530.0 
2002 8.6 10.00 35.0 4.1 3.5 
2003 20.0 24.00 115.6 5.8 4.8 
Notes: Prices are won per kilo. The price series for 1990–1997 and 1998–2003 are from diﬀerent 
sources and not directly comparable. 
Sources: 1990–1997: S. Lee, 2003; 1998–2003: Lim 2005. 
 
 
chapter 5, while the absence of any system of accountability made it impossible 
for the victims of diversion to bring those responsible to justice. 
We have already shown that the weakness of the monitoring system provides 
ample opportunity for diversion along the entirety of the supply chain, from 
port of entry to end user. The pilferage rate for major multinational retailers like 
Walmart, equipped with the world’s most advanced electronic inventory control 
and security systems, is roughly 2 percent (Hollinger and Davis 2003). We would 
ﬁnd it astonishing if forty non-Korean-speaking foreigners operating under highly 
constrained circumstances and responsible for forty thousand retail outlets in a 
country the size of Louisiana or New York could meet this standard. 
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Yet an additional shortcoming of the monitoring system that deserves men- 
tion here concerns the markets themselves. During the famine and its aftermath, 
markets grew in importance as a point of distributing food. The monitoring of 
markets is considered a crucial tool for humanitarian aid workers since it pro- 
vides clear evidence of the extent of scarcities. But foreign observers have consis- 
tently been kept away from markets where illicit transactions might occur. 
We thus begin with an appeal to plausibility: at the most basic level, the 
diversion story makes sense. WFP oﬃcials have admitted as much publicly 
(Fairclough 2005; Reuters 2005). Adherence to an alternative story—that the 
diversion of aid is absent or minor—contradicts both our understanding of 
human behavior and a variety of evidence: it demands a willful suspension of 
disbelief. Having established the underlying plausibility of diversion, it is none- 
theless incumbent on us to consider the types of evidence that might shed light 
on its nature and magnitude. We consider brieﬂy the evidence coming from 
aid workers, from documentary sources, and from refugee interviews before 
attempting our own estimate of the size of the market. 
Probably the most reliable source of information on this issue is interviews 
with humanitarian aid workers themselves. For quite obvious reasons, neither 
the WFP nor any NGO has made a public eﬀort to determine the size of 
diversion, although, as we have mentioned, some organizations left the country 
precisely because they believed that aid was not reaching its intended beneﬁ- 
ciaries.5 Nonetheless, these workers have extensive in-country experience and 
know the institutions with which they are working and the limitations of the 
monitoring regime. Several have attempted overall estimates of diversion from 
their own organization’s programs in private background conversations, and 
these estimates range from 10 to 30 percent. If one accepts the notion that there 
have been improvements in monitoring in recent years, then it could well be 
the case that losses were even higher in the past. 
A somewhat harder bit of evidence from an NGO source is contained in 
a 2005 report from the South Korean organization Good Friends (H. J. Lee 
2005). Good Friends has been at the forefront of publicizing the food problem 
in North Korea since the mid-1990s; however, it is also important to underline 
that the group has been openly skeptical of the South Korean government’s 
aid eﬀorts. Nonetheless, the 2005 report from the organization claims to have 
secured an internal North Korean document or information from such a docu- 
ment that actually outlines the principle for allocating South Korean food aid. 
This document states that the ﬁrst allotment was to the Department of Peo- 
ple’s Armed Forces (30 percent), the second allotment was to Special Govern- 
ment Oﬃces (10 percent), the third went to factories manufacturing military 
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goods and other state-owned enterprises (10 percent), and the remainder to 
the municipal and district food administration centers of the PDS (approxi- 
mately 50 percent). This allocation is arguably not diversion in the technical 
sense since, as we will show in chapter 6 in more detail, the South Koreans 
place only minimal demands on their North Korean counterparts. Moreover, 
we have been unable to vouch for the authenticity of the evidence behind 
Good Friends’ claim. Nonetheless, the priorities reﬂected in the document are 
certainly plausible given the larger context we have sketched and suggest a level 
of diversion that is even higher than our estimates. 
The experience of the NGO Médecins sans Frontières is instructive in this 
context, as it suggests more precisely the problem of assessing the extent of 
diversion (the following is based on Schloms 2003). MSF was one of the ﬁrst 
NGOs to gain entry into the country. One of its major eﬀorts targeted severely 
malnourished children under the age of ﬁve by setting up feeding centers in 
the pediatric wards of county and provincial hospitals. At the beginning of the 
program, the FDRC provided the MSF with a list of all health facilities in each 
county in which it sought to operate. On site visits, MSF personnel saw institu- 
tions that were not on the provided lists and found evidence of children who 
were denied access to the program. MSF—and other European NGOs—grad- 
ually came to the recognition that the demographic information provided by 
the government was implausible. MSF estimated that as many as 25 percent of 
the children in South P’yo˘ng’an Province were orphaned or abandoned, housed 
in institutions that North Korean authorities initially denied existed and sub- 
sequently failed to open to relief eﬀorts. MSF found evidence that provision 
of aid within these institutions was systematically conditioned on the political 
status of the parents, and, as a result, large numbers of the target population 
were in fact not being reached. Other NGOs reached similar conclusions with 
respect to areas under their jurisdiction (Bennett 1999; Schloms 2004). 
The problems facing MSF and the other European NGOs do not denote 
diversion per se but rather concealment to further discrimination in the pro- 
vision of relief. The government was eﬀectively denying access to a particu- 
lar target population, namely, vulnerable children and particularly the many 
orphaned and abandoned ones that the famine spawned. The case is instruc- 
tive, however, because it plausibly mirrors the process of diversion in which 
some target population is eﬀectively denied access to food in favor of a privi- 
leged group, including households deemed politically hostile. 
A second form of substantiation takes the form of a small but revealing 
body of direct documentary evidence of diversion. Although this corrobora- 
tory evidence cannot speak to the question of magnitude, it reveals impor- 
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tant institutional details. The most important source of such evidence is a net- 
work associated with a Japanese NGO called Rescue the North Korean People 
Urgent Action Network (RENK). RENK has supported North Koreans who, 
for ideological or pecuniary motives or both, have surreptitiously taken exten- 
sive video footage of market activity in North Korea by concealing cameras in 
bags. The video footage has then been smuggled out along the Chinese border. 
The ﬁrst tape of this sort was made in 1998. The ﬁrst suggesting diversion was 
shot in August 2003 and contains scenes of food aid from South Korea, the 
United States, and the WFP in marked bags being sold in a market in Hyesan 
City, Yanggang Province. This video was strongly contested by the aid agencies 
at the time. In particular, it was argued that in an economy of such pervasive 
shortages, the bags in which humanitarian rice are shipped have value and 
are reused. WFP Asia bureau director Anthony Banbury has cited an amusing 
example of WFP bag material being recycled as tablecloths (Banbury 2005). 
The rice pictured in bags marked as aid could in fact be North Korean. 
A second video made in July 2004 and viewed by the authors shows scenes 
of the Sunam market in Ch’o˘ngjin, North Hamkyung Province. Several fea- 
tures of this video are interesting (Y. H. Lee 2005). The video shows unopened 
bags of rice from a variety of aid agencies, including South Korea, USAID, the 
WFP, and the Red Cross, as well as several NGOs, and documents that the 
particular foodstuﬀs sold in open bags correspond to the contents marked on 
the bags. The bags could have been resealed, and the sellers could be compul- 
sive types who only store beans in bags labeled “beans.” But the videos at least 
call into question the interpretation that bags are being reused. Moreover, the 
video contains conversations with sellers who testify openly that the food—as 
well as medicine—came from foreign sources and was associated with an addi- 
tional humanitarian response that followed a devastating train explosion near 
the  Chinese  border  at  Ryongch’o˘n.  Given  the  distance  from  Ryongch’o˘n  to 
Ch’o˘ngjin and the ongoing diﬃculties in the internal transportation system, it 
is utterly implausible that such food shipments could have occurred without 
relatively high level military or oﬃcial involvement. The prices of the rice are 
clearly market prices (430 won per kilo, or approximately ten times the oﬃcial 
price); there is no doubt that the food is being sold. A third video—which 
aroused particularly controversy in Japan—was released by RENK in June 2005 
and showed aid from Japan that had been given in conjunction with Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s visit in 2004 (and rice purchased by Japan from Pakistan) 
being sold in the Namheung market in Anju (E. J. Lee 2005). 
This video evidence should be approached with appropriate caution; most 
important, it cannot speak to the issue of magnitude. It is nonetheless reveal- 
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ing of an emerging practice before the crackdown on markets in late 2005. 
The existence of private traders openly selling donated rice in markets reveals 
important institutional detail, at least for the time it was taken. First, the loca- 
tion of these markets and the reference to the fact that aid was coming from 
Ryongch’o˘n suggests that it was transported over long distances, implying the 
involvement of those in control of transport capabilities and an illicit wholesale 
system operating over large distances. This is consistent with other informa- 
tion of the gradual emergence of trading networks extending over somewhat 
larger areas. The WFP, for example, has reported that provincial and local PDS 
oﬃcials have engaged in trading food among themselves as a way of balanc- 
ing supply and demand across jurisdictions. The case of the EU-donated baby 
formula cited in the last chapter also shows that donated materials had traveled 
signiﬁcant distances beyond the intended recipient hospitals. 
Second, the fact that this aid was sold openly suggests the eﬀective complic- 
ity of local oﬃcials and market managers; these sales were not conducted on the 
quiet but in plain view. Finally, the video reinforces our core point that diversion 
does not take place only to serve direct consumption but to stock the market. 
A ﬁnal, more indirect source of evidence is refugee surveys. The testimony of 
refugees about their individual access to food does not constitute ﬁrm evidence 
of diversion, since many other factors might account for shortages.6 Nonethe- 
less, they do provide revealing information on the nature of the distribution 
system. As we indicated in chapter 2, refugee interviews from the late 1990s 
attested to the breakdown of the PDS even after large-scale aid operations 
designed to serve as much as one-third of the population had begun; these ear- 
lier studies have been conﬁrmed by a more recent survey conducted by Chang 
(2005). As with all such samples, the respondents are not representative of the 
country as a whole. Nonetheless, the results are astonishing. Only 62.7 percent 
of the respondents reported knowing of the existence of aid at all; ten years into 
the humanitarian eﬀort, nearly 40 percent of the population remained unaware 
of it. Of those who knew of the existence of food aid, only 7.2 percent reported 
having received any (or less than 5 percent of the total sample, including those 
who were unaware of aid deliveries). These numbers do not imply that only 7 
percent of the population received aid, nor do they constitute proof of diver- 
sion; respondents might have received donated food without knowing it. The 
responses do, however, testify to the extraordinary power of the government to 
control information. Despite the fact that aid constituted a major component 
of total PDS supplies as we show below, many were unaware that these sup- 
plies came from foreign donors. When asked who the primary recipients of aid 
were, fully 98.1 percent responded “the military,” with the remainder replying 
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“citizens” or “others.” Again, these responses do not prove that the military has 
been the primary recipient of food aid, but they do attest to perceptions of the 
privileges accruing to the military, many no doubt observed ﬁrsthand. 
 
The Scope of the Market 
 
Is there any additional way to evaluate the competing claims about diversion? 
Although not precise, one way is to go back to the basics. In an economic 
exchange, every purchase is also a sale, and regardless of the channels through 
which they ﬂow, the quantities bought and sold have to match up. As a plausi- 
bility check, we use a simple balance sheet calculation to stack these diversion 
estimates up against what we know about the North Korean food economy. By 
comparing data on production, aid, and imports against estimates of the food 
passing through the PDS, we can get some broad order-of-magnitude estimates 
of the share of total supply passing through the market. As we will show, these 
estimates are highly germane for understanding the extent of diversion. More- 
over, they can be triangulated using sources of information such as household 
surveys done by the WFP. We conclude that the numbers add up: the estimates 
of signiﬁcant diversion are consistent with these other sources of information 
about the North Korean food economy. 
As the external aid eﬀort ramped up, the WFP targeted roughly 30 percent 
of the population through its feeding programs. The size of the targeted group 
had to be adjusted after 2003 as donations fell. But if we combine the WFP 
targets with the estimates of diversion cited above—taking 10 percent as the 
lower bound and the 50 percent cited in the Good Friends report as the upper 
bound—it suggests that enough food to feed 3 to 15 percent of the population 
has been diverted. What do we make of such an amount? First, it is not trivial. 
It is not massive in terms of overall demand but clearly large enough to divert 
substantial amounts of food aid from intended beneﬁciaries and to provide 
substantial rents to those who manage to gain control over it. 
At the same time, the diversion is large enough to have had an eﬀect on the 
broader process of marketization. By acting as an additional source of supply 
outside government control, the diversion of aid probably contributed to the 
development and scope of markets as institutions for intermediating the allo- 
cation of supply. Diversion probably contributed to the downward trend in 
market prices at least as the worst of the famine started to ease, before the post- 
2002 surge in inﬂation (table 5.1). If true, diversion helped those consumers 
who were obtaining food through the market, and disadvantaged producers. 
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How far has the process of marketization gone, and how do aid and its pos- 
sible diversion ﬁt into it? We have information on the allocation of grain to 
farmers, average PDS rations, and the share of the population dependent on 
the PDS (in eﬀect, the nonfarm population). If we make some simple but we 
believe reasonable assumptions about the share of the population that is work- 
ing and the rations allocated to workers as opposed to dependents, it is possible 
to make some very rough estimates of the share of total food supply from all 
sources that was moving through the PDS. The remainder constitutes the share 
of total supply that was being channeled in one form or another to the market 
or non-PDS forms of exchange. 
As we have seen, rural North Koreans on cooperative farms receive grain 
at the time of the harvest, which they can supplement with other own-grown 
sources. The urban story is more complex, as there are four channels through 
which urban households obtain food: PDS monthly rations, WFP support to 
institutions such as schools and hospitals, the WFP’s food-for-work (FFW) 
programs, and the market. For the purposes of these calculations, we assume 
that non-WFP aid, primarily from China and South Korea, goes directly into 
the PDS to support monthly rations (we include the military as part of urban 
North Korea and thus do not count Chinese aid as being diverted to the mili- 
tary). For the purposes of these calculations, we assume that the food-for-work 
program, which is small in relative terms, is eﬀectively outside the PDS and not 
subject to diversion. Non-FFW distribution is assumed vulnerable to diversion 
to the market at rates ranging from 10 to 50 percent per the estimates we have 
culled from the humanitarian community. 
We further assume that WFP aid either goes exclusively to the PDS monthly 
ration channel or, if it goes to institutions such as schools and hospitals, that aid 
is oﬀset by corresponding reductions in the monthly rations of families receiv- 
ing support through the institutional channel, as has been conﬁrmed by WFP 
staﬀ. For example, if a family is entitled to a certain PDS ration but includes 
a child who is also fed at school, then the household sees a reduction in its 
PDS ration. The implication of this assumption is that, on net, WFP aid does 
not expand the coverage of the PDS system. These assumptions are detailed in 
algebraic terms in appendix 3. 
Finally, we have to consider the impact of diversion. We assume that once 
food is diverted into the market, it is lost to the PDS, and the system delivers 
to consumers less than it was supposed to on paper—that is, the state does not 
subsequently extract more food out of the cultivators to compensate for pilfer- 
age.7 In this balance sheet calculation, diversion will increase marketization 
from the standpoint of consumers by forcing them into the market, but from 
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the standpoint of producers it does not make any diﬀerence. Once the state has 
collected its share of cooperative output, its ﬁnal disposition does not matter. 
We also assume that food obtained from domestic production is not subject to 
diversion; only aid is.8 
Food is fungible to a large degree, and it is therefore impossible to say which 
sources of food are going where: food might ﬁnd its way to the market as a 
result of the behavior of farmers or because of the diversion of aid. Nonethe- 
less, we think of marketization in at least three ways: the share of total domes- 
tic production (minus the allocation to farmers; this is important) going to 
the market, the share of food consumption sourced through markets, and, an 
inverse indicator, the value of aid as a share of food passing through nonmarket 
channels. The results of these calculations for the period 1999–2003 are striking: 
84 percent of output is either consumed on the farm or goes into the market. 
This means that the state is unable to procure very much domestic production 
for the purpose of supplying the PDS. Under the assumption that between 
10 percent and 50 percent of aid is diverted, consumers rely on the market 
for roughly half of their consumption (42 percent under the lower diversion 
assumption; 52 percent under the higher diversion assumption). This implica- 
tion is consistent with recent WFP survey results that are discussed in chapter 
7 and is also consonant with refugee interviews and defector surveys that indi- 
cate that the market, not the PDS system, is the primary source of food for a 
signiﬁcant share of the population. 
Last, we can express the value of aid as a share of what passes through the 
PDS system. In essence, this is the ﬂip side of the marketization estimate from 
the cultivator perspective. Since the state procures little local production for 
the PDS, these calculations suggest that the PDS system has largely become 
a mechanism for distributing aid. Aid accounts for 78 percent—nearly four- 
ﬁfths—of what is reputedly distributed through the PDS system. 
This exercise is subject to a number of possible risks. One has to do with 
our assumptions about the demographics. Farmers may also choose to consume 
some of their surplus rather than selling it on the market, managing to secure 
larger allocations than the ones formally given them. This may seem almost 
self-evidently true, but in fact it is not obvious. Farmers have access to other 
sources of food grown on either legal or illegal private plots, and this diversion 
of eﬀort may have some eﬀect on overall output. But we are doubtful that 
cooperative farms are able to divert large quantities of the main food grains. 
At least until the 2005 harvest, allotments had increased quite clearly, in part 
to avoid this very problem. Moreover, the government had become harshly 
vigilant in trying to check the hoarding behavior of the high famine period 
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even before the eﬀort to increase grain procurement and revive the PDS in late 
2005. A third possibility is that some portion of the population—a protected 
elite—is getting higher rations and consuming very much more than these 
numbers suggest. Again, this is possible, but, as we have seen, the protected 
elite—at least during the famine—was not large, and in any case there are lim- 
its to how much grain an individual can consume. Those privileged enough to 
have access to larger rations of food would also be in a position to supplement 
those rations on the market and through consumption of a more varied diet. 
We are therefore skeptical of the idea that diversion to elite consumption would 
account for a large share of what we observe. 
Instead, these results are consistent with the notion that diversion of aid 
away from state-controlled channels has contributed to the broader process of 
marketization. North Korea’s own statistics suggest—no doubt unwittingly— 
that the PDS is increasingly a mechanism for distributing international aid in 
the context of an economy in which food is increasingly distributed through 
the market. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we are learning from a growing literature on the political economy of aid, the 
donor-recipient relationship must be seen as a bargaining game. Donors seek to 
advance their objectives—both humanitarian and political—and recipients seek 
to maximize aid while limiting the conditions to which this aid is subjected. Aid 
to North Korea is dominated by food assistance through the WFP, as we have 
seen, but in other aspects it shares this basic structure. What is distinctive is 
that the nature of the North Korean political system—its overweening control 
and willingness to allow its citizens to experience extreme deprivation—actually 
gives it surprising leverage over the aid community. Because the international 
humanitarian community, humanitarian interests within the major donors, and 
the NGOs place such strong weight on the plight of the North Korean people, 
they have little bargaining power vis-à-vis the government. As a result, the out- 
side community has largely been forced to accept what we call North Korean 
exceptionalism: an aid regime that is subject to much more substantial con- 
straints than those typical of most aid settings. Until 2005, we saw incremental 
changes in this regime over time, and some signs of marginally greater access 
than in the past. But the events of late 2005 and early 2006 described at the end 
of chapter 4 show how reversible these developments are. 
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The ﬂip side of the weak monitoring regime in the country is the problem 
of diversion that we have taken up in this chapter. We analyzed a variety of 
sources of evidence on diversion and its potential welfare impact across diﬀer- 
ent social groups. Our conclusion is that something on the order of 30 percent 
of aid was probably being diverted by 2005. The plausibility of this estimate 
is supported by a simple balance sheet exercise that suggests that diversion on 
this scale appears to be consistent with what we can observe about the extent 
of marketization of local grain production and the increasing primacy of the 
market as the institution through which households secure food. 
The next two chapters extend and elaborate these two themes. In chapter 6, 
we look in more detail at the sometimes conﬂicting interests of the donors and 
the problem of coordination these diﬀerences pose. In chapter 7, we return to 
the issue of marketization and examine how economic reforms and ongoing 
institutional changes within North Korea aﬀect the severity and incidence of 
food insecurity. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Political Economy of Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our discussion of the origins of the great famine in chapter 2, we placed par- 
ticular emphasis on the failure of the North Korean government to respond in 
a timely way to evidence of food shortages. An aggressive promotion of exports 
and foreign investment, the maintenance of even a minimal capacity to bor- 
row, or an earlier appeal for humanitarian assistance all would have mitigated 
the severe distress the country experienced in the mid-1990s. As the extent of 
the country’s economic problems became more apparent, the North Korean 
leadership did belatedly place greater emphasis on generating or economizing 
on foreign exchange, for example, by seeking to revive export-processing zones, 
increase remittances from Japan, and expand illicit export activities. 
Aid seeking was a critical component of this new strategy. As we indicated 
in chapter 4, North Korea’s quest for aid faced the dilemma that confronts all 
aid relationships. The political leadership sought to maximize aid ﬂows, and on 
highly concessional terms, while maintaining its political autonomy and con- 
trol over resources to the greatest extent possible. Donors, by contrast, sought 
to ensure that aid went to intended beneﬁciaries, was not diverted, and adhered 
to the principles outlined in the preceding chapter: transparency, access, eﬀec- 
tive monitoring, assessment, and even empowerment and organization of ﬁnal 
recipients, in short objectives that were largely anathema to the North Korean 
regime. 
Even were aid motivated solely by humanitarian considerations, this game 
would be complex. But donors faced two additional problems. First, aid and 
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politics were not, and could not, be held on altogether separate tracks; indeed, 
it is largely in the United States that this ﬁction is continuously repeated. Aid 
is used for diplomatic purposes. Moreover, in democratic societies, it is also 
subject to the pull of domestic political forces. Across the major donors, some 
groups sought an expansion of aid for various ends (engagement), and others 
wanted to see it curtailed (pressure, sanctions). Initially, these pressures con- 
tributed to crucial delays in getting aid into North Korea in the immediate 
aftermath of the ﬂood announcement; the international community cannot 
be held completely blameless. South Korean pique at North Korean behavior 
following some early and very large food shipments was particularly important 
in this regard, inﬂuencing both the United States and Japan. But U.S. and 
Japanese policy also sought to limit aid for political ends. 
Over time, political calculations lead to oscillations in aid ﬂows across all the 
major donors. Figure 6.1 shows the volatile pattern of aid by focusing on the 
ﬁve major donors that are the subject of this chapter: the United States, Japan, 
the EU, South Korea, and China. U.S. aid rose sharply in 1998–99 but then fell 
dramatically in 2000, exhibiting a steady decline through the remainder of the 
ﬁrst administration of George W. Bush. South Korean aid moved in nearly the 
opposite direction, largely oﬀsetting the decline in U.S. aid until 2004. Chinese 
aid rose steadily through 2001 but then declined thereafter. EU assistance has 
been somewhat changeable, rising slightly as U.S. aid has fallen in recent years. 
Japanese aid ﬂows, ﬁnally, spike, fall, and are terminated completely on several 
occasions. 
It could be argued that this volatility reﬂected changing needs in North 
Korea, but as we have reported, the dependence of the country on aid—in 
terms of material need—has been surprisingly constant. Rather, this volatility 
reﬂects political and policy cycles in the donors themselves. 
A second dilemma was that these divergent political calculations at the 
national level created coordination problems among the donors. Once aid 
began to ﬂow, North Korean diplomacy sought to exploit this coordination 
problem, sometimes adroitly, sometimes less so. While the United States 
showed a declining willingness to extend humanitarian assistance, and Japan 
has oscillated between engagement and the imposition of outright sanctions, 
the EU and particularly South Korea have shown a growing willingness to 
expand assistance to the country. Moreover, South Korea’s foreign assistance is 
but one component of a much broader strategy of economic engagement with 
the North that has created a variety of other channels for eﬀective transfers to 
the country, from private (and in some cases subsidized) investment to coop- 
erative projects of various sorts. North Korea has also managed to maintain its 
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FIGURE 6.1. Total Food Aid by Major Donors, 1996–2004 
Note: EU includes contributions by the European Commission and EU member countries. Source: 
WFPINTERFAIS 2005. 
 
 
economic relationship with China. Although political relations between the 
two socialist countries have seen ups and downs, the informal Chinese penetra- 
tion of the North Korean economy is proving to be one of the most important 
external factors in its transformation. 
This fundamental inability to coordinate aid policy has crucial implications 
for the debate over engagement. Hawks and critics of the current aid eﬀort 
have consistently argued for a policy of containment, isolation, or the use of 
sanctions against North Korea.1 Conversely, even those more favorably inclined 
to engage North Korea have argued that such engagement should be done 
selectively, using incentives in order to modify North Korean behavior. Yet 
both these approaches would require careful calibration not only of aid ﬂows 
but of the entirety of North Korea’s foreign economic relations. In particular, 
the calls for tougher sanctions against North Korea that tend to emanate from 
hawks in the United States and Japan face the problem that both Chinese and 
South Korean foreign policy are not only resistant to such a strategy but at 
times exhibit a pattern of explicitly oﬀsetting eﬀorts to isolate North Korea by 
increasing their own contributions. 
By carefully calibrating its aid-seeking diplomacy, the North Korean gov- 
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ernment managed to maintain a surprisingly constant level of assistance in the 
decade after 1995. By 2004 this strategy hit some limits. The onset of the second 
nuclear crisis in 2002 was an important event in this regard. In October of that 
year, the United States accused North Korea of seeking to enrich uranium for 
the purpose of making nuclear weapons. When the United States responded by 
cutting oﬀ heavy fuel oil shipments promised under the Framework Agreement 
of 1994, North Korea began a calibrated escalation of the crisis by kicking out 
inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, restarting 
the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yo˘ngbyo˘n, reprocessing spent fuel into pluto- 
nium, and ultimately declaring in February 2005 that the country possessed 
nuclear weapons. During this same period, the regime ran afoul of the Japanese 
over the abduction of a number of Japanese citizens. 
Needless to say, these and other political issues—such as mounting evi- 
dence of North Korean involvement in illicit trade, counterfeiting, and missile 
exports—had the result of sharpening disagreements over the utility of engage- 
ment. Hawks in the United States, Japan, and South Korea once again argued 
that economic pressure should be used more aggressively to secure North 
Korean compliance with its international obligations; the European Union 
pulled back at the margins as well. Through 2005, these calls largely proved 
ineﬀectual as China and particularly South Korea not only maintained exist- 
ing economic relations but, in South Korea’s case, also promised even wider 
economic cooperation. Not until 2006 did a set of ﬁnancial sanctions appear 
to have a substantial, and largely unanticipated, eﬀect on North Korea’s trade 
relations. But even these had not—by mid-2006—forced North Korea back to 
the bargaining table. 
In addition to the constraints on aid posed by these political issues, aid to 
North Korea faced rising resistance within the humanitarian community itself. 
Aid hawks were by no means limited to those preoccupied with the nuclear 
question. As we noted in chapter 4, a number of NGOs walked away from 
North Korea, human rights groups pressed for a tougher stance, and prominent 
refugees argued forcefully that the regime should be cut oﬀ (for example, C. 
Kang 2005; Haggard and Noland 2005). In addition, donors have faced strong 
demands on aid resources from other quarters, including ongoing crises in the 
Middle East and Africa and the South and Southeast Asian tsunami of 2005. As 
a result, supporters of humanitarian assistance faced increasing skepticism about 
the prolonged and seemingly open-ended nature of aid to North Korea. 
In this chapter, we explore these issues by focusing on the ﬁve major donors 
beginning with the hawks—the United States and Japan—before turning to the 
doves: the EU, South Korea, and China. In each case, we outline the development 
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of the aid program over time and provide some sense of the overall economic 
relationship of which it is a part. We then discuss the ways in which both interna- 
tional and domestic political concerns have inﬂuenced the magnitude and nature 
of aid ﬂows. Throughout, we concentrate on the problems of coordination that 
have resulted from shifting patterns of support for aid and engagement and the 
surprising ability of North Korea to maintain its external economic lifeline even 
while once again pursuing a high-risk nuclear diplomacy. 
 
The United States 
 
The United States was not the ﬁrst country to come to North Korea’s aid after 
the famine, and neither did it move with particular speed. Moreover, private 
investment and trade have been limited because of both the political tensions 
between the two countries and the fact that North Korea does not enjoy most- 
favored-nation status.2 But, ironically, the United States has been North Korea’s 
largest benefactor (table 6.1 outlines the U.S. contribution). Between 1995 and 
2005, the United States provided over $1 billion in aid to North Korea. Fully 
40 percent of that aid was the result of U.S. commitments under the Agreed 
Framework of 1994 through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Orga- 
nization (KEDO).3 As we have indicated, this channel ended with the U.S. 
decision in December 2002 to terminate heavy oil shipments, and by the end of 
2005 KEDO itself had been wound down. The remainder of the aid, over $600 
million, has been channeled through the WFP, with some of the aid monitored 
by a consortium of NGOs, the Private Volunteer Organization Consortium. 
As evidence of the famine continued to mount in the second half of 1995 
and ﬁrst half of 1996, a number of NGOs played an important role in mobi- 
lizing support for U.S. assistance. In Congress, Representative Tony Hall (D- 
Ohio) and Senator Paul Simon (D-Illinois) argued strongly that aid and poli- 
tics should be separated, and a bipartisan group signaled to the administration 
that Congress could support aid if certain monitoring conditions were met.4 
From the beginning, however, aid was also closely tied up with the eﬀort of 
the Clinton administration to engage North Korea (table 6.2 traces the diplo- 
matic context of various aid initiatives). The initial strategy of the United States 
in  1996,  taken  in  consultation  with  South  Korea  and  Japan,  was  actually  to 
withhold aid altogether and subsequently to use it only to reward North Korean 
cooperation, a position vigorously opposed by most of the NGO community. 
In  June  1996—nearly  a  year  after  the  ﬂood  appeal—Secretary  of  State  War- 
ren Christopher ﬁnally announced that the United States would make a small 
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 TABLE 6.1. U.S. Assistance to North Korea, 1995–2005  
Food aid (per FY) 
 
Calendar 
or Fiscal 
Year (FY) 
 
 
 
Metric tons 
 
Commodity 
value ($US 
million) 
KEDO assis- 
tance (per cal- 
endar yr; $US 
million) 
Medical 
supplies and 
Other (per FY; 
$US million) 
 
 
Total ($US 
million) 
1995 0 0.0 9.5 0.2 9.7 
1996 19,500 8.3 22.0 0.0 30.3 
1997 177,000 52.4 25.0 5.0 82.4 
1998 200,000 72.9 50.0 0.0 122.9 
1999 695,194 222.1 65.1 0.0 287.2 
2000 265,000 74.3 64.4 0.0 138.7 
2001 350,000 58.1 74.9 0.0 133.0 
2002 207,000 50.4 90.5 0.0 140.9 
2003 40,200 25.5 3.7 0.0 29.2 
2004 110,000 36.3 0.0 0.1 36.4 
2005 25,000 5.7 - - 5.7 
TOTAL 2,088,894 606.0 405.1 5.3 1,010.7 
Sources: Manyin 2005; USDAFAS: Food Aid Reports. 
 
 
 
additional contribution to the WFP appeal, an extraordinarily modest contribu- 
tion given the projected shortfall. This move was interpreted at the time as an 
attempt to induce North Korean participation in a preparatory brieﬁng for the 
Four-Party Talks as well as adherence to the terms of the Agreed Framework. 
With tensions over the implementation of the Agreed Framework continu- 
ing into 1997, the United States made another, larger $25 million donation to 
the WFP in the spring. In July 1997 former senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) 
and former U.S. ambassador James Laney visited Pyongyang to pave the way 
for the anticipated August start of preliminary discussions to set the agenda 
for the Four-Party talks. These negotiations between the United States, China, 
and South and North Korea were designed to follow up on the Agreed Frame- 
work and address longer-term issues such as replacing the armistice with a ﬁnal 
settlement to the Korean War. After the Nunn-Laney trip, the United States 
announced a $27 million (100,000 MT) donation of grain. Aid did not ﬂow in 
substantial quantities until 1998, but when it did, it inaugurated a virtual policy 
of “food for meetings” (table 6.2) that continued through 1999, the year when 
U.S. aid to North Korea peaked. 
  
 
 
 TABLE 6.2. U.S. Food for talks, 1995-2005  
Date Value Form Channel Diplomatic Objective 
February 1996 $2 million Food WFP Encourage North Korean adherence to the Agreed Framework during a period of increasing 
tension between the two Koreas. 
June 1996 $6.2 million Food WFP Encourage North Korean ﬂexibility with respect to a secret proposal for four-way talks 
among the US, North Korea, South Korea, and China. 
February 1997 $10 million Food WFP Quid pro quo for North Korean agreement to participate in joint US-South Korea brieﬁng 
on Four-Party talks proposal. 
April 1997 $15 million 50,000 MT of food WFP Quid pro quo for North Korean agreement to participate in missile proliferation negotiations. 
July 1997 $27 million 100,000 MT of food WFP Quid pro quo for North Korean agreement to participate in Four-Party Talks. 
October 1997 $5 million Grant UNICEF Quid pro quo for North Korean acceptance of 10 additional food relief monitors. 
February 1998 n.a. 200,000 MT of food WFP Quid pro quo for North Korean agreement to participate in ad hoc committee meeting 
associated with the Four-Party Talks. 
September 
1998 
n.a. 300,000 MT of food WFP Quid pro quo for North Korean agreement to resume missile talks, attend the third plenary 
session of the Four-PartyTalks, enter into negotiations over the second suspected nuclear site, 
and resume talks aimed at removing North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. 
April-May 1999   n.a. 600,000 MT, of 
food, 1,000 tons of 
potato seed+C13 
WFP Quid pro quo for agreement on access to North Korea’s underground construction site and 
participation in Four Party and missile talks; 400,000 MT of this commitment announced 
one day before U.S. mission to Pyongyang. 
September 
1999 
September - 
October 2000 
n.a. Sanctions eased Quid pro quo. Agreement in principle on missiles. 
 
Unspeciﬁed Prospective quid pro quo. North Korea agrees to drop demand for cash compensation for 
ending missile program, but seeks equivalent in in-kind aid including food. In subsequent 
talks, U..S.. promises unspeciﬁed aid but talks do not reach conclusion. 
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 TABLE 6.2. U.S. Food for talks, 1995-2005, (continued )  
Date Value Form Channel Diplomatic Objective 
June 2002 Unspeciﬁed Prospective quid pro quo. Bush dministration announces a baseline approach: additional aid 
over 155,000 metric tons conditional on improvements in access and monitoring. 
January 2003 Unspeciﬁed Prospective quid pro quo. Bush administration oﬀers a bold approach including food aid in 
return for North Korea dismantling its weapons program. 
June 2004 Unspeciﬁed Prospective quid pro quo. Bush administration oﬀers a package of measures including 
unspeciﬁed assistance in return for complete, veriﬁable, irreversible dismantlementof North 
Korea’s nuclear program. 
July - August 
2005 
Unspeciﬁed Prospective quid pro quo. Bush Administration continues to provide commitments of 
50,000 MT per year in 2003, 2004 and 2005, but claims they are unrelated to talks. In 
2005, it reiterates its commitments to unspeciﬁed assistance in return for resolution of the 
nuclear issue; supports South Korean promise to supply energy. 
Dec-05 n.a. US suspends aid following WFP expulsion 
Source: Adapted from Noland, 2000), table 5.3 
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The Clinton administration faced recurrent criticism of its North Korea 
policy in general and of the apparent use of food aid as an inducement to talks 
in particular. In the early period, this criticism came from NGOs concerned 
about the linkage of humanitarian assistance to political cooperation. As aid 
began to ﬂow, the criticism increasingly came from the other direction: those 
who felt that the United States was being too generous and was getting little 
in return. Moreover, charges were repeatedly leveled at the administration of 
ignoring evidence of aid diversion.5 Secretary of Defense William Cohen even 
said openly that he had “no doubt” that the North Korean regime had diverted 
food aid to the military.6 In 2000 U.S. food aid dropped sharply from its 1999 
high, and the administration became more circumspect in its aid policy. Yet 
despite congressional protests and concerns within the humanitarian commu- 
nity itself, a major House report on the issue contained no recommendations, 
and the Republican majority never acted directly to curtail U.S. aid. Although 
Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeline Albright, denies in her memoirs that eco- 
nomic compensation was explicitly used to negotiate a last-minute agreement 
over the country’s missile program, she is equally clear that she understood 
that normalization and economic assistance were the crucial quid pro quo 
(2003:593). 
From the outset, the Bush administration pulled back from the engagement 
strategy pursued by its predecessor. Humanitarian aid continued, but, in the 
words of Manyin and Jun, the administration “gave conﬂicting signals about 
whether it would continue donating food aid to North Korea, and if so, how 
much and whether aid should be conditioned on North Korean actions in the 
humanitarian and/or security areas” (2003:17). In June 2002, USAID outlined a 
new approach under which the United States would provide a baseline amount 
of food aid of 155,000 metric tons. Consideration of further assistance would 
be conditional on veriﬁable progress on monitoring. Rather than aid constitut- 
ing a quid pro quo for some speciﬁc North Korean commitment, the Bush 
administration made additional aid contingent on North Korea moving ﬁrst 
(table 6.2). 
In October 2002, the nuclear crisis broke over U.S. intelligence that North 
Korea was seeking to enrich uranium. In December, KEDO funding was cut 
in response, and in the ensuing period there was open discussion of economic 
sanctions. U.S. oﬃcials claimed that North Korea had not responded to oﬀers 
and hinted that humanitarian assistance might not be extended, at least at the 
same level. The administration appeared to be linking humanitarian aid to the 
nuclear crisis, despite protestations that the delay was a function of monitoring 
concerns and the budget cycle. Moreover, this delay occurred just as the WFP 
  
The Political Economy of Aid 135 
 
was experiencing shortfalls in the pipeline and thus generated concern that the 
United States was backtracking on its commitment to separate humanitarian 
considerations from political ones. 
It would be a mistake to attribute the decline in aid purely to the political 
preferences of the Bush administration alone. Aid had begun falling in the ﬁnal 
year of the Clinton administration, as we have seen, and increased demands 
elsewhere in the world meant that aid to North Korea would have probably 
declined under any administration. Nonetheless, the nuclear crisis coincided 
with a further reduction of aid. In February 2003, the administration gave in 
to its critics by promising 40,000 MT of food, with another 60,000 MT made 
conditional on further progress with respect to monitoring. In December 2003 
and again in July 2004, the State Department announced contributions to the 
WFP (the proposed 60,000 MT and a 50,000 MT contribution to the 2004 
appeal, respectively), but they were clearly more modest than U.S. commit- 
ments had been in the past; as can be seen from table 6.1, U.S. aid fell in both 
2003 and 2004.7 
In the fall of 2004—just as the WFP and North Korean authorities were 
entering their standoﬀ over monitoring—the 108th Congress passed and Presi- 
dent Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights Act.8 The bill stipulated 
that human rights be on the agenda of any negotiations either with North 
Korea or “other concerned parties in Northeast Asia,” a reference to the Six- 
Party Talks. The bill had a number of other implications for U.S. policy, both 
with respect to aid in general and food aid in particular. The bill: 
 
• required that U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance be contingent on North 
Korea making “substantial progress” on a number of speciﬁc human rights 
issues; 
• required USAID to issue a report to Congress on humanitarian assistance 
to North Korea and North Koreans in China and to report any changes in 
the transparency, monitoring, and access of food aid and other humani- 
tarian activities; and 
• included hortatory language stipulating that any “signiﬁcant increases” in 
humanitarian assistance be conditioned on “substantial improvements” in 
transparency, monitoring, and access. 
 
In addition to these stipulations, the United States had also developed a pol- 
icy that 75 percent of its food would be shipped to east coast ports for delivery 
in these more severely aﬀected areas (USAID 2005). In June 2005, the admin- 
istration announced another 50,000 MT contribution, the same level that had 
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been oﬀered in 2003 and 2004. Although testimony to the continuing weight 
of humanitarian interests despite the ongoing nuclear crisis, the donation also 
implicitly conﬁrmed the policy that no additional aid would be oﬀered in the 
absence of meaningful improvements in monitoring. In late 2005, with North 
Korea threatening to expel the WFP, the administration ﬁnally suspended fur- 
ther aid commitments altogether pending the outcome of negotiations between 
the WFP and North Korea over continuing operations (see chapter 4); total 
assistance for 2005 was less than $6 million. 
In sum, U.S. policy has undergone an important evolution. Immediately 
following the groundbreaking ﬂood appeal, the humanitarian community was 
divided over the extent of the problem, and the administration delayed food 
aid in support of South Korean preferences at the time. Aid subsequently began 
to ﬂow in large quantities, but even before the inauguration of President Bush 
in 2001, aid had begun to fall. The Clinton administration shifted from a policy 
of “aid for meetings” to an approach in which humanitarian aid continued but 
any increased food aid would be contingent on substantive progress in negotia- 
tions and improved access and monitoring. Under the Bush administration, 
this policy became more explicit, and U.S. aid commitments continued to 
decline to relatively low levels before being suspended altogether in late 2005. 
The North Korean Human Rights Act placed new constraints on aid, such as 
requiring that any increase be preceded by improvements in the monitoring 
regime, and the United States suspended aid to the country altogether in late 
2005. Moreover, a variety of other initiatives that we take up in more detail 
in the conclusion to this book suggested a continuing attraction to a broader 
policy of controls and sanctions.9 
 
Japan 
 
The history of Japanese assistance to North Korea is more tumultuous than that 
of the United States, a function of both the high politics of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries and a variety of domestic political constraints, from 
a large pro-Pyongyang community of North Koreans in Japan to public outrage 
over the 1998 North Korean missile launch and revelations of the abduction of 
Japanese citizens.10 
Japan–North Korean relations had gone through periods of promise and 
disappointment in the 1970s and 1980s. Democratization in South Korea and 
President No T’ae-wu’s Nordpolitik, announced in his inaugural speech in 1988, 
appeared to open the way toward a normalization of relations.11 This promise 
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was forestalled by the onset of the ﬁrst nuclear crisis, but the Agreed Frame- 
work once again opened up the opportunity for rapprochement, and Japan was 
a major ﬁnancial backer of the KEDO process. Moreover, Japan has maintained 
more extensive trade relations with North Korea over time than has the United 
States, as well as large remittances from the Korean-Japanese community that 
have been tapped directly by the regime.12 These trade and ﬁnancial ties were 
particularly important during the peak famine years (ﬁgure 6.2). More impor- 
tant than trade was the promise of aid. Japan’s normalization of relations with 
South Korea in 1965 had been accompanied by a large package of assistance 
to the country, and the North Korean government was clear that it expected a 
similar resolution of postcolonial claims.13 
In contrast to the United States, Japan’s aid has been characterized by large, 
discrete initiatives, either connected with eﬀorts to start talks or in recognition 
of a diplomatic breakthrough; table 6.3 traces the major initiatives in this his- 
tory. These initiatives, however, have been followed by complete cessations of 
aid as a result of diplomatic strategy or public pressure to curtail assistance. 
Even before its appeal to the multilateral institutions in August 1995, the 
North Korean government had approached Japan about the possibility of aid 
in the fall of 1994, a request that was refused. In January 1995, Pyongyang 
repeated the appeal. The Kim Yo˘ng-sam administration signaled that it would 
look unfavorably on any unilateral action by Tokyo, and over the next several 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2. Japan’s Trade with North Korea 
Note: 2005 data annualized based on January–Setepmber 2005. Sources: IMF 2005, 2006; 2001 Exports 
data point; KIEP 32004. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6.3. Japanese Food Aid to North Korea, 1994–2005  
Date Action and Context Amount 
Fall 1994 North Korea solicits aid; Japan denies request 
January 1995 North Korea solicits aid; Japan denies request 
June 1995 Japan agrees to supply rice in context of agreement with Korea; Japan seeks resumption of nor- 
malization talks 
October 1995 Japan agrees to an additional 200,000 MT food shipment, but South Korea objects 
January 1996 North Korea solicits aid; Japan denies request 
November 1997 Following LDP delegation visit to North Korea, the two countries state intention to restart nor- 
malization talks; Japan announces intention to provide aid 
August 1998 North Korean missile launch; Japan suspends normalization talks, food aid, and support for 
KEDO; subsequently returns to KEDO 
December 1999 LDP delegation visits North Korea and announces intention to restart normalization talks and 
food aid 
150,000 MT gratis 
150,000 on concessional terms 
March 2000 Prior to 9th round of normalization talks, Japan announces intention to provide food aid 100,000MT through the WFP 
October 2000 Food aid promised in context of normalization talks; 2001 marks highpoint of aid, but subse- 
quently it is not renewed as a result of conﬂict over abductee issue 
September 2002 Koizumi visits North Korea, announces intention to restart normalization talks. Joint declaration 
outlines prospective aid and economic cooperation. Resumption of talks blocked by revelations 
about abductees 
May 2004 Koizumi visits North Korea, announces food aid in context of eﬀort to restart normalization 
talks, but full commitment not delivered because of ongoing conﬂict on abductees 
500,000 MT, through the WFP26p6 
 
 
 
 
250,00 MT, only 80,000 delivered 
through the WFP 
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years South Korea eﬀectively vetoed several Japanese aid initiatives. But in June 
1995 an agreement was reached that the two countries would act jointly (Snyder 
1999). South Korea would provide 150,000 MT of grain in unmarked bags, and 
Japan would provide 150,000 MT gratis and another 150,000 MT on conces- 
sional terms. In October 1995 and January 1996, North Korea again approached 
Japan for assistance. On these two occasions, which came at a crucial moment 
in the evolution of the famine, opposition from both South Korea and domes- 
tic political sources quashed the deals. 
In 1997 new evidence surfaced that Japanese citizens had been abducted 
by North Korean intelligence agents as had been long alleged. North Korea’s 
launch of a multistage rocket that ﬂew over Japan in August 1998 was also a 
more immediately threatening event for Japan than it was for either South 
Korea—which had long fallen within the range of North Korean artillery short- 
and intermediate-range missiles—or the United States.14 Japan had engaged in 
both party- and government-level discussions aimed at restarting normalization 
talks during this period, but the missile launch led to their cancellation. Food 
aid was again dropped from consideration, and Japan even had to be persuaded 
by the United States and South Korea to resume support for KEDO. 
In August 1999, the cycle began again with a North Korean statement that it 
intended to improve its relations with Japan. In conjunction with the reopen- 
ing of normalization talks in 2000, the Mori government announced a large 
food aid package that accounted for over half of the entire WFP appeal that 
year and constituted an important oﬀset to the decline of American assistance. 
The Mori cabinet proved too weak to capitalize on this initiative, however, and 
it was left to the Koizumi government (taking oﬃce in April 2001) to initiate a 
new phase of political negotiations. 
Koizumi was quite open in stating that he sought normalization of relations, 
a position that periodically put him at odds with the Bush administration. A 
crucial  step  in  this  process  was  his  summit  with  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  in  September 
2002. The Japanese government did not extend aid either in anticipation of the 
summit or in conjunction with it, but the joint declaration held out the prom- 
ise of wide-ranging economic support in the context of normalization talks, 
including humanitarian assistance. The promise of these talks was overshad- 
owed at the summit, however, by North Korea’s admission that the abductions 
had occurred and a number of abductees had died; between these revelations 
and the onset of the nuclear crisis, Japanese policy and public opinion once 
again hardened, and food aid was suspended as of December 2003. 
In May 2004, Koizumi again visited North Korea and reconﬁrmed the 2002 
declaration; this time, he announced his intention to provide 250,000 MT of 
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food aid and $10 million in pharmaceutical supplies through the multilateral 
institutions. This aid was interpreted not only in the context of both the stalled 
Six-Party and normalization talks but as payment for the release of ﬁve family 
members of the abductees, who accompanied Koizumi on his return to Tokyo. 
As in 2000, this aid was timely, as the WFP was continuing to experience pres- 
sure on supplies. 
The decision to release the ﬁrst half of the promised assistance was taken 
in August, just before the ﬁrst round of working-level meetings on normaliza- 
tion. At the third meeting in November, North Korea provided Japan with a 
photograph and the remains of one of the abductees, Yokota Megumi, whom 
the North Koreans claimed had passed away. After the delegation returned 
to Japan, the photo and remains became a point of intense national inter-  
est and controversy as both appeared to be fake (International Crisis Group 
2005:12–14). The Koizumi government not only froze the second shipment of 
food aid but also faced a growing tide of sentiment—including from Lib- 
eral Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members—that Japan should impose wider 
sanctions. Since that time, the Japanese government has taken a number of 
piecemeal actions that—when viewed together—constitute a substantial set of 
restrictions on Japan-DPRK economic relations, in eﬀect a virtual sanctions 
regime.15 Through 2005 Japan continued to raise the issue of abductees within 
the context of the Six-Party Talks despite resistance not only from North Korea 
but from other parties as well for linking the issue to the nuclear question. 
From North Korea’s perspective, the approach to Japan not only constituted 
a political counterweight to the United States but an alternative source of assis- 
tance. But the link between high politics and food aid proved even stronger in 
Japan than in the United States. Despite political economy and factional pres- 
sures within the LDP to extend assistance, Japanese governments have proven 
more willing than the United States to cut aid to North Korea altogether, and 
the Koizumi government has drifted toward a piecemeal sanctions regime that 
has had unambiguous consequences for bilateral trade and ﬁnancial relations 
(ﬁgure 6.2). 
 
South Korea 
 
Like Japan, South Korea’s food aid to the North has gone through important 
political ups and downs, and because of its signiﬁcance and complexity we 
devote somewhat more detailed attention to it.16 The debate over aid has been 
embedded in a much larger transformation of South Korea’s foreign policy, 
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from a policy of deterrence and containment to one of engagement. Aid has 
been subjected to vigorous domestic debate, but in contrast to the United 
States and Japan, the general trend in South Korean aid policy since 1998 has 
been in the direction of greater generosity. Moreover, aid has been embedded 
in a larger strategic vision of engagement that has resulted in increased trade 
(ﬁgure 6.3), investment, and even illicit transfers.17 
This dramatic change in foreign policy has roots in the No T’ae-wu initia- 
tive of 1988 noted above and in the Kim Yo˘ng-sam administration. But its full 
articulation is not to be found until the so-called Sunshine Policy of President 
Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and the subtle but important amendments to this 
approach under his successor, President No Mu-hyo˘n (elected in December 2002 
and inaugurated in February 2003). The No administration has not only been 
more willing to engage North Korea at all levels but has even sent explicit signals 
that its policy has been designed as a counterweight to the United States. 
South Korean aid to North Korea is much more complex in its structure 
than that of the United States, which was basically limited to food and oil 
shipments, and Japan’s, which was conﬁned to a limited number of large food 
shipments. Table 6.4 outlines the various channels that have been used, which 
include multilateral, bilateral, and a large NGO sector that has in the past been 
quasi-oﬃcial and continues to receive direct government subvention.18 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3. Commercial Trade Between North and South Korea 
Source: Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation: Inter-Korean Cooperation, www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6.4. South Korean Humanitarian Assistance, 1995–2005 (in $US millions except where noted)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* Total 
Total public 232.0 3.1 26.7 11.0 28.3 78.6 53.3 83.8 87.0 115.1 123.9 720.6 
Multilateral 0.0 3.1 26.7 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 18.0 17.4 25.9 104.3  
(% of public) 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 21.5 19.9 22.5 14.5  
WFP 0.0 2.0 20.5 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 17.4 16.2 24.0 0.0 91.2 
(form) - CSB CSB, maize, Maize,   - - Maize 
powdered milk ﬂour 
Maize Maize Maize -  
Non-WFP 0.0 1.1 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.9 1.8 13.1 
(channels) - UNICEF,     UNICEF, - - - WHO 
WMO WHO, UNDP, 
FAO 
WHO WHO, 
UNICEF 
WHO, 
UNI- 
CEF 
WHO, 
UNICEF 
- 
Bilateral 232.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.3 78.6 52.7 65.8 69.7 89.3  616.3 
(% of public) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 98.9 78.5 80.1 77.5  85.5 
(form) Rice - - - Fertilizer  Fertilizer Clothing, 
fertilizer 
Fertilizer Fertilizer Emer- 
gency 
relief 
supplies, 
fertilizer 
 - 
Total NGOs 22.4 (1995—1997) 20.9 18.6 35.1 64.9 51.2 70.6 141.1 88.7 424.8 
Korea National 22.4 20.9 13.1 9.4 22.0 6.9 5.9 37.0  137.5 
Red Cross 
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 TABLE 6.4. South Korean Humanitarian Assistance, 1995–2005 (in $US millions except where noted), (continued )  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* Total 
(% of 
NGOs) 
100.0  100.0 70.1 26.8 33.9 13.5 8.3 26.2  32.4 
Other NGOs 0.0  0.0 5.6 25.7 42.9 44.2 64.8 104.1  287.3 
(% of 0.0 
 
0.0 29.9 73.2 66.1 86.5 91.7 73.8 
 
67.6 
NGOs)            
Number of 
other NGOs 
0 0 10 12 19 25 -29 33 
Sources: 1995—2004: Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation 2005a; 2005 non-WFP data: Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation 2005b, 2006; 2005 WFP data: WFP 2006b 
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Several features of South Korean aid are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that while 
the government has made modest contributions through the WFP, the over- 
whelming majority of public assistance has passed through bilateral channels 
in the form of concessional loans, a useful ﬁction for both sides, as we will 
discuss. Over time, a large and growing share of this aid has been in the form 
of fertilizer, but food aid remains an important element both through govern- 
ment and NGO channels. Since public bilateral aid does not pass through the 
WFP—and indeed is not technically aid at all but loans—it is not subject to 
any of the WFP’s protocols with respect to targeting, access, monitoring, or 
assessment. Through 2004 South Korean aid was not monitored at all. In July 
2004, North Korea ﬁnally agreed to establish a monitoring regime for South 
Korean food assistance, but it is substantially weaker than the WFP regime and 
makes no pretense of population targeting.19 Food aid goes directly into the 
PDS for delivery to the PDCs; as a small number of dissident South Korean 
NGOs have noted, the direct use of the PDS, the absence of targeting, and the 
relatively weak monitoring regime makes it even more diﬃcult to guarantee 
that rice is not being diverted to elite consumption, other undeserving groups, 
or the market (see chapter 5). South Korean assistance is also provided in the 
form of rice, which is the preferred staple of the elite rather than less desirable 
grains such as barley or millet, which would be less prone to diversion and 
therefore more likely to reach vulnerable portions of the population. 
The minimalist nature of the monitoring regime reﬂects diﬀerences with the 
United States and Japan in underlying strategy and objectives. Aid policy is 
clearly motivated by a broader political strategy of engagement and strong inter- 
est in forestalling a collapse of the North Korean state, which successive govern- 
ments have believed would impose unacceptable ﬁnancial costs on the South. 
The second characteristic of South Korean aid is that a large share passes 
through NGO channels, fully 37 percent. This is misleading in several important 
respects, however (O. Chung 2003). Until 1999 the South Korean Red Cross 
was the main channel for both government and private aid to North Korea, 
working directly with its North Korean counterpart (which appeared to be used 
almost exclusive for this purpose). With the coming of the Sunshine Policy, 
the government established more direct ministerial contacts. and the Ministry 
of Uniﬁcation developed protocols for private inter-Korean exchanges. NGOs 
that managed to establish a consistent record of raising funds and conducting 
humanitarian operations for a year were entitled to apply for a license that desig- 
nates them as a North Korea support groups. These organizations are diverse and 
involved in a variety of projects that go far beyond food aid and food security. 
But as Oknim Chung summarizes, “They put more emphasis on conﬁdence- 
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building through frequent contacts than on hewing closely to humanitarian 
principles” (2003:82), and while U.S. and European NGOs have reduced their 
activities in North Korea, South Korean groups have expanded theirs quite dra- 
matically. Moreover, a share of the aid passing through these organizations is 
ultimately public, funded through the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. In addi- 
tion to ﬁnancing humanitarian eﬀorts and activities such as family reunions, the 
fund has also been used to ﬁnance North-South infrastructure projects—the 
road and rail links, the Kaeso˘ng industrial park—and to provide loans to private 
companies engaged in trade and investment with the North. 
The ﬁnal point is that, as in the United States and Japan, aid has also fol- 
lowed political cycles. The very large 1995 contribution was seen by the Kim 
Yo˘ng-sam  administration  as  a  gesture  that  would  contribute  to  a  political 
breakthrough, but these hopes were quickly disappointed. In contravention 
to the agreement, the North Korean authorities forced the ﬁrst ship carrying 
grain to ﬂy a North Korean ﬂag and later detained the crew of another relief 
vessel (Noland 2000:185). The government was predictably outraged and not 
only ruled out the possibility of further assistance but actively lobbied other 
countries to condition their aid on improvement in North-South ties; as we 
indicated above, both the United States and Japan pulled back their assistance 
to North Korea at a critical juncture—early 1996—in response to South Korea’s 
wishes (Natsios 1999:185). 
In the last year of his administration (1997), however, Kim Yo˘ng-sam revised 
this policy as evidence continued to accumulate that famine conditions were 
worsening and political support for assistance grew.20 South Korean researchers 
had devoted substantial eﬀort to estimating North Korean food supplies, going 
so far as establishing test plots near the DMZ that mirrored North Korean 
conditions and even using North Korean agricultural techniques to cultivate 
them. These exercises noted substantial shortfalls between estimated supply and 
demand. They assumed, however, that the diﬀerences were being made up—or 
could be—by drawing down ample military stocks. Other analysts outlined 
conﬂicting evidence that pointed to serious shortages (most notably Lim 1997). 
The Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM; subsequently Good Friends) 
reports that we have cited above began to get public attention as well. In May 
1997, the ﬁrst Red Cross agreement was struck, establishing the Red Cross as 
the window through which private contributions could ﬂow to the North. 
From  June,  the  Red  Cross  sent  53,800  MT  of  food  to  Sinu˘iju,  Manp’o  and 
Namyang through the ports of Namp’o and Hu˘ngnam. 
With the coming of the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998 and the ini- 
tiation of the Sunshine Policy, the stage was set for broader and more consistent 
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assistance. In the ﬁrst year of this administration, however, the new government 
was hamstrung both by the regional ﬁnancial crisis and a recalcitrant legisla- 
ture dominated by the opposition party.21 As a result, the administration had 
to make concessions to conservatives in Kim Dae-jung’s coalition, including 
important cabinet positions and the promise that engagement would only be 
pursed on the basis of strict reciprocity (Levin and Han 2002:91). 
Nonetheless, the administration took a number of steps that established 
the institutions and policies of deeper engagement with the North. Among 
them was the early announcement of the principle that economics and politics 
should be separated, including an announcement in April 1998 that the legal 
foundation would be set for private investment in the North. Another early 
change was to allow agencies other than the Red Cross to operate; as can be 
seen in table 6.4, the Red Cross share of total NGO aid began to decline from 
this point as the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund grew and a wide array of 
NGOs began working in North Korea on issues from agriculture to health, 
nutrition, and education.22 
On January 4, 1999, the administration held a National Security Council 
(NSC) meeting that reached a number of important decisions on the overall 
direction of aid policy. The government decided to continue emergency food 
aid but would also focus on agricultural development by providing fertilizer, 
seeds, and pesticide as well; as can be seen from table 6.4, the fertilizer share 
of total aid has consistently been high. South Korea provided 200,000 tons of 
fertilizer aid to the North in 1999, 300,000 tons in 2000, 200,000 tons in 2001, 
and 300,000 tons in 2002, the ﬁnal year of the Kim Dae-jung administration. 
A second decision had to do with South Korea’s participation in the multi- 
lateral appeals process. The provision of fertilizer was motivated at least in part 
by ongoing concerns about transparency in the distribution of aid; diversion 
of fertilizer seemed less of a threat to the integrity of the aid program than was 
diversion of food. Nonetheless, the decision was taken that South Korea would 
also supply its growing food aid largely on a bilateral basis and technically in 
the form of loans rather than grants. The government has made contributions 
through the WFP, but they constitute a small share of total assistance. 
As the administration stepped up its multifaceted push to orchestrate a sum- 
mit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jo˘ng-il in the spring of 2000, 
bilateral food and fertilizer aid increased dramatically. As we have subsequently 
learned, a complex set of public and private payments also accompanied the 
more open aid oﬀer.23 In the wake of the summit, the two governments not 
only reached broad agreements on principles but also established the Inter- 
Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, which served as the 
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locus for discussions on normalizing commercial relations and cooperative 
infrastructure projects as well as humanitarian assistance.24 
Conservatives had expressed doubts about the outcome of the summit 
from the beginning, and as the euphoria of the June 2000 summit faded and 
North Korea oﬀered little in return, domestic opposition to the Sunshine Pol- 
icy mounted (Levin and Han 2002:chap. 6). Kim Dae-jung’s diplomacy was 
complicated not only by the lack of North Korean reciprocity and growing 
conservative opposition but by the transition from the Clinton to Bush admin- 
istrations in the United States and the new president’s open skepticism about 
the Sunshine Policy and hostility toward the North Korean regime. Yet despite 
the dramatic slowdown in policy initiatives in the late Kim Dae-jung years, the 
separation of the political and economic tracks remained a cornerstone of the 
administration’s approach to the end. As can be seen in table 6.4, despite grow- 
ing domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy, total aid continued at levels 
roughly equal to those during 2000, and for the ﬁve years of his administration, 
total aid through public and NGO channels totaled over $450 million.25 
The election of No Mu-hyo˘n occurred just as the second nuclear crisis was 
breaking in late 2002; by the end of the election campaign, the U.S. manage- 
ment of the crisis had become a potent issue, and No signaled his intention to 
distance South Korea from the American approach. No’s election also seemed 
to signal continuity with the Sunshine Policy, but in fact the new administra- 
tion placed even greater faith on using economic ties as a means of advancing 
broader political reconciliation. The administration’s Policy for Peace and Pros- 
perity included aid, commercial relations, investment, and cooperative projects 
as components of a larger project of regional integration that included not only 
the Korean peninsula but Northeast Asia more generally (Ministry of Uniﬁca- 
tion 2003; Moon 2004). 
On coming to oﬃce, the No administration quickly made a contribution 
(100,000 MT of maize) through the WFP, but aid policy reverted to the bilat- 
eral format that developed since the 2000 summit. The bilateral Inter-Korean 
Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee became the venue for the dis- 
cussion of aid commitments. In May 2003—while the nuclear standoﬀ with 
the United States was continuing—the North Koreans requested 200,000 tons 
of fertilizer, which the South Koreans delivered, and a total of 500,000 MT 
of grain, an amount that proved somewhat higher than the approximately 
400,000 MT South Korea ultimately supplied for the year, which was equal to 
nearly half the country’s uncovered food deﬁcit for the year (that is, the short- 
fall between WFP estimates of domestic production and commercial imports 
and total demand). Requests to maintain these levels of support were subse- 
  
148 DILEMMAS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
 
quently made in the June 2004 meetings of the bilateral economic cooperation 
committee and approved by the South Korean side 
Several things are noteworthy about these commitments. First, they are 
quite large when scaled either to the total uncovered food deﬁcit or the total 
WFP appeal. Second, this commitment was initially made in the absence of 
any monitoring system, in part because of the aid-as-loan ﬁction. Monitoring 
was only put in place and became operational in the following year as pres- 
sures mounted for greater accountability. Third, the aid extended by South 
Korea was unconditional on progress on the nuclear issue or even in bilateral 
relations; after June 2004, bilateral relations fell into a freeze that would not 
thaw until June, when a high-level South Korean envoy met directly with Kim 
Jo˘ng-il in an eﬀort to restart both North-South talks and the broader Six-Party 
eﬀort. As during the Kim Dae-jung administration, the engagement policy 
explicitly sought to separate the political and economic tracks, including not 
only humanitarian assistance but commercial relations as well. 
This commitment was severely tested by the February 10, 2005, announce- 
ment that North Korea was suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks 
and had nuclear weapons; only a month before this announcement, the North 
Korean government had placed its largest aid request to the South Korean gov- 
ernment ever: 500,000 tons of fertilizer. The government was divided over how 
to respond to the February 10 statement and was pressured by the United States 
not to grant the aid request. South Korean public opinion was by no means 
altogether uniﬁed on this issue. The opposition Grand National Party has 
argued for more stringent monitoring, and a minority voice within the South 
Korean humanitarian community has argued strenuously that large amounts of 
aid are diverted to the military and that food aid should be cut sharply.26 But 
as table 6.5 shows, Korean public opinion has changed sharply in recent years, 
despite the onset of the second nuclear crisis; opposition to aid has fallen to 
new lows and even support for conditional aid has been replaced by sentiment 
that South Korea should extend assistance without strings attached. 
Despite statements by President No that additional aid should await prog- 
ress in the talks, humanitarian assistance—in which the government counted 
both its fertilizer and food aid shipments—was not so conditioned. Moreover, 
as was subsequently made clear, the June breakthrough and the resumption 
of both the bilateral and Six-Party Talks in mid-2005 had been facilitated by 
promises of generous economic assistance, including not only humanitarian 
assistance but also massive commitments to provide energy in the form of elec- 
tric power, deepen commercial relations, and expand government-to-govern- 
ment projects.27 In early 2006, as the United States was cutting aid and tighten- 
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TABLE 6.5. South Koreans’ Opinions on the Nature of North Korea (2003, 
 percentage)  
 
Question: 
In your opinion, 
North Korea is a country . . . 
 
 
1996 
 
 
All ages 
2003  
 
20s 
 
50s and 
older 
In need of our assistance 22.3 11.8  6.4 14.4 
To cooperate with 45.7 46.1  63.1 28.4 
In bona ﬁde competition 4.0 2.7  3.1 2.3 
Impeding South Korea’s 6.3 31.4  25.1 40.2 
advancement      
Threatening national security 19.2 7.8  2.4 14.4 
Source: Bong 2003, table 6).      
 
 
ing sanctions, South Korea announced it was doubling its budget for economic 
cooperation with the North despite the fact that Pyongyang was continuing to 
boycott the Six-Party Talks (Agence France Press 2006). 
The statements of President No and South Korean oﬃcials have remained 
consistent on the principle that humanitarian assistance (and even broader eco- 
nomic cooperation) should not be linked to political progress on other issues. 
Decisions concerning aid were to be taken by South Korea in consultation with 
the North and were not subject to either multilateral cooperation or coordi- 
nation with the United States and other parties to the Six-Party Talks. South 
Korean oﬃcials consistently expressed their reservations concerning the use of 
sanctions, which would require a substantial adjustment of an increasingly well 
entrenched aid strategy. Moreover, the South Korean government supported 
liberal use of both current and prospective economic assistance as a means of 
facilitating political cooperation. 
 
The Tangle of European Assistance 
 
The coordination problems that we have underlined for the aid eﬀort as a 
whole are reproduced within the European Union itself, which exhibits both a 
diversity of approaches across countries and changing views over time of how 
to engage North Korea most eﬀectively.28 Table 6.6 tracks European assistance 
to the DPRK from the onset of the famine through 2005.29 Viewed as a whole, 
the European countries responded quickly to the famine. Following years saw 
a brief pause as the humanitarian imperative appeared to wane and a number 
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of major countries remained unclear about how to structure their political rela- 
tions with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy provided an opening 
for engagement and wider normalization of relations; Pyongyang also began to 
reach out at this juncture. Overall aid commitments saw a strong revival follow- 
ing the 2000 North-South summit and a more subtle shift in composition away 
from the consolidated appeal toward programs outside it, including a focus on 
technical assistance.30 But engagement, and the hope in some quarters that 
Europe might even play an independent political role in Northeast Asia, fell 
afoul of continuing concerns about human rights, the integrity of the aid eﬀort, 
and the onset of the second nuclear crisis, and by 2005 aid had fallen sharply. 
Even to talk about European aid is arguably misleading given that individual 
countries, both inside and outside the EU, maintain their own aid policies 
and the extent and timing of their involvement has varied. The Scandinavian 
countries were large and consistent supporters of the Consolidated Appeals 
Process from the outset, and each ran programs or made contributions outside 
the appeal process as well; Sweden’s total aid in 2004 was more than $10 mil- 
lion. The Scandinavian countries were among a group that normalized relations 
early and also included Portugal, Austria, and Switzerland. 
A second group of countries, including most notably Italy and Germany, 
responded to the early humanitarian demand in 1997–98 and subsequently 
became more forthcoming as North Korea aggressively reached out to them 
as a political and economic counterweight to the United States. This group of 
countries—Germany in particular—had expressed a variety of concerns about 
normalization of relations with North Korea, but Italy normalized relations 
in early 2000, citing South Koreas’s Sunshine Policy, and was followed, after a 
lag, by Germany (as well as the United Kingdom and Spain) later in the year; 
a number of other countries quickly followed suit. A third group of countries 
has chosen to provide only minimal assistance (in Britain’s case) or virtually 
none at all (Belgium, Austria, Spain, and France). France, in particular, stood 
on the principle that aid should not be extended to North Korea until underly- 
ing political issues—including both the nuclear weapons question and human 
rights concerns—were addressed and steadfastly refused to provide any assis- 
tance to North Korea whatsoever.31 
In another sense, however, we can speak of European assistance because of 
the European Commission’s aid programs. The commission provided over 320 
million euros from 1995 to 2004 from the European Commision Humanitar- 
ian Aid Oﬃce (ECHO) and Food Aid/Food Security budget lines, roughly 
half of it through the consolidated appeal, the rest outside it. After the ﬂoods, 
the commission’s Food Aid/ Food Security budget line accommodated the 
  
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6.6. European Humanitarian Assistance by Donor Organization, 1996–2005 ($US millions)  
 1996/7 1997/8 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Inside UN Consolidated Appeal           
Donor governments           
European Commission 8.6 27.5 9.5 8.0 4.8 0.0 9.5 16.0 15.6 n.a. 
EU member countries 2.5 12.4 6.8 7.2 8.9 14.8 7.7 19.2 25.6 n.a. 
Other European countries 2.7 3.7 4.1 2.3 3.2 4.3 1.4 13.2 3.8 n.a. 
European NGOs 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 n.a. 
UNICEF national committees           
EU member countries 0.0 0.9 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Other European countries 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sub-total 13.9 45.0 23.4 17.8 17.7 19.2 18.7 48.7 45.7 0.7 
Outside UN Consolidated Appeal           
Donor governments           
European Commission 0.5 36.2 36.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 6.1 4.1 15.3 13.4 
EU member countries 1.4 5.7 3.1 2.5 2.4 3.2 5.3 4.3 10.2 17.8 
Other European countries 0.7 9.9 6.2 0.3 0.2 3.5 1.3 0.6 1.6 4.0 
European NGOs 0.0 8.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.4 1.3 1.6 0.0 
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 TABLE 6.6. European Humanitarian Assistance by Donor Organization, 1996–2005 ($US millions), (continued)  
 1996/7 1997/8 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Red Cross national committees           
EU member countries 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.6 
Other European countries 0.2 2.2 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Subtotal 4.1 63.3 52.8 4.6 5.0 8.1 16.0 10.4 30.5 36.9 
Grand total 18.0 108.3 76.1 22.3 22.7 27.4 34.7 59.0 76.2 37.6 
Note: No consolidated appeal for 2005. Numbers for UNICEF National Committees are not within a consolidated appeal process. Data reﬂect only European contribu- 
tions explicitly documented as such in the UN-OCHA FTS.Other European countries include contributions from: Czech Republic, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
Source: UN-OCHA n.d.a. 
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basic provision of substantial humanitarian aid including food aid, fertilizer, 
and agricultural rehabilitation projects (59 million euros in 1997, 55 million 
euros in 1998). Currently, it is again through ECHO funds that most of the 
aid is provided. 
The coming of the Sunshine Policy, and the 2000 summit in particular, 
led to the formulation of a wide-ranging approach that combined political 
and economic objectives; some analysts even proposed that Europe develop an 
independent role in the security process in Northeast Asia.32 Humanitarian aid 
was funded through the food security budget line, but to it were added opera- 
tions through ECHO. 
The European guidelines and commission documents are cautious. The 2001– 
4 country strategy paper (European Commission 2001) says that aid should be 
extended in a measured way and that the extension of aid should be made 
contingent on accommodating EU concerns. The 2000 humanitarian strategy 
extended aid on an ad hoc basis and required the North Korean government 
to sign letters of understanding for each project; these contained an EC clause 
where minimum humanitarian standards are clearly laid out. Moreover, the 
commission also consistently emphasized the risks of long-run humanitarian 
assistance and argued for a shift in the focus of aid away from food toward reha- 
bilitation and longer-run development issues through the provision of technical 
assistance.33 A number of discrete EU projects were to move in that direction 
before the second nuclear crisis in a variety of functional ﬁelds, from agriculture 
to health and nutrition. But these were not implemented because of the crisis, 
and the EU refocused primarily on humanitarian projects in these areas. 
Despite these cautions, commission assessments were hopeful about the 
beneﬁts of engagement and the particular niche Europe had carved out as a 
provider of technical assistance. The 2001–04 country strategy paper, reﬂecting 
on the experience of the previous ﬁve years, noted important improvements 
in access and the leading role played by NGOs ﬁnanced in part through the 
commission:34 “The presence of European NGOs in the country, besides help- 
ing to address important humanitarian needs, is also acting as an ice-breaker 
in the opening process of the country. The relation with the European NGOs, 
even with its important limitations, is in most places the only access to the out- 
side world for the North-Korean population in the areas where these operate” 
(European Commission 2001:14). In their assessment of the overall aid eﬀort, 
Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez (2005) are similarly hopeful. The report argues for 
the beneﬁts of channeling aid through the WFP from Europe’s perspective but 
comes to somewhat uncritical conclusions regarding the eﬀectiveness of such 
aid and of the PDS in particular.35 
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With the onset of the second nuclear crisis, the European Union’s General 
Aﬀairs and External Relations Council drafted a toughly worded conclusion 
calling on North Korea to abide by its international commitments (2002). The 
conclusion reaﬃrmed humanitarian aid but also contained a request that the 
commission and member states review their activities regarding North Korea, 
including technical assistance and trade measures. Moreover, European coun- 
tries shared a common concern about human rights abuses in North Korea, and 
the EU was the chief sponsor of the ﬁrst resolution of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights ever to address the country, a hard-hitting overview that passed 
again in 2004 and 2005 (with South Korea abstaining). The nuclear issue and 
human rights concerns put a pause on the move toward deeper economic engage- 
ment and development assistance. But as the data in table 6.6 show, this did not 
have an immediate eﬀect on overall assistance, in part because some technical 
assistance projects could no doubt be reclassiﬁed as humanitarian. But Europe’s 
collective engagement has clearly been conditional, reﬂecting a continuing diver- 
gence of views. Some countries have been more forthcoming and argued for 
more open-ended engagement that would represent an independent European 
stance. Other countries—most notably France and Great Britain—made policy 
decisions not to extend assistance to North Korea except indirectly through the 
commission’s eﬀorts and after 2002 pushed for a slowdown in engagement. 
 
China 
 
China’s relations with North Korea are shrouded in patron-client privilege. 
Information on such basic issues as the prices that North Korea pays for imports 
from China are unavailable, and as a result it is diﬃcult to distinguish among 
commercial imports, barter, and outright grants.36 The data we have on trade 
are subject to a fairly wide range of estimates, compounded by a border trade 
that exploded in the early 2000s. Furthermore, we have only indirect evidence 
of China’s political motives with respect to North Korea and of the extent—if 
any—to which Beijing might have sought to exercise leverage over Pyongyang 
by economic means. The centralized nature of the Chinese system leads us to 
believe that large ﬂuctuations in trade almost certainly reﬂected political deci- 
sions by the top leadership, and that is no doubt true for core commodities 
such as food and fuel. But decentralized interactions between the two countries 
have grown dramatically in recent years as trade restrictions have been lifted 
in China and North Korea has tolerated a much denser bilateral relationship. 
By our estimate, such decentralized trade accounted for fully 80 percent of all 
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Chinese exports by 2005, providing critical impetus to the marketization pro- 
cess we describe in the next chapter. 
It is possible to get some sense of the evolution of the relationship by tri- 
angulating trade, aid, and the high-level political exchanges and statements 
that are in the public record. Several points are relevant for our purposes here. 
First, despite the shock of normalizing relations with South Korea in 1992, 
China emerged as North Korea’s primary benefactor following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In 1993–94, however, particularly following the death of Kim 
Il-so˘ng,  bilateral  relations  became  increasingly  strained. Trade  fell  sharply  at 
this time, contributing to the famine that subsequently developed. 
After the devastating loss of food imports from China in 1994, bilateral 
trade relations rebounded, and China became a mainstay of economic support. 
China lifted some restrictions on small border trade in 1996, and North Korean 
companies even enjoyed selective tariﬀ exemptions. North Korea apparently 
even beneﬁted from tariﬀ reductions undertaken when China joined the World 
Trade Organization, even though China had no obligation to extend its con- 
cessions to North Korea, which is not a member of the WTO. As relations 
improved, China was willing to maintain trade relations with North Korea in 
critical commodities, including not only food but also oil delivered by pipeline 
from the Daqing ﬁeld in the northeast. These core commodities were almost 
certainly shipped at “friendship prices” or on deferred payment terms and were 
quite possibly altogether gratis. Whatever food North Korea did import from 
China was also not subject to any of the monitoring and targeting require- 
ments, however porous, that characterized aid channeled through the WFP 
or from South Korea. We can only speculate on the end use of these grain 
shipments, but there would appear to be no constraint on the North Korean 
leadership using them to supply core groups, including the military. 
China’s overall economic support for North Korea can be demonstrated by 
examining the two country’s bilateral trade since 1981 (ﬁgure 6.4). Through 
1986 trade was roughly balanced (again, with the caveat about friendship prices 
and North Korean exports of dubious value). But what is striking is the sharp 
divergence that takes place thereafter. In the absence of international capital 
ﬂows to ﬁnance trade, China’s willingness to allow North Korea to run chronic 
bilateral deﬁcits and accumulate large arrears in its trade account must be seen 
as a form of foreign aid or subsidy. We estimate that the value of this implicit 
aid cumulatively reached nearly $6 billion by 2002, which would make China 
by far Korea’s most signiﬁcant supporter over the last decade. Around that time, 
however, North Korean exports to China start to take oﬀ and while the bilateral 
deﬁcit widened in 2004 and 2005, it did so in the context of greatly expanded 
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FIGURE 6.4. DPRK trade with Cina 
Note: 2005 is based on annualized January to September data. Source: IMF 2006. 
 
 
North Korean exports to China. We interpret this pattern as reﬂecting the fact 
that China was no longer willing to conduct bilateral trade on an unrequited 
basis and at least some share of bilateral trade was increasingly conducted on 
commercial terms. 
With respect to food trade in particular, the data we have on cereal imports 
come from two sources: Eberstadt 2003—using Chinese export data—provides 
a volume estimate in million metric tons of grain equivalent, while the UN 
provides value data denominated in dollars (ﬁgures 6.5 and 6.6). China prom- 
ised to enlarge its supply of grain and petroleum to North Korea as early as 1994 
in the wake of Kim Il-so˘ng’s death and made modest promises of assistance in 
1995. But these early North Korean appeals and Chinese promises did not trans- 
late immediately into increased grain exports (BBC Summary of World Broad- 
casts 1994; Donga Ilbo 1994).37 As the depth of the situation became apparent, 
however, and perhaps motivated by the growing movement of refugees across 
the border, Chinese premier Li Peng and North Korean vice premier Hong 
Song-nam signed an agreement on May 22, 1996, that reestablished high-level 
contacts, promised a widening of economic cooperation, and included large 
commitments of food aid. China also explicitly reverted to friendship prices 
for its commercial transactions (Agence France Presse 1996). Both estimates of 
grain trade that we have show sharp increases in 1996–97, with the UN data 
appearing to conﬁrm Eberstadt’s estimate of as much as 1 million metric tons. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.5. Volume of Cereal Shipments to North Korea, Total and from China, 1990–2004 
Sources: Total: FAOSTAT; Cereal imports from China; Eberstadt 2003. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.6. Value of Cereal Imports from China, 1992–2004 
Notes: Original data reported by China. 10% c.i.f./f.o.b. adjustment made. Based on SITC (Rev. 3) 
Chapter 04 commodities. Source: UN-COMTRADE 2005. 
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China’s grain shipments continued throughout the remainder of the decade, 
albeit at reduced levels, and China even appealed to the international commu- 
nity for more aid on behalf of North Korea (Japan Economic News Wire 1997). 
Beginning in 1999, relations between the two countries began to show signs of 
a higher-level political rapprochement (Kim and Lee 2002). Chairman Kim 
Young Nam of the Workers’ Party visited Beijing and in a meeting with Pre- 
mier Zhu Rongji obtained more aid from China (Kyodo News Service 1999). 
This was followed by three visits from Kim Jo˘ng-il himself in 2000, 2001, and 
2004 (when he met with the entire standing committee of the Politburo of the 
Communist Party) and again in 2006, when he visited Guangzhou on a trip 
that was likened to Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour of 1992 when the 
Chinese leader strongly aﬃrmed the reformist path. 
The nature of Chinese inﬂuence over North Korea during this period, and 
particularly since the onset of the nuclear crisis in 2002, has become a virtual 
cottage industry because of U.S. hopes that China would bring its inﬂuence to 
bear on North Korean behavior (Mansourov 2003; Scobell 2004; Wu 2005; Inter- 
national Crisis Group 2006). The result is a divide among China scholars on the 
extent to which China is either capable or willing to inﬂuence North Korea in 
general and through the manipulation of economic assistance in particular. 
On the one hand, Chinese oﬃcials and scholars have become more open 
in their calls for economic reform in North Korea. China has as a matter of 
policy also consistently held to the view that the Korean peninsula should be 
nonnuclear; Bejing played a pivotal role in orchestrating the Six-Party Talks. In 
August 2003, for example, President Hu Jintao publicly suggested that North 
Korea stop its “constant war-preparation” and pursue economic reforms (Lam 
2003). Hu also stated that a continued North Korean eﬀort to develop a nuclear 
program would impede China’s ability and willingness to aid North Korea. 
Analysts have also seized on particular episodes, such as reports of interrupted 
fuel supplies, as well as the size of the overall economic relationship and its 
signiﬁcance for North Korea, to suggest that China has the power to inﬂuence 
the course of the negotiations if it chooses. 
Nongovernmental sources are even more openly critical, although they have 
at times run afoul of stated government policy. In September 2004, the Chinese- 
language journal Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and management) published an 
article that criticized North Korea’s domestic and foreign politics and was subse- 
quently shut down as a result. But a variety of reports and discussions with Chi- 
nese academics suggest more-or-less open disaﬀection with North Korea, includ- 
ing from economic actors who have been burned in their economic dealings with 
the country (Mansourov 2003; Kim 2005; International Crisis Group 2006). 
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On the other hand, the idea that such disaﬀection would translate into the 
use of sanctions reﬂected wishful thinking, as China also repeatedly sent signals 
that it was unable or unwilling to bring economic leverage to bear on North 
Korea or participate in any exercise that did. With respect to Chinese capa- 
bilities, Beijing claims that its importance to North Korea is less than thought 
because of the closed nature of the economy and the vacillating nature of the 
economic relationship. In fact, North Korea’s economic relationship with China 
has become more important over time. Food imports dropped as the agricul- 
tural economy revived, but fuel is the most critical item, since North Korea 
could almost certainly not secure fuel imports on similar terms (ﬁgure 6.7). 
A ﬁnal variant of the capability argument that China has limited leverage 
strikes us more plausible and lies with the increasingly decentralized nature 
of trade. The common assumption is that Chinese exports are tightly con- 
trolled from Beijing, and in one sense this is true. The central government con- 
trols large-scale food and fuel shipments and has the power to eﬀect exchange 
through tightening or loosening border controls. But disaggregated data on the 
sources of Chinese exports by the level of the ﬁrm (central government, provin- 
cial, municipal) shows that an increasing share of Chinese trade and investment 
is decentralized, the result of provincial and lower level entities and purely 
private traders. In the long run, these Chinese economic networks are likely 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.7. Fuel Imports from China, 1992–2004 
Note: Original data reported as exports from China. Based on SITC (Rev. 3) Chapter 3 (total), 32 (coal), 
and 33 (petroleum) commodities. Source: UN-COMTRADE 2005. 
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to be the most important source of economic transformation in Korea, much 
more important than the tightly controlled interactions with South Korea. At 
the same time, however, their depth may limit Beijing’s ability to control trade 
ties or at least raise the cost of doing so. 
The second line of argument about Chinese inﬂuence goes not to capability 
but to intent. To the extent that China has used its economic leverage with 
respect to North Korea, it appears to take the form of inducements to partici- 
pate in talks rather than constraints for failing to do so (see, e.g., Kyodo News 
Service 2004). China also has a number of other concerns with North Korea, 
including the growth of the refugee problem (Lankov 2004). But the refugee 
problem is just the tip of a much larger iceberg of concerns. Although China 
has continued reservations about North Korea’s economic strategy and nuclear 
ambitions, it has equally signiﬁcant concerns about economic pressure that 
would lead to political upheaval, a second economic collapse, and a ﬂood of 
refugees. This very risk increases North Korean leverage vis-à-vis its patron. The 
evidence to date suggests that China has been willing to step in as a lender of 
last resort in crises—albeit it with a lag—and is likely to continue to provide 
crucial support if needed. 
 
The Coordination Problem: A Reprise 
 
In the early 1990s, North Korea faced an extremely diﬃcult international envi- 
ronment. Soviet foreign policy was transformed under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
leading to the normalization of relations with South Korea. The subsequent 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of North Korea’s main patron. 
China stepped into the breach but not smoothly. The dictates of the famine 
required North Korea to develop these existing relationships while aggressively 
cultivating new ones, for example, with Japan, the EU and its member coun- 
tries, and, perhaps most important, South Korea. 
North Korea found itself caught in the terrible downdraft of the 1993–94 
crisis. Slow to adjust and seek support and pursuing a reckless bargaining game 
with the United States, the country initially found it hard to secure the assis- 
tance it needed at a very crucial moment in the evolution of the famine. 
Over time, the plethora of relationships North Korea was able to develop 
generated a quite diﬀerent problem for the donors: the coordination of aid 
became increasingly diﬃcult, including with respect to the basic issues of tar- 
geting, monitoring, and assessment that we took up in chapter 4. This point 
can be made by reproducing ﬁgures from Manyin’s thorough 2005 study of 
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FIGURE 6.8. Food Aid to North Korea, 1996–2004 
Source: Manyin 2005. 
 
 
U.S. aid policy (ﬁgure 6.8). The graph shows the share of food that has passed 
through the WFP and that which is entirely outside it.38 The data refer only to 
food aid. As can be seen, Japan and the United States are the most multilateral 
on this simple measure, channeling the bulk of their contributions through the 
WFP; even the residual non-WFP contribution from the United States was in 
fact undertaken with close collaboration with WFP oﬃcials. When we turn 
to Europe, Korea, and China, however, we ﬁnd that large shares of food aid 
passed to North Korea outside WFP channels. In principle, this aid could also 
be well targeted and monitored, although this would in any case involve an 
ineﬃciency given the accumulated expertise of the WFP on this score. But we 
are skeptical.39 As we will argue in more detail in the conclusion to this book, 
the coordination of assistance and the integrity of the monitoring regime are 
closely related. Before getting to those issues, however, we must ﬁrst understand 
the marketization that occurred in the wake of the famine and the subsequent 
eﬀorts at economic reform. 
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Dealing with a New North Korea 
  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 
New Sources of Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Famines have long half-lives. The consequences of acute food shortages are not 
only felt in the short run but also reverberate for generations through the poli- 
ties and societies they strike. In the ﬁrst instance, households are forced into a 
variety of coping behaviors—migrating, foraging for food, selling assets, and 
engaging in barter and market exchanges—that can fundamentally alter the 
economic landscape. In this chapter, we argue that the famine and these cop- 
ing behaviors contained the seeds of an increasing marketization of the North 
Korean economy. This was a bottom-up process resulting from the very coping 
behaviors we have just noted. Over time, de facto marketization also placed a 
variety of pressures on the government, which initiated a variety of economic 
reforms in the postfamine period, most notably a major package of policies 
introduced in the summer of 2002 that we analyze in some detail. 
Marketization has had profound social impact in North Korea. Before the 
famine, the socialist system of entitlements rested on a particular pattern of 
social stratiﬁcation based ﬁrst on political status (loyal/wavering/suspect; party/ 
nonparty) and then on occupation (see table 3.1 on PDS rations). In this chapter, 
we show that entitlements to food have become increasingly dependent on the 
capacity to purchase food in the market. 
Yet the government’s commitment to marketization and reform was tenta- 
tive at best, and the initial response was to crack down on activities deemed 
threatening to political and social stability. An almost primal impulse of the 
regime was toward the imposition of even tighter controls. As we will argue, 
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even the reforms of 2002, particularly the major reform of prices, can be seen 
as a desperate eﬀort by the state to gain access to resources and reassert control 
over markets that threatened to operate both outside state control and at the 
government’s expense. 
The result of these reform eﬀorts is a hybrid transition that varies in impor- 
tant respects from those in other socialist countries. As in China and Vietnam 
and unlike what took place in Russia and Eastern Europe, the reforms in North 
Korea were undertaken by an incumbent Communist Party that exhibited a 
primary concern with the maintenance of political control and extreme caution 
toward any policy measures that might loosen it; North Korea is certainly not a 
case of a dual economic and political transition.1 Rather, North Korean reforms 
should be interpreted as a ratiﬁcation under duress of a bottom-up process of 
marketization that the regime has subsequently struggled to control. 
A second distinctive feature of the transition lies in the composition of out- 
put at the beginning of the process. North Korea is relatively industrialized and 
looks more like Eastern Europe or parts of the former Soviet Union than it 
does the more agrarian China or Vietnam. These two countries both had more 
than 70 percent of their labor forces employed in agriculture when they initi- 
ated reforms (Noland 2000:table 3.7) and saw high returns from early policy 
changes relating to agriculture. North Korea, by contrast, has had to deal with 
an industrial sector that shows signs of virtual collapse (ﬁgure 7.1).2 Given 
these political and economic circumstances, it is not surprising that the result 
of reform eﬀorts to date have proven mixed at best and that the transforma- 
tion of the North Korean economy has taken place in spite of the stance of the 
government rather than because of it. 
We begin our analysis by looking at the political aftermath of the famine: 
the emergence of “military ﬁrst” politics and the eﬀorts to maintain control. 
We then consider in more detail the underlying process of marketization that 
we have already noted in chapter 3 before turning to the policy reforms and 
their consequences for access to food. We begin with the agricultural reforms, 
which predate the 2002 package, before turning to crucial developments in the 
industrial sector and macroeconomic policy that have had profound implica- 
tions for access to food. 
We closed our consideration of the famine with a review of the death toll. 
We evaluate this more recent period with an overview of a succession of nutri- 
tional surveys of children that have been done since the mid-1990s. Children 
are of particular interest to the humanitarian relief eﬀort because of their intrin- 
sic vulnerability to both shortages and entitlement failures, including those 
within the household itself. The portrait these data paint is grim. Ten years 
  
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 167 
 
FIGURE 7.1. North Korea’s Composition of Output 
Source: Bank of Korea 2005. 
 
after the famine, we still ﬁnd classic signs of chronic malnutrition, with all the 
long-range developmental implications they carry. In this way, too, the results 
of the famine and ensuing shortages are proving to be enduring. 
We close the chapter with a consideration of events in 2005 and early 2006, 
including the eﬀort to revive the PDS. It is too soon to reach a ﬁrm conclusion 
about the longer-term meaning of these developments. But they show very 
clearly the ongoing ambivalence of the regime toward the de facto decentral- 
ization and marketization that has occurred in the country in the decade after 
the famine. 
 
The Government Responds: The Quest for Control 
 
The onset of the famine coincided with the ﬁrst nuclear crisis, the death of 
Kim Il-so˘ng, and the ﬁnal transition to the political leadership of his son. As he 
came to power, Kim Jo˘ng-il faced the virtual collapse of the economy and, 
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as the famine broke, social disintegration on a massive scale. The emergence 
of “military ﬁrst” politics (s˘on’gun ch˘ongch’i) must be understood in this con- 
text. The military had long held a privileged position in North Korea; a pri- 
mary source of Kim Il-so˘ng’s legitimacy was his role as an anti-Japanese guerilla 
ﬁghter. Yet “military ﬁrst” politics refers to an important shift in the political, 
organizational, and ideological base of the North Korean regime that took place 
following the death of Kim Il-so˘ng, if not before. A renewed emphasis on the 
military emerged quite clearly during the period of the “arduous march”—the 
leadership’s euphemism for the deprivations of the famine—that began in 1995. 
The term “ ‘military ﬁrst’ politics” (s˘on’gun ch˘ongch’i) was ﬁrst oﬃcially unveiled 
in 1997 and appeared to become the ideological cornerstone of political rule 
in 1998 following the end of the oﬃcial three-year mourning period after the 
death of Kim Il-so˘ng. 
The “military ﬁrst” credo reﬂected two main political imperatives, one exter- 
nal, the other internal (Suh 2002; Koh 2005; I. Kim 2006). The ﬁrst was a 
renewed emphasis on national security during the standoﬀ with the United 
States over the nuclear issue in 1992–94. During periods of external threat, it 
is not surprising that the military would gain in stature and signiﬁcance. The 
primary role of the military was reiterated strongly in oﬃcial speeches after the 
onset of the second nuclear crisis in October 2002 as well. 
But the timing of the ultimate announcement of the “military ﬁrst” poli- 
tics suggests that external circumstances were not primary. Rather, this shift 
reﬂected a complex set of internal political calculations associated with the 
succession  as  well.  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  did  not  have  a  military  background,  which 
had been a key component of Kim Il-so˘ng’s political legitimacy. Kim senior 
was no doubt concerned that Kim Jo˘ng-il gain control over the military before 
the succession. Once Kim junior assumed key military-related posts begin- 
ning in 1990, he was able to use his position on the National Defense Com- 
mission (NDC) and power over appointments and spending to shore up this 
crucial base of support.3 We see evidence of this before the succession and even 
more clearly in the wake of Kim Il-so˘ng’s death in July 1994. In constitutional 
amendments engineered in 1998, the National Defense Commission was eﬀec- 
tively elevated above the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party as 
the central organ of political power. Since that time, Kim Jo˘ng-il has ruled the 
country from his position as chairman of the NDC rather than through either 
party or other government positions; the position of president was granted to 
Kim Il-so˘ng in perpetuity. 
To this, however, must be added a third motivation that we believe has 
received inadequate attention: the increasing use of the military, including 
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paramilitary and reserve forces, both as a model of social discipline and hier- 
archy and as an additional instrument of control in the face of the widespread 
social disruption arising from the famine.4 In his speech at Kim Il-so˘ng Univer- 
sity, Kim Jo˘ng-il (1996) derided the party for its lack of dynamism and hinted 
at increasing corruption in its ranks. The military, by contrast, was lauded for 
its discipline and revolutionary purpose (I. Kim 2006:65–66). 
The problems were also short run in nature. It is standard during food short- 
ages and famines for people to seek to move in search of food. However, all 
travel within North Korea is controlled and requires permits. As early as 1992, the 
government began to relax internal travel for the purpose of securing food (Ahn 
1996); such movement undoubtedly accelerated thereafter and was even noted by 
Kim Jo˘ng-il in his December 1996 speech, cited earlier. Undocumented move- 
ment remained illegal, however, and thus vulnerable to low-level extortion and 
corruption. Good Friends interviews conducted in 2000 found that roughly half 
of 512 refugees interviewed had faced punishment for traveling without permits 
and that 70 percent either paid a ﬁne or bribed oﬃcials (Good Friends 2004). 
Not only are internal migrants vulnerable to harassment by the security forces, 
but they are also eﬀectively denied protection. Of the 512 refugees interviewed, 42 
percent reported that they had been robbed, and 98 percent believed that public 
security was a problem. In short, the government had criminalized key coping 
behaviors, including internal migration and various forms of exchange. 
The government also moved to crack down on cross-border movement. 
The right to leave one’s country is enshrined in both the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to which the government of the DPRK is a state party. Nonetheless, the 
North Korean penal code prescribes sentencing of up to three years in a prison 
camp for unauthorized departure. Detention in these camps is characterized 
by extreme deprivation, torture, and high rates of death (Hawk 2003). As 
the food situation worsened in the mid-1990s, the number of refugees ﬂeeing 
into China’s border provinces rose dramatically. This population has received 
increasing attention in recent years because of its size—estimates vary from 
the tens of thousands up to half a million—and the increasing vulnerability to 
forced repatriation of North Korean refugees in China.5 Interviews reveal not 
only that the overwhelming majority of refugees moved for food or economic 
reasons but that some either moved back and forth between North Korea and 
China or sought to do so, bringing small amounts of money or food with them 
(Good Friends 1999, 2004). 
As the ranks of the internal migrants and cross-border refugees expanded, 
the North Korean government responded in a variety of ways, including estab- 
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lishing a network of ad hoc detention facilities, again characterized by extreme 
deprivation, torture, and, in the case of pregnant women repatriated from 
China, forced abortions and infanticide (Hawk 2003). Adults engaged in illegal 
internal movement and famine-orphaned children (the kotchebi, or “wandering 
sparrows”) were subject to detention in so-called 9-27 camps named after the 
date (September 27, 1995) when Kim Jo˘ng-il issued the edict authorizing their 
establishment. Males over sixteen, who had crossed the border were vulner- 
able, however, to incarceration in prison camps, and those suspected of more 
extensive engagement—frequent trips, trade, traﬃcking, marriage to a Chi- 
nese, contacts with South Koreans or Christians who were active in sheltering 
refugees—faced more extended incarceration in the long-term political prison 
camps that constitute the North Korean gulag.6 
In addition to controls on movement, a second aspect of the command- 
and-control response to the famine and its aftermath was the use of the mili- 
tary to reassert authority over both the cooperative farms and the industrial 
workplace. One element of the new order was what Andrew Natsios calls the 
“militarization of agriculture,” described in chapter 5 (1999:117): the mobiliza- 
tion of military reserve units (the Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard) not only for 
planting and harvesting but also for security purposes. Refugee interviews make 
reference to corn guards sent to protect against preharvesting or diversion in 
1997. They also report the growth of a phenomenon that is virtually inevitable 
given the combination of rationing, extreme shortages, and very high market 
prices for food: bribery and corruption between farmers and the military. In 
August 1997, the Public Security Ministry issued a decree on hoarding and theft 
of food that stipulated the execution of individuals involved in either stealing 
grain or trading in it. 
The internal security forces were also called upon to address similar prob- 
lems that were emerging in the industrial workplace. The general breakdown 
of the industrial economy forced enterprise managers to engage in a variety 
of coping behaviors to secure the inputs required to maintain production and 
food to feed workers. State-owned enterprises with access to land or other 
resources sought to grow food or to harvest resources that could be traded 
for food; the deforestation along the Chinese border attests to the fact that 
these coping strategies were not just employed by individuals but involved 
well-organized eﬀorts coordinated by either military units or enterprises in 
the region. This process of adaptation and spontaneous privatization from 
below was ultimately sanctioned by the government and institutionalized. 
There is also evidence, however, that ﬁrms engaged in asset stripping and 
theft as well. 
  
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 171 
 
Scott Snyder’s early reports (1997) from the border region provide insight 
into these coping strategies. He found that in addition to the representatives 
of the central government, hundreds of trading interests representing local and 
provincial authorities appeared in Dandong and other Chinese cities near the 
border during the famine. He estimates that as many as eight hundred ﬁrms 
were engaged in such activity at the peak, although this number declined as 
their trading eﬀorts proved less successful over time. These groups were autho- 
rized to conduct barter trade deals and to procure other resources on behalf of 
local authorities or even individual work units. For example, Snyder reports 
that a representative of the Hwanghae provincial government was authorized 
to sell scrap metal or timber resources in return for wheat ﬂour, which was 
delivered to provincial authorities for local distribution. 
But some of this illicit trade came from the dismantling of factories and/or 
involved personal enrichment. Becker (2005:190–93) relates the story from two 
refugees of public executions at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Works in Febru- 
ary 1998 for theft of state property; this episode was conﬁrmed by Kim Jo˘ng-il 
himself in an interview with a delegation of North Koreans from Japan (Mar- 
tin 2004:573–74). Bradley Martin (2004:551–78) presents a number of refugee 
accounts of work unit eﬀorts to secure grain but also of widespread corruption 
and bribery in managers’ eﬀorts to secure inputs and periodic eﬀorts to pun- 
ish such behavior. Again, one of the most revealing sources of evidence on this 
point is the Kim Jo˘ng-il speech of December 1996, which recognizes the risks of 
“letting the people solve the food problem for themselves.” The North Korean 
leader derided the party for maintaining inadequate control over work units and 
relying on “legal measures imposed by the police and other law enforcement 
agencies” as opposed to adequate political and ideological work that would 
guarantee appropriate work eﬀort and protection of state assets. 
 
Coping and Marketization 
 
Yet as the government attempted to crack down on illicit activities and regain 
social control, it was at the same time forced to tolerate, if not sanction, a vari- 
ety of behaviors that it had not tolerated before. Some of these coping strate- 
gies constitute the grisly survival mechanisms evident in all famine settings: 
purchasing or foraging for inferior foods, such as grasses and tree bark; begging; 
criminal activity; and even cannibalism (see, e.g., Becker 1997c, 1998b; Associ- 
ated Press 1998; Struck 2003). Yet an important component of these coping 
strategies involved some form of trade: barter, sale of assets in order to purchase 
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food, prostitution, or foraging for foods that were then sold in order to pur- 
chase grain. Many of these activities implied the diversion to emerging markets 
of grain and other foods not only from aid (chapter 5) but either from farm 
households or the PDS. As a result, access to food was increasingly determined 
by the position of the individual or household vis-à-vis these markets. These fac- 
tors included geographic location (food-surplus or -deﬁcit region), occupation 
(urban or rural), and, increasingly, access to foreign exchange (either through 
oﬃcial employment or nonoﬃcial economic activities or through remittances, 
principally from relatives in Japan or China). 
To some extent, this process of marketization reﬂected piecemeal policy 
changes that occurred well before the reforms of 2002 discussed in the next sec- 
tion and even before the famine (the following draws on S. Lee 2003:298–303). 
These can be classiﬁed into two basic sorts: those that regularized the use of 
private plots and thus aﬀected the supply side of the equation and those that 
regularized markets and thus provided new distribution channels for food. One 
innovation was to allow PDS populations, most notably those on state farms, 
to grow grains other than maize and rice as well as other foodstuﬀs. These 
private plots were oﬃcially incorporated into the supplementary channels of 
supply in 1987. At that time, the government ordered all state farms to allocate 
a certain amount of land and work time to these activities and allowed the cul- 
tivation of maize, clearly in compensation for the declining ability to provide 
PDS rations. In 1995 the right to cultivate private plots was also granted to mili- 
tary personnel, although it is interesting that these grants to the state farms and 
military were not formally approved by the government until the constitution 
of 1998. In 1987 the government also allowed cooperative farm households to 
grow any crops they chose on private plots, which supplemented overall supply 
but generated the incentive problems we highlighted in chapter 2. 
In addition to these formal grants, the government tolerated to varying 
degrees illegal private plots (t’uigibat). These plots included urban gardens near 
residences or workplaces but primarily illicit holdings by cooperative and state 
farmers on marginal lands such as steep hillsides. This tolerance was not sanc- 
tioned, however, and thus was subject to classic credibility problems about 
future policy reversal. In 1989 the government announced that such plots were 
illegal, and in 1992 groups aimed at breaking up such nonsocialist activities 
were sent down to the countryside to eliminate them. Thus while local oﬃcials 
may have tolerated these sources of supply, they, too, were undoubtedly sur- 
rounded by corruption and bribery. 
Finally, the government did allow farmers’ markets to function to a greater 
extent than in the past. From the banning of private grain trade in the late 
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1940s until the revival of private plots in the 1980s, farmers’ markets played a 
minimal role in the overall distribution system, conﬁned largely to supple- 
mentary foodstuﬀs. In 1982 markets were allowed to operate on a more regular 
basis: daily instead of every ten days. In May 1984, additional markets were 
allowed to operate, with the total number rising to three or four per county. In 
the early 1990s, as the capacity of the PDS began to falter, such markets were 
allowed to trade in grain, although this was not formally institutionalized. 
As the PDS went into decline, these markets spread and, according to a 
study by the South Korea’s Ministry of Uniﬁcation, totaled between 300 and 
350 as early as 1998, covering all counties in the country (Lintner 2005). The 
scope of goods traded also increased from supplementary food and grains to 
industrial products and came to include not only farm households but also pro- 
fessional merchants, even Chinese-Korean ones granted permission to enter the 
country and trade. Trade in these markets remained a precarious undertaking, 
however.  In  his  December  1996  speech,  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  expressed  his  antipathy 
to these activities, underlining that “the party and the government have full 
responsibility for the care and well-being of the lives of the people” and that 
“if the party lets the people solve the food problem themselves, then only the 
farmers and merchants will prosper, giving rise to egotism and collapsing the 
social order of a classless society. The party will then lose its popular base and 
will experience meltdown as in Poland and Czechoslovakia.” In January 1999, 
Kim  Jo˘ng-il  ordered  the  government  to  reinforce  state  control  over  farmers 
markets and prevent labor from being diverted to them. 
In sum, the course of policy before the 2002 reforms suggests a tolerance 
but not institutionalization of market means of allocating food. But precisely 
what role did market-based activities play? Again, we start with the evidence 
from refugee interviews. Although the questions were not addressed in every 
interview, putting the results of these surveys together in sequence suggests a 
process of increasing marketization over time. 
The Johns Hopkins studies (Robinson et. al. 1999, 2001) ask respondents 
what their principal source of food was from 1994 to 1997; we reproduce their 
results in tables 7.1 and 7.2. As the famine deepened, the share of respondents 
in the ﬁrst sample depending primarily on foraging increased dramatically, 
reaching 40 percent by 1997. But fully 16 percent of respondents claimed that 
purchases were their main source of food in 1994, and another 4 percent said 
they relied on barter. By 1997, 39 percent relied primarily on food purchases (26 
percent) and barter (13 percent). When this question was posed again in the sec- 
ond, larger set of interviews in 1998, a marginally larger share of respondents— 
31 percent—said that they had come to rely primarily on food purchases, but a 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  TABLE 7.1. Johns Hopkins 1999 Survey Results on Principal Source of Food, 1994–97  
Government 
 Ration*  Buy  Barter Forage  Grow  Other  Total 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
1994 260 60.6 70 16.3 16 3.7 51 11.9 18 4.2 14 3.3 429 100.0 
1995 122 28.4 99 23.1 60 14.0 98 22.8 29 6.8 21 4.9 429 100.0 
1996 42 9.8 117 27.4 67 15.7 148 34.7 31 7.2 22 5.2 427 100.0 
1997 24 5.7 108 25.8 54 12.9 168 40.2 36 8.6 28 6.7 418 99.9** 
*Includes public distribution system as well as government allocations to farmers and the military. 
**Total does not sum to 100 because of rounding 
Source: Robinson et al., 1999. 
 
 
  TABLE 7.2. Johns Hopkins 2001 Survey Results on Principal Source of Food, 1995–98  
Government 
 Ration  Buy  Barter Forage  Gift  Grow Other  Total 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
1995 802 30.1 651 24.4 479 18.0 339 12.7 34 1.3 269 10.1 93 3.5 2,667 100.1* 
1996 242 9.1 756 28.4 696 26.1 416 15.6 39 1.5 384 14.4 130 4.9 2,663 100.0 
1997 56 2.1 760 28.6 754 28.4 433 16.3 37 1.4 422 15.9 195 7.3 2,657 100.0 
1998 50 1.9 833 31.4 679 25.6 397 15.0 45 1.7 422 15.9 223 8.4 2,649 99.9* 
*Total does not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Robinson et al., 2001 
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very much larger proportion said they relied on barter (25 percent) and growing 
their own food (16 percent). If we take those relying primarily on purchases and 
barter as the marketized segment of the sample, it accounts for 56 percent of all 
respondents. Lim (2005) cites similar results from an unpublished 500-person 
survey conducted by the South Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation that concluded 
that by the late 1990s ordinary citizens obtained up to 60 percent of their food 
through unoﬃcial channels. Interestingly, these results correspond roughly to 
our estimate in chapter 5 of the share of total food nonfarm residents were 
securing in the market. 
The 1998 Good Friends interviews conﬁrm some of the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst 
set of Johns Hopkins interviews. These interviews asked how families survived 
following the end of government distribution. The Good Friends surveys on 
this question also allowed multiple answers, giving us a wider view of household 
strategies. The dominant coping mechanism was listed as foraging and con- 
sumption of inferior foods, with 57 percent reported resorting to these means. 
Yet 46 percent reported engaging in barter, and nearly 45 percent reported 
selling assets (with 4 percent even reporting that they had sold their houses). 
Even though only 5 percent of respondents were farmers, 13 percent reported 
farming ﬁelds in the mountains, and another 6 percent reported collecting 
herbs to exchange for food. 
The Good Friends (2004) interviews asked respondents to estimate the share 
of households involved in trade in their locales. Nearly 50 percent of respon- 
dents answered that more than 90 percent of households engaged in trade; 
only 20 percent estimated that less than 80 percent of households did. When 
asked personally if they had engaged in trade, 92.5 percent said that they had. 
Of this group, 61 percent reported trading in food. These results reﬂect the fact 
that many refugees either were, or became, traders. However, their perception 
of North Korean society is nonetheless revealing: at least by these respondents’ 
estimates, North Korean society had become actively engaged in trade as a mat- 
ter of survival. In the words of one refugee, “those who could not trade are long 
dead” (cited in Lankov 2006a:112). Indeed, the ﬁgures on the wedge between 
oﬃcial and market prices reported in table 5.1 indicate that there were tremen- 
dous incentives to channel supplies outside oﬃcial avenues; these incentives, 
although attenuated by the July 2002 price reforms, as discussed below, have 
persisted to a signiﬁcant degree. 
Additional evidence about the process of marketization can be found by 
considering price trends. The extent of depreciation of the won on the black 
market is one indicator of the severity of economic distress in North Korea 
and has been monitored by Chinese scholars and in the Chinese-Korean com- 
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munity; Snyder 1997 provides some early evidence. The unoﬃcial black mar- 
ket exchange rate soared as the food crisis worsened—from about 90 won per 
dollar in the early 1990s to over 220 won per dollar in June 1997 (the oﬃcial 
exchange rate was 2.2 won to the dollar that year, and average salaries ranged 
from 100 to 350 won per month). The won/dollar exchange rate in black mar- 
kets along the Chinese border reached its peak in late fall 1996, at 250 to 280 
won per dollar. The black market price of one kilogram of rice quadrupled 
during the same time frame, to 80 to 90 won per kilogram, and was as high as 
150 won per kilogram in October 1996. When put side by side, the evidence 
on the exchange and rice prices provides an important reminder of the fact that 
those with access to foreign exchange could protect themselves from the crisis 
while those locked into won incomes—the vast majority of the urban popula- 
tion—faced debilitating prices on the market. 
 
Policy Reform I: Reforms in the Agricultural Sector 
 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, well before the reforms of 2002, the government 
initiated a number of piecemeal reforms in the agricultural sector as a response 
to declining output. Among the policies undertaken was an intensiﬁcation of 
double-cropping, an emphasis on the introduction of higher-yield varieties, 
and a number of specialized campaigns to increase the output of particular 
foodstuﬀs, such as potatoes, mushrooms, rabbits, and goats.7 Some of these 
policy changes were introduced with technical assistance from the donor com- 
munity and made perfect sense. An example is the eﬀort to expand potato 
production, which could be interpreted as a return to a more traditional and 
environmentally appropriate crop pattern that had been disrupted by policy 
interventions dating to the 1960s and the ideological campaigns of the 1970s. 
Striking in this list of reforms, however, is the prominence of technical ﬁxes, 
the reliance on exhortation to greater eﬀort, and the dearth of measures that 
addressed the incentives facing farmers. Indicative of this mind-set was the 
revival in 1998 of the Nature Remodeling Program as “an important alternative 
to increased agricultural production” (Kwon and Kim 2003:32). This program 
had originally been launched in 1976. In the words of Kim Jo˘ng-il, it would 
literally bulldoze “in a sweeping manner” the North Korean countryside into 
ﬁelds of “regular shapes like a checkerboard.” The intent of the reform was 
to spur agricultural mechanization and sever the connection between former 
landowners and the land by changing its physical contours “beyond recogni- 
tion” (Kim 2000, Foster-Carter 2001). Similarly, his potato, rabbit, and goat 
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projects—even where they might have had technical justiﬁcation and outside 
support—were run in the style of mobilization campaigns reminiscent of his 
father’s failed “chicken in every pot” scheme (Noland 2000:box 3.2). 
In at least one aspect, however, North Korean agricultural policy during 
this period did recognize incentive issues. Early land reforms had beneﬁted 
cultivators and generated an early base of support for the regime. But col- 
lectivization—“cooperativization” in North Korean parlance—as well as grain 
seizures had broken the link to household and individual incentives (Smith 
2005b:48–49). In 1996 the government introduced on a limited or pilot project 
basis in certain areas of the country a reduction of the size of work teams on 
the cooperatives from roughly ten to twenty-ﬁve to seven to ten members, a 
number that could eﬀectively accommodate family-based teams. This reform 
was similar in certain respects to the Chinese household responsibility system 
introduced nearly twenty years earlier that had resulted in a dramatic increase 
in output. At the same time, the government introduced a system under which 
production targets would be established according to a moving-average formula 
rather than arbitrary diktat, thus allowing some predictability in the state’s 
take of the harvest and farmer allotments. The new system would also allow 
the production team to keep any output over the target either to consume or 
to dispose of as they wished (Han 2004; Kwon and Kim 2003). As we have 
discussed, government policy played a crucial role in the onset and deepening 
of the famine. These policies included the discretionary nature of production 
targets—and farmers’ eﬀorts to evade them and protect themselves from con- 
ﬁscatory policies—as well as the fact that extra production was still sold to the 
state at stipulated prices. 
The initiative to reduce the size of work teams confronted several diﬃcul- 
ties, however. First, although it increased individual and family responsibility 
and eﬀort, decision-making authority did not devolve in a comparable man- 
ner. In eﬀect, the new policy amounted to simply pushing grain targets onto 
work units of smaller size without granting them the corresponding freedom to 
adjust production techniques, inputs, or the mix of crops. Second, the end of 
the ﬂoods and the increase in aid by no means implied a revival of the indus- 
trial economy, on which agricultural production remained dependent. Even if 
households eﬀectively adjusted for declining production, targets under the new 
formula were essentially unattainable because of the lack of inputs. As a result, 
the targets still implied eﬀective conﬁscation by the state of all production 
above the level retained on farm for in-kind consumption. 
More fundamentally, it is doubtful that the mere announcement of a new 
target-setting process was enough to reverse farmers’ perceptions of govern- 
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ment intent; the government had reversed course before. Eventually, the for- 
mula, which was based on a moving average of past production, began to 
reﬂect plausible targets under the existing input-constrained conditions, not 
the higher yield pattern of the past. As a result, it held forth the possibility to 
the cooperative farmers that extra eﬀort would be rewarded. In the short run, 
however—and continuing through 2005—the changes almost certainly did not 
fully reverse the hoarding and diversion on the part of the farmers that were a 
component of their eﬀorts to mitigate political risk. 
While the rapid increase in the provision of aid arguably relieved the pres- 
sure on North Korea to adopt policy reforms (indirectly crowding out domes- 
tic production as well as commercial imports), the donor community also 
attempted to encourage the adoption of more eﬀective agricultural policies. At 
the 1998 Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) meet- 
ing organized by UNDP, representatives of the donor community were blunt 
at to the signiﬁcance they placed on the importance of changing policies (see, 
e.g., Babson 1998). But the North Korean interpretation of the crisis continued 
to emphasize the role of natural disasters and the collapse of foreign trade. 
The government identiﬁed the three priorities of the AREP program as farm- 
land recovery and rehabilitation, the restoration of irrigation capabilities, and 
emergency improvements to fertilizer production facilities but ﬂatly rejected 
institutional or incentive reforms. In his introductory remarks to the First The- 
matic Roundtable on the AREP in 1998, the leader of the North Korean del- 
egation—a vice minister of foreign aﬀairs—argued explicitly that the AREP 
program would be implemented through existing institutions (Choi 1998). 
The process of marketization got a push in July 2002, when the govern- 
ment of North Korea announced major changes in economic policy compris- 
ing four central components: microeconomic policy changes, macroeconomic 
policy changes, and renewed eﬀorts to create special economic zones and secure 
foreign aid (we take up these reforms in detail in the following sections).8 
From the perspective of agriculture, however, the government continued to 
describe incentive reforms such as the introduction of smaller work teams and 
ﬁxed-rate tenancies along the lines of Chinese practices as pilot projects. The 
evaluation of the inadequacies of North Korea’s “within the box” initiatives by 
a South Korean government think tank is worth citing at length: “Irrigation 
facilities require streamlining, preferably linked to large gravity-fed networks. 
More fertilizer alone is not likely to provide sustainable enhancement in agri- 
cultural productivity. Other innovative, environmentally friendly agricultural 
techniques (such as improving soil fertility through green manure, using alter- 
natives to chemical fertilizer, rotating crops, integrating pest management, 
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and instituting policy reforms) need to be put into practice. Double-cropping 
wheat and barley after rice and maize (cereal after cereal) on already exhausted 
soils is unsustainable. Introduction of leguminous crops in the crop rotation is 
vital” (KIEP 2004:104). 
In some sense, the policy changes undertaken in July 2002 with respect to 
agriculture could be interpreted as a belated recognition that earlier incentive 
reforms had not gone far enough. The most important change introduced at 
this time was a dramatic increase in the procurement prices of grains. With 
the famine and chronic food shortages, food prices on the market skyrocketed, 
while the prices paid to farmers remained constant and the prices paid for 
the rations that were available through the PDS remained nominal. The price 
reform raised the state procurement price to roughly 80 percent of the contem- 
poraneous market price. This reform was clearly designed to increase the vol- 
ume of food entering the PDS and to limit diversion to farmers’ consumption, 
private markets, and other uses, such as the production of liquor, and the real- 
location of acreage away from grain to cash crops such as tobacco on the supply 
side and thus, by implication, to draw consumers back into state-controlled 
institutions on the demand side.9 In parallel, the authorities loosened central 
planning, allowing some cooperative farms to choose their own crop mixes. 
The government also permitted an increase in the size of private plots on 
cooperative farms from 30 p’yo˘ng (approximately 100 square meters) to 400 
p’yo˘ng (1,320 square meters) while at the same time introducing a rental or tax 
system to compensate the state for the corresponding reduction in the land 
controlled collectively by the cooperative. Since the rental rate was not set ex 
ante, however, farmers exhibited reluctance to apply themselves intensively to 
the cultivation of these plots. Again, the security and credibility of property 
rights loomed as an important constraint since farmers remained unsure about 
how much of the output they would be required to surrender to the state 
(Nam 2004). 
The incentives for farmers to route their production through state channels 
were further weakened by the inﬂationary spiral set oﬀ by the July 2002 policy 
changes that we take up in the next section. In the year following the July 
2002 price increases, the market price of rice and corn, which had been on a 
generally downward trend since peaking during the famine, more than tripled. 
The result was that the gap between the state procurement price for grain and 
the price that farmers could receive if they diverted production to the market 
increased sharply (ﬁgure 7.2). Although the discrepancy between state procure- 
ment prices and market prices was not as wide as it was during the prereform 
period, it was nonetheless substantial. 
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FIGURE 7.2. Price Trends, 1998–2003 
Source: Lim 2005. 
 
The maintenance of yields in the face of dwindling fertilizer inputs suggests 
that North Korea saw improvements in input-adjusted productivity that might 
be traced at least in part to the incentive changes introduced after 1996. But 
the modesty of the changes in incentives—and undoubtedly their lack of cred- 
ibility—together with an ongoing dearth of complementary inputs contributed 
to continuing stagnation in output. Despite South Korea’s infusions of fertilizer 
and improved weather, North Korea’s agricultural output was still lower in 2005 
than in 1990 (ﬁgure 2.3). If one accepts the quasi-oﬃcial ﬁgures from the FAO, 
output remains less than half its peak. It is extremely unlikely that bad weather 
alone can explain this pattern of stagnation. 
 
Policy Reform II: Industrial Adjustment and 
Macroeconomic Instability 
 
Although the 2002 reforms made some reference to agriculture, at their core 
was a wider-ranging reform of prices, wages, and incentives in the industrial 
sector as well. Whether the intent was to change fundamentally the way the 
economy operated or simply to improve the functioning of the socialist system 
is a subject of continuing controversy (see Lee 2002; Y. H. Chung 2003; Frank 
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2005a; Nam 2003, 2004; Newcomb 2003; Oh 2003; Gey 2004; Noland 2004b; 
and Kim and Choi 2005). Either way, the July 2002 measures involved a break 
with the past. From the standpoint of assessing access to food, two aspects of 
the policy reforms are of particular relevance: the microeconomic reforms in 
the industrial sector, which aﬀected the demand for food among the urban 
working class, and the macroeconomic policy changes, which had the eﬀect of 
generating a sustained high inﬂation. 
The North Korean experience conﬁrms that a successful transition from 
central planning to market-oriented resource allocation is more complex and 
challenging in the industrial sphere than in agriculture. This is particularly true 
in North Korea, where the industrial sector looms large (ﬁgure 7.1). Reforms 
of the industrial sector are important for at least three reasons. First, as we 
have noted, the North Korean agricultural system was particularly dependent 
on inputs from agriculture, and the terms of trade between agriculture and 
industry constitute a critical component of the larger social contract. In the 
absence of inputs or ﬁnal consumer goods, there are strong incentives for farm- 
ers to bypass the formal channels of intersectoral exchange altogether. Second, 
developments in the industrial sector were crucial for the demand side of the 
food story; with marketization, the ability of urban workers to purchase food 
depends critically on the health of the enterprises in which they work. Perhaps 
most important, a revived industrial sector is key to North Korea’s generating 
the export earnings needed to ﬁnance food imports and to resolve once and for 
all its chronic food insecurity problem. 
The microeconomic reforms had two components. The ﬁrst was an altera- 
tion of state-administered relative prices and wages by administrative ﬁat, pre- 
sumably with the intent of aligning them more closely with underlying values 
or shadow costs. The second change was an alteration of institutional rules and 
practices with the aim of introducing greater ﬂexibility into decision making 
at the level of the work unit. This second cluster of changes was by no means 
the result of a clear reform process but involved a high level of discretion on 
the part of enterprise managers adapting to declining subsidies and the eﬀective 
collapse of the planning process. 
These changes were both a cause and an eﬀect of the macroeconomic insta- 
bility that emerged when the reforms were initiated; the reforms gave rise to a 
high, sustained inﬂation that continued to plague the country through 2005. In 
fact, the North Korean experience embodied three analytically distinct changes 
in prices—a change in relative prices; a one-time jump in the overall price level; 
and, last, a continuous process of rising prices or inﬂation—each with a diﬀer- 
ent set of political-economy implications. 
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Let us begin with the alteration of relative prices: the relationship in the 
product market between the price of one good, say, rice, and another, such as a 
television, or in the labor market between wages paid to a miner and those paid 
to a doctor. In the case of centrally planned economies, these relative prices and 
wages typically misrepresent underlying scarcities and encourage misallocation 
of resources, ineﬃciency, and waste. The alteration of relative prices and wages 
undertaken in July 2002 could be interpreted as an attempt to bring them into 
alignment with true, underlying values and thereby improve allocative eﬃ- 
ciency. The changes in relative product prices, in particular the prices of staple 
foods, are evident in the highly uneven pattern of the price changes in the last 
column of table 7.3. At the same time that the government was changing rela- 
tive prices in product markets, the authorities were also changing relative wages 
in the labor market. Certain favored groups such as military personnel, party 
oﬃcials, scientists, and coal miners received supernormal increases in their real 
wages, while others implicitly suﬀered a real income loss (table 7.4). 
What is unusual about the North Korean case is that the authorities did not 
simply alter relative wages and prices but also raised the overall price level by 
roughly 1,000 percent. To get a grasp on the magnitude of these price changes, 
consider that when the Chinese government raised the price of grains at the 
start of its reforms in November 1979, the increase was on the order of 25 per- 
cent. In comparison, when the North Korean government raised the price of 
cereals sold through the PDS in 2002, the increase over previous oﬃcial prices 
was nearly 40,000 percent or more. Of course, to some extent this change in 
oﬃcial prices was simply a recognition of the fact that the PDS had eﬀectively 
ceased to function, distributing only very small quantities of the total food sup- 
ply; the reform might therefore be seen as simply bringing the PDS in line with 
the market. This interpretation is too facile, however, since a number of urban 
households still depended to at least some extent on the rations they received 
at oﬃcial prices, even if the PDS was not the primary source of food. 
This second form of price change—the one-time jump in the overall price 
level—was unnecessary to generate the changes in relative prices that might 
encourage greater eﬀorts to grow grain or mine coal.10 Such changes in incen- 
tives could have been accomplished by much smaller increases, as illustrated 
by the Chinese example, where the price of grain was increased by 25 percent, 
not 25,000 percent. 
So why did the North Korean authorities not only change relative prices but 
engineer an apparently gratuitous hike in the price level? We can see two hypoth- 
eses, both turning on the fact that the increase in the price level also decimated 
the value of local currency holdings. The sympathetic interpretation is that the 
  
 
 
TABLE 7.3. State Consumer Prices Before and After the Price Reform of July 1, 
  2002 (North Korean won)  
 
Product Unit Price Before Price After Change in % 
Bean Paste kg 0.20 17.00 8,400 
Beans kg 0.08 40.00 49,900 
Chicken kg 18.00 180.00 900 
Corn kg 0.06 24.00 39,900 
Herring kg 10.00 100.00 900 
Meals in kindergarten 
(infants) 
monthly 50.00 300.00 500 
Pork kg 17.00 170.00 900 
Rice kg 0.08 44.00 54,900 
Soy sauce kg 0.20 16.00 7,900 
Wheat ﬂour kg 0.06 24.00 39,900 
Coal ton 34.00 1,500.00 4,312 
Diesel Liter 40.00 2,800.00 6,900 
Electricity kWh 0.035 2.10 5,900 
Gas ton 923.00 64,600.00 6,899 
Petroleum liter 40.00 2,800.00 6,900 
Beer bottle 0.50 50.00 9,900 
Cigarettes packet 0.35 2.00 471 
Penicillin ampoule 0.40 20.00 4,900 
Bus ticket (urban 
transport) 
0.10 2.00 1,900  
Pyong-yang—Chung 
Jin train fare 
16.00 590.00 3,558  
Streetcar fare 0.10 1.00 900  
Underground ticket 0.10 2.00 1,900  
Facial soap 3.00 20.00 567  
Laundry soap 0.50 15.00 2,900  
Men’s sports shoes pair 3.50 180.00 5,043 
Men’s suit 90.00 6,750.00 7,400  
Men’s sneakers pair 18.00 180.00 900 
Spectacles 20.00 600.00 2,900  
Winter vest 25.00 2,000.00 7,900  
Television set 350.00 6,000.00 1,614  
Sources: Y. Chung 2003; Nam and Gong 2004. 
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TABLE 7.4. Monthly Incomes Before and After the Price Reform of July 1, 2002 
  (North Korean won)  
 
Occupation Income Before Income After Percentage Change 
Party Members and 
Oﬃcials 
120–200 850 -3,000 608–1,400 
Company manager 250–300 3,500–4,000 1,233–1,300 
Company Workers 85–140 1,200–2,000 1,312–1,329 
University professors 200–270 4,000–5,000 1,752–1,900 
Teachers 80–135 2,400–2, 880 2,033–2,900 
Doctor 80–250 1,200–3,000 1,100–1,400 
Reporter, Broadcaster 150–200 4,500–6,000 2,900 
Miner 130–140 3,000–4,000 2,208–2,757 
Services occupation    
(hairdressers, waiters, 
etc.) 
20–60 1,000–1,500 2,400–4,900 
One-star general 247 6,670 2,600 
Colonel 219 5,830 2,562 
Lieutenant colonel 185 4,610 2,392 
Major 163 4,130 2,432 
Lieutenant 95 2,970 3,026 
Sources: Nam and Gong 2004, KIEP 2004. 
 
North Korean authorities feared so-called monetary overhang. Since the North 
Korean economy had shrunk so dramatically during the previous decade, the 
authorities might have feared that citizens had large amounts of cash stuﬀed in 
their mattresses. This kind of involuntary savings would have occurred because 
workers continued to receive wages but in the absence of goods available for 
purchase. Once the economy began to marketize and goods began to appear in 
the markets, prices would begin rising as accumulated cash began chasing what 
goods were on oﬀer. Marketization is often associated with a transitional bout of 
price increases of this sort. Under this interpretation, the administratively engi- 
neered increase in prices was meant to control this process in a way that would 
reinforce the desired changes in real income for favored groups. 
A related but less sympathetic interpretation is that the intent of the price 
increase was to strike a blow at a disfavored group, namely, the class of trad- 
ers and black marketeers that had sprung up over the course of the previous 
decade. To the extent that this group maintained large cash holdings of North 
Korean won, the huge jump in the overall price level would have the eﬀect of 
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destroying the value of their working capital, potentially crippling their busi- 
nesses. Historically, socialist governments have periodically used state-admin- 
istered inﬂations and their cousins, currency reforms,11 to target those engaged 
in economic activity outside state strictures. 
The problem for the state was that, having experienced three previous cur- 
rency reforms, North Korean traders were aware of this political risk and had 
already begun to operate in U.S. dollars, Japanese yen, and even Chinese yuan. 
The resulting collapse in the exchange value of the won will be discussed in 
greater detail below, but the currency was so debased that even North Koreans 
working on cooperative farms reportedly preferred trinkets as a store of value.12 
In combination, these measures could therefore be interpreted as attempts 
not to reform and marketize the economy but rather to buttress the state’s 
position vis-à-vis core state constituencies while reasserting state control by 
conﬁscating the assets of newly emergent traders. Unfortunately, these blows 
aimed at traders may have fallen more squarely on the North Korean masses, 
especially those in regions and occupations in which opportunities to obtain 
foreign currencies were limited. 
Just as the changes in relative wages and prices did not necessitate a 1,000 
percent increase in the price level, in principle, the price-level rise did not nec- 
essarily have to generate an ongoing process of inﬂation, our third analytically 
distinct price eﬀect; it could have resulted in a one-time jump in the price level. 
Good economywide estimates of North Korean inﬂation do not exist, though 
a growing corpus of data on individual product prices is accumulating. One 
way of inferring the magnitude of the overall inﬂation rate would be through 
the black market exchange rate value of the North Korean won.13 Although the 
black market exchange rate is not a perfect proxy for underlying inﬂation,14 in 
a high-inﬂation environment, movements in the exchange rate are likely to be 
dominated by inﬂation diﬀerentials. Fragmentary data on the price of foreign 
exchange indicate that, in the three years after August 2002, the black market 
exchange rate of the North Korean won depreciated against the U.S. dollar 
at a relatively steady rate of 7–9 percent monthly, or at an annualized rate of 
130–140 percent. Since inﬂation in the United States over this period was trivial 
in comparison, this indicator suggests that North Korea experienced ongoing 
inﬂation well in excess of 100 percent a year in the three years following the 
July 2002 policy changes.15 Other indications of a high-inﬂation environment 
include the introduction of a new 10,000 won note in 2003 (5,000 won had 
previously been the largest denomination in circulation) and monthly nominal 
interest rates of 10–30 percent in the informal market (Lim and Kim 2004, 
Chosun Ilbo 2005).16 
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This ongoing inﬂation was both a cause and an eﬀect of the problematic 
adjustment of the industrial sector. The government no doubt continued to be 
keep important ﬁrms aﬂoat by implicit subsidies, either through national or 
local government budgets or by loans from the central bank. This latter means 
of support, of course, contributed directly to the inﬂationary process. State- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) that cannot meet their payrolls and receive subsidies 
from the state or indirectly through the accumulation of nonperforming loans 
with the Central Bank generate excessive monetary growth relative to output. 
In simple terms, too many won are chasing too few products. 
At the same time, the high inﬂation complicated the transition for SOE 
managers. We ﬁrst examine the industrial adjustment experience and then con- 
sider how it both eﬀected and was aﬀected by the macroeconomic policy mak- 
ing of the central government. 
The North Korean economy had been in decline for more than a decade at 
the time of the 2002 reforms (ﬁgure 7.3), and signiﬁcant deindustrialization 
had occurred (ﬁgure 7.1).17 Demand for many of the goods produced by state- 
owned enterprises had collapsed, and by some accounts the central planning 
mechanism itself had degraded beyond repair. Major facilities such as the Kim 
Ch’aek Integrated Iron and Steel Works and the Namp’o Glass Factory were 
barely operating or had closed completely. In the absence of coherent adjust- 
ment policies, oﬃcials had been turning a blind eye to unauthorized coping 
responses by SOE managers (Michell 1994, 1998). Banking and ﬁnance had 
never played a central role in the allocation of resources, but by the mid-1990s 
a process of ﬁnancial disintermediation was well under way: the internal pay- 
ments clearing system had collapsed, and enterprises were reduced to settling 
transactions in cash or through barter. 
With the introduction of the 2002 reforms, SOE managers were instructed 
that they were responsible for covering their own costs; there would be no more 
state subsidies. At least initially, it was unclear to what extent managers were 
sanctioned to hire, ﬁre, and promote workers or to what extent remuneration 
would be determined by the market as opposed to state directive. Likewise, 
while the central planners told the enterprises they had to cover costs, the state 
was continuing to administer output prices. Moreover, in the absence of any 
formal bankruptcy or other exit mechanism, there was no prescribed method 
for enterprises that could not cover costs to cease operations. In the absence 
of a social safety net, it was also unclear how workers from closed enterprises 
would survive; as in all socialist systems, the core of the social safety net had 
historically been the employment guarantee, which the state could no longer 
eﬀectively honor as the industrial sector went into steep decline. In short, man- 
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FIGURE 7.3. North Korean GDP (at 1995 constant prices) 
Source: Bank of Korea 2005. 
 
 
agers were told that they were responsible for their enterprises but were given 
contradictory messages about their scope actually to manage them. 
These conditions of fundamental uncertainty undermined enterprise man- 
agers’ incentives to follow state dictates and encouraged entrepreneurial behav- 
ior outside the state plan. Just as the breakdown of the social compact with 
farmers and households contributed to a de facto marketization from below, so 
enterprise managers and workers were forced to adapt to a decline in central 
government support, exploiting the limited autonomy granted to them under 
preexisting policies and practices. 
Two institutional factors were particularly important in this regard; both 
had originally been introduced to permit limited adaptation to local conditions 
in the context of the central plan and, as in the case of the PDS, devolved at 
least some power to the county level. The Daean accounting model, launched 
in 1961, gave local authorities and enterprises limited autonomy in recalibrating 
centrally planned directives in the context of local needs. The 1984 “August 3 
campaign for people’s goods” (so named for its date of proclamation by Kim 
Il-so˘ng) sought to increase the availability of consumer goods by mobilizing 
underutilized labor (housewives, retirees, the handicapped) and waste materi- 
als from SOEs at the local level. Neither policy was particularly successful in 
signiﬁcantly boosting productivity at the time of its introduction (Oh 1993, 
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Kim 1994), though in the case of the August 3 movement, sales under the program 
reportedly reached 13 percent of central plan sales by 1991 (Lee 1991, 
1994, 2000). 
These initiatives did, however, create a legal and institutional space for 
using SOE resources in an entrepreneurial or coping fashion as the economy 
deteriorated in the 1990s (S. C. Kim 1994, 2003, 2006; Lim and Kim 2004; 
Kim 2005a). In particular, the August 3 measures allowed entrepreneurs (or 
so-called funding squads) aﬃliated with SOEs or even government agencies to 
obtain some political protection in a system with few private property rights. 
In return, their institutional patrons received a share of the proﬁts generated 
by what were eﬀectively private initiatives, even entering into multiyear con- 
tracts that speciﬁed obligations and responsibilities of each party.18 These con- 
tracts included rights of control over assets that were nominally owned by the 
patron institution as well as the right to transfer these assets at the conclusion 
of the contract period. Alternatively, individual workers could buy their way 
out of their obligations to the work unit simply by paying a daily tax to be 
reclassiﬁed as an “August 3” worker; this buyout permitted them to engage 
in entrepreneurial activity and in eﬀect constituted a means through which 
labor in declining ﬁrms could be productively redeployed (K. J. Kwon 2006). 
Such arrangements have numerous drawbacks, including the absence of genu- 
ine property or contracting rights and the absence of any eﬀective method of 
appealing to third-party neutrals to resolve the disputes that inevitably arise in 
business. They did, however, permit a means of reallocating both capital and 
labor into higher value-added activities. 
Entrepreneurship was not limited to funding squads and workers; managers 
themselves used resources from failing enterprises to establish side businesses 
either as a legitimate coping mechanism or as a dodge to shed unwanted labor. 
Others simply stripped assets for barter in China (H. J. Lee 2005), cut wages 
despite the oﬃcial wage increase, or closed enterprises altogether. This loosen- 
ing of central control was in eﬀect ratiﬁed in 2004 through directives from the 
State Planning Commission that granted SOE managers enhanced autonomy 
(Y. K. Kwon 2006). Quietly, some industrial facilities are being transferred to 
investors for cash—that is to say, privatized (Kim and Park 2005). 
The result of these crisis-driven adaptations has been a considerable decen- 
tralization of the industrial economy, with local political authorities and man- 
agers playing a more important role. The loosening of the central distribution 
mechanism is manifest in an increase in direct sales outlets where these ventures 
sold directly to the public at noncontrolled prices. Recent years have also seen 
an increase in department stores selling Chinese goods at noncontrolled prices, 
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again paralleling the shift from the PDS to the market in the case of food 
(Noland 2000, Choi and Koo 2005). The authorities, however, exhibited an 
ambivalent stance toward both the markets and these other retail outlets, tol- 
erating them as a safety valve but periodically cracking down or banning trade 
in speciﬁc items (Choi and Koo 2006). 
As the volume of products passing through these noncontrolled distribution 
channels increased, domestic trading ﬁrms began to arbitrage price diﬀerentials 
across markets, and as a consequence the central planners began to replace ﬁxed 
prices with ceilings or bands. Yet the North Koreans’ discussion of price adjust- 
ment has been incoherent, suggesting that prices would simultaneously adjust 
though the market, adhere to planning guidelines, and be subject to adjust- 
ment by the central planners, local governments, and enterprises (Choi and Koo 
2005). The authorities announced no mechanism for periodically adjusting state 
planning prices. As a result, severe disequilibria developed over time, as illus- 
trated by the large wedges between oﬃcial and market prices for food. At the 
retail level, state prices are being brought in line with prices observed in the oﬃ- 
cially sanctioned markets. Because of high ongoing inﬂation, these sanctioned 
market prices have been subject to price ceilings that are posted outside the 
market, subject to enforcement by the police. According to anecdotal accounts, 
these guidelines are increasingly ignored despite periodic adjustments. 
At the same time that the government was attempting to restructure the 
industrial sector, its inability to secure resources forced it to undertake a fun- 
damental ﬁscal and ﬁnancial reform. With the central plan crumbling, the 
government was no longer able to raise signiﬁcant revenue through a so-called 
transactions tax administered by the central planning authorities. Lim (2005) 
quotes a purported internal North Korean document from October 2001 in 
which  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  bemoans  the  loss  of  state  control  over  the  economy  and 
concludes, “Frankly the state has no money, but individuals have two years 
budget worth” (Lim 2005:7). 
There are two ways for a state to garner resources: taxes or borrowing. 
Unable to tax eﬀectively, in March 2003 the government announced the issu- 
ance of “People’s Life Bonds.” The government’s announcement states, without 
irony, that “the bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the DPRK 
government,” but despite their name these instruments more closely resemble 
lottery tickets than bonds as conventionally understood. The bonds had a ten- 
year maturity, with principal repaid in annual installments beginning in year 
ﬁve. There did not, however, appear to be any provision for interest payments, 
and no money for such payments was budgeted. Rather, for the ﬁrst two years 
of the program, the government would hold semiannual drawings (annually 
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thereafter) with winners to receive their principal plus prizes. No information 
was provided on the expected odds or prize values other than that the drawings 
were to be based on an “open and objective” principle. Moreover, there is evi- 
dence that purchase of the bonds was not altogether voluntary, as committees 
were established in every province, city, county, institute, factory, village, and 
town to promote their sale as a “patriotic deed.”19 Both the characteristics of 
the instrument and the mass campaign to sell it suggest that politics, not per- 
sonal ﬁnance, would be its main selling point. According to Kim (1998), when 
the government has resorted to lotterylike instruments in the past to deal with 
monetary overhang problems, they have been unpopular. 
The government then attempted to address its underlying ﬁscal crisis by 
moving from an indirect system of raising state revenue through transaction 
taxes levied through the central plan to direct taxation of enterprises based 
on proﬁts, as one would observe in a market economy. This proved highly 
problematic. The enterprises did not have the accounting systems to make this 
shift feasible, nor, for that matter, did the state. For ﬁfty years, the economy 
had run on the basis of centrally orchestrated quantity planning, not ﬁnancial 
proﬁts and losses. Not until March 2003 was accounting legislation enacted, 
and not until September 2003 was the Tax Collection Agency even organized! 
Amid this chaos, one tactic was to push responsibility for tax collection down 
to local governments, which were then supposed to share collections with the 
center. Not surprisingly, it appears that the local authorities were unwilling 
and/or unable to carry out these responsibilities. The result has been a chronic 
gap between what the state spends and what it takes in; the response has been 
a resort to the printing press, fueling the inﬂationary process. 
In sum, just as there has been a bottom-up process of marketization in other 
areas—in the emergence of low-level service and retail activities at the house- 
hold level, in the distribution of food that we take up in the next section—so 
the industrial sector has undergone a spontaneous and decentralized adjustment 
process. The contours of this reform are still very diﬃcult to read, since this sec- 
tor is even less visible to outsiders than other activities such as food distribution. 
It is almost certain that lower-level political oﬃcials are playing an important 
role in sanctioning, protecting, and deﬁning the scope of the marketization 
that is taking place. The result is likely to be the kind of apparatchik or crony 
capitalism familiar to the slow-reforming cases of the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe: continued subsidization of favored ﬁrms coupled with sponta- 
neous privatization and opportunistic behavior in the context of highly uncer- 
tain property rights. As one Western diplomatic with considerable experience in 
North Korea put it, when it comes to economic policy, “there is no consistency, 
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no coherency. It’s just a tug of war.” Such settings are typically characterized by 
growing inequality, which is highly apparent in access to food. 
 
Food Insecurity I: Marketization and Access to Food 
 
One consequence of the partial reform process we have just described has been 
a large underemployed industrial proletariat facing sharply falling real wages, 
no social safety net, and inadequate access to food. Before the standoﬀ over 
humanitarian assistance in 2005/6, the WFP had begun to conduct household 
surveys and canvass government oﬃcials, both central and local, about these 
phenomena. They discovered that many factories were running well under 
capacity and that as a consequence as much as 30 percent of the workforce 
outside of agriculture was unemployed. 
Among those who remained employed in the industrial sector, there was 
considerable underemployment, and some workers who continued to receive 
salaries saw their wages cut by 50–80 percent. Women appeared to be among 
the most seriously aﬀected, with an unemployment rate double that of men. 
Many of the male redundant workers are redeployed to sanctioned market 
activities run by their work units or to public works projects. Women were 
given preferential treatment in obtaining permission to sell in oﬃcial markets 
and roadside kiosks. Outside visitors and refugee interviews report a margin- 
ally relaxed environment with a bustling small-scale entrepreneurship: wood 
delivery services, bicycle repair, tailoring, shoe repair, hair cutting, and small 
vendors, with women represented prominently in these activities (see, e.g., 
Caritas—Hong Kong 2005b, J. H. Kwon 2006). The prominence of women 
in these activities could reﬂect a higher rate of dismissal from formal sector 
employment or a household division of labor in which men retain formal- 
sector positions to access remaining beneﬁts, including social services and 
rations. Writing in 2004, Gey estimated that 6–8 percent of the work force 
was engaged in such activities, and subsequent refugee interviews suggest it 
could be much higher. 
Prices in North Korea increasingly reﬂect underlying market scarcities, sub- 
ject to the proviso that markets remain fragmented and considerable price dis- 
persion across geographic regions persists. Visitors in the immediate postreform 
period (2003–6) reported an emerging pattern in which the prices for foreign 
exchange and consumer goods were lower in towns on the Chinese border than 
in Pyongyang and other inland regions and in which living standards near the 
border may now exceed those in the capital. In contrast, compared to Pyong- 
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yang, prices appeared to be much higher in the hard-hit northeastern industrial 
port town of Ch’o˘ngjin (table 7.5). The exception was foreign exchange: the 
euro was considerably weaker in Ch’o˘ngjin, perhaps reﬂecting that city’s port 
status and easier access to foreign exchange. This, however, only reinforces the 
price disparity point: the prices of local goods are even higher in Ch’oo˘ngjin 
in comparison to Pyongyang in foreign exchange terms than they are in local 
currency terms. 
Grain prices have always displayed a seasonal pattern, tending to fall in the 
autumn after the harvest and peak in the spring. The open marketization of 
grain, however, made these trends even more apparent. Prices also appeared to 
respond to supply-side shocks. To cite several examples, rice prices fell in June 
2003 following the arrival of 400,000 MT of rice donated by South Korea. 
Indeed, according to the WFP, the mere announcement of a large South Korean 
aid donation sent prices tumbling in 2005 (Fairclough 2005). In July 2003, the 
prices of both rice and corn spiked following the closure of the border with 
China during the SARS scare. Yet another aspect of this phenomenon can be 
seen from diﬀerences in provincial prices that emerged during periods in which 
the government was collecting local production for the military and banning 
export to other provinces. 
The eﬀect of the marketization of the economy under weak institutions has 
been to increase the degree of social diﬀerentiation within North Korea and 
contribute to the creation of a new class of mostly urban food-insecure house- 
holds. The inﬂation that began in August 2002 was particularly pernicious in 
this regard, because the market price of food in real terms had been trending 
downward from the extraordinarily high peaks of the famine years. 
 
 
  TABLE 7.5. Regional price diﬀerences (North Korean won)  
 
Item Pyongyang Northern Hamkyeong 
 August 2004 Chongjin August 26, 2004 
Rice (1 kg) 420 (imported)* 900 
Corn (1 kg) 200 450–80 
Cooking oil (bean oil 1 kg) 1,500 2,000 
Egg (hen), 1 45 100 
Pork (1 kg) 1,000 2,700 
Sugar (1 kg) 470 900 
Exchange rate 1 euro: 2,000 1,300 (unoﬃcial) 
*The actual price of North Korean rice in Tongilgeori General Market was 680 won per kg. 
Source: Nam n.d. 
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In principle, the maintenance of the PDS as a mechanism for distributing food 
could be interpreted as an attempt to maintain the social contract under which 
everyone is guaranteed a minimum ration. Residents are still issued monthly 
ration cards; if they do not have suﬃcient funds to purchase the monthly allot- 
ment, it is automatically carried over to the next month. Before the attempt to 
revive the PDS, declared rations delivered only about half the minimum daily 
caloric needs and at much higher costs than in the past. According to WFP 
household surveys in 2004/5, PDS-dependent (in eﬀect, urban) households 
spent roughly one-third of their income on PDS-supplied food alone, and a 
typical family of four with one income would spend 40 percent of its budget on 
PDS-supplied food. Some households surveyed by the WFP reported spending 
50–60 percent of their household incomes on PDS food. By 2005, however, the 
PDS was only supplying households with approximately one-half of an abso- 
lute minimum caloric need. If these households are spending one-third of their 
incomes on PDS food, and we estimate they are spending another third on 
nonfood essentials, this leaves only one-third of their budgets to cover half their 
caloric needs through other sources. Market prices are conventionally thought 
to be three or more times expensive than the PDS. As a result, WFP surveys 
are ﬁnding that households are spending up to 80 percent of total expenditures 
on food, inclusive of non-PDS sources (WFP 2003b). 
How do households cope? What is striking is the continuity in coping 
behaviors between the high famine period and the current setting, despite a 
massive increase in food aid. According to the WFP, 40 percent of interviewed 
households reported receiving food from relatives in rural areas. Between 60 
and 80 percent of PDS-dependent (i.e., urban) households and 65 percent of 
cooperative farm households reported gathering wild foods. Many households 
and workplaces maintain kitchen gardens, and, as in other cases of economic 
stress around the world, there are extensive anecdotal reports of households 
selling or bartering personal belongings for food. According to the WFP, house- 
holds with a single earner and dependents and PDS-dependent households 
without access to kitchen gardens are the most vulnerable. 
The reality may be even worse, however. One interpretation of the price 
increases is that they were simply bringing PDS food prices in line with the 
market. Yet we also have anecdotal evidence that we return to in the conclu- 
sion that even the pretense of universalism has been breached and the authori- 
ties have signiﬁcantly reduced the number of households being issued PDS 
ration cards at all. These reports are fully consistent with refugee surveys from 
early 2005 (Chang 2005) that document the continuing decline in the share 
of the population that depends on the PDS as its major source of food. Less 
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than 4 percent of the refugees in China interviewed by Chang “agreed” or 
“strongly agreed” with the statement that there had been an improvement in 
food availability since the July 2002 changes were enacted, and 85 percent of 
these refugees, who admittedly may not be representative of the country as a 
whole, “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement that North Koreans are 
voicing their opinions about the chronic food shortage. 
What is striking about this emerging picture of contemporary North Korea 
is just how random or idiosyncratic individual life chances have become. As 
shown in table 7.4, the initial increase in wages in August 2002 was highly 
uneven, and for most employees subsequent increases (or decreases) have pre- 
sumably depended on factors such as the cleverness, deviousness, and gen- 
eral competency of individual enterprise managers under a relatively anarchic 
process of marketization, the ability of individual enterprise managers to con- 
tinue to wheedle implicit or explicit subsidies out of the state, and proximity 
to China; as well as underlying economic eﬃciency. The actual life chances 
of workers therefore probably depend substantially on idiosyncratic features 
of their work unit, such as the entrepreneurial capabilities of managers, the 
nature of the assets in place, and the product markets in which they operate. 
Clearly, ﬁrms that are capable of generating foreign exchange—through what- 
ever means—fare better. 
Under conditions of high inﬂation, access to foreign currency may act as 
insurance, preserving purchasing power in real terms. Indeed, a process of dol- 
larization appears to be well under way in North Korea, and in certain respects 
two parallel economies are emerging. In the ﬁrst, high-quality local products and 
services (such as North Korean rice or luxury restaurants) and imported goods 
are bought and sold in foreign exchange. The second is a won-based economy 
of inferior local products and services. In addition to traditionally privileged 
senior party oﬃcials, those with access to foreign exchange and hence access to 
the dollarized luxury economy include households with familial or ethnic ties 
to China and Japan (Lankov 2006a). Subject to systematic discrimination in 
the past, members of these groups have exploited their transborder connections 
and surfaced as important beneﬁciaries of the emerging new order. 
In sum, the July 2002 policy changes have created winners and losers. 
Among the winners have been some enterprise managers, military oﬃcers, 
party oﬃcials, and bureaucrats who have used their power and privilege for 
asset stripping and other forms of entrepreneurial behavior. The more prosper- 
ous of the “August 3” workers have in eﬀect successfully exited the state system 
as well. In the commercial sector, Choi and Koo (2006) describe a hierarchy 
of traders that exists virtually worldwide: an upper class of dealers in foreign 
  
Coping, Marketization, and Reform 195 
 
exchange and large-scale distributors, a middle class of wholesalers, and a lower 
class of market vendors and peddlers. Among the losers have been the industrial 
proletariat and those who played by the rules and did not engage in market- 
oriented activities. 
 
Food Insecurity II: The Evidence on Consequences 
 
In chapter 4, we talked about what aid was intended to do and how restrictions 
on monitoring and diversion to various uses—consumption or sale—might 
have aﬀected who got assistance. In this chapter, we have talked about the 
possible consequences of marketization and the reform process and the emer- 
gence of new vulnerabilities. The data do not permit us to separate the precise 
weight of these oﬀsetting eﬀects: the positive beneﬁts of aid versus the adverse 
eﬀects of the reform. Nor can we say how the North Korean population might 
have fared under various counterfactual scenarios, for example, with less aid 
or under diﬀerent reform scenarios. The best we can do is oﬀer a descriptive 
snapshot of how vulnerable populations are faring as of 2005, after a decade of 
humanitarian assistance. What we see is a distressing continuity in the welfare 
of vulnerable groups. 
As relief activities got under way in the mid-1990s, a number of NGOs 
attempted to do assessments that would size up the scope of the hunger prob- 
lem, identify the populations in greatest need, and benchmark the eﬀectiveness 
of their activities in providing relief (see KDI 1999). In 1997 a WFP request to 
implement a conventional randomized survey was rejected by the North 
Korean government. Médecins sans Frontières had similarly been denied per- 
mission to conduct its own nutritional survey, despite having been assigned 
responsibility for conducting emergency feeding activities over an extensive 
geographic area. 
The government did consent to a more narrow evaluation of child anthro- 
pometric status. In August 1997, the WFP examined 3,965 children under the 
age of seven from forty government-selected institutions located in nineteen 
counties in ﬁve provinces. The results provided unambiguous evidence of long- 
term malnutrition. Seventeen percent of the children were wasted (as mea- 
sured by weight-for-height, signaling short-term malnutrition), and 38 percent 
were stunted (as measured by height-for-age) and/or underweight (42 percent, 
measured weight-for-age), measures of longer-term problems (ﬁgure 7.4). The 
age-related ﬁgures in particular again suggest that the country’s food problems 
did not begin with the ﬂoods of 1995 but were of much longer standing. This 
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FIGURE 7.4. Child Nutritional Status 
Sources: 1997: Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1998; 1998: WFP 1998; 2002: Central Bureau of Statistics 
(North Korea) 2002; 2004: Central Bureau of Statistics , Institute of Child Nutrition, 2005. 
 
evidence is thus consistent with our interpretation of a secular decline in food 
availability well before the famine. 
As two of the survey’s designers observed, the results might not have been 
representative of the country as a whole or even of the selected institutions. If 
anything, the sources of bias seemed in the direction of painting a more favor- 
able picture than actually existed, which make the ﬁndings even more horriﬁc. 
The institutions selected were in either the capital or “rice bowl” counties in 
which conditions were generally believed to be superior. On the day that data 
was collected, attendance rates at the institutions varied from 21 percent to 100 
percent, and there was no way to ensure that local authorities were not deliber- 
ately keeping some children away (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1998). 
Some commentators have claimed that the basic anthropomorphic norms 
embodied in the standards are inappropriate for the Korean population, speciﬁ- 
cally, that they overstate the expected size of normal Korean children, recall- 
ing the debate among nutritionists and anthropologists about the existence of 
“small but healthy” populations.20 The implication is that if Korean children 
are naturally small, the true degree of malnutrition is less than indicated in 
these ﬁgures. 
The division of the Korean peninsula and the existence of a large corpus 
of historical data allow us to do a natural apples-to-apples comparison that 
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does not involve anthropomorphic standards of diﬀerent races or nationali- 
ties. Eberstadt (2001b) reports that the mean heights and weights of the North 
Korean seven-year-old males measured in the 1998 survey discussed below were 
105 centimeters and 15 kilograms, respectively. According to the South Korean 
National Statistical Oﬃce, the comparable ﬁgures for South Korean seven- 
year-olds in that year were 126 cm and 26 kg. This is to say that, if these ﬁgures 
are to be believed, in 1998 seven-year-old North Korean males were roughly 
20 percent shorter and 40 percent lighter than their southern counterparts—a 
gigantic diﬀerence that cannot be ascribed to genetic diﬀerences or inappropri- 
ate norms. Indeed, the North Koreans in 1998 are signiﬁcantly smaller than 
the South Koreans in 1965 when the National Statistical Oﬃce series begins, 
and if the Japanese colonial records reported in Yun (1987) are to be believed, 
smaller than Korean seven-year-olds at any time in the twentieth century.21 
And whatever the validity of the “small but healthy” claim with respect to the 
level of malnutrition, it should not aﬀect the interpretation of changes in the 
indicators over time. 
As noted above, a second survey of 1,762 children under the age of seven was 
conducted in September and October of 1998 (WFP 1998). Although involving 
fewer children than the ﬁrst venture, it covered a larger geographic area. Two 
provinces  (Chagang  and  Kangwo˘n)  that  were  largely  oﬀ-limits  to  the  WFP 
were excluded from the survey, however, as were parts of others, reputedly loca- 
tions of penal colonies and sensitive military sites. Altogether, eighty-two coun- 
ties containing roughly 30 percent of North Korea’s population were excluded 
(See ﬁgures 4.3—4.5). The sampling procedures appear to have improved mark- 
edly over the prior survey, though problems remained. The WFP could not 
cross-reference its data with that collected by UNICEF and MSF and could 
not ensure that the households visited were actually the households selected by 
the survey team (Bennett 1999). Nevertheless, the results of the second survey 
are generally regarded as more reliable than those of the ﬁrst despite the much 
smaller sampling of children. 
The second survey recorded a wasting rate of 16 percent, comparable to that 
observed in the ﬁrst study. But underweight and stunting rates—indicators 
capturing chronic malnutrition—were roughly 50 percent higher than the rate 
observed the previous year (61 percent and 64 percent, respectively). To get 
some comparative sense of these ﬁgures, the results of the 1998 survey implied 
that the incidence of wasting among children in North Korea was more than 
double that in Angola, a country in the midst of a thirty-year civil war, and 
more than 50 percent greater than in Sierra Leone, a country that had collapsed 
into virtual anarchy. 
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The North Koreans were reportedly infuriated by the public release of what 
they regarded as embarrassing information and refused repeated requests by 
the WFP for a follow-up study (GAO 1999, Snyder 2003b). A subsequent sur- 
vey was apparently conducted by the North Korean government in 2000 and 
documented broad improvements in nutritional status, but to our knowledge 
this study was never publicly released or, as two UN-aﬃliated analysts put it, 
“wasn’t internationally observed” (Shrimpton and Yongyout 2003:3). 
In October 2002, a survey of 6,000 children and 2,795 mothers was con- 
ducted by the North Korean Central Bureau of Statistics in collaboration 
with the North Korean Institute for Child Nutrition. UNICEF  and  the 
WFP provided ﬁnancial and logistical support. Certain geographic regions 
accounting for roughly 20 percent of the population were excluded, including 
Chagang and Kangwo˘n provinces. The survey results implied extraordinary 
improvements in nutritional status. The percentage of underweight children 
fell  from  61  to  21  percent.  Stunting  dropped  from  62  to  42  percent,  and 
wasting from 16 to 9 percent. The proportion of low birth-weight babies in 
the North Korean survey (6.7 percent) was actually lower than that for the 
United States (7.6 percent) or England and Wales (7.7 percent), as was the 
reported rate of infant mortality. These improvements were so astonishing as 
to provoke considerable internal debate about their veracity within the col- 
laborating UN institutions. In the end, the UN agencies decided to accept 
and disseminate the North Korean report (see Shrimpton and Yongyout 2003, 
2004a, 2004b). 
The data conﬁrmed the strong regional dimension to the famine that we 
emphasized in our discussion in chapter 3 (table 7.6). Variation in child and 
mother nutritional status varied sharply across regions of the country. Stunting 
and underweight rates reported for the capital of Pyongyang and the port city of 
Namp’o, for example, were consistently about half that recorded for the province 
of Yanggang in the northeast. The wasting rate of Pyongyang (4 percent) was a 
third of that of the worst province, South Hamgyo˘ng (12 percent). 
In October 2004, North Korean authorities with the support of the UN 
agencies conducted a survey of 4,800 children and 2,109 mothers. Again the 
survey excluded certain geographical areas and cannot be regarded as neces- 
sarily representative of the country as a whole. Indeed, even some areas being 
served by the WFP were omitted, and the results cannot therefore even be 
interpreted as representative of areas in which the WFP has operations. Foreign 
participants in the study registered a variety of complaints with respect to basic 
lack of quality control over the implementation of the survey, such as the North 
Korean authorities impeding standard randomization procedures. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  TABLE 7.6. Nutritional Status by Region (%)  
 
 
1997 
 
Kaesong Namp’o 
North 
Hamgyong 
North 
Hwanghae 
North 
P’yong’an  Pyongyang Yanggang 
South 
Hamgyong 
South 
Hwanghae 
South 
P’yong’an Overall 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: 1997: Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1998; 2002: Central Bureau of Statistics (North Korea) 2002; 2004: Central Bureau of Statistics, Institute of Child Nutrition, 
DPRK 2005. 
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Wasting n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.2 20.1 15.1 16.5 
Stunting n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 35.9 26.0 53.1 38.2 
Underweight n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Wasting 7.00 4.33 10.68 9.00 6.83 3.68 9.50 12.02 11.00 7.19 8.12 
Stunting 44.41 23.24 42.83 39.40 42.40 27.00 46.67 45.50 38.56 42.17 39.22 
Underweight 20.67 14.67 20.33 20.67 17.83 14.83 26.50 24.17 20.17 18.67 20.15 
2004            
Wasting n.a. n.a. 10 7.9 6 2.8 9.1 10.8 7.6 4.9 7 
Stunting n.a. n.a. 40 41 41.2 25.9 45.6 46.7 36.7 29.7 36.99 
Underweight n.a. n.a. 26.6 24.8 21.6 18.8 30.8 29.3 23.4 19.6 23.4 
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At the national level, the rate of stunting (measured height-for-age), sig- 
naling chronic malnutrition, was found to be 37 percent among children 
under the age of six. This would have marked a slight fall from the previous 
survey’s ﬁgure of 42 percent and was well below the 1998 survey’s 62 percent, 
though the comparison is inexact since the previous reports surveyed chil- 
dren under seven while the most recent one used an age ceiling of six. The 
underweight share (measured weight-for-age) was 23 percent, representing a 
slight increase from the 21 percent obtained in 2002. Wasting, a measure of 
acute malnutrition (measured weight-for-height) was 7 percent, down from 
9 percent in 2002. 
Again, the survey revealed considerable regional variation. For example, the 
stunting rate in Pyongyang (26 percent) was well below that in the eastern 
provinces of South Hamgyo˘ng (47 percent) and Yanggang (46 percent) (ﬁg- 
ure 7.5). Similarly, underweight rates were roughly 50 percent higher in the 
northeastern provinces of Yanggang (31 percent) and South Hamgyo˘ng (29 per- 
cent) as compared to southern areas such as Pyongyang (19 percent) and South 
P’yo˘ng’an (20 percent) (ﬁgure 7.6). Most dramatic were the regional disparities 
with respect to wasting: the prevalence in Pyongyang (3 percent) was a third or 
less of that observed in the provinces of South Hamgyo˘ng (11 percent), North 
Hamgyo˘ng (10 percent), and Yanggang (9 percent) (ﬁgure 7.7). 
How one assesses secular trends at the national level depends very much on 
the reliability of the ﬁrst two surveys, done in 1997 and 1998. The 1997 survey is 
widely acknowledged to have severe deﬁciencies, and the consensus has been to 
discount its results. The 1998 survey represents a methodological improvement, 
but the reported results—implying wide swings in the longer-term markers in 
comparison to either the survey that preceded it or the one that followed—make 
it suspect. With respect to another indicator of distress, maternal nutritional 
status, ﬁrm proof of improvement is lacking because the international agencies 
had not previously examined this issue and the North Koreans have not made 
their 2002 survey available (Shrimpton and Yongyout 2004b). 
 
 
 
(opposite page) 
 
FIGURE 7.5. Stunting (2004) 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005. 
 
FIGURE 7.6. Underweight (2004) 
Source: Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005. 
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FIGURE 7.7. Wasting 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005. 
 
 
There are at least three possible explanations for this anomalous pattern. 
They are not mutually exclusive. The ﬁrst explanation is that the 1998 numbers 
are correct and the subsequent dramatic improvement in child nutritional 
status can be ascribed to the humanitarian relief eﬀort; we call this “the sys- 
tem worked” interpretation, and it is the view of the North Koreans and   
the UN agencies (Central Bureau of Statistics 2002, WFP 2003a, Shrimpton 
and Yongyout 2004a, b). If this interpretation is correct, the improvement in 
nutritional status in North Korea between 1998 and 2002 is, to our knowl- 
edge, without historical parallel. The 2004 ﬁgures, however, do not reveal a  
continuation  of  the  tremendous  gains  recorded  between  1998  and  2002; 
indeed, the levels of the indicators of chronic malnutrition—stunting and 
low weight—remain “very high” according to the World Heath Organization 
(WHO) classiﬁcation. The problem for supporters of this view is to explain 
why improvements seem to have stalled after 2002. One possible explanation 
would be the decline in aid after 2002 that we have described (ﬁgure 4.2). 
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Another would be that the nature of the food problem shifted from the col- 
lapse of the PDS to entitlement failures connected with the emergence of a 
more market-driven distribution process. 
A second explanation is that at least some of the reported ﬁgures are wrong 
because of deliberate falsiﬁcation, or, as one participant in these surveys put it 
more euphemistically, “they were politically determined.” Rather than paint- 
ing a rosier picture than was in fact the case, the North Korean government 
initially exaggerated the magnitude of the famine in the mid-1990s in order to 
secure humanitarian relief. The government then exaggerated the subsequent 
improvement in nutritional status in order to build political support for con- 
tinuation of the concessional aid program. In this “fabricated ﬁgures” inter- 
pretation, the relative constancy of the 2002 and 2004 results that depict high 
levels of chronic child malnutrition represents a calibrated decision on the part 
of a North Korean government that wants to maintain access to relief. This 
interpretation requires that the North Koreans are not only strategic with the 
use of data and, if one accepts the claims by the UN’s statisticians, that they 
had the capability to ﬁne-tune the data through control over the sample since 
internal statistical consistency checks should have caught obvious fabrication 
(Shimpton and Yongyout 2004a). 
A third “human error” explanation is that some of the reported ﬁgures are 
wrong, but as a result of design problems and mismeasurement in the various 
surveys, not strategic calculations. The 1998 survey obtained extremely high 
stunting and underweight percentages, both in an absolute sense and relative 
to the much lower wasting percentage. Both of these measures involve age, 
which could have been misunderstood or misrepresented.22 According to this 
“human error” interpretation, the 2002 and 2004 surveys were conducted by 
the North Koreans who presumably got the ages right, hence the dispropor- 
tionate improvement in the age-related measures between 1998 and 2002 and 
the relative stability of the indicators in the 2004 survey that followed. 
However we interpret the anomalous trends, the following is clear: after 
nearly a decade of relief eﬀorts, nutritional status continued to have a pro- 
nounced regional component. On average, the favored cities and the more 
fertile regions of the south consistently displayed far better childhood nutri- 
tional status than did other parts of the country, especially the northeast. The 
continued existence of pronounced regional disparities may, in a backhanded 
way, give some credence to the “the system worked” interpretation, at least in 
response to “the ﬁgures have been fabricated” view. Yet the damning regional 
disparities—compounded by continued lack of access to signiﬁcant regions of 
the country, together with the testimony of refugees in China that they had 
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not received aid, suggests that neither the normal internal mechanisms for dis- 
tributing food on a nonconcessional basis nor international aid programs are 
adequately serving populations in historically low food-production areas. If 
“the system worked,” it did so in an exceedingly narrow sense, at best. 
 
Conclusion and Epilogue: Attempted Retrenchment? 
 
The famine gave rise to both de facto or bottom-up marketization as well  
as reform eﬀorts initiated by the government. These reform eﬀorts present a 
mixed picture and suggest—although we can only speculate—divisions within 
the government over the scope and pace of the reform eﬀort. On the one hand, 
they do reﬂect some liberalization and increased opportunity for market activ- 
ity, if only to acknowledge the changed reality that had occurred on the ground 
in the famine’s wake. We also know that oﬃcial pronouncements, at least, have 
introduced changes in incentives for cultivators and managers and that at least 
until the harvest of 2005, the terms of trade had shifted in favor of farmers. To 
the extent that farmers had been relatively disadvantaged in the past, this is a 
desirable outcome. Moreover, it was precisely such a shift in relative prices that 
marked the ﬁrst phase of the Chinese reforms, unleashing a wave of productiv- 
ity improvements and rising incomes in the rural sector that ultimately spilled 
over into industrial activity as well. 
In 2005, however, reports began ﬁltering out of North Korea that the state 
was reneging on the formula determining the share of cooperative grain out- 
put to be sold to the state at the oﬃcial procurement price that remained well 
below the market price. These reports also suggested that the government was 
treating grain produced on private plots, in principle purely for free disposal, 
as cooperative output and subject to forced sale to the state (see, e.g., Y. J. Kim 
2005e). These reports were followed by the formal announcement, in the con- 
text of a better than normal harvest and high levels of South Korean aid, that 
private trade in grain would be banned starting October 1. The PDS, which had 
fallen into disuse in most parts of the country, was to be resuscitated, in eﬀect 
reversing demand-side reforms. In parallel, the government announced that it 
was expelling international relief agencies that over the previous decade had fed 
nearly a third of the country. 
Moreover, the revived PDS would involve a strongly diﬀerentiated price 
structure, involving a market price; a lower state price for those employed at 
SOEs; and an additional discount for “good workers.” The market price was 
set at roughly ﬁfteen times that of the state price, apparently approximating 
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the actual diﬀerence at the time the policy was enacted (Y. Kwon 2006). (The 
irony that the market price is undeﬁned if markets are banned seems to have 
escaped the North Korean authorities.) The new price structure conveyed large 
preferences to SOE employees who reported to work (that is, not the “August 
3” workers engaged in entrepreneurial activity outside state control). 
If diligently implemented, these changes would amount to a fundamental 
reorganization of the North Korean food economy. By this time, the market, 
not the PDS, had become the primary institutional mechanism through which 
North Korean households obtained food. In one fell swoop, the state was crim- 
inalizing the market and requiring that families obtain food through a system 
that had not operated properly, if at all, for over a decade in much of the coun- 
try. Not only did these policy changes raise important humanitarian issues, but 
they called also into question the status of the broader reform process. 
The most charitable interpretation of these actions is that the government 
itself had become concerned with the social consequences of allowing food to 
be allocated solely on the basis of purchasing power in the market. With the 
supply situation improved as a result of the better than normal harvest of 2005 
and inﬂows of aid from South Korea and China, the government was simply 
moving to rebuild the social safety net (Frank 2005c, Y. Kwon 2006). 
A second possibility is that the reorganization of the food economy amounted 
to an ersatz anti-inﬂation policy. The previous decade had witnessed a signiﬁ- 
cant decentralization of the economy, penetration of the economy by Chinese 
consumer goods, and the development of an extensive retail distribution system 
outside state control. At the same time, the economy had been plagued by 
high, sustained inﬂation of at least 100 percent a year. We have argued that this 
inﬂationary process fundamentally reﬂects underlying macroeconomic disequi- 
libria: namely, the state’s inability to raise revenues through taxation combined 
with the maintenance of large expenditures, including SOE subsidies and mili- 
tary outlays. 
North Korean policy makers privately shared this concern about inﬂation 
but were uncertain about how to respond. They could not control the prices 
of consumer goods from China (ironically considered a source of deﬂation 
elsewhere in the world). Food looms large in consumers’ budgets. The lion’s 
share of food is either produced domestically or takes the form of aid that 
passes directly through state-controlled channels. Ergo, if one wants to control 
inﬂation, one must control the food economy. Price controls make little eco- 
nomic sense; they address the symptom of inﬂation, not its underlying cause. 
But given the command-and-control nature of the Stalinist economy and the 
absence, or lack of understanding, of standard macroeconomic policy tools, it 
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is highly plausible that authorities would reach for direct price controls as a tool 
for stabilizing prices. 
Several features of the reform suggest a third interpretation, however: that 
the revival of the PDS reﬂected an eﬀort to reassert both economic and politi- 
cal control in the face of ongoing marketization and de facto decentraliza- 
tion of economic decision making. The diﬀerentiated price structure, which 
apparently makes no accommodation for vulnerable groups, is clearly designed 
to create incentives for workers to return to employment in the state sector. 
Some commentators hailed this development as a praiseworthy precursor to the 
resuscitation of the industrial economy (e.g., Lim 2006b). Given the low rates 
of capacity utilization in the industrial SOEs and the fact that many of these 
dinosaurs will never be competitive, it is unclear how getting workers to return 
to their work units would have positive eﬀects. To the contrary, if the exit of 
workers under the cover of the so-called August 3 measures marked a realloca- 
tion of labor to more productive activities, this “reform” would be altogether 
retrograde or simply punitive. 
Instead, an economic measure aimed at reviving the rust belt, the ban on the 
market, and the revival of the PDS could be seen as a bid to reestablish politi- 
cal control through the food distribution system. The preference given to SOE 
workers—bound more closely to the state than those operating outside state 
strictures—would be consistent with an interpretation emphasizing this politi- 
cal motivation. A revived PDS would also empower local party and govern- 
ment oﬃcials and provide a mechanism for reconstituting a political network 
loyal to the central authorities. 
At this writing, it is questionable whether the government can actually 
implement and sustain a policy U-turn. On the demand side, the government 
has been unable to supply the announced 500–700 gram daily ration (WFP 
2005b, Good Friends 2006a). As might be expected under the circumstances, 
there appears to be a certain degree of unevenness geographically in how dili- 
gently the new restrictions are being implemented, and there are anecdotal 
reports of grain continuing to trade surreptitiously in markets and via private 
residences. Indeed, Good Friends reports that since the availability of PDS sup- 
plies strongly aﬀects market prices, most underground grain dealers maintain 
good relations with the local Department of Food Policy. Not only do local 
oﬃcials turn a blind eye toward these black market transactions, they are prob- 
ably involved in the market either as recipients of graft or as direct participants 
themselves. 
On the supply side, it is not clear how widespread the conﬁscatory grain 
seizures have been. The critical issue is whether during the next harvest cycle 
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the farmers respond by reverting to their famine-era coping behavior of prehar- 
vesting, hoarding, shifting crop mixes away from grains, tending secret plots, 
and diverting output to illicit markets. There is already some evidence that this 
kind of coping behavior (Good Friends 2006b). As we documented in chapter 
2, when the North Korean authorities engaged in conﬁscatory seizures in 1995, 
attempting to extract grain that had already been allocated for farm household 
consumption, half the North Korean corn harvest “disappeared” the following 
year. We are not claiming that the events of 2005 are equivalent to the trau- 
matic events a decade earlier. If harvests continue to improve and aid continues 
to be forthcoming, the policy could be sustained. But the supply response of 
the farmers during the next harvest cycle could make operating the PDS much 
more diﬃcult the following year as farmers seek to protect themselves from 
exploitation. If a standoﬀ between the state and cultivators were to recur, one 
can imagine at least three possible scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario would essen- 
tially amount to a continuation of the status quo at the beginning of 2006: 
the market would remain banned, the PDS would operate irregularly, black 
markets would exist, and farmers would exhibit duplicity in their dealings with 
the state. Because the market would be underground, its eﬃciency would be 
degraded. This outcome is a recipe for the continuation of the chronic nutri- 
tion problems documented earlier in this chapter. 
A second possibility is that the policy would simply be unsustainable because 
of some combination of poor harvests, attenuated aid inﬂows, and coping 
behavior by the farmers. In this case, the attempt to ban the market and revive 
the PDS could prove to be little more than a bump on the road to continued 
reform. The government would quietly acquiesce to the situation that existed 
from the late 1990s until the fall of 2005, with the market regaining its role as 
the primary institution for the allocation and distribution of food. 
Hopefully, the third possibility will not eventuate, but given the country’s 
history its likelihood cannot be entirely discounted: namely, the recurrence 
of severe shortages. Farmers would engage in signiﬁcant hedging behavior by 
neglecting the oﬃcial plots, preharvesting, and hoarding. South Korea, China, 
and perhaps other donors would no doubt respond to signs of shortage. But 
with the WFP and private NGOs largely excluded from the North Korean 
countryside, the international community would once again lack information 
on the distribution of misery and exercise little inﬂuence over the allocation of 
food. Even a recurrence of famine could not be ruled out. 
Whether the recent policy changes amount to a U-turn or merely a minor 
detour remain to be seen. It is clear that the social contract in North Korea 
has fundamentally changed and that some sort of hybrid market system is 
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increasingly  in  play  in  the  country.  An  instructional  speech  by  Kim  Jo˘ng-il 
made in October 2001 is worth quoting at some length: “There are too many 
giveaways in our society and more unproductive expenditures than produc- 
tive ones in the use of the state budget. . . . The state spends millions of won 
annually in providing its citizens with food supplies. . . . a result, the socialist 
rationing policies of the past malfunctioned and the society experienced an 
extreme form of egalitarianism, and it became the norm for people to unlaw- 
fully take government property. The [situation] created indolence among the 
citizens, and decreased eﬃciency and productivity.” At the same time, the Dear 
Leader acknowledges the ﬂip side of these developments in the emergence of 
the market. “During the last few years, when the state was unable to supply 
food eﬃciently, people began to abandon their jobs and began searching for 
ways to acquire personal gains [sic]”(KIEP 2004:296–97). Herein lies both the 
hope for the North Korean economy and the current source of vulnerability. 
With the state unable to provide, markets emerged. But in the absence of social 
safety nets, signiﬁcant portions of the urban working class risk continuing of 
poverty, marginalization, and insecure access to food. 
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During the 1990s, as many as a million North Koreans died in a famine that 
ranks as one of the most destructive of the twentieth century. An entire cohort 
of children was consigned to a myriad of physical and mental impairments 
associated with chronic childhood malnutrition. This tragedy was the result of 
a misguided strategy of self-reliance that only served to increase the country’s 
vulnerability to both economic and natural shocks. Slow to respond to crisis— 
as closed, authoritarian governments so frequently are—the government not 
only limited eﬀective targeting, monitoring, and assessment of humanitarian 
assistance but cut oﬀ whole portions of the country from desperately needed 
help just as the famine was cresting. These government actions—and failures to 
act—are not incidental to the famine and ongoing food shortages; they are cen- 
tral to any explanation of it. The state’s culpability in this vast misery elevates 
the North Korean famine to a crime against humanity.1 
The famine set in train the marketization of the economy and reforms 
that hold out at least some hope for the transformation of the country. But 
through mid-2006, these reforms remained partial and ill conceived in impor- 
tant respects, and their promise for relieving North Korea’s economic distress is 
thus highly uncertain. Evidence is accumulating that North Korea is changing, 
but in spite of—not because of—the stance of the government. 
We divide our conclusions into two parts. The ﬁrst explores the implications 
of our ﬁndings for an understanding of North Korea itself. What do the famine 
and its aftermath imply for the prospects for an economic transition in North 
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Korea—and a transition to what? What does our understanding of the North 
Korean economy suggest for the prospects of regime change and for political 
developments more generally? 
Second, we take up in more detail the international implications of our ﬁnd- 
ings. We begin with the humanitarian eﬀort and consider not only how the aid 
game has worked but also the moral dilemmas of assisting North Korea. Should 
the international community provide assistance in such a setting? What are the 
implications of channeling that assistance through multilateral as opposed to 
bilateral channels? How do donors engage North Korea not only to relieve cur- 
rent suﬀering but also to assure a more positive future for its citizens? 
These questions cannot be posed outside the broader geostrategic context of 
the Korean peninsula: the complex maze of international politics that has kept 
the Korean peninsula divided. We close with a consideration of the debate over 
engagement and the light our ﬁndings shed on the second nuclear crisis that 
began in 2002. 
 
Famine and Reform in North Korea I: The Economic Transition 
 
North Korea experienced severe political and economic shocks in the early 
1990s: the collapse of the Soviet Union, a tense standoﬀ with respect to its 
nuclear ambitions, an uncertain political transition, and a succession of national 
disasters. From October 2002, the country was once again involved in a dispute 
with the international community over its nuclear weapons and faced a “hos- 
tile policy”—in the regime’s trenchant language—not only from the United 
States but from the increasingly skeptical Japan and European Union as well. 
All these apparently exogenous shocks contributed to North Korea’s economic 
isolation and posed severe policy challenges to the government. They constitute 
one explanation, invoked by North Korea and sympathetic outsiders, for the 
economic collapse of the last ﬁfteen years. 
We have argued that these shocks cannot be considered exogenous; rather, 
they stem from core features of the regime itself, including an economic strat- 
egy that contributed to the great famine of the mid-1990s and ongoing food 
shortages since. 
The key to resolving the North Korean hunger problem does not lie in a 
consideration of agriculture and the food distribution system alone, however; 
it requires the development of a functioning economy that generates suﬃcient 
foreign exchange earnings to purchase needed food on a commercial basis. 
This argument may strike many as counterintuitive. Food security seems like 
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a reasonable national objective, and some have defended a policy of self-suf- 
ﬁciency for the country (Ahn 2005, Ireson 2006). But food security is rarely 
if ever best achieved through a policy of self-reliance in food production. Par- 
ticularly given North Korea’s basic endowments, most notably the scarcity of 
arable land, it is highly unlikely that the country is capable of achieving self- 
suﬃciency in food; indeed, the famine and chronic food shortages have proved 
the point beyond dispute. 
The solution to the hunger problem in North Korea is thus intimately tied 
to the broader question of economic reform. Food security requires North 
Korea to generate enough foreign exchange through export revenues or borrow- 
ing to import bulk grains on a sustainable commercial basis, as Japan, South 
Korea, and China have done. This problem could probably be solved purely 
by expenditure switching: shifting the composition of imports away from 
other priorities. But even taking existing expenditure preferences as given, the 
improvements in the performance of the export sector needed to address this 
constraint are modest: the annual import shortfall is not large, in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars. 
Yet relaxing this aggregate supply constraint is not the end of the story. The 
hunger issues that we have examined are also distributional in nature. Many 
households in North Korea are now food insecure because the Public Distribu- 
tion System has broken down and they do not command adequate resources 
to purchase food in the market. The purpose of the reform process is therefore 
to reallocate resources, including both capital and labor, in ways that are more 
conducive to long-run growth. Although we must be concerned with the gov- 
ernment’s role in ameliorating the impact of inequality on access to food and 
providing social safety nets, the ultimate solution to the problem is to pursue 
reforms that raise productivity and incomes. 
What is to be done? It is frequently argued that North Korea should pursue 
the China model, which is regarded as emblematic of a successful outcome 
but seldom deﬁned. But North Korea diﬀers from China in important ways 
that will inevitably shape its transition from socialism. We should be cau- 
tious about the idea that North Korea is following, or can follow, a Chinese 
reform path, with or without North Korean characteristics. Unlike China (and 
another relatively successful reformer, Vietnam), North Korea does not have a 
large labor-intensive agricultural sector. In terms of the sectoral composition of 
output and employment, the North Korean economy more closely resembles 
Romania and parts of the former Soviet Union than it does the agriculture-led 
Asian reformers. 
The existence of a labor-intensive agricultural sector matters for two reasons. 
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First, because of the relatively simple techniques of production used in such 
agriculture, considerable productivity improvements can be achieved without 
an extensive package of ancillary reforms or inputs. Simply removing price 
distortions and controls on the allocation of acreage to alternative crops and 
providing some incentives for farmers can go a long way toward increasing 
output. Similar reforms could no doubt improve agricultural productivity in 
North Korea as well, and until 2005 the authorities seemed to recognize the 
importance of moving in this direction. 
North Korean farmers, however, are much more reliant on industrial inputs 
than were their Chinese or Vietnamese counterparts. Productivity in agricul- 
ture has been ﬂat over the last decade, suggesting that the incentive reforms 
may have done little more than stave oﬀ an even deeper decline in output. 
NGO reports note that maize ﬁelds were still being guarded in 2006, sug- 
gesting that the price reforms have not solved the fundamental problems of 
diversion. So while improvements in the agricultural terms of trade may have 
important long-run beneﬁts, they are unlikely to generate Chinese- or Viet- 
namese-magnitude results without complementary industrial inputs. The suc- 
cess of the reforms in North Korea is thus dependent on developments in the 
industrial sector. 
Increasing productivity in the industrial sector in turn requires a more 
extensive package of policy supports and, as a consequence, is more diﬃcult 
to achieve. In China, this sector could be carried by the success of the broader 
reform eﬀort.2 In North Korea, by contrast, the weight of the industrial sector 
is extraordinarily large, and much of it is beyond ﬁxing. The agricultural sector 
is relatively small, and even with large increases in productivity it will not be the 
leading sector of a major economic transformation. Eﬀective change will only 
come from expanding the foreign sector and by allowing urban workers to shift 
to market-oriented activities, a process that we return to in more detail below. 
The second reason that the Chinese or Vietnamese path appears relatively 
successful is political. In contrast to Eastern Europe and some of the countries 
of the former Soviet Union, China and Vietnam maintained their authoritar- 
ian structure during the course of their economic reforms. Structural condi- 
tions arguably made it easier to do so. In a labor-surplus economy, the initial 
productivity-increasing reforms in agriculture permit a simultaneous increase 
in agricultural output and a movement of extremely low productivity agri- 
cultural labor to the nascent non-state-owned light manufacturing sector. In 
principle, each of three major groups in the economy can beneﬁt from such a 
change. The migrants to the emerging light manufacturing sector have higher 
wages than they did on the farm, as do the remaining farmers, whose average 
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and marginal productivity will increase with higher output generated by fewer 
farmers. Food prices might initially rise following decontrol of prices, but with 
a suﬃcient supply response in agriculture, the incumbent urban proletariat in 
the old, state-owned heavy manufacturing sector can see an improvement in 
real wages as the implicit terms of trade between food and industrial products 
falls. Reform under these circumstances constitutes a happy equilibrium: no 
large group comes out an obvious loser. 
A crucial question for North Korea is whether a labor-abundant agricultural 
sector was a necessary condition for such a reform path to succeed or whether 
it was only suﬃcient. The key factor in the China model is that initial wages in 
agriculture were extremely low, permitting easy movement into light manufac- 
turing. By contrast, North Korea’s industrial sector bears a closer resemblance 
to conditions in the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries where 
industrial workers (and crony capitalists) bitterly opposed economic restructur- 
ing, in some cases decisively. These workers not only received relatively high 
wages through the enterprise but a broad set of social welfare beneﬁts includ- 
ing housing and health care. If an enterprise closed, workers lost not only their 
jobs but their homes and their access to medical care and even education and 
foodstuﬀs as well.3 
The evidence we have presented suggests that the decline in the industrial 
sector in North Korea has been so substantial and future opportunities look 
suﬃciently bleak that a positive economic-cum-political dynamic could oper- 
ate in a more industrialized economy such as North Korea’s. If workers at the 
Kim Ch’aek Iron and Steel Complex are under- or unemployed and are not 
receiving salaries and beneﬁts, or it is widely believed that the plant is never 
going to reopen in any case, then the managers, workers, and their represen- 
tatives in the corridors of power will not oppose reforms that could generate 
alternative employment. In its second decade of decline, North Korea may have 
fallen so far that its underemployed industrial proletariat might have become 
the political equivalent of Chinese surplus agricultural labor: economically 
available—and even anxious—to be redeployed in new activities and politi- 
cally lacking in any levers to resist fundamental restructuring. 
If this story is correct, then we are once again confronted with the funda- 
mental economic issue of how to raise productivity in a more industrialized 
economy. The existing literature on North Korea suggests that the current econ- 
omy is horrendously distorted and that economywide liberalization would have 
profound aﬀects on the structure of the economy, the composition of output, 
and the sectoral and geographic distribution of employment (Noland 2000). 
But what are the new activities into which labor and capital would ﬂow? 
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Given the country’s smaller size and geographical position, it is clear that the 
foreign sector should play a much larger role in the North Korean transition 
than it has to date. North Korea should be exporting its natural resources—as 
it increasingly is—but also light and medium-tech manufactures. It should 
import capital goods, intermediate products, and food. The composition of 
employment would shift toward those emerging export-oriented manufacturing 
sectors, with literally millions of North Korean workers changing jobs. Given 
the prevalence of subscale manufacturing establishments and the excessive geo- 
graphic dispersion of existing facilities, this process of restructuring would have 
its own distributional consequences. For example, it would involve substantial 
agglomeration of economic activities in certain areas, as has occurred following 
reforms in similarly spatially distorted economies such as Russia. Some existing 
industrial towns could be depopulated, but others with more favorable geo- 
graphic locations—near ports, near China, or near the road and rail links with 
South Korea—would expand dramatically. The biggest natural partners would 
be China, South Korea, and Japan. 
Foreign investment would be a fundamental driver of this process of renewal. 
Foreign ﬁrms represent a kind of neural synapse between the latent productive 
potential of the North Korean economy and external demand in world mar- 
kets. Foreign ﬁrms have the blueprints for the products that the rest of the 
world wants to buy, as well as the global distribution and marketing networks 
to make sales happen. One can imagine a wide range of modalities through 
which this interaction could develop. In the short run, special economic zones, 
export processing zones, and special industrial parks, such as the ones estab- 
lished or contemplated in Kaeso˘ng, Sinu˘iju, Wo˘ensan, and Pyongyang, could 
form geographically delimited enclaves of foreign investment while the political 
system adjusted to the enhanced role of foreign investors in the economy. In 
the longer run, more liberalized policies and practices would allow the spread of 
such activities throughout the economy as a whole, as occurred in South Korea 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The transformation of the North Korean economy would not depend only 
on the external sector. North Korea is no exception to the tendency of con- 
trolled socialist economies to ignore the service sector. Under the current and 
highly uncertain degree of marketization, we already observe an explosion of 
small-scale activities such as restaurants, beauty parlors, small shops, and other 
commercial activities. Closer inspection reveals that these activities are already 
transforming foreign trade from below, as they participate in growing distribu- 
tion networks for foreign goods that are increasingly paid for by hard currency 
earnings from a variety of legal and illicit sources. 
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Yet North Korea’s progress on this path has been at best uneven, and the 
government has created a number of problems for itself; these barriers are 
worth reiterating. As documented in chapter 7, the economic policy changes 
of 2002 unleashed considerable inﬂation, on the order of 100 percent or more 
annually. Although the government appears to be making progress on address- 
ing its underlying ﬁscal and monetary problems, these have by no means been 
resolved, and some of the solutions pursued—such as the issue of bonds that 
more closely resemble a lottery and banning the market in grain—do not augur 
well. Countries that have attempted fundamental reforms in high-inﬂation 
environments have generally not fared well. High inﬂation complicates the 
policy-making process, magniﬁes mistakes, and exacerbates distributional con- 
ﬂicts over reform. Inﬂation also makes it diﬃcult to gauge relative prices and 
thus deters investment and exchange as well. It is notable that when China, to 
which North Korea is often compared, introduced its reforms, it faced neither 
the degree of macroeconomic instability nor the degradation of its planning 
mechanism that currently confront North Korea. 
More fundamentally, the regime faces severe credibility problems. We believe 
that the substantial marketization from below that has occurred to date has 
been largely in spite of, rather than because, of government policy. The regime 
has tolerated the emergence of market activity only grudgingly, and reform 
eﬀorts have repeatedly been undermined by a zigzagging process that opens up 
opportunities only to close them down. Reported changes in agricultural policy 
in the fall of 2005 involving forcible seizures of grain in order to revive the PDS 
are only the most recent example. Market actors operate in the context of weak 
and uncertain economic institutions that limit the scope of their business and 
encourage markets to operate in a netherworld between the legal and the illicit. 
To date, we have seen few political changes that would buttress private property 
and contracting rights, and where they have occurred their credibility remains 
in doubt (Yoon 2005). 
Diﬀerences in the treatment of local and foreign enterprises reveal the relative 
weakness of internal forces for the regularization of external economic relations. 
South Korean small and medium enterprises rendered uncompetitive by rising 
wages in South Korea are the most natural group of prospective investors in 
North Korea’s manufacturing sector. Individually, these ﬁrms lack direct political 
clout in either Seoul or Pyongyang, and consequently formal institutional rules 
matter more for them since they have less opportunity for private redress. In 
this light, the conclusion of bilateral North-South agreements on issues such as 
taxation and the repatriation of proﬁts could be interpreted as mechanisms for 
solving these credibility problems. The establishment of the Kaeso˘ng Industrial 
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Complex, with the eﬀective imprimatur of the South Korean government and 
complete with explicit and implicit socialization of risk, also serves this function. 
Yet even here North Korean behavior has been perplexing. North Korea contin- 
uously stalled the completion of the transportation links necessary to make the 
Kaeso˘ng project viable, has made wage demands that negate the very advantages 
in moving to North Korea in the ﬁrst place, and snubbed South Korean oﬃcials 
during the ceremonial opening of the complex. 
At least four nonmutually exclusive hypotheses could explain North Korea’s 
inauspicious policy making to date. The ﬁrst is that the North Korean authori- 
ties are well intentioned but that the failures of economic policy reﬂect a lack 
of experience and technical capacity: they literally do not know what they are 
doing. A second possibility is that the government knows what it should be 
doing but cannot take the necessary steps because of political stalemate or fear 
of the political consequences of reform. A third argument focuses on the moral 
hazard associated with external support: the provision of foreign assistance per- 
mits half-measures and temporizing. The fourth possibility is that they know 
what they should be doing but are discouraged by external constraints such as 
embargos or sanctions. We take up the ﬁrst two of these arguments here and 
return to the external constraints in the following section 
There is ample evidence to support the ﬁrst interpretation, including the 
well-worn anecdote of North Korean economic policy makers asking a visit- 
ing World Bank oﬃcial what a bond market was. Technical assistance and 
training may have large payoﬀs and help avoid some of the more egregious 
and costly mistakes. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund could 
play an important role in this regard, as could bilateral technical assistance.4 
Evidence on North Korean receptiveness to such advice is mixed, however, 
even if we set aside for the moment the issue of Western reluctance that we 
take up in more detail below. Even the Chinese complain privately about 
North Korean resistance to outside advice. The government has ultimately 
been unwilling to accept the degree of openness and transparency that mem- 
bership in the international ﬁnancial institutions entails.5 While it is possible 
that the partial and vacillating nature of the reforms reﬂects a necessary learn- 
ing process, it is also possible that the partial nature of the reforms reﬂects a 
deeper political equilibrium. 
One possible reason that the reform process would be blocked is that author- 
ities could come to fear the consequences of what had occurred to date and 
slowly reassert economic control in order to maintain political control. Central 
government oﬃcials would be motivated by the many political liabilities associ- 
ated with the reforms to date, including growing inequality, the emergence of 
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alternative centers of economic power, and the leakage of ideas and information 
as a result of increasing trade and investment, particularly and ironically through 
China (Lankov 2006a). Implicit evidence of these concerns can be seen in, for 
example, the location of the country’s ﬁrst special economic zone in the highly 
isolated extreme northeast of the country, or the banning of the private use of 
cellular telephones after subscriptions began growing rapidly in 2004, or the 
periodic seizures of contraband videos of South Korean soap operas. Under a 
more statist scenario, the government would concentrate on resolving the most 
obvious policy problems, such as the weakness of the tax base and the inad- 
equacy of foreign exchange earnings, while relying on aid inﬂows from China 
and South Korea for regime maintenance. Food security could improve in the 
short run, if, for example the state used its increasing command of resources to 
reconstitute a social safety net; this could be consistent with the eﬀorts to revive 
the PDS in October 2005. Such an eﬀort at restoration, however, would ulti- 
mately delay a broader reform eﬀort or imply a fragmented and partial process 
hostage to the regime’s perception of political stability. 
An alternative political explanation for partial reform may lie not only with 
the leadership but also with the very economic forces that have been spawned 
by the reforms to date. North Korea’s process of marketization occurred largely 
in the absence of formal rules and institutions. One route to wider economic 
changes would build on this start by legalizing, regularizing, and deepening this 
implicit reform from below. A central problem, however, is that an incumbent 
set of stakeholders who have acted opportunistically could well oppose the 
regularization of property rights (for example, enterprise managers engaged in 
asset stripping or spontaneous privatization) or the introduction of a more 
coherent and open regulatory environment. Much of this early marketiza- 
tion was allowed to ﬂourish only through corruption and cronyism, which a 
more open economic environment would dissipate to at least some extent (for 
example, by eliminating monopoly privileges of various sorts). The stakes are 
particularly high to the extent that the military is involved in these irregular 
economic activities, as is surely the case. 
In such a setting, reform is uneven or ineﬀective not because the center 
is trying to reassert control but because beneﬁciaries of partial liberalization 
are suﬃciently inﬂuential to block further reform (Hellman 1998). This sce- 
nario holds forth the possibility of gradually improving economic performance 
through greater eﬀective reliance on markets. In the absence of oﬀsetting social 
safety nets, however, such an outcome would continue the trend toward grow- 
ing inequality and more varied outcomes for individual households, including 
the possibility of continuing food insecurity. 
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The interests of the North Korean military are relevant in this regard. 
The military continues to operate its own parallel economy. With its own 
trading ﬁrms and preferential access to foreign technology and imported 
goods, the military was well situated to take advantage of the reforms. It 
now controls a dozen or more conglomerates modeled on East German 
Kombinaten or South Korean chaeb˘ol, depending on one’s cultural reference 
point. Given Kim Jo˘ng-il’s growing reliance on the military, crystallized in the 
“military-ﬁrst” politics, economic policy could increasingly reﬂect the idiosyn- 
cratic interests of the military elite itself. This would undoubtedly be a sadly 
ironic turn of events for an elite raised on the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon. Yet the stance of the military toward the reform process remains a 
central mystery.6 
Whether and how the military and the defense industrial complex partici- 
pate in the reform process will have a fundamental bearing on the nature and 
prospects for success of the process of economic development and engagement 
with the outside world. The case of China is especially relevant here. A key 
factor behind China’s ability to undertake the rapid pace of economic reforms 
during the ﬁrst ten to ﬁfteen years of its open door policy was aggressive demil- 
itarization of its economy. The key elements of the Chinese strategy included 
a concerted eﬀort to shift the output of the military-industrial complex from 
military to civilian production, the large-scale transfer of military manpower, 
industrial facilities, and infrastructure to civilian use, and a signiﬁcant down- 
sizing of the armed forces. At the same time, the political clout of the military 
in the political process began to decline steadily. Without this extensive and 
rapid demilitarization of the economy at the outset of reforms, the pace and 
scale of China’s economic liberalization would likely have been much slower 
and more limited. 
In North Korea, the reform eﬀort is taking place without any signs that 
demilitarization is being seriously considered or pursued; to the contrary. The 
“military-ﬁrst” policy suggests that the leadership of the Korean People’s Army 
may view the economic reforms as an opportunity to garner more resources 
for the military-industrial complex. If this is the case, then the North Korean 
model of economic development linked with the continued militarization of 
the state economy has much more in common with the experiences of the 
Soviet Union during the 1980s than it does with China. 
The external environment will play an important role in how these domes- 
tic political forces supporting and opposing reform play out. In this regard, 
the North Korean government faces a complicated environment that is nei- 
ther wholly supportive nor entirely hostile to the cause of economic reform. 
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Two important countries, the United States and Japan, impose signiﬁcant 
external constraints on North Korea’s ability to globalize successfully. Yet its 
two principal partners, South Korea and China, value political stability above 
all else and if anything have erred on the side of excessive generosity.7 As  
a consequence, the policies of the United States and Japan reduce the pro- 
spective payoﬀs of reform, while those of South Korea and China retard it 
by enabling North Korea to temporize. These considerations point toward a 
trajectory of policy that is gradual, partial, and very much tied up with the 
behavior of external actors. 
This outcome is not preordained. If one looks carefully, one can see internal 
signs of progress. To cite two such examples, the passage of a ﬁscal law in April 
2004 at least holds out the hope that as the new tax system takes hold, the ﬁscal 
basis of the state can be reestablished and macroeconomic instability attenu- 
ated. In 2006 Kim Jo˘ng-il visited the economically vibrant cities of southern 
China and aﬃrmed the “correctness” of the Chinese model; some observers are 
already hailing this as the beginning of North Korean reforms with Chinese 
characteristics (Lim 2006b). 
With a genuine commitment to reform at the top, China and South Korea 
providing both resources and technical assistance, and a cooling of diplomatic 
pressure from the United States and Japan, it is not diﬃcult to imagine a sig- 
niﬁcant rehabilitation of the North Korean economy. Yet such hopes have been 
dashed in the past: during earlier visits to China, Kim visited Shanghai, praised 
Chinese reforms eﬀusively, and declared that North Korea “supports the reform 
policy pursued by the Chinese side,” lending a certain air of déjà vu to the 2006 
visit (Noland 2001:4). Ultimately, the optimistic scenario rests squarely on the 
North Korean leadership’s willingness to undertake wide-ranging reforms, con- 
ﬁdent that it can manage this process internally and that the external environ- 
ment remains fundamentally supportive. 
To summarize, the food problem must be seen in the context of wider 
economic reforms. There is no single route for such reforms, but given 
North Korea’s endowments, an agriculture-led reform process is not likely 
to be enough; broader changes will be required. These will involve allowing 
greater freedom for commerce and a reorientation of the economy toward 
export-oriented activities, facilitated by foreign investment. The failure to 
pursue this path more aggressively may be due to lack of technical expertise 
and learning, but it may also be blocked by concerns over political control 
or the interests of favored groups. To gain a better understanding of these 
constraints, we turn to a more detailed examination of the country’s politi- 
cal prospects. 
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Famine and Reform in North Korea II: The Political Consequences 
 
We have argued that the food problem in North Korea is ultimately linked to 
fundamental features of the political system. The system of socialist entitle- 
ments, including access to food through the PDS, was determined both directly 
and indirectly by a complex castelike system in which political loyalty was a 
key determinant of life chances. We showed how certain regions of the country 
(most notably the northeast) were particularly disadvantaged vis-à-vis others 
(Pyongyang) and how these regional diﬀerences correlated strongly with other 
social distinctions (party members versus industrial workers). 
We also highlighted the government’s response to signs of shortage, the issue 
that motivates the political theory of famine advanced by Amartya Sen (Dreze 
and Sen 1989; Sen 2000). We took note of accounts suggesting that the leader- 
ship was unaware of the extent of the distress yet also catalog actions by the gov- 
ernment that made the food situation worse. These actions included cutting oﬀ 
the northeast from humanitarian access and criminalizing personal movement. 
North Korea’s tragedy could only have occurred in a system in which the 
political leadership was both insulated from events on the ground and free to 
prioritize political control over the welfare of the citizenry. The crisis was there- 
fore systemic, intimately related to the authoritarian structure of government, 
the absence of accountability to the citizenry, and the denial of political and 
civil liberties and property rights. At a minimum, these rights include the ability 
to publicize information—without fear of reprisal—that would have allowed 
government oﬃcials to ascertain the extent of distress. Granting citizens secure 
property rights, the freedom to trade and engage in private production, and 
simply the freedom to move would have also had wide-ranging social welfare 
eﬀects. More expansively, famine and shortages could have been avoided were 
citizens free to organize collectively in the face of deprivation, confront public 
oﬃcials with their shortcomings, and replace them for failures. In the presence 
of these rights, neither the great famine nor the ongoing shortages of food 
would have taken the toll they did. 
Yet wishing does not make things so, and simply to trumpet the beneﬁts of 
regime change does not constitute either a prediction or a policy. If the political 
characteristics of the country are fundamental to an ultimate resolution of the 
food situation and of the problem of reform more generally, we need to assess 
the prospects for political change. 
Some humility is warranted. An initial phase of discussion on this issue 
in the mid-1990s centered on the prospects of regime collapse in the face of 
international isolation, mounting economic distress, and the problems antici- 
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pated  with  the  succession  following  the  death  of  Kim  Il-so˘ng  in  July  1994.8 
In addition to these exogenous shocks, “collapsists” also focused on a number 
of features of the political system that appeared to signal internal schisms or 
institutional weaknesses: the apparent decay of political institutions, manifest, 
for example, in the suspension of Korean Workers’ Party Congresses, Supreme 
People’s Assembly (SPA) sessions, and even meetings of the Central Commit- 
tee; the failure of Kim Jo˘ng-il to assume his father’s titles of president of state 
and secretary general of the Korean Workers’ Party; the absence of mass rallies 
in support of the Dear Leader; an increase in elite defections, most prominently 
of former Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee member Hwang Jang- 
yo˘p; and a variety of anecdotal evidence on the public’s muted views of Kim 
Jo˘ng-il compared to his father. 
Predictions of collapse were widespread in the literature (see, however, 
Noland 1997). In 1995 the American analyst Nicholas Ebersadt wrote, “There is 
little reason at present to expect a reign by Kim Jo˘ng-il to be either stable or 
long” (139). His important book on the topic was called The End of North 
Korea (1999). In an article titled “No Way Out: North Korea’s Impending Col- 
lapse,” South Korean scholar and diplomat Kim Kyung-won wrote that “there 
is a real possibility that Kim Jo˘ng-il may ﬁnd himself on the way out in the 
next few years, pushed out by reformists or military hardliners.” His assessment 
was shared by fellow academic Ahn Byung-joon, who predicted in widely read 
articles that the Kim family regime would be short-lived, probably followed 
by a reformist military coup or the breakup and disappearance of the North 
Korean state (1994a, b).9 
We do not cite these accounts to belittle them; all were made by thought- 
ful analysts and they were not atypical.10 Nonetheless, at the risk of overes- 
timating the regime’s solidity, it is worth considering why North Korea did 
not collapse. 
Evidence of the ability of governments to survive extreme economic distress 
can be gained by placing North Korea’s experience in a broader comparative 
perspective. Despite the economic collapse we have detailed in this book, the 
country’s experience is not unique. According to ﬁgures put together by the 
Bank of Korea,11 North Korea experienced a decline in per capita GDP of 
approximately 25 percent over the twelve-year interval 1990–2002, or about a 2 
percent decline annually. The maximum decline of roughly 33 percent (imply- 
ing a compounded rate of more than 5 percent a year) occurred between 1990– 
98, before the economy began to stabilize at a lower level of income. According 
to World Bank data on national economic performance since 1960, forty-two 
countries other than North Korea have suﬀered declines of 25 percent or more 
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in per capita income over a twelve-year period, with per capita income falling 
50 percent or more in fourteen of these countries.12 
If North Korea’s economic performance is therefore not altogether unusual, 
its combination of extraordinary crisis and the continuity of authoritarian rule 
might be. But even this conclusion would be hasty. Cuba is the most obvi- 
ous comparator: a communist regime led by a charismatic founding leader 
who endured a devastating economic collapse following the end of the Soviet 
Union as well as similar if not greater antipathy from the surviving superpower. 
Among other personalist authoritarian regimes that survived severe crises are 
Syria under Haﬁz and Bashir al-Assad, Haiti under François and Jean-Claude 
Duvalier, and Romania’s Nikolae Ceauçescu, whose fall from power followed 
a major economic collapse but must be attributed to the wider revolutionary 
developments sweeping Eastern Europe. What these examples demonstrate is 
that while deep economic crises may increase the probability of political insta- 
bility and regime change, they are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to 
the retention of power. In none of these cases did regime change coincide with 
or follow immediately upon the worst economic downturns. 
This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by a more systematic crossnational analysis of the 
determinants of regime change by Noland (2004b). The so-called hazard mod- 
els used in this study can be calibrated using national data to suggest the likeli- 
hood of regime change in any given country and year. According to the most 
plausible speciﬁcation of these models—the hazard estimates derived from a 
sample of countries that experienced particularly severe economic declines— 
the probability of a North Korean collapse peaked in 1997–98 at around 10 
percent and declined to around 5 percent in 2002. Those who predicted that 
North Korea would experience fundamental political change during the period 
since 1990 were not making such a bad bet: even in a wider sample of cases, the 
cumulative hazard rises well above 50 percent over the course of the decade. 
By extending these models into the future and making some assumptions 
about future growth rates, we can estimate some broad, order-of-magnitude 
probabilities of future regime change; in all of them, the nature of the external 
environment is a crucial parameter. Under one scenario that might be labeled 
“cooperative engagement,” the Six-Party process succeeds and the diplomatic 
tensions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program dissipate—at least for 
a time. North Korea receives higher levels of aid from South Korea, China, 
Europe, and perhaps even the United States as a result of a comprehensive 
settlement. Pyongyang normalizes diplomatic relations with Japan and begins 
to receive postcolonial claim settlements. North Korea joins the multilateral 
development banks and begins receiving aid from them as well. Under this less 
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threatening environment, the leadership pushes forward with a reform process 
that, in conjunction with international assistance, permits growth to rebound 
to its 1999 peak of 6 percent. Under this scenario, the likelihood of regime 
change falls to less than 1 percent. 
In the “neo-con’s dream” scenario, the Six-Party Talks fail—or the ﬁve pow- 
ers grow weary of North Korean gambits—and they decide to put the squeeze 
on  the  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  regime.  Aid  is  cut  oﬀ,  trade  declines,  growth  falls  to  its 
previous low of negative 6 percent, and the inexpertly enacted economic policy 
reforms result in an ongoing high rate of inﬂation. In the “neo-con’s dream,” 
the likelihood of regime change rises to about a one in seven probability. In 
an even more drastic scenario, which we will call “international embargo,” the 
North Koreans test a nuclear weapon, export ﬁssile material, or engage in some 
other armed provocation that results in an even more complete economic iso- 
lation. Trade and remittances are cut oﬀ completely, eﬀorts to trade by sea 
are met with interdiction, and the country experiences even worse economic 
performance than was seen during the crisis of the mid-1990s. In these circum- 
stances, the likelihood of regime change could rise to over 40 percent in the ﬁrst 
year with a virtual certainty of collapse in the medium run. 
These calculations should be taken with the appropriate grain of salt, but 
they suggest strongly that external economic pressure is not likely to lead to 
a change of regime anytime soon. The Kim dynasty has already survived the 
worst of the crisis, and the coordination problems we have highlighted preclude 
the economic restrictions that would substantially increase the likelihood of 
regime change. To the contrary: by carefully calibrating its behavior to avoid 
high-risk outcomes, the North Korean regime could face an international envi- 
ronment that is surprisingly conducive to survival. 
So far, we have looked only at the correlation between economic perfor- 
mance and political change, with a focus on the prospects for regime change. 
But a more nuanced understanding requires a consideration of the mechanisms 
through which such change might operate and the oﬀsetting political, institu- 
tional, and coercive resources the regime can bring to bear. 
Haggard and Kaufman (1995:28–32) have suggested three routes through 
which economic crises weaken the hold of authoritarian leaders: by generating 
mass protest from below, by reducing support from key economic or business 
elites, and by generating splits within the coercive apparatus, which always 
plays a crucial role in the maintenance of power. Why didn’t these mechanisms 
operate as they have in other settings? 
With respect to protest from below, famine, recurrent food shortages, and 
large-scale un- and underemployment would seem a politically lethal mix. But 
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the current regime can draw on two generations of unparalleled political indoc- 
trination and a massive apparatus for internal social control. Accounts of anti- 
regime activity have surfaced periodically, but usually with the conclusion that 
they were dealt with swiftly and brutally.13 
Equally important is the virtual absence of intermediate or civil society insti- 
tutions that enjoy at least some independence from the state and might thus 
be capable of channeling discontent into eﬀective political action. A variety of 
state-controlled associations exist (see KINU 2002:113–17 for an overview), but 
they are under very tight party control. There is no Solidarity trade union as 
in Poland. Nor do there exist alternative poles of moral authority such as the 
Catholic Church that are capable of legitimating dissent, as was the case in the 
uprising against the marital law regime in Poland and in the “People Power” 
movement against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. 
An additional constraint on public action concerns information that might 
provide an outside metric on the society and serve to coalesce opposition. The 
degree of North Korea’s isolation from the outside world has been unusual, 
although this appears to be changing (Lankov 2005b, 2006a). All televisions 
and radios are ﬁxed to state channels and have to be modiﬁed to receive outside 
broadcasts.14 Reading foreign publications or listening to foreign broadcasts—or 
tampering with TVs or radios for this purpose—is a crime. Leaving the country 
is also a crime, although that, too, has become an important leak in the dam of 
outside information ﬂows. Trade with the outside world is increasing access to 
cultural products from abroad, such as South Korean music and videos. 
In addition to these well-documented political and informational controls, 
it is important not to underestimate the capability of authoritarian regimes to 
maintain key bases of support even during periods of scarcity. Authoritarian 
regimes do not survive by coercion alone (Wintrobe 1998). At the top, the 
North Korean political elite appears relatively coherent and uniﬁed, or at least 
competing factions have been eﬀectively held in check. Kim Jo˘ng-il’s “military 
ﬁrst” politics undoubtedly reﬂected an eﬀort to sustain or shore up the sup- 
port of the Korean People’s Army. We have reports of mutiny within particular 
units over the last ten years or even more organized challenges within the mili- 
tary hierarchy.15 But as with episodic social protest, these have been crushed, 
and we know of no credible evidence that suggests the likelihood of a high- 
level military challenge to Kim Jo˘ng-il’s rule. Finally, there are no independent 
sources of economic power that might play a direct political role in challenging 
the regime, for example, by withholding investment or through capital ﬂight. 
Despite the widespread distress that began in the 1990s, favored ﬁrms such 
as those linked to the military industrial complex have been protected and 
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enjoyed access to foreign exchange; indeed, their status has probably even risen 
under the “military ﬁrst” politics. 
Outside of the core political, military, and economic elite, there are other 
ways in which the government has moved to forestall opposition. In the 
absence of rural rebellion, the mobilization of urban publics constitutes the 
most important threat from below. In North Korea, Pyongyang accounts for 
perhaps a quarter of the nonrural population, excluding the military. Within 
the constraints of the economic collapse of the mid-1990s, the regime catered 
quite assiduously to the needs of its residents. An additional though unknown 
share of the non-Pyongyang urban population should probably be classiﬁed as 
similarly privileged. An emerging middle class of small-scale entrepreneurs and 
traders, including Korean Japanese and Korean Chinese, are the beneﬁciaries of 
recent marketization and hardly likely to lead the political charge. 
Finally, it should be noted that the external environment not only is eco- 
nomically supportive but doesn’t pose strong political challenges, either. North 
Korea’s neighbors have not provided sanctuary to anti-Kim political forces that 
could provide a transnational lever for change. There is little or no evidence of 
anti-Kim political organizing among the refugees in the Chinese border region, 
despite growing evidence of political disaﬀection among them (Chang 2005), 
and there are certainly no marauding guerilla insurgencies on North Korea’s 
borders. Not only is overt political activity in China limited, but to date there 
is little prospect for a hole in the fence that would prove fundamentally desta- 
bilizing, as occurred in 1989 when Hungary opened its borders and allowed 
East German refugees to escape to West Germany via Austria. The Chinese 
authorities have cooperated with North Korean security services to repatriate 
refugees and have steadfastly refused mounting international pressure to treat 
ﬂeeing North Koreans as political refugees (Charny 2005). The development 
of overt political activity aimed at regime change in North Korea, or even a 
signiﬁcant increase in refugees, would clearly meet a swift and unequivocal 
response from Beijing. 
Not only has China forestalled a refugee-led destabilization, but South Korea 
has been increasingly cautious in this regard as well (Lankov 2006b). As the 
political utility of defectors has declined, as the social composition of defectors 
has shifted from the elite to more diﬃcult to assimilate workers and farmers, 
and as the South Korean government has more aggressively pursued a strategy 
of engagement, Seoul has gradually moved to shut the door. 
We are not suggesting that the political situation in North Korea is static. 
But the focus on collapse scenarios has deterred a more careful consideration of 
political evolution that falls short of regime change. Given that no communist 
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regime has ever undergone an evolutionary transition to democratic rule, how 
might North Korea’s distinctive brand of authoritarianism evolve? 
One route that has been suggested in a number of accounts of “Kim Jo˘ng-il 
as reformer” is the transition to a kind of developmental state that bears some 
resemblance to other East Asian newly industrializing countries, such as Taiwan 
under the Kuomintang and South Korea under Pak Cho˘ng-hu˘i, or, more logi- 
cally, to the Chinese path.16 The potential obstacles to such a course of action 
created by the dynastic nature of the North Korean regime and the division of 
the Korean peninsula should not be underestimated. Economic reform that 
blurs the ideological distinction between the two regimes or widens exposure 
to South Koreans risks regime delegitimization. Hence it is perhaps no surprise 
that the regime’s initial reaction to the collapse of socialism was unrepentant 
and open hostility to economic reform, which it interpreted as a crucial— 
indeed fatal—misstep of Soviet revisionism (Buzo 1999:206–9). 
But the initiation of the “military ﬁrst” politics, which at ﬁrst blush appeared 
to signal the ascendance of the most reactionary element of the polity, could 
allow a reinterpretation of chuch’e and signiﬁcant departures from past prac- 
tice (Frank 2003, 2005a; Noland 2004b). Current propaganda that emphasizes 
“military-ﬁrst” politics to build a “powerful and prosperous country” out of the 
“barrel of a gun” oddly echoes the “wealthy nation and a strong army” slogan 
of Meiji-era Japan. Nationalism would be the crucial ideological glue, as it has 
long been. A skeptical military would be reassured about the reform process, 
although at the cost of some dilution of the integrity of the reform eﬀort and 
continuing diversion of resources to the military-industrial complex (Eberstadt 
2004; see Cheung 2001 on the Chinese case). 
Such a path would not entail political reform in the sense of liberalization 
but would involve a certain rationalization of the state apparatus and economic 
decision making. There is some evidence of such a process occurring as a result 
of the ﬁnal consolidation of Kim Jo˘ng-il’s formal political authority in 1998. In 
July of that year, the tenth SPA elections were held, resulting in a substantial 
increase in military representation (from 45 to 107 active duty military oﬃcers, 
out of a total of 687). Among a number of other political changes,17 the new 
constitution gave the cabinet more responsibility and power to run the econ- 
omy and the administration, including oversight of the local People’s Commit- 
tees. The economic bureaucracy was both purged and rationalized. 
We certainly cannot rule out such a course of development, but we are skepti- 
cal. North Korea diﬀers in important ways from the other East Asian develop- 
mental states, particularly in the size of the private sector at the onset of reforms 
and in the somewhat more open, if by no means democratic, political context. 
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Moreover, North Korea labors under the well-known weaknesses of personalist 
rule. Such systems suﬀer not only from the long-run problem of succession but 
from weak institutionalization, the absence of checks on the leader’s discretion, 
the blurring of the lines between the public and the private, and the tremendous 
diﬃculty of making credible commitments to private actors. For example, the 
apparent rationalization of the state apparatus in the 1998 constitution is obvi- 
ated by the increasing fusion between key oﬃcials in the government and party 
and higher military echelons and the ability of Kim Jo˘ng-il to appoint all key 
economic actors and to override technocratic decision making. Despite discus- 
sions of distinct hard-line and reform factions within the government, there is 
little evidence of real delegation of decision-making power, and in any case the 
lines of accountability all end in the same place. 
The assumption that the beneﬁciaries of reform to date are private also mis- 
characterizes the North Korean system and the nature of gradual reforms in a 
communist context more generally.18 Partial reforms in communist systems can 
be highly distorting, favoring small groups of government-connected actors— 
party cadre, government oﬃcials, military oﬃcers, and their families—that 
subsequently become opponents of further reform. The political correlate of 
such partial reforms is a sort of crony-socialist state characterized by the grant- 
ing of market opportunities to favored groups, ongoing extortion, and distinct 
limits on the emergence of a more independent private sector. Far from fore- 
shadowing political reform, such a system requires even more political controls 
in order to enforce privilege and deter opposition from the economically dis- 
enfranchised (Pei 2006). 
The fact that Kim Jo˘ng-il has relied so openly on the military is a particular 
source of concern. On the one hand, a number of pronouncements suggest 
that Kim Jo˘ng-il sees the military industrial complex as a leading sector for the 
economy’s growth, either through the production and export of weapons or 
through the involvement of the military or military-linked ﬁrms in related sec- 
tors, from construction to telecommunications. On the other hand, the favored 
position of the military suggests that it might end up following the course of the 
People’s Liberation Army in China by moving into altogether unrelated busi- 
nesses as a payoﬀ for declining ﬁscal commitments. Tai Ming Cheung (2001) 
has provided the most detailed analysis of this path in China and shows how 
military enterprises were involved in corruption, smuggling, and proﬁteering. 
Yet in China the party was ultimately able to orchestrate a divestiture of at least 
some of the military’s businesses in the context of a comprehensive program 
of demilitarization, a prospect that may prove harder in the DPRK, given the 
relative weakness of the Korean Workers’ Party. 
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An alternative and somewhat more hopeful scenario lies in the de facto 
decentralization of the political system. To be sure, the central government 
owns and controls the major enterprises in the country, and there is to date 
little sign of the sort of formal devolution of policy to provincial and lower- 
level governments. But as in China and Vietnam, government oﬃcials, party 
cadres, ﬁrm managers, and even military oﬃcers at lower levels in the chain 
of command may prove to be agents of change. Attuned to both local needs 
and proﬁt opportunities, these oﬃcials would represent the political-cum-eco- 
nomic forces that have gained from recent marketization and could become 
a constituency for such activities. Even though the elections for the SPA and 
local People’s Committees are not competitive, it is possible that oﬃcials more 
responsive to local needs have entered the political system through this route. 
Minxin Pei (2006) makes the argument that these actors are subject to the 
same incentives as those at the center and could become a force for blocking 
further reforms and institutionalizing local protection and rent seeking. But at 
the current juncture these forces are more likely to provide the political foun- 
dation for the sort of competitive liberalization and reform from below that 
played some role in both the Chinese (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995) 
and Vietnamese reforms. 
To summarize, the debate about political change in North Korea has focused 
for too long on the issue of collapse, ignoring political sources of resilience and 
failing to consider alternative paths of change within the existing system. It is 
again important to restate that neither of the scenarios we have sketched here 
is particularly hopeful with respect to the future evolution of the political sys- 
tem. The “modernization from above” model is associated with a high level of 
central control. Nor is the more decentralized path we have sketched necessarily 
conducive to broader political reform. A discouraging feature of recent Chinese 
political history is that greater economic freedoms have not been associated 
with greater political freedom, competitiveness, or even the strengthening of 
civil and political liberties. If there is a relationship between economic growth 
and democratization, China is a regrettable reminder that that relationship 
operates only over the long run. 
 
The International Dimension I: The Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Assistance Revisited 
 
What obligations do the international community have to the people of North 
Korea?19 The right to food is enshrined most clearly in the Universal Declara- 
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tion of Human Rights and article 11 of the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which North Korea has been 
a party since December 1981. The nature of governments’ obligations under the 
ICESCR has subsequently been clariﬁed through a wide-ranging consultative 
process, most speciﬁcally by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul- 
tural Rights in its General Comment 12 of 1999 (United Nations 1999). The 
ICESCR does recognize that the right to adequate food can only be realized 
progressively, but General Comment 12 is clear that states have the obligation 
to “respect, protect, and fulﬁll” this right (paragraph 15). Paragraph 6 of the 
comment is quite explicit on this point: “States have a core obligation to take 
the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger as provided for in para- 
graph two of article 11, even in times of natural or other disasters.” 
These commitments recognize that governments cannot necessarily meet 
this obligation on their own. The ICESCR and its subsequent interpretation 
therefore include both an obligation to facilitate (General Comment 12, para- 
graph 15) and corresponding duties on the part of the international community 
to assist governments in distress or chronic need (ICESCR Article 11; General 
Comment 12 paragraph 36). 
As we discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the humanitarian response was not as 
swift as it might have been, held hostage at various points by political calcula- 
tions. But it did ultimately prove generous. In the decade following the ﬂoods 
of 1995, the international community provided North Korea with over $1.5 
billion in food aid alone. 
Yet as we also have shown, the North Korean government consistently 
sought to frustrate transparent, eﬀective humanitarian relief. It is likely that 
aid is not proﬀered in a nondiscriminatory manner. Diversion is almost cer- 
tainly occurring on a large scale, enough food to feed between 3 to 10 percent 
or more of the North Korean populace. Some of this aid is almost surely con- 
sumed by politically connected groups, including the military.20 The diversion 
that goes to the market has some positive eﬀects but is also contributing to the 
creation of a privileged class of state-sector entrepreneurs and their allies and an 
increasingly stratiﬁed society, with a sharp division between those with access 
to foreign exchange and food and those without. 
A crucial ﬁrst question is whether the international community—viewed as 
a whole—should provide aid to North Korea at all. A variety of critics—not 
only in the United States but in Europe and South Korea as well—have argued 
that aid to North Korea serves to prolong the life of the existing regime (North 
Korea Advisory Group 1999; Terry 2001; and C. Kang 2005). Some have drawn 
the conclusion that the goals of policy reform or even regime change would be 
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advanced by coordinated action to cut North Korea oﬀ from the international 
economy and even from external supplies of food (C. Kang 2005). 
We agree wholeheartedly that a reformist government or, better still, a peaceful 
change of regime would be highly desirable. We have also suggested that a coor- 
dinated strategy of cutting North Korea oﬀ from international assistance would 
increase the probability of regime change. But there are a number of problems in 
jumping from the beneﬁts of regime change to a policy of reducing humanitarian 
assistance. The North Korean government has shown repeatedly its willingness 
to impose extreme deprivation on its people. The probability that coordinated, 
wholesale reductions in food aid will lead to improved conditions, policy reform, 
or regime change remains both uncertain and well below 100 percent. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that the coordination required to have the 
intended (if uncertain) eﬀect is possible given the competing political interests 
of the donor countries. To the contrary, reductions in multilateral assistance 
have been matched by increases in bilateral aid from South Korea and China. 
Thus reductions in aid from any one party must be weighed both against the 
unlikelihood that such reductions will have their intended eﬀect and the loss 
of leverage that comes from disengagement. 
It is also important to emphasize that the violation of humanitarian norms, 
the ﬂaws in the aid program, and the problem of diversion do not mean that 
aid is without positive eﬀects. Aid has had beneﬁcial eﬀects both directly, by 
increasing overall supply and moderating prices, and indirectly, by encouraging 
commercialization and the growth of markets.21 The highest estimates of diver- 
sion that we have seen—fully 50 percent going to less-deserving groups or the 
military—still leave 50 percent of food going to meet the needs of vulnerable 
groups. Markets have clearly been developing and are likely to continue to do 
so despite the retrenchment of late 2005. 
Most important, the argument for cutting food aid rests on a highly dubious 
utilitarian logic: that it is morally acceptable to sacriﬁce the innocent today in 
the uncertain probability that lives will be saved or improved at some future 
point. This type of argument ﬂies directly in the face of the fundamental rights 
that the international community is trying to uphold. We applaud those with 
the courage to make such a sacriﬁce for themselves. But we are much less com- 
fortable with the notion that the outside community should make that decision 
for vulnerable North Korean citizens. It is important to point out that those 
NGOs who did pull out of North Korea did so in the context of continued 
aid through the World Food Programme, bilateral donors, and other NGOs. 
The calculus is very diﬀerent when considering whether total food aid should 
be reduced or cut altogether. 
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If the arguments in favor of continued assistance seem clear, we must simul- 
taneously be clear-headed about the nature of the bargains that have been 
struck and continually seek to advance the underlying purposes of humanitar- 
ian assistance. The donor community must be a voice of conscience for those 
deprived of the most fundamental right to food. The WFP and its associated 
donors must: 
 
• continue to highlight government practices that impede the delivery of 
food to vulnerable groups, including diversion; 
• continue to uphold humanitarian principles, including the empowerment 
of beneﬁciaries; and 
• continue to press for eﬀective assessment that would provide information 
not only to outsiders but to the North Korean government itself on the 
nature of the health and nutritional problems faced by its citizens. 
 
Failure to uphold the basic norms of humanitarian assistance risks turning 
North Korean exceptionalism into the North Korean precedent in dealing with 
complex humanitarian emergencies. 
Although we oppose cutting oﬀ food aid, we agree with the critics that the 
international community must make a concerted and coordinated eﬀort to 
wean North Korea oﬀ of humanitarian assistance. This would involve outlining 
and negotiating a path of reduced aid—subject to reversal in the face of natu- 
ral disasters—that would point toward self-suﬃciency, deﬁned as the capacity 
to import adequate external supplies on commercial terms. One of our most 
disturbing ﬁndings is the evidence that North Korea seems unwilling to spend 
scarce foreign exchange on food. We cannot allow this practice to continue and 
must voice our intent to shift the burden of ﬁnancing North Korea’s food deﬁ- 
cit from the international humanitarian community—which is facing pressing 
needs elsewhere—onto the North Koreans themselves. 
A component of this strategy of reducing humanitarian assistance is to couple 
it with the promise of greater access to development assistance. Such a shift in 
emphasis would be facilitated by getting North Korea into international orga- 
nizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
Asian Development Bank that are capable of providing comprehensive techni- 
cal assistance in a relatively depoliticized way. As of 2005, membership in the 
international ﬁnancial institutions remained hostage to ongoing negotiations 
on the country’s nuclear program. Yet we strongly suspect that North Korea’s 
understanding of participation in these organizations is ﬂawed, and a similar 
set of ongoing negotiations will be required to make such aid eﬀective. North 
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Korea’s unhappiness with humanitarian assistance has rested to some extent 
on the invasive nature of external monitoring. But the international ﬁnancial 
institutions attach an equal if not even more onerous set of conditions to the 
development lending they do, ranging from policy reform, to the monitoring 
of particular projects, to demands for transparency and accountability in the 
use of funds and the collection and publication of meaningful data. North 
Korea will have to recognize and adhere to the norms embodied in these insti- 
tutions if it expects to avail itself of their beneﬁts. 
In thinking through a coherent aid strategy toward a country such as North 
Korea, the coordination problems cannot be ignored. We have shown that two 
countries, China and South Korea, have provided concessional sales or grants 
of food to North Korea largely outside the ambit of the WFP. We have no 
direct evidence of China’s contracts with North Korea but have seen no public 
evidence that they have conditioned aid either on overall policy reform or more 
particular principles of programmatic design, implementation, or monitoring. 
In the case of South Korea, aid has been provided on a concessional basis and, 
by the admission of the government, with only the most minimal eﬀort to 
monitor. There are numerous disadvantages in this arrangement. If China and 
South Korea remain suppliers of last resort, the North Korean government 
gains the opportunity to weaken the multilateral regime that is in place and 
to challenge the WFP’s most basic mandate; in mid-2005, that is exactly what 
Pyongyang did by asking the WFP to leave. 
In this respect, the policy choices of the South Korean government proved 
the most problematic. Large, relatively open-ended aid commitments—total- 
ing as much as 90 percent of total WFP needs—had the unintended conse- 
quence of undercutting the WFP’s attempts to uphold the norms embodied 
in international agreements to which South Korea is a party. More broadly, 
we are dubious that a strategy of unconditional economic assistance will have 
the positive eﬀects, either political or economic, that are postulated. The 
strategy of engagement was an advance over its predecessors, and we recog- 
nize the special circumstances that bind the South and North Korean people 
together. The open-ended and large-scale delivery of food aid, however, has 
not advanced the cause of helping North Korea to become more self-reliant 
in the long run and has even undermined the modest progress in providing 
more transparent and eﬀective humanitarian relief in the short run. We have 
therefore argued (Haggard and Noland 2005)—not without controversy— 
that China and South Korea should channel a greater portion of their conces- 
sional food assistance through the WFP. These countries’ experience and voice 
would be of invaluable assistance to WFP operations and would facilitate 
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the coordinated approach needed to reduce North Korea’s dependence on 
humanitarian assistance.22 
We are fully aware of the ambiguities in the strategy of conditional engage- 
ment that we have outlined here, including the fact that North Korea may 
be unwilling to enter into such a bargain and could call our bluﬀ by once 
again using its population as a hostage. Strategy, however, does not only involve 
deciding whether to provide aid or not but continually being on guard for 
opportunities to press the humanitarian and human rights cause and for gains 
at the margin. 
Yet the issues in this case do not center on food alone. As in most humanitar- 
ian disasters, they encompass a wider set of political issues, and on the Korean 
peninsula, these issues are particularly complex. 
 
The International Dimension II: The Broader Geopolitical Equation 
 
Throughout our discussion—of the economic reforms, of political change, of 
the humanitarian eﬀort—we have continually been forced back to the plane 
of high politics: the political and military issues associated with the continuing 
division of the Korean people into two separate states. Given the structural 
attributes of the North Korean economy, opening to greater international trade 
and investment will be central to North Korea’s economic revitalization. But no 
reform initiative will achieve its full potential as long as the country remains a 
pariah state. 
North Korea’s external economic relations have always been highly politi- 
cized. During the cold war, it received preferential treatment from the East- 
ern bloc, while its relations with Western countries were problematic at best 
(Noland 2000). Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United 
States imposed comprehensive sanctions under the World War I–era Trading 
with the Enemy Act. These sanctions were partially eased in 1995 as part of 
the Agreed Framework, and a bilateral agreement on long-range missile test- 
ing resulted in the removal of most of the remaining trade restrictions in June 
2000.23 But a few potentially signiﬁcant ones remain.24 
Over the course of the second Bush administration—and even before—the 
United States has also intensiﬁed its eﬀorts to squeeze North Korea by depriv- 
ing it of revenues obtained through illicit activities such as counterfeiting, 
smuggling, and drug traﬃcking. Although no actions had been taken under 
it through the end of 2005, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) threat- 
ened coordinated action to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMD) or materials and equipment related to WMD production (Winner 
2005). South Korea and China do not participate in the PSI but have cooper- 
ated in multilateral eﬀorts to stop illegal activity such as drug traﬃcking. Given 
North Korea’s limited trade relations, ﬁnancial sanctions are likely to have more 
substantial eﬀect. Japan has strengthened its ability to impede remittances to 
North Korea. And in 2005 the United States threatened an important action 
against a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia, that had wide-ranging implica- 
tions for the entirety of North Korea’s oﬀshore ﬁnancial relationships (United 
States Department of Treasury 2006). 
Beyond these measures, North Korea is among the few countries that do not 
enjoy normal trade relations (NTR) status with the United States; as a result, 
North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column two tariﬀ rates that 
have their origins in the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariﬀ Act of 1930. These 
tariﬀs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, 
in which North Korea would presumably specialize. Some countries, notably 
China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject 
to the higher column two tariﬀs (though even China eventually gained NTR 
status, initially on a year-to-year basis).25 Nevertheless, the eﬀective inability 
to export to the United States from North Korea represents an important dis- 
incentive to ﬁrms of any nation contemplating investment in North Korea. 
Indeed, the issue of whether to treat products made in the Kaeso˘ng Industrial 
Complex as “made in South Korea”—and hence eligible for duty-free treat- 
ment—has come up in discussions about a U.S.-South Korea free trade agree- 
ment, with South Korea pushing for liberal rules of origin and the United 
States signaling its resistance. 
At present, only the terrorism list is a legally—as distinct from politically— 
binding constraint on U.S. diplomacy.26 North Korea remains on the U.S. 
government list of state sponsors of terror, although it is not known to have 
committed  any  terrorist  acts  since  1987  and  has  subsequently  made  public 
statements condemning terrorism and even signed a number of antiterrorism 
conventions. The willingness of the United States to support North Korea’s 
membership in the multilateral development banks is explicitly tied to third- 
party allies concerns in this regard. South Korea has indicated that it holds 
no objection to the removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, but the 
Japanese abductee issue as well as that of the few aging Japanese Red Army 
hijackers North Korea continues to harbor are speciﬁcally mentioned in the 
U.S. State Department report on terrorism.27  Until these issues are settled it 
is doubtful that the United States will remove North Korea from the list of 
terror sponsors. 
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Once they are resolved, both the United States and Japan might drop 
their opposition to North Korean participation in the international ﬁnancial 
institutions. Getting North Korea into the international ﬁnancial institutions 
would permit those organizations immediately to begin providing technical 
assistance to be eventually followed by lending. Furthermore, such a pack- 
age deal would likely include normalization of relations between Japan and 
the DPRK and, with it, signiﬁcant monetary compensation from Japan for 
postcolonial claims. 
In sum, one can imagine diplomatic breakthrough leading to bilateral ﬁnan- 
cial support and integration into the international ﬁnancial institutions and 
greater willingness on the part of private sector ﬁrms to invest as sanctions on 
trade and investment were removed. By raising the payoﬀs to economic open- 
ing, these changes would also presumably cause Pyongyang to begin viewing 
reform more favorably. But until this happens, North Korea’s integration into 
the world economy will remain somewhat irregular and partial, heavily ori- 
ented toward South Korea and China, where these political concerns inhibit 
the process of economic integration less than they do elsewhere. 
So what is the likelihood of North Korea resolving its diplomatic diﬀer- 
ences with the United States and Japan? It is important to begin by stating the 
obvious: U.S. policy toward North Korea has been driven overwhelmingly by 
security considerations on the peninsula and since the late 1980s, if not before, 
by concern over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions in particular. The United States 
has vacillated between strategies of containment and engagement for pursuing 
these objectives. These two policy orientations are not mutually exclusive as 
Cha and Kang (2003) show in their thoughtful debate on the issue. But they 
do rest on contending views of the stability of the military balance on the pen- 
insula and the logic of North Korean behavior. 
Those drawn to policies of containment believe that North Korea is weak but 
dangerous and that the stability of the peninsula cannot be taken for granted 
(Cha and Kang 2003).28 More important for our purposes, hawks argue that 
economic and other concessions tend to strengthen the regime and increase 
rather than mitigate its tendency to engage in threatening behavior. The result 
is a form of blackmail in which North Korea eﬀectively demands payment to 
abide by its international commitments (Downs 1999; Cha and Kang 2003:72– 
75). Although dubious about the eﬀects of positive incentives (carrots), hawks 
are not averse to using negative sanctions (sticks) and even threatening the use 
of force. The reasons appear to rest on the assumption that negative sanctions 
are more likely to signal resolve and have the intended eﬀect, while material 
inducements can be misused to support undesirable (read “military”) initia- 
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tives. Moreover, a policy of sanctions has the additional beneﬁt of imposing 
costs on the regime and increasing the probability that it might fall. 
Advocates of engagement, by contrast, argue that the military balance is 
fundamentally stable—that deterrence works—and that there are in any case 
no politically feasible military options for solving the nuclear issue.29 When 
stability has been threatened, it was not only North Korean behavior that 
was to blame but threats from the United States that left North Korea uncer- 
tain about the credibility of American commitments and even about its basic 
intentions.30 The core to a settlement therefore resides in maintaining a ﬁrm 
deterrent posture while also providing security guarantees to North Korea that 
alleviate its insecurity. 
Economic integration plays a key role in broader political strategies of engage- 
ment. Economic incentives not only build trust and signal peaceful intent but 
also have direct eﬀects on both the economy and polity that may mute the pro- 
pensity for conﬂict and foster change. In particular, increasing economic ties 
will create vested interests in trade, investment, continuing economic reform, 
and greater economic openness. Increasing openness is also assumed to have a 
corrosive eﬀect on the regime’s political control by introducing outside sources 
of information and cultural inﬂuence and thus strengthening the independence 
of civil society. Over the long run, openness fosters growth, which in turn 
provides the political as well as economic foundation for political liberalization 
and democratization. 
As can be seen, although these approaches hinge largely on contending 
models of North Korea’s military and bargaining behavior, they also rest on 
important political economy assumptions as well. We have considered these 
issues with respect to the aid relationship, but they are worth reviewing in the 
context of the broader strategic context of the period we have considered in 
this book: the settlement of the ﬁrst nuclear crisis in 1994, the shift in policy 
between the Clinton and Bush administrations, and the onset of the second 
nuclear crisis in October 2002. 
Following the ﬁrst nuclear crisis and the signing of the Agreed Framework, 
further progress on bilateral relations between North Korea and the United 
States stalled. In the immediate postframework period, North Korea was dis- 
tracted by the political transition following the death of Kim Il-so˘ng and the 
extreme economic conditions that characterized the peak famine period. Yet 
once these immediate challenges had passed, Pyongyang dragged its feet on 
negotiations that would have institutionalized a ﬁnal settlement to the Korean 
War (the so-called Four-Party Talks, 1997–99) while engaging in a string of 
threatening actions, most notably the failed attempt to place a small satellite 
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into orbit in August 1998. Pakistani intelligence uncovered through the A. Q. 
Khan network suggests that it was almost certainly during this period—before 
the election of George W. Bush—that North Korea also moved to acquire tech- 
nology and equipment for enriching uranium, in direct violation of a number 
of its international commitments. 
From Pyongyang’s perspective, however, the Clinton administration had 
eﬀectively reneged on key commitments under the Agreed Framework as well. 
Under the deal, the North agreed to freeze and eventually to dismantle its 
nuclear program in return for two light-water reactors (LWRs), an interim 
supply of heavy fuel oil, some relaxation of sanctions, and, above all, progress 
in normalizing political relations with the United States. The Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) orchestrated the early work on 
the LWR construction and the United States generally met its commitments 
with respect to heavy oil shipments and the partial easing of sanctions. But 
the Clinton administration and the Agreed Framework came under increasing 
pressure from Republican hawks in Congress after the midterm elections of 
November 1994. Distracted by other issues, the administration saw little gain 
from elevating North Korea to a priority issue; from North Korea’s perspective, 
the United States had reneged on the key quid pro quo of normalization. 
The missile launch of 1998 triggered a wide-ranging review of policy con- 
ducted by former defense secretary William Perry that restated the engagement 
logic: a settlement of the nuclear and missile issues in return for security guar- 
antees and at least the promise of economic beneﬁts associated with normaliza- 
tion. The so-called Perry report and the June 2000 North-South summit pro- 
vided the basis for a ﬂurry of diplomatic activity at the very end of the Clinton 
administration, including a visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, and removal of most of the remaining economic sanctions applied 
administratively under the International Emergency Powers Act, the successor 
to the Trading with the Enemy Act. But time had run out, and the outgoing 
administration did not succeed in ﬁnalizing a deal to end North Korea’s bal- 
listic missile program. 
The Bush administration quickly backed away from the Perry approach by 
initiating an internal review of policy that signaled a more demanding interpre- 
tation of the framework and the inclusion of altogether new issues, including 
conventional force deployments. With the coming of 9/11, everything changed: in 
rapid succession, North Korea was dubbed a member of the Axis of Evil, 
and the United States outlined a new counterproliferation strategy that justiﬁed 
preemption and showed that these were not empty threats by confronting Sad- 
dam Hussein over weapons of mass destruction and ultimately going to war. 
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The American revelation that it had evidence of North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment program in October 2002 signaled the onset of the second nuclear 
crisis. As North Korea quickly escalated the crisis through a series of calcu- 
lated steps, the United States was in no mood to negotiate, and certainly not 
directly with North Korea. Nor was it in the mood to reiterate the concessions 
it had previously made—including a presidential statement under the Clinton 
administration that the United States did not harbor hostile intent—let alone 
oﬀer new ones. 
While escalating the crisis, the North Koreans were also consistent in stat- 
ing their demands for reaching an agreement, even if they were vague on the 
details. In return for addressing the nuclear question, they sought provision of 
a negative security guarantee from the United States, an end to Washington’s 
hostile policy and a normalization of relations, and the promise not to interfere 
in North Korea’s economic relations, interpreted to mean either with third 
countries or with the international ﬁnancial institutions. 
China brokered a face-saving solution for both the United States and North 
Korea by hosting three-party talks that gelled into the Six-Party Talks, also 
including South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The United States did not table a 
meaningful proposal through this venue until June 2004. The North Koreans 
failed to respond, content to proceed with their nuclear activities while hoping 
that the November 2004 U.S. elections would yield a more pliant set of inter- 
locutors. When the American electorate dashed this hope, the North Koreans 
suspended their participation in the talks and announced for the ﬁrst time in 
February 2005 that they possessed nuclear weapons. A combination of consid- 
erable multilateral pressure and substantial economic inducements from South 
Korea brought the North Koreans back to the negotiating table in July 2005 
and produced a statement of principles in September that contained many 
of the earlier quid pro quos: a promise to dismantle the nuclear program in 
return for security guarantees, future steps toward normalization, and provision 
for substantial economic assistance from South Korea and probably China as 
well. But as of this writing in mid-2006, negotiations remain stalled with no 
breakthrough in sight. 
What does this brief history tell us about the prospects for strategies of 
containment and engagement? In the absence of credible military options, the 
strategy of containment would seem to face many of the same coordination 
problems we have highlighted with respect to humanitarian assistance. The 
Bush administration clearly saw the Six-Party Talks as a mechanism through 
which the United States could bring coordinated pressure to bear on North 
Korea. But China and South Korea bore the immediate risks of North Korean 
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isolation or collapse and had their own strategic and domestic political rea- 
sons to be skeptical of U.S. intentions. For those two pivotal countries, the 
Six-Party Talks were less a mechanism for bringing pressure to bear on North 
Korea than they were a means of bringing pressure to bear on the United 
States to be more forthcoming. 
Beijing has repeatedly stated its belief that the Korean peninsula should 
be denuclearized and has quite possibly exerted pressure on North Korea 
that is not visible from the outside. Yet it has also consistently opposed the 
strategy of isolating North Korea politically, rejected economic sanctions as 
counterproductive, and called on the United States to be more cooperative 
in the negotiations. 
Ironically, the problems the United States faces on the South Korean front 
are arguably more diﬃcult and intractable than the ones they have with China. 
A growing majority of South Koreans, accustomed to living for decades in the 
shadow of the North’s forward-deployed artillery, do not regard the North as 
a serious threat. Growing prosperity and conﬁdence in the South have trans- 
formed fear and loathing of the North into pity and forbearance. 
Deep generational and political changes in South Korea have driven this 
fundamental shift. In a 2004 public opinion poll, for example, more South 
Koreans identiﬁed the United States as the principal threat to peace than North 
Korea. The younger the respondent and the higher the level of educational 
attainment, the wider is this gap. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in their 
twenties and 52 percent of students and white-collar workers polled singled out 
the United States as the primary threat to peace (Chosun Ilbo 2004). Another 
survey found that more than three-quarters of South Korean students polled 
actually supported North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons (Bong 
2003). These changes were both tapped and led by the No government, which 
ran on a subtly anti-American platform and whose strategy toward North 
Korea extended the underlying logic of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. In one 
controversial speech in early 2005—a critical moment in the eﬀort to restart 
the negotiations—President No even argued that South Korea’s foreign policy 
rested on playing a balancing role in the region, presumably between the United 
States—its nominal alliance partner—and both North Korea and China! 
If the case for containment, isolation, and regime change seems weak, it 
does not necessarily imply that the logic of engagement is airtight. It is true 
that the 2005 statement of principles seems to embody a clear quid pro quo. 
As of this writing, it remains a distinct possibility that Pyongyang is playing 
for time and hoping that the divisions among the ﬁve parties over strategy—in 
eﬀect, the political correlate of the coordination problems we have discussed 
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with respect to humanitarian assistance—will allow it to have the best of both 
worlds: maintaining its nuclear program while blaming the United States for 
the necessity of doing so. Indeed, the reticence and outright paranoia evinced 
by the regime in a decade of dealing with humanitarian aid workers does not 
augur well for the establishment of a credible veriﬁcation and monitoring sys- 
tem for its nuclear weapons programs. 
That said, the proponents of some form of engagement would seem to be 
vindicated. The circumstances leading up to the Agreed Framework itself are 
ambiguous: U.S. signals of a willingness to use force arguably played a role in 
North Korea’s thinking, but the actual deal was made possible by assurances 
carried to Pyongyang by President Carter and a number of material conces- 
sions (the LWRs, commitment to normalize, and at least suggestions of other 
economic beneﬁts). Republican pressure on the Clinton administration did not 
appear to have any aﬀect on moving North Korea toward cooperation and did 
not rest on a coherent alternative strategy. Neither the early years of the Bush 
administration nor its early management of the 2002 crisis resulted in any prog- 
ress, either. Financial sanctions may prove more eﬀective than trade sanctions, 
but only in the context of other economic concessions such as those provided 
by South Korea: generous food and fertilizer aid, promises of massive electricity 
assistance, and the initiation of a number of new cooperative ventures. 
If a very explicit economic quid pro quo facilitated an agreement to continue 
to negotiate, some of the softer and longer-term elements of the engagement 
approach are much more diﬃcult to demonstrate. Moreover, the dilemmas we 
noted with respect to humanitarian engagement are replicated in the broader 
political sphere. 
The engagement strategy rests on the presumption that the North Korean 
government places a heavy weight on economic incentives and is sensitive to 
the costs of both forgone beneﬁts and sanctions. But this reading of North 
Korean preferences is by no means obvious. It is not clear how much pressure 
the North Korean government faces to undertake a coherent, wide-ranging 
economic reform. To the contrary, it is doubtful that this reform will resemble 
anything like what Western pundits mean by the term. And it is even more 
dubious that they would lead either directly or indirectly to a relaxation of 
political controls; indeed, the opposite appears to be the case. 
If a strategy of engagement is to have positive eﬀects on North Korea’s 
military and political behavior, those beneﬁts will ironically come in the ﬁrst 
instance from North Korea’s integration with China and socialization into not a 
Western but a Chinese model of doing business. U.S., Japanese, and European 
economic relations with North Korea remain relatively limited, dominated in 
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both the U.S. and European cases by humanitarian assistance and in all three 
cases constrained by ongoing political tensions over the nuclear question. 
South Korea’s economic relations with North Korea have grown rapidly over 
the last decade and over the long run will undoubtedly play an important role 
in North Korea’s economic transformation. But they, too, remain constrained 
in important ways that limit their transformative eﬀect. North Korea has been 
more than willing to accept South Korean aid, but investment and trade have 
been conﬁned to relatively small enclaves such as the Kaeso˘ng Industrial Com- 
plex and the Mount Ku˘mgang tourism project. Despite its apparent welcome 
of South Korean largesse and the limited opening of rail and road links, North 
Korea is unlikely to allow South Korean business unfettered access to the coun- 
try. A number of South Korean NGOs have been allowed to operate and are 
undoubtedly having an eﬀect by ﬂying under the radar and building local alli- 
ances. But it is overly optimistic to think that the North Korean authorities will 
allow these relationships to have serious political consequences. 
It is also important to underline crucial silences that have accompanied 
the engagement approach. North Korea has managed to focus the discussion 
entirely on the issue of nuclear weapons. But the international community has 
a range of other interests with respect to North Korea as well: the humanitarian 
disaster of the last decade, the question of human rights, the growing issue of 
refugees. The terms of engagement cannot be circumscribed to nuclear weapons 
and high politics, particularly if we believe that there are close links between 
political and military behavior and the fundamental nature of the regime. 
In short, the same sort of dilemma operates in the political as in the humani- 
tarian sphere. The North Korean regime uses the issue of nuclear weapons to 
protect itself but also as a bargaining tool to extract gains from engagement. 
As tempting as it may seem to cut oﬀ assistance or to walk away with the hope 
that an intensiﬁcation of misery could provoke collapse of the regime, in the 
end it is unpersuasive to bet increased suﬀering now against possible gains in 
an uncertain future. As a consequence, one is forced back into trying to make 
incremental improvements in the status quo. 
We have outlined a variety of policy changes and technical ﬁxes that could 
contribute to the resolution of food insecurity issues in North Korea—every- 
thing from changing the product composition of humanitarian aid, to extend- 
ing incentive reforms in agriculture, to getting North Korea into the interna- 
tional ﬁnancial institutions. But these actions, however positive and desirable, 
ultimately  rest  on  more  basic  changes.  Kang  Ch’o˘l-hwan,  a  North  Korean 
defector and author of a widely read memoir of life in the country’s prison sys- 
tem (Kang 2002), recently oﬀered the following metaphor. “If you hold a cow 
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by its hoof, it will starve; if you allow it to roam, it will ﬁnd grass and eat.” This 
metaphor holds more truth than may appear on its surface. Granting citizens 
secure property rights and the freedom to trade and engage in private produc- 
tion would have wide-ranging eﬀects, enabling the people of North Korea to do 
what is best for themselves. This alone is no guarantee of a North Korea perma- 
nently free from hunger—there is a role for policy in many dimensions—but 
the relaxation of social control and establishment of the fundamental rights of 
a free and open society are a necessary prerequisite. 
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We argued in chapter 2 that the decline in Soviet-Russian and Chinese sup- 
port and the collapse of the industrial economy provided the government with 
strong incentives to earn foreign exchange. The government, however, proved 
largely unwilling or unable to undertake the reforms necessary to do this: 
expanding exports, encouraging foreign investment, and reestablishing access 
to international capital markets. 
In one important respect, however, this assessment is misleading as the 1990s 
saw a dramatic expansion of a variety of illicit activities and arms sales. These 
activities take us beyond the core concerns of this book, but given their sheer 
scope and magnitude and their growing signiﬁcance for U.S. policy toward 
the country after 2002, it is worth providing an overview and some estimates 
of their size.1 Moreover, a brief catalog of North Korea’s illicit trade provides 
fascinating insights into the changing nature of the regime. The bulk of these 
illicit activities appear to have been undertaken at the direction or with the 
knowledge of the top leadership, although more recent episodes suggest that at 
least some of these activities are more decentralized in nature and involve com- 
plex transnational relations among various state entities and criminal networks 
of various sorts (Chestnut 2005). 
For some time—probably since the inception of the regime—North Korea’s 
diplomatic corps has been under pressure to support the maintenance of foreign 
missions by earning foreign exchange. One of the simplest ways of doing so is 
to exploit diplomatic immunity, including most importantly the international 
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conventions that protect the secrecy and integrity of the diplomatic pouch. 
Erik Cornell (2002:61–62) the ﬁrst Swedish consular oﬃcer in Pyongyang, out- 
lines one of the early cases of such activity in the mid-1970s. Police in all four 
Scandinavian countries found that North Korean embassies were using their 
diplomatic tax exemption to purchase alcohol and cigarettes in large quantities 
and then reselling them on the black market. Far more lucrative, however, was 
traﬃcking in drugs. Chestnut (2005:42) documents how total drug seizures 
went up sharply after 1996, the peak of the famine. She also shows how the 
personnel involved in these seizures came to include oﬃcials outside the for- 
eign ministry (economic and intelligence oﬃcials) or individuals without any 
clear oﬃcial designation (employees of trading companies), as well as members 
of Asian criminal organizations that were acting as partners or intermediaries 
(see also Noland 2000 and Paddock and Demick 2003). From the mid-1990s, 
North Korea also began to produce drugs for export, beginning with opium 
but diversifying into methamphetamine following the ﬂoods of 1995 (Perl 
2005:7–10; Chestnut 2005:52–61). Although drugs almost certainly dominate 
North Korea’s smuggling activity, there is evidence—in the form of diplomatic 
expulsions—for trade in other sanctioned items, including so-called conﬂict 
diamonds from civil war zones in Africa, rhino horns, and ivory (Noland 2000; 
Chestnut 2005; Asher 2005). 
A second major form of illicit activity is counterfeiting. U.S. government 
oﬃcials had long suspected North Korea to be the origin of the so-called super- 
notes, very high quality counterfeits of $100 bills, that began to appear in 1989. 
But not until 2005 did a series of criminal cases and Treasury enforcement 
actions against a Macau bank shed more light on the issue (Meyer and Demick 
2005; Perl 2006); Chestnut’s study (2005:chap. 4) adds compelling evidence 
from defector interviews. 
As with drug smuggling, the sale of supernotes involves a complex “whole- 
sale” and “retail” distribution chain. A 2005 indictment targeted the leader of 
the oﬃcial IRA, Sean Garland, for distributing $28 million in notes in Russia, 
Belarus, Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Germany, and two sting 
operations in the United States resulted in indictments citing $6 million in 
counterfeit currency. More interesting, however, was a Treasury Department 
ﬁnding that Banco Delta Asia in Macau was a ﬁnancial institution of primary 
money laundering concern under the 2001 Patriot Act. Although the bank 
denied wrongdoing, Macau’s lack of crossborder currency reporting require- 
ments had clearly made it a center for North Korea’s oﬀshore ﬁnancial activi- 
ties. In the wake of the ﬁnding and pressure from correspondent banks in 
Japan, Korea, and Europe, Banco Delta Asia severed connections with roughly 
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forty North Korean individuals or businesses—many believed to be military- 
or party-related—replaced several managers, and allowed a panel named by 
Macau’s government to administer its operations (Demick and Meyer 2005). 
Nor has counterfeiting been limited to currency; evidence also exists of North 
Korean involvement in counterfeiting of cigarettes and pharmaceuticals (Chest- 
nut 2005:93–97). 
Much of North Korea’s weapons trade is arguably not illicit. Although North 
Korea continues to sell missiles and base technologies for them that fall under 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), North Korea is not a party 
to that agreement. The complications arising from this fact were made painfully 
evident in December 2002, when a Cambodian-registered North Korean ship 
bound for Yemen was intercepted by Spain in the Arabian Sea carrying ﬁfteen 
Scud missiles, warheads, and propellant. Although it was later revealed that the 
missiles were delivered to Libya, at the time the United States chose to release 
the cargo because Yemen had allied itself with the USA in the post-9/11 period. 
Other customers of North Korean missiles or missile technology include Paki- 
stan, Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Vietnam (Noland 2000, Lintner 2005). 
Calculating the size of the illicit sector is even more risky than the other 
estimates we undertake in this book. For a number of reasons, such trade is 
likely to be more volatile than other economic activities, and thus an estimate 
for any given year can be highly misleading. Seizures and arrests that appear 
to show very large amounts of trade—such as Japanese seizures in 1998–2002 
of methamphetamines with a wholesale value of $75 million or the Garland 
indictment—can be followed by the breakup of networks and a sharp falloﬀ in 
trade. Large military sales are “lumpy” as well. Successful exports to a particu- 
lar country do not necessarily generate repeat business. A statement by a U.S. 
oﬃcial in 2002 put sales in 2001 alone at $560 million. But this statement, if 
correct, probably reﬂects the high point of such sales, as the customer base has 
subsequently shrunk (Ward 2002, Lintner 2005). 
Rather than building up estimates from evidence on seizures or particular 
military sales, it is probably more sensible to work down from the external 
accounts of the country. Asher (2005), for example, walks through such an 
exercise and comes to the conclusion that total criminal activity and military 
sales in 2003 could have accounted for as much as 35–40 percent of all DPRK 
trade and an even higher share of total cash earnings. This number is broadly 
in line with Noland’s (2000) earlier estimate of about one-third of all exports, 
which we use in chapter 2. 
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The Scope of the Humanitarian Aid Eﬀort 
  
 
 
 
 APPENDIX 2.1. Total Humanitarian Assistance, by Sector (millions of US$)  
Coordination 
  
Food 
 
Agriculture 
 
Health 
Water and 
Sanitation 
 
Education 
and Support 
Services 
 
Other 
 
TOTAL 
1996/7 36.16 4.73 4.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 5.38 50.35 
1997/8 243.35 8.83 27.09 1.49 0.00 0.23 11.47 292.46 
1998 312.14 7.09 6.35 3.55 0.62 0.30 5.04 335.09 
1999 180.82 41.62 10.26 0.27 0.00 0.84 1.99 235.80 
2000 150.21 59.03 7.37 0.23 n.a. 1.01 6.36 224.22 
2001 270.75 55.52 20.19 0.31 0.18 1.33 29.28 377.59 
2002 213.25 70.87 14.68 5.18 0.32 0.84 55.66 360.83 
2003 124.02 5.31 24.44 0.95 0.93 0.23 30.79 186.70 
2004 128.07 67.41 27.72 10.75 1.72 1.55 63.24 300.49 
2005 29.79* 2.33 4.21 1.21 n.a. 1.36 24.64 63.56 
Total 1688.59 322.75 146.33 23.96 3.79 7.78 233.86 2427.10 
*Value derived from non-WFP-UN-OCHA ﬁgure ($107,563) and WFP reported contribution ($29,683,835) 
Notes: Does not include China. For 1996–1999, categories listed by UN-OCHA were slightly diﬀerent: Food security, Coordination, Food aid, Health/Nutrition, Water/Sani- 
tation, Education, and Other. 
Row and column totals do not all sum precisely in the original source. 
Sources: UN-OCHA, n.d.a.; WFP 2006b. 
H
AG
G
AR
D
 APPEN
D
IX.indd 250 
8/23/06 10:56:14 AM
 
  
 
 
 APPENDIX 2.2. Consolidated Appeal Humanitarian Assistance, by Agency ($US millions)  
  
WFP 
 
FAO 
FAO / 
UNDP 
 
UNDP 
 
UNICEF 
 
WHO 
OCHA 
(DHA) 
 
UNFPA 
 
NGOs 
 
TOTAL 
1996/7 26.21 2.29 0.00 2.28 3.49 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 34.39 
1997/8 134.34 1.66 1.03 2.50 17.20 1.60 0.06 0.00 0.00 158.38 
1998 202.65 0.90 5.12 0.00 5.73 1.17 0.30 0.00 0.00 215.87 
1999 177.91 0.00 3.09 0.00 6.16 1.90 0.84 0.00 0.00 189.89 
2000 145.58 0.00 3.04 0.00 2.51 1.30 0.68 0.00 0.00 153.10 
2001 240.08 0.00 1.84 0.00 3.47 1.57 0.49 0.10 0.42 247.97 
2002 206.11* 0.00 1.09 0.00 6.07 2.29 0.60 0.00 3.85 220.01* 
2003 117.78 1.36 0.00 0.00 5.98 3.47 0.23 0.11 4.16 133.10 
2004 118.86 2.38 0.00 0.00 17.31 5.53 0.53 0.19 6.78 151.58 
2005** - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 1,369.53 8.60 15.20 4.78 67.91 18.88 3.80 0.40 15.21 1,504.31 
* Includes $99.32 million carried over by the WFP 
**No consolidated appeal humanitarian assistance process in 2005 
Notes: Additional aid is given by agencies that is not part of the consolidated appeals process. Does not include China. 
Source: UN-OCHA n.d.a.. 
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 APPENDIX 2.3. Consolidated Appeal humanitarian assistance, by sector (millions of US$)  
 Food Aid Food Security Health / Nutrition Water / Sanitation Education Coordination TOTAL 
1996/7 26.21 4.57 3.55 0.00 0.00 0.06 34.39 
1997/8 134.34 5.80 16.52 1.49 0.00 0.23 158.38 
1998 202.65 6.04 2.71 3.55 0.62 0.30 215.87 
1999 177.91 3.09 8.01 0.00 0.00 0.84 189.89 
2000 145.58 3.04 3.80 0.00 0.00 0.68 153.10 
2001 240.08 2.26 4.64 0.31 0.18 0.49 247.97 
2002 206.11* 1.53 7.39 4.06 0.33 0.60 220.01* 
2003 117.78 2.27 10.93 0.95 0.94 0.23 133.10 
2004 120.34 3.00 19.09 6.69 1.73 0.73 151.58 
2005 - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 1,371.01 31.59 76.64 17.06 3.80 4.17 1,504.31 
* Includes $99.32 million carried over by the WFP. 
Notes: Does not include China. Food security includes agriculture; Coordination includes capacity building. Row and column totals do not all sum precisely in original 
source. 
Source: UN-OCHA n.d.a. 
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 APPENDIX 2.4. WFP Target Groups, by Appeal  
Appeal Target coverage and populations Comments 
Sept. 1995-June 1996 500,000 ﬂood victims 
June 1996-Mar. 1997 1.575 million total, including: 
500,000 ﬂood-aﬀected collective farmers 
525,000 children under ﬁve (25% of total cohort) 
125,000 workers and 425,000 dependents 
April 1997 - Dec. 1997 100,000 MT, total recipients not initially speciﬁed, but: 
 
80 percent of aid in support of food-for-work projects in ﬂood-dam- 
aged regions 
April: Expansion of initial appeal to cover 4.7 million 
people, including 2.6 million children under age six 
(100% of cohort) - nutritional support for twelve months 
through nurseries and kindergartens. 
20 percent for children under ﬁve July: Further expansion of appeal to increase rations to 
targeted children and provide special feeding for malnour- 
ished children and hospital patients 
1998 7.47 million total, including: Appeals shift to calendar year basis; initial appeal is the 
largest emergency operation in WFPs history. 
5.52 million children 
500,000 hospital patients 
500,000 workers (family ration based on two dependents) 
1999 8.044 million, including:| 
1.47 million children 6 months to 4 years; 665,000 5-6 years; 1.362 
million primary school; 1.947 million secondary school 
 
 
 
Target reported corresponds to the emergency operation 
begun in July (EMOP 5959.01), which expands upon the 
operation that went into eﬀect in January targeting 5.44 
million people (EMOP 5959). 
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 APPENDIX 2.4. WFP Target Groups, by Appeal (continued)  
Appeal Target coverage and populations Comments 
10,000 orphans March: WFP begins support of local production of forti- 
ﬁed biscuits and blended foods. 
120,000 hospital patients. 
500,000 over 60 years old 
1.65 million in food for work projects and dependents 
2000 Same as 1999 Continuation of emergency operation begun in July 1999. 
September: Additional appeal to cover needs through 
December. 
2001 7,619,500 total, including: February: WFP approves a special operation to supple- 
ment existing program, including increased local produc- 
tion and food-for-work allocations. 
346,000 pregnant and nursing women The WFP establishes more factories to produce special 
blended foods for babies, biscuits for children, and forti- 
ﬁed noodles for pregnant women; 18 operational by end 
2001. 
1.312 million nursery children (6 months - 4 years old); 631,000 
kindergarten; 1.352 million primary school; 1.850 million secondary 
school; 6,000 orphans; 24,000 patients in pediatric hospitals 
600,000 elderly people 
1.5 million in food-for-work projects and dependents 
Program expanded in the wake of spring drought, includ- 
ing through supplementary feeding programs in pediatric 
hospitals. 
Appeal experiences break in the pipeline in February 2002 
and risk of shortfalls due to pace of contributions. 
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 APPENDIX 2.4. WFP Target Groups, by Appeal (continued)  
Appeal Target coverage and populations Comments 
2002 6.458 million total, including: Growing share of aid is targeted to urban food for vulner- 
able populations in the Northeast. 
7,000 orphans, 1.357 million nursery children, 650,000 kindergarten, 
1.394 primary school, 676,000 secondary school 
 
357,000 pregnant and nursing women 
365,000 elderly 
24,000 patients in pediatric hospitals and their mothers 
April: WFP issues urgent appeals to meet shortfalls in tar- 
gets. May: Shortfalls in donations force cutbacks in rations 
to one million beneﬁciaries 
September: food distribution halted to some primary 
schools and kindergartens on the west coast, and cutbacks 
subsequently spread to the east coast including food-for- 
work projects and output of WFP factories. 
10,000 patients in nutrition rehabilitation centers July 1: Price reforms introduced 
300,000 in food-for-work projects and 900,000 dependents 
144,000 in need of food safety net during lean season 
250,000 contingency provision to assist populations aﬀected by 
disasters 
2003 6.436 million total, including: In response to the reforms, the WFP is placing still more 
emphasis on reaching PDS-dependent urban households, 
including through urban food- for-work projects. 
1.148 million nursery children (6 months - 4 years old); 577,335 kin- 
dergarten; 1.269 million primary school 
208,000 pregnant and nursing women 
551,000 elderly 
22,000 patients in pediatric hospitals and their mothers 
Deliveries to target populations erratic due to supplies. In 
January and February, continuing cutbacks in targets from 
previous appeal as a result of shortfalls in commitments and 
deliveries. Programs resume in March as a result of new 
deliveries, but then once again face cutbacks in July and 
again in October through December. 
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 APPENDIX 2.4. WFP Target Groups, by Appeal (continued)  
Appeal Target coverage and populations Comments 
2003 (continued) 725,000 in food-for work projects and 1.45 million dependents August: DPRK government lends WFP stocks to cover 
programs (14,000 MT) 
247,000 disaster contingency 
2004 6.513 million total, including: 
 
984,000 nursery children (6 months - 4 years old); 505,172 kinder- 
garten; 1.142 million primary school 
297,955 pregnant and nursing women 
 
All core beneﬁciaries except for 80,000 nursing and preg- 
nant women do not receive rations in January and Febru- 
ary. Site visits report drop in school attendance as rations 
drop. WFP issues urgent appeal to speed or increase 
donations and feeding is resumed in March. 
21,000 patients in pediatric hospitals and their mothers April: Train disaster in Ryongchon followed by new 
North Korean appeal to UN. 
709,553 elderly, representing 50% of PDS dependants in accessible 
counties 
366,634 low-income households, representing 15% of low-income 
PDS dependants in 17 of the most urbanized counties 
725,000 in food-for-work projects and 1.45 million dependents 
111,111 disaster contingency 
2005 6.517 million total, including: 
2.7 million children in nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools 
and orphanages 
300,000 pregnant and nursing women 
900,000 elderly (PDS dependant) 
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 APPENDIX 2.4. WFP Target Groups, by Appeal (continued)  
Appeal Target coverage and populations Comments 
2005 (continued) 360,000 in low-income urban households 
725,000 in food-for-work projects and 1.4 million dependents 
100,000 disaster contingency 
2006 1.877 million: 
(proposed) 977,100 mother and child health 
424,100 school food programs 
300,000 food for community development 
100,000 victims of natural disaster 
76,000 most vulnerable groups 
Sources: FAO/WFP 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004; UN-OCHA n.d.b. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The Marketization Balance Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This appendix describes the marketization balance sheet calculation. We assume 
that WFP’s food-for-work (FFW) program is both outside the PDS and not 
subject to diversion and that 10–50 percent of non-FFW aid is diverted, or in 
the notation below d = [.1, .5]. 
Target PDS is identical to the announced monthly ration (PDSmr) and can 
be decomposed into FFW and non-FFW aid and the component sourced from 
North Korean domestic supply. (We do not otherwise distinguish between 
WFP and non-WFP sources of non-FFW aid.) We have announced monthly 
ration PDSmr, FFW, and non-FFW aid; we can calculate the part sourced from 
NK farmers (PDSnk) as a residual: 
PDS = PDSmr = [PDSnk+ AIDnon-FFW] + AIDFFW 
PDSnk = PDS – AIDnon-FFW – AIDFFW 
Implicitly we assume that non-FFW aid is not additional, that is, it substitutes 
for PDSnk without raising the target PDS quantity. 
Then we apply the diversion parameter [.1, .5] to the non-FFW aid share (i.e., 
only aid, not domestically sourced supply, is diverted; this itself is a questionable 
assumption) to calculate the magnitude of aid that reaches its intended recipients: 
 
PDSaid = AIDnon-FFW x (1–d) 
  
 
(Alternatively, we could assume that diversion occurs uniformly across sources 
of supply, which would have the eﬀect of increasing the estimated degree of 
marketization.) 
We now assume that the government does not compensate for the diverted 
aid by increasing procurement from the farmers (i.e., the PDS does not deliver 
in reality what is claimed on paper by the magnitude of the diverted aid). 
We know the amount of food retained by farmers for in-kind consumption. 
This allows us to calculate the amount of food intermediated through markets 
as a residual 
 
S = Snk +Said = D = PDSnk + PDSaid + AIDFFW + INKIND+ MKT 
MKT = S – PDSnk – PDSaid – AIDFFW – INKIND = S – [PDSmr– 
[ AIDnon-FFW – AIDFFW ] – PDSaid – AIDFFW – INKIND 
Note that since PDSaid is a function of diversion, greater diversion (i.e., a 
larger parameter d) will increase marketization. 
  
 
 
 APPENDIX 3.1. Marketization, 1999-2003  
Basic assumptions 
Population (millions) 
Total PDS-share 
(%) 
Ag-share 
(%) 
1999-2003 22.3 71 29 
Aid (‘000 MT) 
Targets 
Said WFP total 
target 
 
 
WFP FFW 
target 
 
 
WFP FFW 
target / total 
target (%) 
 
AIDwfp AIDnon- 
FFW 
 
 
PDSaid 
d=0.1 
 
d=0.5 AIDFFW AIDnon- 
wfp 
1999-2003 1,198 583 n.a. 17.3 457 378 1,007 559 79 741 
Supply (‘000 MT) 
Snk Said S 
1999-2003 3,197 1,198 4,395  
PDSmr (via the PDCs)    
 PDS-dependent 
population 
Average daily PDS ration (g) PDSmr 
 n (mil- % workers 
lions) 
Workers Non-workers (‘000 
MT) 
1999-2003 15.8 66.7 279 242 1,538 
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 APPENDIX 3.1. Marketization, 1999-2003, (continued)  
Basic assumptions 
INKIND consumption by 
farmers 
 
Ag population Average daily PDS ration (g) 
 n (mil- % workers Ag work- Ag non-workers INKIND  
lions)  ers  (‘000 
 
1999-2003 
 
6.5 
 
66.7 
 
583 
 
250 
MT) 
1,112 
Demand - (‘000 MT)       
 
1999-2003 
PDS1 
1,538 
PDSmr 
1,538 
PDSnk 
340 
   
Marketization (‘000 MT)       
 
1999-2003 
d=.1 
1,856 
d=.5 
2,304 
    
Descriptive statistics (%)       
Marketization (pro- 
ducers’ perspective) 
Marketization (consumers’ 
perspective) 
d=.1 d=.5 
Said / 
PDS1 
1999-2003 83.7 42.2 52.4 77.9 
Sources: Population: Bank of Korea; shares: FAO/WFP 1999b, table 6. 
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NOTES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Other general accounts of the famine on which we draw throughout this study include 
Lautze 1996; Kim, Lee, and Sumner 1998; Noland 2000; Goodkind and West 2001; Noland, 
Robinson, and Wang 2001; Natsios 2001; Woo-Cumings 2002; S. Lee 2003; Noland 2004a; 
Haggard and Noland 2005; and Smith 2005b. 
2. Cumings 1997 provides a highly readable introduction to the whole of Korean history; 
Oberdorfer 1997 does the same service for the post-1960 era. 
3. On North Korea’s internal classiﬁcation system, see Foster-Carter (1994), Hunter 
(1999), Armstrong (2002), and the Korea Institute for National Uniﬁcation (KINU) (2004). 
On the sources of the Kim regime’s popular legitimacy, see Park (1998) and Cumings (1997, 
2003). 
4. There is no technical deﬁnition of famine. Most commentators associate the concept 
with a catastrophic food crisis resulting in an abrupt increase in mass mortality, though this 
deﬁnition is subject to reﬁnement and contestation (Devereux 2000). We will ascribe to 
the conventional interpretation in our discussion. For a review of theories of famine, see 
Devereux 1993. 
5. Drazen (2002) provides a theoretical model of this interaction, which centers on the 
concept of “ownership.” See also Khan and Sharma 2003. 
 
 
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE GREAT FAMINE 
 
1. Jagdish Bhagwati pointed out to us that in the context of widespread shortfalls across 
an entire population living near subsistence, an eﬀort to distribute shortfalls equitably could 
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in fact result in higher rather than lower famine deaths; see also S. Lee 2005. However, the 
typical famine pattern is characterized by substantial inequalities across regions in the avail- 
ability of food, and North Korea seems to ﬁt this pattern, as we will show in chapter 3. 
2. The share of the workforce employed in agriculture has risen in recent years as the 
industrial sector withered and demechanization of agriculture increased manpower require- 
ments in that sector. Moreover, the government has attempted to solve the food problem in 
part by forcing individuals to return to agricultural work. 
3. Total arable land in 1995 amounted to some 2 million hectares, though only some 1.43 
million hectares are suitable for cereal and other food grain production. Of the rest, approxi- 
mately 300,000 hectares were under fruit cultivation, and the remaining 270,000 hectares 
predominantly under mulberry trees for sericulture (FAO/WFP 1995). 
4. According to U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ﬁgures, the net ﬂow of resources from 
the Soviet Union turned negative even before 1990, although these ﬁgures probably under- 
state ongoing Soviet subsidies for both fuel and military equipment (CIA 1994). 
5. Readers with an economics background will no doubt recognize the more general 
problem of how to manage a major balance-of-payments adjustment associated with an 
external shock. 
6. While this campaign rose to public prominence in 1990 (Smith 2005b), the former 
East German ambassador to Pyongyang, Dr. Hans Maretzki, indicates that such campaigns 
were already under way in the late 1980s (pers. comm., May 30, 2005). 
7. In August 2000, North Korea merged Rajin and So˘ngbong into a special municipality 
called Raso˘n. We, however, will refer to the special district by its more commonly known 
former name. 
8. Admittedly, rapid supply response was probably easier to achieve in Vietnam’s labor- 
intensive agrarian economy than in the more complex and industrialized North Korean 
economy. But Vietnam had also been through its highly destructive war much more recently 
than North Korea had. 
9. As of 1997, the onset of the period of interest to us here, North Korea had accumu- 
lated approximately $11.9 billion of external debt, $4.6 billion owed to Western countries, the 
remainder to the Soviet Union and China, with the bulk of it owed to the Soviet Union. 
There was certainly no expectation, however, that the debt to Russia would be repaid at a 
Soviet-era oﬃcial exchange rate. 
10. Until 1998 the United States, Japan, and South Korea all opposed North Korean 
membership in the international ﬁnancial institutions. After the inauguration of Kim Dae- 
jung as president of South Korea in 1998, the South Korean government changed its position 
to one of support, though the United States and Japan remained opposed because of con- 
tinuing concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea 
remains on the U.S. government list of state sponsors of terror, although it is not known to 
have committed any terrorist acts since 1987 and has subsequently made public statements 
condemning terrorism. It continues to harbor a few aging Japanese Red Army airline hijack- 
ers, however. Under a U.S. law enacted when U.S. airplanes were regularly hijacked to Cuba, 
the provision of sanctuary to hijackers is one of the speciﬁc legal triggers for U.S. opposition 
to IFI lending. The unresolved cases of Japanese citizens abducted to North Korea were an 
additional source of tension in the case of Japan, one that assumed greater centrality fol- 
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lowing Kim Jo˘ng-il’s admission in September 2002 that North Korea had indeed kidnapped 
Japanese citizens. Additional complications arose because of purported involvement in drug 
traﬃcking, counterfeiting, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and human 
rights abuses, including religious rights, constraining any administration’s room to maneuver 
if so inclined; we take up these issues in appendix 1 and chapters 6 and 8. 
11. For unknown reasons, the ﬁgures on Chinese grain shipments to North Korea re- 
ported by the South Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation and the UN’s International Food Aid 
Information System (INTERFAIS) diverge signiﬁcantly after 1998. 
12. Isolation from the outside world reduced genetic diversity of the North Korean seed 
stock, making plants more vulnerable to disease 
13. While the ﬂooding was considerable, the consensus of outside observers was that 
the government’s claims were exaggerated. For example, a UN survey concluded that the 
ﬂooding displaced 500,000 people, not the 5.4 million the government initially claimed. 
Michell (1998) observes that the 1995 and 1996 crop losses were insured. Rehabilitation of 
ﬂood-damaged lands lagged, however, though it is not clear whether this was due to lack of 
institutional capacity or the use of insurance receipts for other purposes. 
14. See, for example, the wide-ranging historical account of the historical origins of the 
North Korean ideological system in Cumings 2003. 
15. See Sigal (1998) on the crisis as an eﬀort to extract concessions from the United 
States. The key economic demands of the North Koreans related to energy (the provision of 
light-water reactors) and the normalization of relations and lifting of sanctions rather than 
food per se. 
16. On the commercial initiatives of 1996–97, see Harrison 2002:34. The quality of these 
initiatives undercut their purported message, however. At least one high-level group was 
sent out to procure foreign investment, but their road show was ham-handed, and other 
similar initiatives were marked by abrupt cancellations of meetings with potential investors 
(Noland 2000). 
17. On the ﬁrst nuclear crisis—from very diﬀerent perspectives—see Mazarr 1995; Ober- 
dorfer 1997:chaps. 11–14; Sigal 1998; Downs 1999; Harrison 2002, particularly chap. 17); Cha 
and Kang 2003; Cumings 2003:chap. 2); Harrison 2002; Wit,  Poneman,  and Galucci 2004. 
18. See Woo-Cumings 2002 for an explicit discussion and critique of Sen’s ideas in the 
context of the North Korean famine. 
19. Trade statistics indicate that North Korea exported small quantities of niche products 
such as sea urchins. To the extent that revenues from the sale of these delicacies could be used 
to purchase bulk grains, such trade would make sense. Whether the revenues were actually 
spent this way is unknown. There are also allegations that the DPRK resold aid, though even 
if these are true the magnitudes appear small. Again, if one could sell high-value rice received 
from donors for lower-cost grains, this would be a sensible tactic—though again there is no 
evidence that the receipts were actually being spent in this manner. 
20. A careful analysis of trade statistics by Eberstadt (1998a) indicates that while commer- 
cial imports of bulk grains dropped considerably during the 1990s, North Korea continued 
to import small quantities of “bread or biscuits,” “cakes or pastries,” and even “diet infant 
cereal preparation,” presumably to be consumed by the political elite and their oﬀspring. 
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21. The argument that aid crowded out imports can be extended to domestic supply 
as well. In the conventional case of a market economy receiving concessional assistance, 
food aid drives down the price of food and provides a disincentive to cultivators to grow 
it. During the famine, grain was sold on markets to an increasing extent, and as a result 
this eﬀect might have operated to some degree. But food aid probably did have a some- 
what diﬀerent crowding-out eﬀect: it relieved the government of the need to adopt more 
wide-ranging reforms of incentives that would have boosted output. As Scott Snyder ob- 
serves, “the UN WFP has become an essential crutch upon which North Korea depends 
for its survival, while facing diminished structural pressure to engage in system reforms” 
(2003a:8). 
22. This counterfactual supply line falls above the baseline by varying amounts depending 
on the diﬀerence between that year’s commercial imports and those of 1993. 
23. The 2.3 million MT ﬁgure was the maximum non–human use ﬁgure ever cited by 
the FAO/WFP (1995). Subsequent FAO/WFP analyses have put nonhuman usage at 1.5 
million MT or less, with the most recent assessment putting it at less than 1.2 million MT 
(FAO/WFP 2004). 
24. According to Bermudez 2001, defectors had reported that these stockpiles were 
enough to sustain the Korean People’s Army from six months to three years; this claim 
would be consistent with the range of estimates cited. Smith (2005b) alleges that as much as 
3 million tons of underground war stocks were destroyed in the 1995 ﬂoods. We are skeptical 
of this much larger ﬁgure. In terms of the harvest cycle, one would not expect the govern- 
ment to maintain large stocks immediately before the harvest. Moreover, Smith’s source is an 
unpublished paper (Quinones 2002) that mentions the number in passing, in turn ascribing 
it to unnamed UNDP oﬃcials quoting unidentiﬁed North Korean oﬃcials. In short, this 
claim appears to be part of the history of North Korean exaggeration about losses. If true, 
however, it would imply that after four years of dwindling supplies and suppression of con- 
sumption and in the face of a widespread famine, the North Korean government was still 
maintaining “war stocks” equal to 80 percent of the previous year’s harvest; such behavior 
would constitute damning evidence of the regime’s culpability in the famine. It should be 
noted that if the military was maintaining the stocks (i.e., on balance were neither drawing 
them down nor building them up), then their existence would not aﬀect our analysis of ag- 
gregate food availability. The stocks would only have an adverse eﬀect on supply if they were 
subsequently rebuilt; in that case, the period of stock accumulation would be associated with 
a corresponding decline in food availability. 
 
 
3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF MISERY 
 
1. If we treat the PDS as serving the nonagricultural population, then the share is 71 
percent, but, as we will show, there were special distribution networks for some party and 
government oﬃcials, and the military had a separate provisioning system, bringing the total 
covered by the general PDS to approximately 60 percent of the population. 
2. Pyongyang was also favored with a higher share of rations in the form of rice as op- 
posed to maize. 
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3. This point is made in Amnesty International 2004. One of the ﬁrst studies of the 
human rights situation in the country is Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights 
Committee 1998. 
4. Hunter 1999 provides a thorough introduction to the class system. International Fed- 
eration for Human Rights (2003) and Oh (2003) oﬀer succinct summaries. 
5. For an extremely thoughtful and thorough speculation on the “oﬀ-limits” counties 
based on extensive defector interviews, see Martin 2004:557–78 
6. The wavering class accounted for 45 percent, and the hostile class the remaining 27 
percent (cited in International Federation for Human Rights 2003:5). 
7. This protected core elite consists of perhaps two hundred thousand people or roughly 
1 percent of the population, many either blood relatives or descendents of guerillas who 
fought with Kim Il-so˘ng (Lankov 2003). 
8. These plots were 95 square meters each in the rural areas and 30 square meters in urban 
areas, but only where land was available. 
9. The quantity allocated per household would depend on the number of dependents 
and their ages. 
10. The cash payments to the cooperative were distributed among the farmers on the basis 
of work points earned from various duties performed in the cooperative farming process. 
11. These points are made both by the two most comprehensive studies of the famine, 
Natsios 1999 and S. Lee 2003 (see also S. Lee 2005). See also Natsios 2001 for an excellent 
summary of these incentive issues. 
12. There have been persistent rumors that data compiled on defecting North Korean 
soldiers record a decrease in average size, implying that the onset of the food crisis was some- 
time in the 1980s. The Korean People’s Army reportedly has lowered its minimum height 
requirement for male conscripts from 150 cm to 125 cm. 
13. This is the conclusion of Sen’s pioneering book on famines (1981). 
14. General accounts of the famine can be found in Snyder 1997; Kim, Lee, and Sumner 
1998; Natsios 1999, 2001; Noland 2000:chap. 5; Woo-Cumings 2002; S. Lee 2003, 2005; Smith 
2005b. 
15. Suk Lee (2003, 2005) argues that the government in fact did this. 
16. For example, the claim appears to be supported by systematic survey evidence and 
refugee testimonials of the collapse of the PDS in the eastern provinces, but this collapse 
could have resulted from other sources. Hwang Jang Yo˘p, the highest-ranking political of- 
ﬁcial ever to defect from the country, has claimed that even sensitive personnel such as 
weapons scientists were dying (Natsios 2001:203), but many of his other claims have been 
called into question. Natsios argues that triage is plausible because of historical animosity 
between the eastern and western provinces (2001). Suk Lee (2003:237) cites Ahn (1996:251) to 
the eﬀect that the party gave a direct order not to ship grain to the northeast, but Ahn in 
fact does not make such a claim. 
17. See Ellman (2000), who distinguishes between a food-availability famine in which 
there is no feasible allocation of grain that would prevent hunger or starvation and one in 
which food has declined but could be redistributed. 
18. This ﬁgure is revealing, however, because the allocations suggested by the FAO/WFP 
crop assessments fell well below that. 
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19. This exercise is subject to one objection: that the distribution of the population in 
diﬀerent entitlement categories may vary. We ignore this, although it is the most obvious 
explanation for Pyongyang’s consistently higher share. 
20. Namp’o and Kangwo˘n also fared poorly with respect to PDS distribution, but as a 
port city Namp’o almost certainly had a more developed black market than did the cities in 
the northeast. See Smith 2005b:83–86. 
21. These data reﬂect the occupation not of respondents but of their families. 
22. Intriguingly, women tend to fare better than men during famines, but the biological 
and sociological bases for this advantage are not well understood (Macintyre 2002). 
23. Good Friends (1998) also presents estimates of mortality that show the classic U-shape 
pattern—high among infants and the elderly—but at rates that are outside the bounds even 
of famine conditions. 
24. Eberstadt (1998b) takes a somewhat diﬀerent tack in estimating famine-related 
deaths. Noting the fact that the size of the Supreme People’s Assembly did not change 
between 1990 and 1998, despite the fact that each member is supposed to represent a ﬁxed 
population (30,000), Eberstadt argues that three million people were “missing” during this 
period. Although this novel calculation gains some external validation from other estimates, 
it rests on the assumption that the North Korean government in fact stuck precisely to the 
ﬁne points of its constitution, an assumption that strains credulity. 
 
 
4. THE AID REGIME 
 
1. Overviews of the multilateral aid process can be found in Natsios 1999:chap. 8; Ben- 
nett 1999; Noland 2000; Smith 2002; Flake and Snyder 2003; J. Lee 2003; Reed 2004; and 
Manyin 2005. 
2. The relatively small shares devoted to coordination and other purposes almost certainly 
were in support of the food distribution eﬀort as well. 
3. The WFP planning and appeal process closely mirrors that of the CAP. The WFP, 
working in conjunction with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) dispatches 
Emergency Assessment teams to the aﬀected country to investigate how much food aid is 
needed, for how many beneﬁciaries, and how the food can be most eﬀectively delivered. 
The WFP then draws up an Emergency Operation (EMOP), including a plan of action 
and a budget. This plan lists who will receive food aid, what rations are required, the type 
of transport WFP will use. and which humanitarian corridors lead to the crisis zone. This 
assessment and planning process feeds into the formulation of an appeal, which depends 
entirely on voluntary contributions from governments, in the form of either food aid or 
cash for the purchase of food from third parties. As funds and food start to ﬂow, the WFP 
and OCHA logistics teams oversee the movement of food from its point of embarkation to 
the ultimate recipients. 
4. The representative of one NGO with a long-time involvement with North Korea may 
have inadvertently demonstrated this political capture phenomenon when she observed that, 
“while the DPRK authorities have not fully accepted the concept of nongovernmental aid 
agencies operating on a long-term basis in their country, there is an understanding now that 
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NGOs in many countries have a strong voice and thus can be quite inﬂuential” (quoted in 
Flake 2003:40). 
5. The most prominent of these exercises is the Inter-agency Code of Conduct arising out 
the Sphere Project (2004), and later, in recognition of the absence of a formal accountability 
mechanism, the establishment of the Humanitarian Accountability Project International 
(Young et al. 2004). 
6. The humanitarian principles included knowledge about the overall humanitarian situ- 
ation in the country according to assessed needs; assurance that humanitarian assistance 
reaches sectors of the population in greatest need; access for assessment, monitoring, and 
evaluation; distribution of assistance only to areas where access is granted; protection of 
the humanitarian interests of the population; support to local capacity building; beneﬁ- 
ciary participation in program planning and implementation; adequate capacity in terms 
of international staﬀ; and guarantees of the health and safety needs of the international 
humanitarian community. 
7. UNICEF established a resident oﬃce in January 1996, and the World Health Organi- 
zation in late 1997. The European Commission opened an oﬃce in 1997, and several Europe- an 
countries also established resident oﬃces. A number of NGOs proved more nimble, but 
they too faced start-up costs and resistance from the North Korean government. Excellent 
analyses of the NGOs are contained in Smith 2002; Flake and Snyder 2003; Reed 2004. 
8. A thorough discussion of these coordination issues is contained in Flake (2003) and 
included the formation of a North Korea working group, which coordinated functions taken 
on by InterAction in the United States, and the establishment of the Food Aid Liaison Unit 
in Pyongyang, which represented mostly Canadian and European NGOs and worked with 
the WFP. 
9. The most respected European consultancy on North Korea stated ﬂatly in July 1994. 
“We have been unable to ﬁnd anyone in the DPRK who is starving” (Euro-Asian Business 
Consultancy 1994). Similarly, an assessment conducted in March and April 1996 funded by 
the British Overseas Development Administration concluded that there did not appear to 
be widespread malnutrition, although certain groups were deemed vulnerable (Nathanail 
1996:5). 
10. The December 1995 assessment states, “There is a need for both emergency and proj- 
ect and program food assistance as well as support for the rehabilitation of the agriculture 
sector to raise production to more normal levels” (FAO/WFP 1995). 
11. Typically, parents supply a daily ration of 100 grams per day to nurseries, kindergar- 
tens, and schools for their children, a very large share of total allocation through the PDS 
(WFP 2003c). 
12. The WFP admits this speciﬁcally (WFP 2003b). 
13. NGOs have been subject to similar obstacles, and we note the distinctive constraints, 
but some have been more successful in adapting than others. As a result, the characteriza- 
tion of North Korean behavior that we oﬀer may not hold universally; some NGOs may 
have eﬀectively gained better access than we describe here by keeping their heads down and 
developing relationships at the local level. 
14. We constructed the map for 1995–96 by excluding four provinces altogether (Cha- 
gang, Yanggang, North and South Hamgyo˘o˘ng). 
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15. The bargaining power of the government is considerably greater vis-à-vis NGOs. The 
North Korean government routinely denies access to NGOs in the absence of a precommit- 
ment to a target aid level and has shown reluctance to issue long-term or multiple entry visas. 
Once a program has been agreed on, NGOs also depend on government-appointed staﬀ, a 
problem we discuss in more detail below. 
16. All oﬃcial visits (including calls on North Korean oﬃcials in Pyongyang) are included 
in these totals. In June 2003, there was a revision in the way food-for-work visits were 
counted: the WFP started to count visits to beneﬁciaries, work sites, and PDCs separately. 
As food-for-work visits were a relatively small share of the total, this diﬀerence does not af- 
fect the totals substantially and is any case justiﬁed. 
17. Deliveries for NGOs handled by the WFP’s Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) follow 
the same format. See Caritas—Hong Kong 2005a for a description. 
18. The North Koreans’ revision of their baby formula proposal to encompass a much 
larger number of institutions after diversion was detected is notable in this regard. 
19. The following draws on the March 31, 2005, press conference with Tony Banbury, 
WFP regional director for Asia (see Banbury 2005). 
20. The following draws on USAID (2005) and subsequent private correspondence with 
WFP staﬀ. 
21. In fact, the distinction between the two forms of engagement is not crystal clear: 
the WFP had been operating food factories and food-for-work programs, which might be 
thought of as having a development assistance component. 
22. Jan Egeland, the United Nations emergency relief coordinator, described halting hu- 
manitarian aid as “potentially disastrous” and pointed to nutritional surveys documenting 
chronic widespread malnourishment and the widening gap in stature between North and 
South Koreans (Brooke 2005). These surveys are discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
 
 
5. DIVERSION 
 
1. MSF interviews conducted in August 1998 reported speciﬁcally that foreign aid was 
diverted to the military and “executives,” although the three accounts making this allegation 
use suspiciously similar language and do not appear to rest on ﬁrsthand accounts (MSF 
1998). 
2. There are also periodic allegations of aid being resold abroad. In one such case, a Thai 
senate committee concluded that rice sold to North Korea on concessional terms had been 
diverted to West Africa instead (Joongang Ilbo 2002). However, we have not come across 
evidence that foreign diversion is a central aspect of the North Korean story, as food exports 
were, for example, during the great Irish famine. 
3. As Caritas—Hong Kong observes, “With a market economy developing, the chances 
that food and non-food donations are sold or bartered increase” (Caritas—Hong Kong 
2005a:11), and “no doubt with more market activities—some cities now have apparently 
oﬃcial bartering centers—the risk that donations are sold or bartered is increasing” (Cari- 
tas—Hong Kong 2005b:4). 
4. The story is complicated by the ability to store food. In this case, the ability to stock- 
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pile will attenuate the impact on market prices, reducing the gains to third-party consumers 
and reducing the losses to cultivators. Just such a case is reported in an interview with a 
defector (Daily North Korea 2006) who describes how a shipment of South Korean food aid 
lowered market prices initially but aid was quickly diverted by the military or bought up by 
speculators with the intention of reselling it at a later point in time. 
5. Certainly the most vociferous in this regard was Fiona Terry, a researcher for MSF, who 
repeatedly invoked refugee interviews to suggest that food was not getting to its intended 
targets but was being diverted (Terry 2001). 
6. As we have seen, the PDS was collapsing for a complex set of reasons that included a 
drop in overall production, regional shortages, farmers’ hoarding and diversion, the break- 
down of the transportation system, the emergence of black markets, and the fact that food 
aid was squeezing out rather than complementing commercial imports. Moreover, the hu- 
manitarian allotments to particular regions constituted only the best guesses of the aid com- 
munity as to what actual needs were. 
7. In reality, the state is presumably factoring in diversion when setting its procurement 
targets. 
8. As observed in chapter 3, the PDS is decentralized, with local oﬃcials coordinating 
supply and demand within their jurisdictions to a signiﬁcant extent. We assume that this bu- 
reaucratic regime more eﬀectively deters diversion to the market of locally procured supply 
than aid. If one relaxes this assumption and posits that locally procured food is also diverted 
to the market, then such diversion will increase the revealed degree of marketization associ- 
ated with that level of diversion. Alternatively, it will imply less diversion associated with a 
particular degree of marketization, since a greater quantity base is subject to diversion. 
 
 
6. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID 
 
1. For a review of this issue from somewhat diﬀerent perspectives, see Cha and Kang 
2003 and Manyin 2005. 
2. Manyin summarizes concisely: “Following North Korea’s invasion of the South in June 
1950, the United States imposed a nearly complete economic embargo on the DPRK. In 
September 1999, President Clinton announced that the United States would ease economic 
sanctions against North Korea aﬀecting most trade and travel. Today, trade and related trans- 
actions are generally allowed for other than dual-use goods (i.e., items that may have both 
civilian and military uses). U.S. citizens may travel to North Korea; there are no restrictions 
on the amount of money one may spend in transit or while there” (2005:27). Nonetheless, 
commercial transactions between the two countries are trivial. 
3. North Korea received heavy oil shipments while light water reactors were being con- 
structed, nominally to compensate for the power lost by the closure of the 5MW(e) reactor 
in Yo˘ngbyo˘n, as well as the cessation of construction of a 50MW(e) reactor in Yo˘ngbyoo˘n 
and a 200MW(e) reactor in T’aech’o˘n under the terms of the Agreed Framework. However 
it is conceived, this aid clearly constituted a major source of support for the North Ko- 
rean economy, which had seen both Soviet/Russian and Chinese supplies of fuel shift from 
friendship prices to hard currency ones. 
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4. These included the conditions that South Korea did not oppose the aid, that previous 
aid had not been diverted, that North Korea’s military stocks had been tapped to address 
the crisis, and that the WFP would guarantee that future aid would not be diverted. On 
this important and still-controversial early history, see Natsios 2001:168–71, 182–86; Noland 
2000:186–87; Flake 2003 (on the NGO community); and Hathaway and Tama 2004 (on 
the legislative politics). 
5. Most notable in this regard were a GAO report in October 1999 and the House of 
Representatives North Korea Advisory Group report of a month later. Both of these reports 
underlined the weakness of the monitoring regime and repeated evidence of various sorts 
that diversion to the military was occurring. 
6. The comment was made in a press conference with Swiss president Adolf Ogi. The 
Swiss were one of the earliest and most generous European providers of aid (Deutsche Presse 
Agentur 2000). 
7. In both cases, the announcements also referred to marginal improvements in North 
Korea’s cooperation with the WFP on access and monitoring. 
8. For criticisms of the legislation from diﬀerent perspectives, see Smith 2004 and particularly 
Chung 2004, which argues (apparently without irony) that “the North Koreans perceive human 
rights as ‘human rights in our own style,’ characterized by socialism and communitarianism. 
From this perspective, freedom of religion and conscience of individuals and political freedom 
can be sacriﬁced to some degree for the sake of the greater good of the majority” (76). 
9. In particular, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) sought to establish the inter- 
national legal authority and military capacity to interdict suspected proliferation eﬀorts. 
The PSI did not directly aﬀect the aid regime but served more as a reminder of hardening 
attitudes toward North Korea among some major aid donors. In addition, the U.S. govern- 
ment took a number of actions to curtail North Korea’s illicit activities, most notably the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency; we take these up in chapter 8. 
10. The most comprehensive treatment of the Japan–North Korea relationship is Hughes 
1999. See also Lind 1997; Hughes 2002, 2005; Manyin 2003, 2005:24; International Crisis 
Group 2005; and Lintner 2005:chap. 7. We are also thankful to Christopher Hughes for his 
comments on this section and to Amanda Hayes and Takeshi Nagasawa. 
11. Crucial in this regard was an unoﬃcial visit by a Liberal Democratic Party–Japan 
Socialist Party delegation led by LDP kingmaker Shin Kanemaru in 1990. On this earlier 
history, see Hughes 1999:51–112. 
12. The size of these remittances has been the subject of substantial speculation, but 
Lintner’s assessment—that they amounted to tens of millions annually through the early 
2000s—seems plausible (2005:162). Hughes 2005 oﬀers more recent estimates, following 
closer investigation of the issue by Japanese authorities, of approximately $32 million in 
2002 falling oﬀ to about $23 million in 2003. In addition to these ﬁnancial ﬂows, Hughes 
2005 estimates that North Korea had defaulted on approximately $900 million of loans to 
Japanese banks in the 1970s. See also Lind 1997. 
13. Japan insisted that the aid extended following normalization in 1965 in no way re- 
ﬂected reparations for damage inﬂicted during World War II but was simply a settlement of 
outstanding property claims. Figures on the order of $10 billion have been ﬂoated in discus- 
sions of a package for North Korea (Noland 2004a). 
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14. For an intriguing account of the political economy of the missile program in North 
Korea, see Pinkston 2003. 
15. From 2002 the Japanese government started to crack down on illicit activities of the 
previously powerful General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren in 
Japanese; Chongryun in Korean), tightened supervision of its aﬃliated credit union, and 
removed some of the organization’s tax privileges. The government gained legal authority 
to control remittances, pressured several banks to limit them, and passed legislation in con- 
junction with the American-led Proliferation Security Initiative eﬀectively to limit North 
Korean maritime connections. Japanese authorities began subjecting North Korean vessels to 
detailed safety inspections that they could not pass and requiring insurance that they could 
not aﬀord. The government also took a variety of trade-related actions, such as requiring 
labeling of North Korean imports as such, a move proposed by those encouraging a boycott. 
See Lintner 2005:chap. 7) and particularly Hughes 2005. 
16. We are indebted to Yeon-kyeong Kim for his research on this section, as well as to exten- 
sive interviews with South Korean oﬃcials and detailed comments from Chung-in Moon. 
17. Figure 5.2 reports data for commercial trade, that is, excluding aid. South Korean 
sources sometimes incorrectly count aid (including items such as U.S.-ﬁnanced heavy oil 
deliveries under the 1994 Agreed Framework) as exports to North Korea. The series reported 
in ﬁgure 5.1 also nets out processing-on-commission (POC) trade, in which components are 
sent to the North for assembly and then reexported. Under normal accounting conventions, 
these reexports are not counted as exports of the processing country. Until recently, however, 
there has been no direct route through which South Korean ﬁrms could ship components 
to the North; everything was trans-shipped via China. As a consequence, there is probably 
some erroneous double-counting of these trans-shipments as Chinese exports to and imports 
from North Korea. 
18. The evolution of South Korea’s aid policy can be tracked through the Ministry of 
Uniﬁcation’s monthly Overview of Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation at www.unikorea. 
go.kr/en/index.jsp. 
19. South Koreans are at the dock when food is delivered, but no distribution plan is de- 
cided in advance; the North Korean authorities provide a distribution plan thirty days after 
food has arrived. Monitoring takes place at a small number of sites by four-person teams 
chosen by the South Koreans from a list provided by their North Korean counterparts. From 
2004 the South Koreans were permitted to station roughly forty people in North Korea. The 
number of visits is low, however; in 2004 the WFP conducted more site visits in a typical 
week than the South Koreans did in the entire year. South Korea does not audit the disposi- 
tion of its aid beyond visual conﬁrmation that rice is indeed stored in the public distribution 
center under inspection. 
20. The following draws on personal communication with Im Wo˘n-hyo˘k, particularly 
on events during 1997. 
21. An accessible introduction to the domestic politics of the Sunshine Policy, emphasiz- 
ing consistent resistance by the opposition Grand National Party, can be found in Levin 
and Han 2002. 
22. For an overview of these eﬀorts see O. Chung 2003. An unexpected by-product of 
this approach to aid has been an increasing number of visits by South Koreans to the North 
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in conjunction with these programs. In 1998 thirty-four people visited, and forty-nine in 
1999. Thereafter, however, the numbers rise and in 2003 exceeded ﬁfteen hundred. This is 
still a relatively small number, of course, but recall that at its peak the WFP only had ﬁfty- 
one resident staﬀ in the whole country. 
23. As early as 1998, members of the Hyundai group committed to payments of nearly $1 
billion over seven years (1998–2005) for the rights to develop tourism at Mount Ku˘ mgang in 
North Korea. In a meeting purportedly held a month before the breakthrough North-South 
summit in 2000, South Korean oﬃcials and a representative of the Hyundai group met 
and promised payments of $500 million to secure business rights for the company in North 
Korea. But this promise was commingled with government money. In February 2003, Kim 
Dae-jung, who had won the Nobel Prize for his policy toward the North, admitted publicly 
that government payments were part of the summit deal and were not legal. Several of his 
aides, including his national security adviser, were eventually convicted, but President No 
Mu-hyo˘n eﬀectively blocked further investigation before it reached Kim personally. 
24. Of particular importance with respect to commercial policy were agreements reached 
in December 2000 on investment guarantees, prevention of double taxation, settlements, 
and conﬂict resolution. As of early 2005, the main cooperation projects were the Mount 
Ku˘ mgang tourism project, the Kaesoo˘ng Industrial Complex, and an ambitious program to 
connect both railroads and roads on the east and west coasts of the peninsula. These projects 
were expanded after June 2005, as we detail below. 
25. It is again important to underscore that this humanitarian assistance was in addition 
to the highly controversial private payments by South Korean groups and the illegal public 
payments. 
26. Good Friends 2005 estimates that 30 percent of aid is diverted to the military and 
another 10 percent to industrial enterprises in the military-industrial complex. The Good 
Friends statement also noted—as we have—that the remainder of the aid is channeled 
through the PDS and thus allocated on the basis of the priorities of those oﬃcials, which 
included workers on major construction projects and railway workers. Last in priority is 
“general” food distribution (3). 
27. These commitments can be seen in the agreement reached following the tenth meet- 
ing of the economic cooperation committee, described in Rhee 2005, which also contains 
quite frank assessments of the continuing limits on commercial relations. 
28. The following draws on overviews of the European aid experience in Berkofsky 2003, 
the EC’s useful “Country Strategy Paper” (European Commission 2001), and recently com- 
pleted evaluation of the ECHO program in Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez 2005. A useful 
overview of the broader EU–North Korean relationship is Frank 2002; we are thankful to 
the author for his comments on this section as well. An outstanding review of the stormy 
relationship between European NGOs and North Korea can be found in Schloms 2003. We 
are particularly thankful for comments by Maria Castillo-Fernandez. 
29. The non-EU European share is accounted for by Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, Poland, Russia, and Switzerland. Russia made its ﬁrst contribution to the WFP 
($10 million) in 2003. 
30. As in South Korea, a certain share of European Commission assistance is channeled 
through NGOs. See Schloms 2003. 
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31. It is striking that the two major European countries that have withheld assistance are 
also the continent’s two nuclear powers. 
32. The political dialogue at the EC level began in December 1998 and with a succes- 
sion of EU parliamentary delegations as well. The new approach was set out in the council 
conclusions of October 9 and November 20, 2000. On the possible role of Europe in the 
security process, see Heiskanen 2003. In January 2003, as the second nuclear crisis was break- 
ing, the European Parliament called on the commission to consider convening a multilateral 
conference on the full range of issues on the peninsula. This approach had roots in earlier 
eﬀorts to deﬁne a role for Europe in Korea but was superseded by political developments. 
33. The Europe Aid Co-Operation Oﬃce was set up in January 2001 to oversee projects 
funded by the EC budget and European Development Fund. 
34. Food aid is not channeled through the ECHO program but through the food security 
budget line; since the report is evaluating ECHO eﬀorts, it does report on food aid issues 
but includes a parenthetical discussion. It is quite possible that monitoring issues are not as 
severe in the functional project areas because of the need for ongoing contact with beneﬁ- 
ciaries and coordination with NGOs. 
35. For example, it ﬁnds that “[there are] particularly positive aspects to the food aid pro- 
gramme that are almost unique to DPRK. These include the implementation of the target- 
ing system through institutions such as nurseries and kindergartens and the local production 
of fortiﬁed food. The targeting system, based on data made available by the government, 
provides WFP with a picture of the groups that require food aid, though not complete ben- 
eﬁciary lists” (Dammers, Fox, and Jimenez 2005:31). 
36. The following draws extensively on Kim 2005 and research by Erik Zhang for a 
project with TaiMing Cheung on China–North Korea economic relations. For broader over- 
views of the relationship, see Scobell 2004; Wu 2005; and International Crisis Group 2006. 
37. Our interviews with Chinese scholars found that they were themselves divided on 
how to interpret this crucial event. Possible economic explanations for this fall-oﬀ are 
continuing shortfalls in Chinese production, conﬂicts over Chinese trade duties, and the 
onset of Chinese disaﬀection with North Korean failure to pay for commodities shipped 
as the crisis deepened. An alternative political explanation, however, is high-level Chinese 
political disaﬀection with Kim Jo˘ng-il and a general deterioration in relations. This disaf- 
fection had two possible sources. One was North Korea’s initial eﬀort to marginalize China 
in the context of the ﬁrst nuclear crisis, a strategy that Kim and Lee 2002 refer to as the 
“two plus zero” approach of dealing directly with the United States. The second source of 
disaﬀection has to do with economic strategy. Premier Li Peng came close to criticizing 
North Korea publicly at the time aid was extended in 1996. Since then, Chinese contempt 
for North Korea’s failure to reform has become increasingly open. See for example, Man- 
sourov 2003. 
38. These numbers do not reﬂect total humanitarian assistance; such assistance might 
reasonably pass through other channels given the capabilities of national aid bureaucracies 
to provide technical assistance. 
39. For a more detailed overview of these issues, see Haggard and Noland 2005 and our 
exchange with the South Korean Ministry of Uniﬁcation on these questions at www.hrnk. 
org/. 
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1. Many of the countries of the former Soviet Union represent hybrid cases in this politi- 
cal aspect, since reforms were launched under largely unreformed Communist parties, albeit 
with some political liberalization. 
2. The data in reported in ﬁgures 7.1 and 7.3 should be viewed with skepticism: there 
would be signiﬁcant conceptual diﬃculties associated with measuring value added in a 
planned socialist economy as distorted as North Korea’s even if one had access to the nor- 
mal complement of data. The Bank of Korea estimate of North Korean national income is 
reportedly constructed by applying South Korean value-added weights to physical estimates 
of North Korean output derived through classiﬁed sources and methods, though a classiﬁed 
North Korean input-output table exists and may have been used to do this computation in 
recent years. This raises a variety of concerns: that the reliance on physical indicators may 
signal an overemphasis on the industrial sector (where output is relatively easy to count) rela- 
tive to the service sector; that prerelease discussions may imply interagency bargaining and a 
politicization of the estimate; and that the methods through which the ﬁgures are derived are 
not subject to independent veriﬁcation. At times, analysts have even questioned the veracity 
of the South Korean estimates. See Noland 2001 for further elaboration. 
3. The amended constitution of 1992 stipulated that the National Defense Commission 
was the supreme command of the military. Kim was “elected” NDC chairman in 1993 and 
reelected in 1998 and again in 2003 by the SPA. 
4. As one would expect, the internal security organization of the DPRK is large and 
complex. In addition to the State Security Department, which provides internal intelligence 
functions, the police are organized on a highly centralized military model in the Ministry of 
People’s Security. Moreover, the regime clearly drew on a large pool of reservists (the Work- 
ers-Peasants Red Guard) for a variety of internal security and economic functions during the 
1990s; Bermudez 2001 estimates the size of this reserve force, made up largely of veterans, at 
over four million (162). Thus, quite apart from the speciﬁc tasks these groups undertake, 
the “military ﬁrst” politics clearly appeals to very large group within society quite apart from 
the regular military forces: reservists, paramilitary groups, intelligence forces, and police. See 
Bermudez 2001 and the excellent study of the Ministry of People’s Security by Chon (2004). 
We are also indebted to Park Syung Je for conversations on this point. 
5. On the refugee problem, see Human Rights Watch 2002; Kim 2002; Charny 2004; Lankov 
2004; and Lee 2004. On the quantitative estimates, see Noland 2000 and KINU 2004. 
6. In 2004 the SPA passed revisions to the criminal code. The revisions could be inter- 
preted as an attempt to bring the penal code in line with the changes that had occurred in 
North Korea over the previous decade, for example, by indicating what kinds of economic 
activity were legal and which were not. Sentencing was also revised, with the categories 
including “unlimited-term correctional labor,” “limited-term correctional labor,” and the 
euphemistically named “labor training” (KINU 2005; Yoon 2005). 
7. A chronology of agricultural reforms derived from North Korean pronouncements 
ﬁnds references to increasing production of various foodstuﬀs through the application of 
the “chuch’e farming method” in every year between 1995 and 2000 (Kwon and Kim 2003: 
table 2). 
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8. These changes were preceded by constitutional revisions in 1998 that introduced such 
concepts as private property and proﬁt, if in the context of an otherwise thoroughly ortho- 
dox elaboration of a planned socialist economy, and a comprehensive law on central plan- 
ning enacted the following year that criminalized nonsanctioned economic activities (Lim 
and Kim 2004). See Noland 2004b, Kim and Choi 2005, and Frank 2005a for comprehen- 
sive evaluations of the policy changes and speculation about the possible reasons for their 
introduction. The Kaeso˘ng Industrial Complex was the most obvious example of the tactic 
of establishing special zones. Pyongyang’s botched rapprochement with Tokyo, described in 
the previous chapter, is the most obvious example of aid seeking. 
9. One member of a delegation that visited the Mansﬁeld Foundation in Washington, 
D.C., in late 2002 made this explicit: “If the oﬃcial price of grain is the same as in the 
markets, people will have no incentive to sell grain in the markets.” 
10. For example, in March 2003, Kang Kyoo˘ng-sun, director of North Korea’s State Price 
Determination Bureau, declared “80% of the standard wage will be guaranteed if 80% of the 
plan is achieved, and 200% of the wages will be guaranteed if 200% of the plan is achieved” 
(quoted in Kim and Choi 2005:16). 
11. In a currency reform, residents are required to turn in their existing holdings—subject 
to a ceiling—for newly issued notes; the ceiling on the ability to convert is what makes such 
reforms conﬁscatory. In July 2002, the blue won (“foreigner’s won”) foreign-exchange certiﬁ- 
cates were replaced by the normal brown (“people’s”) won, though it is unclear if the latter were 
formally convertible into foreign currency. The other shoe dropped in December 2002, when 
the authorities prohibited dollar holdings and required that all residents, foreign and domestic 
alike, would have to exchange dollars for euros, which the central bank in fact did not have. 
12. Echoing the monetary theory of Chicago-school bluesman Willie Dixon, who, ob- 
serving the likenesses on American paper currency, opined, “Everybody loves them dead 
presidents,” one North Korean refugee in China was reported to have expressed its interna- 
tional ﬁnance equivalent: “[George] Washington is better than Kim Il-so˘ng.” 
13. According to the South Korean government, despite the government’s December 
2002 announcement prohibiting the use of U.S. dollars, most foreign exchange in North 
Korea is held in this currency, with the remainder roughly divided between Japanese yen 
and Chinese yuan. 
14. It could vary for other reasons such as the risk or penalties associated with what is 
technically criminal behavior. 
15. Frank (2005b), on the basis of casual observations in Pyongyang, concluded that be- 
tween July 2002 and October 2005, the annual rate of inﬂation was roughly 215 percent; Y. 
Kwon (2006) estimates it at more than 300 percent annually since August 2002. 
16. According to Lim and Kim 2004, lenders are typically backed by organizations such 
as the Korean People’s Army or the People’s Security Agency for obvious reasons relating to 
the collection of debts. 
17. To reiterate an earlier warning, this data should be viewed with caution. There are 
signiﬁcant conceptual diﬃculties associated with measurement, and the South Korean au- 
thorities derive their estimates from unknown sources and methods. 
18. Kim 2005a, b, c, d) and Kim 2006 provide fascinating examples of the symbiotic 
relationship among entrepreneurs, their patron SOEs, and the parasitic state oﬃcials who 
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regulate economic activity. Indeed, Kim 2005a documents how, at least in some cases, entre- 
preneurs who aﬃliated with government oﬃces received preferential tax treatment. 
19. The discussion in Y. H. Chung (2003) suggests that purchases of the bonds may be 
compulsory. According to another account, while purchases are not mandatory, the authori- 
ties use purchases as “a barometer of the buyers’ loyalty and support for the party and the 
state” (ITAR-Tass 2003). 
20. See Seckler 1980 for the original exposition of this now discredited hypothesis and 
Pelto and Pelto 1989, Martorell 1989, and Beaton 1989 for critiques. 
21. The 1998 survey reports the worst outcomes on nutritional status, and it would have 
been desirable to compare the sample means of subsequent surveys to those obtained in 
1998. Unfortunately, the WFP was unwilling to supply the comparable data, making evalua- 
tion of changes over time—either positive or negative—in this particular dimension impos- 
sible to assess. 
22. In traditional Korean society, a baby is considered to be one at birth. It could be 
that there was cultural miscommunication among the North Korean anthropometrists, the 
North Korean respondents, and the foreign participants from the UN agencies and the EU 
who, given North Korean practices, could be assumed not to speak Korean. This could have 
led to misinterpretation of parental responses to questions about the children’s ages, resulting 
in a systematic overestimation of the ages of the children in their sample, hence the shocking 
ﬁgures on the age-related measures. However, the questionnaire asks for both the date of 
birth and the age in months and years; it should have been possible for the enumerators to 
maintain internal consistency. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
1.  G.  Kang  (2005)  sets  out  the  case  for  prosecuting  Kim  Jo˘ng-il  in  the  International 
Criminal Court. 
2. As Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) observe, additional institutional changes, such as 
the maintenance of a dual price system in the context of reforms of the central planning 
mechanism, might have yielded additional beneﬁts, and some argue that a similar process 
of growing around the plan is under way now in North Korea (e.g., Lim 2006), though we 
suspect that macroeconomic instability is so great and the planning mechanism so degraded 
in contemporary North Korea that this channel is unlikely to produce large eﬀects. 
3. These considerations were reinforced in economies like Russia’s by the excessive spatial 
dispersion of economic activity and the prevalence of company towns, which reduced the 
opportunities for alternative employment or access to alternative networks of support. 
4. Among such programs have been a variety of Chinese technical support programs, 
U.S.-supported legal training conducted in China, and Vietnamese programs on economic 
reform, as well as Swedish-supported economic policy training programs conducted in Viet- 
nam. Australia has supported an economics educational initiative, and the EU has supported 
visits to North Korea by a number of former economic policy makers from its new Central 
European members. 
5. Rather, it has favored technical assistance and training that can be gained under highly 
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controlled circumstances. Although the impact of these sorts of programs and exchanges is 
diﬃcult to document, they are potentially important not only in the design of reforms but 
in negotiating with foreigners, whether in the international ﬁnancial institutions or in the 
private sector. Yet while such interactions might be helpful in the long run, China intro- 
duced its reforms without access to such supports, and indeed we can attest from personal 
experience that at least through the mid-1980s some senior Chinese oﬃcials betrayed very 
hazy notions of the operations of a market economy. This interpretation of what has gone 
wrong to date may have a relatively hopeful interpretation. 
6. On the one hand, some foreign visitors have hypothesized a hard-liner/reformer split 
in the government, with military leaders at the core of the hard line (Harrison 2002). These 
groups see little point in engaging the United States and other parties on the nuclear issue, 
prioritize spending on the military over the reform process, and favor tight economic as well 
as political controls. These arguments have been deployed in support of deeper engagement 
with the country—which we support—yet we have some doubt about their veracity. In par- 
ticular, it is almost certain that the emerging market economy is deeply penetrated by state 
actors of various sorts, including the military; no other groups would be able to engage in 
large-scale trade or control substantial foreign exchange. 
7. In December 2004, President No Mu-hyo˘n observed, “The Chinese government is 
providing assistance to the North because it will be completely out of control if a serious 
political crisis happens in North Korea and refugees literally pour into Chinese territory. 
South Korea doesn’t want to see the North Korean government collapsing either because 
that situation would lead to a huge inﬂux of North Korean refugees. For this reason, China 
and South Korea are in a kind of desperate position to help the North pursue reform and 
opening” (Kim 2004). See also Shin, Chun, and Ser 2005. The South Korean public appears 
ambivalent on this score: a 2005 poll conducted by the East Asia Institute found declining 
interest in uniﬁcation; more than 30 percent of those surveyed were unwilling to pay any ad- 
ditional taxes to support uniﬁcation, while another 40 percent were willing to pay less than 
$100 a year to support North Korea’s development before uniﬁcation (N. Lee 2005). 
8. Despite its popularity in discussions of North Korea, the term “collapse” does not 
have any clear meaning in economics beyond some unspeciﬁed but large decline in overall 
output. By any threshold, the North Korean economy certainly collapsed in the 1990s. The 
term does not have a precise meaning in political science, either. It is most plausibly invoked 
in a revolutionary setting in which an incumbent regime is altogether incapable of maintain- 
ing political and social control and is replaced by a challenger or nominally maintains power 
but in the context of sustained civil conﬂict or war, so-called state failure. It is not a good 
metaphor for political changes that occur as a result of challenges from within the regime, 
such as a coup d’état, or from some other sort of evolutionary change. 
9. These judgments were aﬃrmed by the one attempt we know of to model the process 
of transition formally; see Bueno de Mesquita and Mo 1997. Employing a repeated game 
model calibrated to 1996 that predicted outcomes on the basis of the potential power of each 
actor, each actor’s policy positions, and the salience each ascribed to the issue of political 
reform, the authors concluded that “Kim Jo˘ng-il’s hold on power is tenuous” (26) and that 
North Korea was entering “a period of signiﬁcant political instability” (25). See also Collins 
1996 and Pollack and Lee 1999. 
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10. When forty-eight analysts were queried in a poll conducted by Lee Young-sun in 1995 
about the prospects for Korean uniﬁcation through a North Korean collapse and its absorp- 
tion by the South, the modal response (29 percent) was that such change would occur in 
the period 2001–2005, with cumulatively 40 percent of respondents expecting it to transpire 
by this time, and 60 percent expecting it by 2010 (Lee 1995). A similar survey the following 
year undertaken by the Joongang Ilbo found that 16 percent expected North Korean col- 
lapse within ﬁve years (i.e., by 2001), while an additional 28 percent expected it to occur by 
2006. Only one of the ﬁfty respondents doubted that North Korea would ever collapse. An 
informal poll of another group of scholars in September 1997 reached a similar conclusion: 
roughly one-third of the participants expected North Korea’s collapse within ﬁve years (i.e., 
by 2002), with the remainder splitting between those expecting the maintenance of a “hard” 
state and those anticipating signiﬁcant reform (Noland 1998). 
11. To reiterate the cautions from chapter 7, the South Korean estimates of North Korean 
activity should be regarded as rough guesses: the North Koreans to do not report the relevant 
underlying data, and there are enormous conceptual and measurement challenges associated 
with inferring it from the outside. See Noland 2001 for further discussion. 
12. Many of these were oil exporters, and their declining fortunes were therefore expli- 
cable in terms of commodity price movements rather than general policy failings. 
13. Becker (2005:197–202) provides a useful catalog of these incidents, although he in- 
cludes antiregime behavior that might have largely economic motives such as stripping of 
state assets. 
14. A 2004 survey of two hundred recent defectors found that for 19 percent foreign radio 
broadcasts such as Korea Broadcasting System Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and Radio 
Free Asia were their main source of news. Twenty-one percent knew someone who had mod- 
iﬁed his or her North Korean ﬁxed-tuner radios to listen to foreign broadcasts, and more 
than half reported knowing someone who had been punished for listening to unauthorized 
broadcasts. None reported receiving information through foreign newspapers. There is no 
way of knowing how representative these defectors are of the general public. 
15. See Martin 2004:545 for a defector account of a plot within the Ministry of the Peo- 
ple’s Armed Forces dating to 1989. Oberdorfer 1997:375 and Becker 2005:199–201 report on a 
plot within the Korean army’s Sixth Corps, headquartered not coincidentally in Ch’o˘ngjin 
in the northeast and taking place at the height of the famine in 1995; the oﬀending units were 
purged, disbanded, and merged. 
16. There are other historical precedents, of course, including the Meiji Restoration and 
the founding of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal; in both of these circumstances as 
well, revolutionary changes were justiﬁed as responses to external threats. 
17. The new constitution clearly weakened the institutional status of the Korean Work- 
ers’ Party, a marked contrast to the Chinese model. Choi is worth quoting at length on this 
point, since his assessment is still true as of 2006: 
A party congress has not been held since the sixth party congress in 1980. According 
to the Party Act, a party congress is supposed to be held every ﬁve years. The ple- 
num of the Central Committee has not been held since the twenty-ﬁrst plenum in 
December 1993. The plenum, which has the right to elect the secretary-general, was 
not held even when Kim Jo˘ng-il became the party’s secretary-general in October 1997. 
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Instead, Kim Jo˘ng-il was endorsed by both the Central Committee and the Central 
Military Committee. For the ﬁrst time in the history of North Korea’s communist 
party, a plenum also was not held before the ﬁrst session of the 10th SPA. It is also 
suspected that Secretariat and Politburo meetings have not been held since Kim Il- 
so˘ng’s death. (1999:9) 
18. Hellman 1998 was the ﬁrst to make the point. Pei 2006 elaborates it in the context of 
the Chinese case. 
19. This discussion draws extensively on the thorough treatment of the international legal 
issues in Amnesty International 2004. 
20. As we noted in chapter 5 and want to underline again here, the ethical issues sur- 
rounding diversion to the military are not straightforward. The North Korean army is a 
conscript force, and we have ample evidence that lower-level military personnel have not 
received adequate rations in the past. 
21. The modest improvement in nutritional status that we detail in chapter 7 does not 
mean that delivered aid is ineﬀective; it only demonstrates the uphill battle the humanitarian 
community must ﬁght in a context where other features of the system make it diﬃcult to be 
eﬀective. In the absence of food aid, nutrition status would certainly have been worse still. 
22. Given that most food aid passes through oﬃcial channels, we have not addressed the 
outstanding and innovative work by the variety of NGOs that have worked in North Korea. 
A handful of inﬂuential organizations have taken the decision to leave; others have stayed 
in the hope of continuing to do eﬀective work. A number of them have adopted innovative 
strategies that manage to provide assistance while also serving to advance the cause of basic 
human rights and the empowerment of the people whom they serve. To the extent that 
NGOs focus not only on their humanitarian mission but also on the empowerment of their 
constituencies, their activities constitute a low-proﬁle channel of social transformation. 
23. U.S. importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the U.S. 
Treasury’s Oﬃce of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North 
Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condi- 
tion, approval is routine. U.S. government oﬃcials report that they receive only a handful 
of such requests each year. The relaxation of sanctions tied to a speciﬁc political agreement 
is intentionally reversible: the trade restrictions remain oﬀ as long as North Korea maintains 
the missile moratorium; if missile testing is resumed, sanctions could be reimposed. 
24. Probably the most important of these are restrictions on the sale of potential military- 
use items under the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement to which both the United States 
and South Korea are parties. Under the existing regulations, South Korean ﬁrms attempting 
to establish operations in Kaeso˘ng initially encountered diﬃculty outﬁtting their establish- 
ments with basic computer and telecommunications equipment, though the incumbent 
ﬁrms appear to have surmounted this obstacle. 
25. Even if the DPRK should obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify 
it as a nonmarket economy and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese 
template. 
26. With respect to narcotics, the State Department has declined to list the DPRK as a 
major producer or traﬃcker in illicit drugs, so this provision at present is not binding. The 
DPRK government is probably the world’s worst abuser of human rights, and it would be 
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hard to certify North Korean human rights practices under any meaningful criteria. But 
under current U.S. law, the executive probably can act with more discretion with respect 
to the human rights requirements than those relating to other concerns. Labor practices at 
the Kaeso˘ng Industrial Complex have already emerged as a subject of controversy in the 
proposed U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (Yonhap 2006). 
27. Under a law enacted when U.S. airplanes were regularly hijacked to Cuba, the pro- 
vision of sanctuary to hijackers is one of the speciﬁc legal triggers for U.S. opposition to 
international ﬁnancial institution lending. 
28. In particular, Cha draws on power transition theories to suggest that there are plau- 
sible conditions under which North Korea could be tempted to launch a preemptive strike 
despite its weakness. Yet, as he admits, the conditions under which this would occur are 
when North Korea believes with a high probability that it will be forced to ﬁght in the future 
on worse terms than it would ﬁght in the present, a parameter determined almost entirely 
by North Korea’s perception of external threats. 
29. The fundamental military problems include lack of knowledge about the precise loca- 
tion of weapons and facilities but even more important the forward-deployment of North 
Korean military forces, the vulnerability of Seoul to conventional attack, and the corre- 
sponding South Korean resistance to military options. 
30. The staunchest defenders of this position have been Leon Sigal (e.g., Sigal 1998) and 
Selig Harrison (2002). See also Cumings 2003:43–102 and McCormack 2004. 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
1. Of particular importance is the outstanding monograph by Sheena Chestnut, “ ‘The 
Soprano State’ ” (2005), which does the service of collating information from a wide range 
of public sources. 
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